grundlinien.de

299

These matters are more closely determined, in relation to individuals, according to two sides: α) what accrues to them through the state and which they are to enjoy, and β) what they have to render to it. Under the former are comprised the laws of private right in general, the rights of communities and corporations, and wholly universal arrangements, and, indirectly (§ 298), the constitution as a whole. What is to be rendered, however, can be determined in a just manner, and at the same time in such a way that the particular labours and services which the individual can perform are mediated by his arbitrary will, only by being reduced to money, as the existing universal value of things and of services.

What is to be the object of universal legislation, and what is to be left to the determination of the administrative authorities and to the regulation of government in general, can indeed be distinguished, in general, in such a way that only what is wholly universal in content, the legal determinations, falls to the former, while the particular and the manner of execution falls to the latter. But this distinction is not thereby fully determinate, since a law, in order to be a law and not a mere command in general (like “thou shalt not kill,” cf. the Remark to § 140), must be determinate in itself, and the more determinate it is, the more its content approaches the capacity to be executed just as it stands. At the same time, however, a determination going this far would give the laws an empirical side, which would have to be subject to alteration in actual execution — something that would detract from the character of laws. It lies in the organic unity of the powers of the state itself that it is one spirit which fixes the universal and which brings it to its determinate actuality and executes it. — It may at first seem striking that, of the many skills, possessions, activities, talents, and the infinitely manifold living resources they contain, which are at the same time bound up with disposition, the state demands no direct performance, but claims only the one resource that appears as money. — The services relating to the defence of the state against enemies belong only to the duty of the following division. In fact, however, money is not a particular resource alongside the others, but is their universal, in so far as they produce themselves into the externality of existence, in which they can be grasped as a thing. Only at this most external point is quantitative determinacy, and hence the justice and equality of the services, possible. — Plato, in his state, has the individuals allotted to the particular estates by their superiors and imposes on them their particular services (cf. Remark to § 185); in the feudal monarchy, vassals likewise had to render indeterminate services, but also in their particularity — for example, the office of judge, and so on; the services in the Orient, in Egypt, for the immense architectural works and so forth, are likewise of a particular quality. In these relations, the principle of subjective freedom is lacking — namely, that the substantial activity of the individual, which in such services is in any case particular in its content, should be mediated by his particular will — a right that is possible only through the demand for services in the form of universal value, and that is the ground which has brought about this transformation.

DE

Comments

2 responses to “299”

  1. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    The two sides of the constitution relate to the rights and the services of individuals. As for the services, they now almost all reduce themselves to money. Military duty is now almost the only personal service. In earlier times the concrete abilities of individuals were drawn upon far more, and they were called upon to work according to their skill. Among us the state buys what it needs, and this may at first appear abstract, dead, and unfeeling, and it may also look as though the state had thereby been degraded, in that it contents itself with abstract services. But it lies in the principle of the modern state that everything the individual does be mediated through his will. Through money, however, the justice of equality can be carried out far better. The talented person would otherwise be taxed more heavily than the untalented, if it depended on concrete ability. But it is precisely through this that respect for subjective freedom is displayed, in that one lays hold of someone only at the point where he can be laid hold of.

  2. Karl Marx Avatar
    Karl Marx

    On this determination of the objects of legislative power, Hegel himself remarks in the Remark to this paragraph:

    »What is to be the object of universal legislation and what is to be left to the determination of the administrative authorities and the regulation of government in general can, in general, be distinguished thus: that into the former falls only what, in respect of content, is wholly universal, the legal determinations, while into the latter falls the particular and the manner of execution. But this distinction is not made fully determinate even by this, that the law, in order to be a law and not a mere command in general (such as: »thou shalt not kill« […]), must be determinate in itself; but the more determinate it is, the more its content approaches the capacity of being carried out. At the same time, however, a determination going this far would give the laws an empirical side which would have to be subject to alteration in actual execution, which would do damage to the character of laws. It lies in the organic unity of the powers of the state itself that it is one spirit which establishes the universal and which brings it to its determinate actuality and carries it out.«

    But it is precisely this organic unity that Hegel has not constructed. The various powers have a different principle. They are, at the same time, fixed actuality. To flee from their actual conflict into the imaginary »organic unity«, instead of having developed them as moments of an organic unity, is therefore an empty, mystical evasion.

    The first unresolved collision was that between the whole constitution and the legislative power. The second is that between the legislative and the governmental power, between the law and its execution.

    The second determination of the paragraph is that the only service the state demands of individuals is money.

    The grounds Hegel adduces for this are:

    1. money is the existing universal value of things and of services;
    2. what is to be rendered can be determined in a just manner only through this reduction;
    |262| 3. only in this way can the service be determined in such a manner that the particular labors and services which the individual can render are mediated through his own arbitrary choice.

    Hegel remarks in the Remark:

    ad 1. »It may at first seem striking, in the state, that of the many skills, possessions, activities, talents, and the infinitely manifold living capacities bound up with them — which are at the same time bound up with disposition — the state demands no direct service, but claims only the one capacity that appears as money. — Services relating to the defense of the state against enemies belong first to the duty of the following division« (not the following division, but for other reasons we shall come only later to the personal duty of military service).

    »In fact, however, money is not a particular capacity alongside the others, but is the universal of them, insofar as they produce themselves into the externality of existence in which they can be grasped as a thing.« »Among us«, it says further in the Addition, »the state buys what it needs.«

    ad. 2. »Only at this most external point« (namely, where capacities produce themselves into the externality of existence in which they can be grasped as a thing) »is quantitative determinacy, and hence the justice and equality of services, possible.« The Addition says: »But through money the justice of equality can be far better carried through.« »Otherwise the talented person would be taxed more heavily than the untalented, if it depended on concrete capacity.«

    ad. 3. »Plato, in his state, has the individuals allotted to the particular estates by the rulers and has their particular services imposed on them […]; in the feudal monarchy, vassals likewise had to render indeterminate services, but also in their particularity, e.g. the office of judge etc.; the services in the Orient, in Egypt, for the immense architectural works etc., are likewise of a particular quality etc. In these relations the principle of subjective freedom is lacking, namely that the substantial activity of the individual — which in such services is in any case, as regards its content, something particular — should be mediated through his particular will; a right which is possible only through the requiring of services in the form of universal value, and which is the ground that has brought about this transformation.« The Addition says: »Among us the state buys what it needs, and this may at first seem abstract, dead, and unfeeling, and it may also look as though the state had thereby sunk down to satisfying itself with abstract services. But it lies in the principle« of the modern state »that everything the individual does should be mediated through his will.« … »But now precisely through this, respect for subjective freedom is displayed, in that one lays hold of someone only at the point at which he can be laid hold of.«

    Do what you will. Pay what you owe.

    The opening of the Addition reads:

    »The two sides of the constitution relate to the rights and the services of individuals. As for services, they now nearly all reduce themselves to money. Military duty is now nearly the only personal service left.«

Leave a Reply