Author: wbauer

167

Marriage is essentially monogamy, because it is personality — immediate, exclusive singularity — that enters into and gives itself over to this relationship; its truth and inwardness (the subjective form of substantiality) therefore arise only from the reciprocal, undivided devotion of this personality. This [personality] comes into its right, of being conscious of itself in…
168

Further, because it is this infinitely self-proper personality of the two sexes from whose free devotion marriage proceeds, it must not be concluded within a circle already naturally identical, already acquainted, and, in all its particulars, familiar to itself — a circle in which the individuals do not have, over against one another, a personality…
169

The family, as a person, has its external reality in a property, in which it has the existence of its substantial personality only in the form of resources.
170

B. The Family’s Resources The family has not merely property, but, for it as a universal and continuing person, there arises the need and the determination of a permanent and secure possession — of resources. The arbitrary moment, in abstract property, of the particular need of the merely single individual, and the self-seeking of desire,…
171

The family, as a legal person against others, is to be represented by the man as its head. Further, it is he to whom acquisition from without, care for its needs, and the disposition and administration of the family’s resources chiefly belong. These resources are common property, so that no member of the family has…
172

Through a marriage a new family constitutes itself, which is something self-subsistent for itself over against the stocks or houses from which it proceeded; the connection with these has natural blood relationship as its basis, but the new family has ethical love [as its basis]. The property of an individual therefore also stands in essential…
173

C. The Upbringing of Children and the Dissolution of the Family In the children, the unity of the marriage — which, as substantial, is only inwardness and disposition, but which, as existing, is separated within the two subjects — becomes, as unity, itself an existence and an object that is for itself, one that they…
174

Children have the right to be nourished and brought up out of the family’s common resources. The parents’ right to the services of the children, as services, is grounded in, and limited by, the common concern of the family in general. Likewise, the parents’ right over the arbitrary will of the children is determined by…
175

Children are in themselves free, and their life is the immediate existence solely of this freedom; they do not, therefore, belong to others, nor to their parents, as things. Their upbringing has, with respect to the family relationship, the positive determination that the ethical be brought, within them, to an immediate feeling still free of…
176

Because marriage is, at first, only the immediate ethical Idea, and thus has its objective actuality in the inwardness of subjective disposition and feeling, there lies in this the first contingency of its existence. Just as little as compulsion can take place to enter into marriage, just as little is there otherwise a merely legal,…
177

The ethical dissolution of the family consists in this: that the children, brought up to free personality, are, upon reaching their majority, recognized as legal persons, capable, in part, of having free property of their own, and, in part, of founding families of their own — the sons as heads, the daughters as wives —…
178

The natural dissolution of the family through the death of the parents, in particular of the man, has as its consequence inheritance with respect to the resources — an entry, by its essence, into the peculiar possession of resources that were, in themselves, held in common; an entry that becomes the more indeterminate, with the…
179

Through this falling apart there arises the freedom for the arbitrary will of individuals, in part, in general, to employ their resources more according to the liking, opinions, and purposes of their own particularity, and, in part, to regard, as it were, a circle of friends, acquaintances, and so on, in place of a family,…
180

The principle that the members of the family become self-subsistent legal persons (§ 177) allows something of this arbitrariness and distinction, among the natural heirs, to enter within the circle of the family — but it can take place only within the strictest limits, so as not to violate the fundamental relationship. The merely direct…
181

Transition of the Family into Civil Society The family disintegrates, in a natural way, and essentially through the principle of personality, into a plurality of families, which conduct themselves, in general, as self-subsistent concrete persons, and thus externally toward one another. Or: the moments bound together in the unity of the family, as the ethical…
182

Second Section. Civil Society The concrete person, who is, to himself, a particular purpose, as a whole of needs and a mixture of natural necessity and arbitrary will, is the one principle of civil society; but the particular person, as essentially in relation to other such particularity, is such that each makes itself count and…
183

The self-seeking purpose, in its actualization, so conditioned by universality, grounds a system of all-round dependence, such that the subsistence and welfare of the individual, and his rightful existence, are interwoven with the subsistence, welfare, and right of all, are grounded on this, and are actual and secured only within this context. — This system…
184

The Idea, in this its division, grants to its moments a peculiar existence — to particularity the right to develop and range itself over all sides, and to universality the right to prove itself the ground and necessary form of particularity, as well as the power over it and its ultimate purpose. — It is…
185

Particularity, for itself, on the one hand, as the satisfaction of its needs, of contingent arbitrary will, and of subjective liking, indulging itself in every direction, destroys itself and its substantial concept in its enjoyments; on the other hand, as infinitely excited, and, in its thoroughgoing dependence on external contingency and arbitrary will as well…
186

But the principle of particularity, precisely in that it develops itself, for itself, into totality, passes over into universality, and has its truth, and the right of its positive actuality, solely in this. This unity, which, on account of the self-subsistence of both principles at this standpoint of division (§ 184), is not [yet] the…