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The subjective [aspect] of poverty, and of want of every kind in general — to which every individual is already exposed, even within his natural sphere — also requires a subjective help, in respect both of the particular circumstances and of disposition and love. This is the place where, amid all universal arrangements, morality finds enough to do. But because this help, in itself and in its effects, depends on contingency, the endeavour of society goes toward discovering and arranging what is universal in [cases of] want and its relief, and toward making that [subjective] help more dispensable.

The contingency of almsgiving, of endowments, such as the burning of lamps before images of saints, and so on, is supplemented by public poorhouses, hospitals, street lighting, and so on. Enough remains for charity to do on its own account; and it is a mistaken view when charity wishes to reserve this relief of want solely to the particularity of disposition, and to the contingency of its own attitude and knowledge, and feels itself injured and offended by obligatory universal arrangements and precepts. On the contrary, the public condition is to be regarded as the more perfect, the less is left over for the individual, according to his own particular opinion, to do on his own account, in comparison with what is arranged in a universal manner.