Introduction – grundlinien.de

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Sat, 01 Jun 2024 07:50:00 +0000

The philosophical science of right has as its object the “The idea in general is nothing other than the concept, the reality of the concept, and the unity of both.“ (Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics, p. 145) of “This reality in general, as the existence of the free will, is right, which is to be taken comprehensively not only as limited legal right, but as the existence of all determinations of…

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Sat, 01 Jun 2024 07:40:00 +0000

The science of right is a part of philosophy. |4| It has, therefore, to develop the Idea—which is the reason of an object—out of the Concept, or, what is the same thing, to watch its own, immanent development of the matter itself. As a part, it has a determinate starting point, which is the result and the truth of what precedes it and what constitutes its so-called proof. The Concept of Right…

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Sat, 01 Jun 2024 07:30:00 +0000

Right is positive in general: a) through the form of having validity within a state; this legal authority is the principle for the knowledge of right, the subject of positive jurisprudence. b) In terms of content, this right receives a positive element α) through the particular national character of a people, the stage of its historical development, and the interconnectedness of all those…

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Sat, 01 Jun 2024 07:20:00 +0000

The ground of right is the realm of spirit in general; its more precise location and point of departure is the will, which is free, so that freedom constitutes its substance and determination, and the system of right is the realm of actualized freedom, the world of spirit produced from within itself as a second nature. …

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Sat, 01 Jun 2024 07:10:00 +0000

The will contains α) the element of pure indeterminacy or of the pure reflection of the ego into itself, in which every limitation, every content immediately present by nature, needs, desires, and drives, or given and determined by any means whatsoever, is dissolved; the boundless infinity of absolute abstraction or universality, the pure thinking of itself.

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Sat, 01 Jun 2024 07:00:00 +0000

β) Likewise, the I is the transition from undifferentiated indeterminacy to differentiation, determining, and the positing of a determinacy as a content and object. — Whether this content is further given by nature or produced from the concept of spirit, through this positing of itself as something determinate, the I enters into existence in general; — the absolute moment of the finitude or…

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Sat, 01 Jun 2024 06:50:00 +0000

γ) |19| The will is the unity of these two moments; — particularity reflected into itself and thereby brought back to universality; — individuality; the self-determination of the I, at once to posit itself as the negative of itself, namely as determinate and limited, and yet to remain with itself, i.e., in its identity with itself and its universality, and in this determination to join together…

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Sat, 01 Jun 2024 06:40:00 +0000

The further determination of particularization (β. § 6) constitutes the difference between the forms of the will: a) insofar as the determinacy is the formal opposition of the subjective and objective as an external, immediate existence, this is the formal will as self-consciousness, which finds an external world before it and, as the individuality returning into itself within its determinacy…

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Sat, 01 Jun 2024 06:30:00 +0000

b) Insofar as the determinations of the will are the will’s own—its particularization reflected into itself in general—they are “The asunderness of the world of appearance is totality and is entirely contained in its relation-to-self. The relation of appearance to itself is thus completely determined, having form within itself and, because of this identity, as an essential subsistence. Thus…

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Sat, 01 Jun 2024 06:20:00 +0000

This content, or the distinct determination of the will, is in the first instance immediate. Thus the will is free only in itself, or for us, or it is the will in general in its concept. Only when the will has itself as its object1 is it for itself what it is in itself.

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