C. Alienation of Property
I can alienate my property, since it is mine only insofar as I place my will in it — so that I may release my thing altogether from myself as ownerless (derelict) or surrender it to another’s will to be possessed — but only insofar as the thing is, by its nature, an external thing.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), §§ 407–408:
§ 407. 3) The subjective and contingent side of property is the thing, which is in general something external, immediate, and that I place my will into this thing. The aspect of the predicate of mine, which I have given it, is interest, and my will, in accordance with this, is arbitrary will, such that I can just as well place it therein, or not, and can withdraw it, or not; – right, in its absoluteness, is at the same time, from the side of reality, a formal one.
§ 408. Insofar, however, as my will lies in a thing, only I myself can withdraw it, and it can pass to another only with my will, whose property it likewise becomes only with his will; – contract.
Not a consuming sublation, but rather separation in general. Interest on account of the following § determinations. In alienation, a property emerges that only comes into being as such – becomes so only in the expression and in relation to the alienation. Taking possession, which is use.
I can take a thing into possession, make it my property, because it – according to its truth, its concept – is a thing – I and the other have done something contrary to the nature of the thing. Only insofar as I have taken possession of myself – am not a slave – can I have private right against another, and he against me. – I am not a selfless thing, but rather [my] own will, which can dispose over me before all else – that this is an absolutely, wholly necessary condition –
If I make myself a slave, then I do the opposite of myself – to be a free will that is none – not to be a free will is [then] my free will. Free will is only that which has itself as its content.
Ethical life, religion – free self-consciousness of my identity with that which is absolute in me, substantial, essence – the thinking [element], intellectual – only insofar am I a thinking being – a human being – cannot make myself into an other than I am –
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 492:
§ 492. The subjective and contingent side of property is that I place my will into this thing; in this respect my will is arbitrary will, such that I can just as well place it therein, or not, and can withdraw it, or not. Insofar, however, as my will lies in a thing, only I myself can withdraw it, and it can pass to another only with my will, whose property it likewise becomes only with his will; – contract.
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 492:
§ 492. The contingent side of property is that I place my will into this thing; in this respect my will is arbitrary will, such that I can just as well place it therein or not, and can withdraw it or not. Insofar, however, as my will lies in a thing, only I myself can withdraw it, and it can pass to another only with my will, whose property it likewise becomes only with his will; – contract.
If prescription is an alienation with a will not directly declared, then true alienation is a declaration of the will that I no longer wish to regard the thing as mine. The whole matter can also be grasped in such a way that alienation is a true taking possession. Immediate taking of possession is the first moment of property; through use, property is likewise acquired, and the third moment is then the unity of both, taking possession through alienation.
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