“Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline”, 3rd edition, Heidelberg 1830, Philosophy of Spirit, Third Section. Text after the Werkausgabe (vol. 10), in our own English translation. The reading group reads §§ 553–571; §§ 572–577 on philosophy conclude the system and are therefore included here.
Print version (PDF, German): to print and take along – with a wide margin for your own notes.
In the notes, “Werkausgabe:” precedes remarks by the editors, “Hegel’s footnote.” precedes Hegel’s own notes, and “Deleted in the manuscript:” precedes text that Hegel himself struck out.
Contents
Introduction: § 553 · § 554 · § 555
A. Art: § 556 · § 557 · § 558 · § 559 · § 560 · § 561 · § 562 · § 563
B. The Revealed Religion: § 564 · § 565 · § 566 · § 567 · § 568 · § 569 · § 570 · § 571
C. Philosophy: § 572 · § 573 · § 574 · § 575 · § 576 · § 577
Third Section: Absolute Spirit
Cross-reference: The Groundlines themselves name the triad of art, religion and philosophy in § 341 and § 360. Immediately before this section stands Enc. § 552 with Hegel’s long Remark on religion and the state, on the page on objective spirit. In the Groundlines the same theme is treated by the Remark to § 270.
§ 553
The concept of spirit has its reality in spirit. That this reality, in identity with that concept, be the knowing of the absolute Idea – herein lies the necessary side that intelligence, free in itself, be liberated in its actuality to its concept, in order to be the shape worthy of it. Subjective and objective spirit are to be regarded as the path on which this side of reality or existence develops.
§ 554
Absolute spirit is identity that is as much eternally within itself as returning and returned into itself; the one and universal substance as spiritual, the judgement into itself and into a knowing for which it is as such. Religion, as this highest sphere may in general be designated, is to be regarded as much as proceeding from the subject and residing in it as proceeding objectively from absolute spirit, which as spirit is in its community.
That here, and that in general, faith is not opposed to knowing, but that faith is rather a knowing and the former only a particular form of the latter, has been noted above in the Remark to § 63. – That nowadays so little is known of God and so little attention is paid to his objective essence, but so much the more is said of religion, i.e. of his indwelling in the subjective side, and that religion and not truth as such is demanded – this contains at least the correct determination that God must be grasped as spirit in his community.
§ 555
The subjective consciousness of absolute spirit is essentially within itself process, whose immediate and substantial unity is faith in the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. Faith, being at once this immediate unity and containing it as the relation of those distinct determinations, has passed over in devotion, in implicit or more explicit worship, into the process of sublating the opposition into spiritual liberation, of confirming that first certainty through this mediation, and of gaining its concrete determination, namely reconciliation, the actuality of spirit.
A. Art
§ 556
The shape of this knowing, as immediate (the moment of the finitude of art), is on the one hand a falling apart into a work of external common existence, into the subject producing it and into the subject intuiting and revering it; on the other hand it is the concrete intuition and representation of absolute spirit in itself as the ideal – of the concrete shape born of subjective spirit, in which natural immediacy is only a sign of the Idea, transfigured by the imagining spirit for its expression in such a way that the shape shows nothing else in it; – the shape of beauty.
§ 557
The sensuous externality in the beautiful, the form of immediacy as such, is at the same time a determinacy of content, and the god, along with his spiritual determination, still has in him the determination of a natural element or existence. He contains the so-called unity of nature and spirit – that is, the immediate unity, the form of intuition; thus not the spiritual unity in which the natural would be posited only as ideal, as sublated, and the spiritual content would be only in relation to itself; it is not absolute spirit that enters into this consciousness. – On the subjective side the community is indeed an ethical one, because it knows its essence as spiritual and its self-consciousness and actuality are herein raised to substantial freedom. But, burdened with immediacy, the freedom of the subject is only custom, without the infinite reflection into itself, without the subjective inwardness of conscience; accordingly, in further development, the devotion and worship of the religion of fine art are also determined.
§ 558
For the intuitions it is to produce, art needs not only an external given material, to which subjective images and representations also belong, but, for the expression of spiritual content, also the given forms of nature according to their significance, which art must divine and possess (cf. § 411). Among the configurations the human is the highest and true one, because only in it can spirit have its bodiliness and thereby an intuitable expression.
This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art, about which no understanding is possible with an equally abstract opposite as long as the natural is taken only in its externality, not as a characteristic, meaningful natural form signifying spirit.
§ 559
Absolute spirit cannot be explicated in such singularity of configuration; the spirit of fine art is therefore a limited spirit of a people, whose universality, being in itself, falls apart into an indeterminate polytheism as one proceeds to the further determination of its wealth. With the essential limitedness of the content, beauty in general becomes only the penetration of the intuition or image by the spiritual – something formal, so that the content of the thought or the representation, like the material it uses for its embodiment, can be of the most diverse and even most inessential kind, and the work still be something beautiful and a work of art.
§ 560
The one-sidedness of immediacy in the ideal contains (§ 556) the opposite one-sidedness, that it is something made by the artist. The subject is the formal element of the activity, and the work of art is the expression of the god only when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it, but the content of the indwelling spirit has been conceived and born forth without admixture and unstained by its contingency. But since freedom goes only as far as thinking, the activity filled with this indwelling content, the inspiration of the artist, is like a power alien to him, an unfree pathos; the producing has in itself the form of natural immediacy, belongs to genius as this particular subject – and is at the same time a labour occupied with technical understanding and mechanical externalities. The work of art is therefore just as much a work of free arbitrariness, and the artist the master of the god.
§ 561
In that state of being filled, reconciliation appears as a beginning in such a way that it is accomplished immediately in subjective self-consciousness, which is thus secure and serene within itself, without depth and without consciousness of its opposition to the essence that is in and for itself. Beyond the perfection of beauty achieved in such reconciliation in classical art lies the art of sublimity, the symbolic, in which the configuration adequate to the Idea has not yet been found; rather, thought is presented as going beyond and wrestling with the shape, as a negative relation to it, into which it at the same time strives to embody itself. The meaning, the content, thereby shows precisely that it has not yet attained the infinite form, is not yet known and conscious of itself as free spirit. The content is only the abstract god of pure thinking, or a striving after it, which hurls itself restlessly and unreconciled about in all configurations, since it cannot find its goal.
§ 562
The other mode of the inadequacy of Idea and configuration, however, is that the infinite form, subjectivity, is not, as in that extreme, merely superficial personality, but the innermost, and that the god is known not as merely seeking his shape or satisfying himself in an external one, but as finding himself only within himself, thereby giving himself his adequate shape in the spiritual alone. Thus – romantic – art gives up showing him as such in external shape and through beauty; it presents him as only condescending to appearance, and the divine as inwardness in externality, withdrawing itself from this externality, which may therefore here appear in contingency over against its meaning.
The philosophy of religion has to cognize the logical necessity in the progression of the determinations of the essence known as the absolute, to which determinations there corresponds first of all the kind of worship, and further how worldly self-consciousness, the consciousness of what the highest determination in the human being is, and thereby the nature of a people’s ethical life, the principle of its right, of its actual freedom and of its constitution, as well as of its art and science, correspond to the principle that constitutes the substance of a religion. That all these moments of a people’s actuality constitute one systematic totality and that one spirit creates and informs them – this insight underlies the further one, that the history of religions coincides with world history.
Concerning the close connection of art with the religions, the more specific remark is to be made that fine art can belong only to those religions in which concrete spirituality, become free within itself but not yet absolute, is the principle. In the religions in which the Idea has not yet become manifest and known in its free determinacy, the need for art does indeed come forth, in order to bring the representation of the essence to consciousness in intuition and imagination; indeed art is even the only organ in which the abstract content, unclear within itself and confused out of natural and spiritual elements, can strive to bring itself to consciousness. But this art is defective; because it has so defective a content, its form is defective too; for the content is defective in that it does not have the form immanently within itself. The presentation retains a side of tastelessness and spiritlessness, because the inner itself is still burdened with spiritlessness and therefore does not have the power to penetrate the external freely into meaning and configuration. Fine art, by contrast, has as its condition the self-consciousness of free spirit, and with it the consciousness of the dependence of the sensuous and merely natural over against spirit; it makes the sensuous wholly into the expression of spirit; it is the inner form that expresses only itself. – Connected with this is the further, higher consideration that the entry of art indicates the decline of a religion still bound to sensuous externality. At the same time, while art seems to give religion the highest transfiguration, expression and splendour, it has raised religion above its limitedness. The genius of the artist and of the spectators is at home, satisfied and liberated, with its own sense and feeling, in the sublime divinity whose expression the work of art has attained; the intuition and consciousness of free spirit is granted and attained. Fine art has achieved from its side the same as philosophy – the purification of spirit from unfreedom. That religion in which the need for fine art first arises, and for that very reason, has in its principle a thoughtless and sensuous beyond; the images devoutly revered are the unbeautiful idols, as wonder-working talismans directed at a spiritless objectivity beyond, and bones do the same or even better service than such images. But fine art is only a stage of liberation, not the highest liberation itself. True objectivity, which is only in the element of thought, the element in which alone pure spirit is for spirit and liberation is at once reverence, is lacking also in the sensuous beauty of the work of art, and still more in that external, unbeautiful sensuousness.
§ 563
Fine art (like its own peculiar religion) has its future in the true religion. The limited content of the Idea passes over in and for itself into the universality identical with the infinite form – intuition, immediate knowing bound to sensuousness, into knowing that mediates itself within itself, into an existence that is itself knowing, into revelation; so that the content of the Idea has the determination of free intelligence as its principle and, as absolute spirit, is for spirit.
B. The Revealed Religion
§ 564
It lies essentially in the concept of the true religion, i.e. of the religion whose content is absolute spirit, that it be revealed, and indeed revealed by God. For since knowing, the principle by which substance is spirit, is, as the infinite form that is for itself, what is self-determining, it is absolutely manifesting; spirit is spirit only in so far as it is for spirit, and in the absolute religion it is absolute spirit that manifests no longer abstract moments of itself, but itself.
To the old representation of Nemesis, according to which the divine and its working in the world were grasped by the still abstract understanding only as an equalizing power that shatters the high and great, Plato and Aristotle opposed the view that God is not envious. This can likewise be opposed to the newer assurances that man cannot know God; – these assurances – for these assertions are no more than that – are all the more inconsistent when they are made within a religion that is expressly called the revealed one, so that according to those assurances it would rather be the religion in which nothing of God would be manifest, in which he would not have revealed himself, and those belonging to it would be “the heathen”, “who know nothing of God”. If one is in earnest with the word God in religion at all, then the determination may and must begin from him too, the content and principle of religion; and if self-revelation is denied him, then all that would remain of a content of his would be to ascribe envy to him. But if the word spirit is to have any meaning at all, it contains its revealing itself.
If one considers the difficulty of the cognition of God as spirit, which cannot rest content with the simple representations of faith but goes on to thinking, at first to the reflecting understanding, but is meant to go on to comprehending thought, then it may hardly be surprising that so many, especially theologians, as those more nearly called upon to occupy themselves with these Ideas, have hit upon getting off more easily and have so willingly taken up what was offered them for this purpose; the easiest of all is the result stated: that man knows nothing of God. To grasp correctly and determinately in thought what God is as spirit requires thorough speculation. It contains first of all the propositions: God is God only in so far as he knows himself; his self-knowing is further his self-consciousness in man and man’s knowing of God, which goes on to man’s self-knowing in God. – See the thorough elucidation of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorismen über Wissen und Nichtwissen usf. by C. F. G. . . . . l, Berlin 1829.1)
1) Werkausgabe: Carl Friedrich Göschel, Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen im Verhältnis zur christlichen Glaubenserkenntnis. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnisse der Philosophie unserer Zeit, Berlin 1829 – cf. Hegel’s review of this work in Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, 1829
§ 565
Absolute spirit, in the sublated immediacy and sensuousness of shape and of knowing, is as to content the spirit of nature and of spirit that is in and for itself; as to form it is at first for the subjective knowing of representation. Representation on the one hand gives the moments of its content self-standingness and makes them presuppositions for one another and successive appearances, and a connection of occurrence according to finite determinations of reflection; on the other hand such a form of finite representation is also sublated in faith in the one spirit and in the devotion of worship.
§ 566
In this separating, the form parts from the content, and within the form the distinct moments of the concept part into particular spheres or elements, in each of which the absolute content presents itself: α) as eternal content remaining with itself in its manifestation; β) as the distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation, which through this distinction becomes the world of appearance into which the content enters; γ) as the infinite return and reconciliation of the externalized world with the eternal essence, the going back of the latter from appearance into the unity of its fullness.
§ 567
α) In the moment of universality, the sphere of pure thought or the abstract element of essence, it is therefore absolute spirit which is at first what is presupposed, yet not what remains shut up, but which as substantial power, in the determination of reflection of causality, is creator of heaven and earth, but in this eternal sphere rather begets only itself as its Son, and remains just as much in original identity with this distinct one as this determination, to be what is distinct from the universal essence, eternally sublates itself, and through this mediation of self-sublating mediation the first substance is essentially concrete singularity and subjectivity – is spirit.
§ 568
β) In the moment of particularity of the judgement, however, this concrete eternal essence is what is presupposed, and its movement is the creation of appearance, the falling apart of the eternal moment of mediation, of the only Son, into the self-standing opposition, on the one hand of heaven and earth, of elemental and concrete nature, on the other hand of spirit as standing in relation to it, thus of finite spirit, which, as the extreme of negativity being within itself, makes itself self-standing as evil, is such an extreme through its relation to a nature standing over against it and through its own naturalness thereby posited, and in this, as thinking, is at the same time directed towards the eternal, but thereby stands in external relation to it.
§ 569
γ) In the moment of singularity as such, namely of subjectivity and of the concept itself, as the opposition of universality and particularity returned into its identical ground, there presents itself 1. as presupposition the universal substance actualized out of its abstraction into singular self-consciousness, and this as immediately identical with the essence, that Son of the eternal sphere transposed into temporality, and in him evil as sublated in itself; but further this immediate and thereby sensuous existence of the absolutely concrete positing itself in judgement and dying in the pain of negativity, in which, as infinite subjectivity identical with itself, it has become for itself out of that negativity as absolute return and universal unity of the universal and singular essentiality – the Idea of the eternal but living spirit present in the world.
§ 570
2. This objective totality is the presupposition, being in itself, for the finite immediacy of the singular subject, and is for it therefore at first an other and something intuited, but the intuition of the truth that is in itself, through which witness of the spirit in it the subject, on account of its immediate nature, at first determines itself for itself as what is null and evil, and further, after the example of its truth, by means of faith in the unity of universal and singular essentiality accomplished in itself therein, is also the movement of externalizing itself from its immediate natural determinacy and its own will, and of joining itself together with that example and its in-itself in the pain of negativity, and so of knowing itself as united with the essence, which 3. through this mediation brings itself about as indwelling in self-consciousness and is the actual presence of the spirit that is in and for itself, as the universal spirit.
§ 571
These three syllogisms, which constitute the one syllogism of the absolute mediation of spirit with itself, are its revelation, which explicates its life in the cycle of concrete shapes of representation. From their stepping apart and temporal and external succession, the unfolding of the mediation gathers itself together in its result, the joining together of spirit with itself, not only into the simplicity of faith and of the devotion of feeling, but also into thinking, in whose immanent simplicity the unfolding likewise has its expanse, but known as an inseparable connection of the universal, simple and eternal spirit within itself. In this form of truth, truth is the object of philosophy.
If the result, spirit that is for itself, in which all mediation has sublated itself, is taken in a merely formal, contentless sense, so that spirit is not at the same time known as being in itself and unfolding itself objectively, then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness knowing itself within itself as absolute, irony, which knows how to make all objective content come to nothing for itself, into something vain, and is thus itself contentlessness and vanity, which gives itself from itself, and thereby a contingent and arbitrary content, as its determination, remains master over it, is not bound by it and, with the assurance that it stands at the highest summit of religion and philosophy, rather falls back into hollow arbitrariness. Only when the pure infinite form, the self-manifestation that is with itself, lays aside the one-sidedness of the subjective, in which it is the vanity of thinking, is it free thinking, which has its infinite determination at the same time as absolute content that is in and for itself, and has this content as an object in which it is equally free. Thinking is to that extent itself only the formal element of the absolute content.
C. Philosophy
§ 572
This science is to that extent the unity of art and religion, in that the mode of intuition of the former, external as to form, its subjective producing and splintering of the substantial content into many self-standing shapes, is, in the totality of the latter, whose stepping apart unfolding itself in representation and mediating of what has been unfolded, not only held together into a whole but also united into simple spiritual intuition and then raised to self-conscious thinking. This knowing is thereby the concept of art and religion cognized in thought, in which what is different in the content is cognized as necessary and this necessary element as free.
§ 573
Cross-reference: On Hegel’s rejection of the charge of pantheism in the Remark to this paragraph, see the FAQ Was Hegel a Christian, a pantheist or an atheist?
Philosophy accordingly determines itself as a cognition of the necessity of the content of absolute representation as well as of the necessity of the two forms, on the one hand of immediate intuition and its poetry and of presupposing representation, of objective and external revelation, on the other hand first of subjective going-into-itself, then of subjective movement towards and of the identification of faith with the presupposition. This cognition is thus the recognition of this content and its form, and the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms and their elevation into the absolute form, which determines itself into content and remains identical with it, and is therein the cognition of that necessity that is in and for itself. This movement, which philosophy is, finds itself already accomplished in that at the close it grasps its own concept, i.e. only looks back on its knowing.
It might seem that this would be the place to treat the relation of philosophy to religion in a determinate discussion. What alone matters is the difference between the forms of speculative thinking and the forms of representation and of the reflecting understanding. But it is the whole course of philosophy, and of logic in particular, that has not only made this difference known but also judged it, or rather has let its nature develop and judge itself in these categories themselves. Only on the ground of this cognition of the forms can the true conviction that was at issue be gained, that the content of philosophy and of religion is the same, apart from the further content of external nature and of finite spirit, which does not fall within the compass of religion. But religion is the truth for all human beings; faith rests on the witness of the spirit, which, as bearing witness, is the spirit in man. This witness, substantial in itself, in so far as it is driven to explicate itself, first takes on the culture that is otherwise that of its worldly consciousness and understanding; thereby truth falls into the determinations and relations of finitude in general. This does not prevent spirit from holding fast to its content, which as religious is essentially speculative, against these determinations even in the use of sensuous representations and of the finite categories of thought, from doing violence to them and being inconsistent towards them. Through this inconsistency it corrects their defectiveness; nothing is therefore easier for the understanding than to point out contradictions in the exposition of faith and so to prepare triumphs for its principle, formal identity. If spirit yields to this finite reflection, which has called itself reason and philosophy (rationalism), it finitizes the religious content and in fact reduces it to nothing. Religion then has its perfect right to guard itself against such reason and philosophy and to declare itself hostile. But it is another matter when it sets itself against comprehending reason and against philosophy in general, and specifically also against a philosophy whose content is speculative and thereby religious. Such opposition rests on a lack of insight into the nature of the difference stated and into the value of spiritual forms in general and of the forms of thought in particular, and most specifically on a lack of insight into the difference of the content from those forms, a content which can be the same in both. It is on account of its form that philosophy has suffered reproaches and accusations from the religious side, and conversely, on account of its speculative content, from a so-called philosophy and likewise from a contentless piety; for the former it has too little of God in it, for the latter too much.
The accusation of atheism, formerly often made against philosophy – that it has too little of God – has become rare; all the more widespread, however, is the accusation of pantheism, that it has too much of him; so much so that this counts not so much as an accusation but as something proven, or even as something needing no proof, as a bare fact. Piety in particular, which in its pious superiority believes itself dispensed from proving anyway, in harmony with the empty philosophy of the understanding, to which it means to be so opposed but on whose culture it in fact wholly rests, abandons itself to the assurance, as if merely mentioning a well-known matter, that philosophy is the doctrine of the All-One or pantheism. One must say that it did more honour to piety and theology themselves to accuse a philosophical system, e.g. Spinozism, of atheism rather than of pantheism, although the former accusation at first sight looks harsher and more invidious (cf. Remark to § 71). The accusation of atheism does after all presuppose a determinate representation of a God rich in content, and arises from representation not finding again in philosophical concepts the peculiar forms to which it is bound. For philosophy can indeed recognize its own forms in the categories of the religious mode of representation, and thereby its own content in the religious content, and do justice to the latter, but not conversely, since the religious mode of representation does not apply the critique of thought to itself and does not comprehend itself, and is therefore exclusive in its immediacy. The accusation of pantheism instead of atheism against philosophy belongs mainly to more recent culture, to the new piety and new theology, for which philosophy has too much God, so much so that, according to its assurance, he is even supposed to be All, and All God. For this new theology, which makes religion only into a subjective feeling and denies the cognition of the nature of God, thereby retains nothing more than a God in general, without objective determinations. Without any interest of its own in the concrete, fulfilled concept of God, it regards this only as an interest that others once had, and therefore treats what belongs to the doctrine of the concrete nature of God merely as something historical. The indeterminate God is to be found in all religions; every kind of piety (§ 72) – the Indian towards apes, cows etc. or towards the Dalai Lama, the Egyptian towards the ox etc. – is always veneration of an object which, along with its absurd determinations, also contains the abstraction of the genus, of God in general. If such a God suffices for that view to find God in everything called religion, it must at least find him recognized in philosophy too and can no longer well accuse it of atheism. The softening of the reproach of atheism into that of pantheism therefore has its ground only in the superficiality of the representation to which this mildness has thinned and emptied God. Since that representation holds fast to its abstract universality, outside which all determinacy falls, determinacy is further only the undivine, the worldly existence of things, which thereby remains in firm, undisturbed substantiality. With such a presupposition, even with the universality that is in and for itself, which philosophy asserts of God and in which the being of external things has no truth, it is maintained as before that worldly things nevertheless retain their being and that it is they which constitute the determinate element in the divine universality. So they make that universality into the one they call pantheistic – that everything, i.e. empirical things without distinction, the more highly esteemed as well as the common, is, possesses substantiality, and that this being of worldly things is God. – It is only their own thoughtlessness and a falsification of concepts arising from it that produces the representation and assurance of pantheism.
But if those who pass off some philosophy as pantheism are not able and willing to see this – for it is precisely insight into concepts that they do not want –, they would above all have to establish merely as a fact that some philosopher or some human being has in fact ascribed to all things reality, substantiality that is in and for itself, and regarded them as God; that such a representation has ever entered anyone’s head except their own alone. I will still shed light on this fact in this exoteric consideration; which cannot be done otherwise than by placing the facts themselves before our eyes. If we want to take so-called pantheism in its poetic, most sublime or, if one prefers, crassest shape, one has, as is well known, to look among the Oriental poets, and the broadest presentations are found in the Indian. From the wealth that has been opened to us on this, I select from the Bhagavad Gita, which lies before us most authentically, and from among its tirades, elaborated and repeated to the point of surfeit, some of the most telling passages. In the tenth lesson (in Schlegel p. 1622)) Krishna says of himself:
I am the breath that dwells in the body of the living; I am the beginning, the middle of the living, and likewise their end. – Among the stars I am the radiant sun, among the lunar signs the moon. Among the sacred books the book of hymns, among the senses the sense, the understanding of the living etc. Among the Rudras I am Shiva, Meru among the peaks of the mountains, among the mountains Himalaya etc., among the animals the lion etc., among the letters I am A, among the seasons I am spring etc. I am the seed of all things, there is none that is without me etc.
Even in these wholly sensuous depictions Krishna (and one must not suppose that besides Krishna there is here still some other God or a god; just as he said before that he is Shiva, also Indra, so it is said of him afterwards (11th lesson, śloka 15) that Brahma too is in him) gives himself out only for the most excellent of everything, but not for everything; everywhere the distinction is made between external, inessential existences and an essential one among them, which he is. Even when it is said at the beginning of the passage that he is the beginning, the middle and the end of the living, this totality is distinguished from the living themselves as single existences. One cannot therefore call even such a depiction, which extends divinity far into its existence, pantheism; one would rather have to say only that the infinitely manifold empirical world, the everything, is reduced to a more limited number of essential existences, to a polytheism. But it already lies in what has been cited that even these substantialities of what exists externally do not retain the self-standingness to be called gods; even Shiva, Indra etc. dissolve in the one Krishna.
This reduction proceeds more expressly in the following depiction (7th lesson, śloka 7 ff.); Krishna speaks: I am the origin of the whole world and its dissolution. There is nothing more excellent than I. On me the universe hangs, like the rows of pearls on a string. I am the taste in the waters, the splendour in sun and moon, the mystic name in all sacred books etc., the life in all that lives etc., the understanding of those who understand, the strength of the strong etc. He then adds that through Maya (Schlegel: Magia), which is likewise nothing self-standing but only his own, through the peculiar qualities, the world is deceived and does not know him, the Higher, the Unchangeable; that this Maya is hard to break through; but those who partake of him have overcome it etc. – The representation then gathers itself into the simple expression: at the end of many rebirths, says Krishna, the one endowed with knowledge advances to me: Vasudeva (i.e. Krishna) is the All; whoever has this conviction, this great-minded one is hard to find. Others turn to other gods; I reward them according to their faith, but the reward of such men of little insight is limited. The fools take me for visible, – me the Invisible, Imperishable etc. – This All, as which Krishna declares himself, is no more the everything than is the Eleatic One and the Spinozist substance. This everything, rather, the infinitely many sensuous multiplicity of the finite, is determined in all these representations as the accidental, which is not in and for itself but has its truth in substance, the One, which, different from that accidental, alone is the divine and God. Indian religion moreover goes on to the representation of Brahman, the pure unity of thought within itself, in which the empirical everything of the world, as well as those nearest substantialities called gods, vanish. Colebrooke3) and many others have therefore determined Indian religion in its essentials as monotheism. That this determination is not incorrect follows from the little that has been cited. But this unity of God, and indeed of spiritual God, is so little concrete within itself, so powerless so to speak, that Indian religion is the enormous confusion of being just as much the maddest polytheism. But the idolatry of the wretched Indian, when he worships the ape or whatever else, is still not that wretched representation of pantheism that everything is God, God everything. Indian monotheism is, moreover, itself an example of how little is done with mere monotheism when the Idea of God is not deeply determined within itself. For that unity, in so far as it is abstract within itself and thereby empty, itself brings it about that it has the concrete in general self-standingly outside it, be it as a multitude of gods or of empirical, worldly singularities. Consistently with the shallow representation of it, one could even call that pantheism a monotheism; for if according to that representation God is identical with the world, then, since there is only one world, there would also be only one God in this pantheism. Empty numerical unity may perhaps be predicated of the world, but this abstract determination has no further particular interest; rather, this numerical unity is precisely this: to be in its content the infinite multiplicity and manifoldness of finitudes. But it is that deception with empty unity which alone makes possible and brings about the bad representation of a pantheism. Only the representation, floating in the indeterminate blue, of the world as one thing, the All, could one perhaps regard as connectable with God; only from this did it become possible to suppose that it had been meant that God is the world; for had the world been taken as it is, as everything, as the endless multitude of empirical existences, one would surely not have held it even possible that there had been a pantheism that asserted of such a content that it is God.
If, to come back once more to the factual, one wants to see the consciousness of the One not according to the Indian split, on the one hand into the determinationless unity of abstract thinking, on the other into the wearisome working-out in the particular, which itself becomes like a litany, but in its most beautiful purity and sublimity, one must look among the Mohammedans. When, for example, in the excellent Jalal ad-Din Rumi in particular the unity of the soul with the One, and also this unity as love, is emphasized, this spiritual unity is an elevation above the finite and common, a transfiguration of the natural and the spiritual, in which precisely the external, transient element of the immediately natural as of the empirical, worldly spiritual is separated out and absorbed.4)
I refrain from multiplying the examples of the religious and poetic representations that one is accustomed to call pantheistic. Concerning the philosophies to which this very name has been given, e.g. the Eleatic or the Spinozist, it has already been recalled earlier (Remark to § 50) that they so little identify God with the world and make him finite that in these philosophies this everything rather has no truth, and that one would more correctly have to designate them as monotheisms and, in relation to the representation of the world, as acosmisms. They would most precisely be determined as the systems that grasp the absolute only as substance.
Of the Oriental, especially Mohammedan, modes of representation one can say rather that the absolute appears as the absolutely universal genus, which dwells in the species, the existences, but in such a way that no actual reality belongs to these. The defect of all these modes of representation and systems is that they do not go on to the determination of substance as subject and as spirit.
These modes of representation and systems proceed from the one need common to all philosophies as to all religions, to grasp a representation of God and then of the relation between him and the world. In philosophy it is cognized more precisely that his relation to the world is determined by the determination of the nature of God. The reflecting understanding begins by rejecting the modes of representation and systems of heart, imagination and speculation that express the connection of God and the world; and in order to have God purely in faith or consciousness, he is separated as essence from appearance, as the infinite from the finite. After this separation, however, there also enters the conviction of the relation of appearance to essence, of the finite to the infinite etc., and with it the now reflecting question about the nature of this relation. It is in the form of reflection about it that the whole difficulty of the matter lies. It is this relation that is called the incomprehensible by those who want to know nothing of God’s nature. At the close of philosophy this is no longer the place, nor in general in an exoteric consideration, to say a word about what comprehending means. But since the grasping of this relation is connected with the grasping of science in general and with all accusations against it, this much may still be recalled: that while philosophy does indeed have to do with unity in general, yet not with abstract unity, mere identity and the empty absolute, but with concrete unity (the concept), and throughout its whole course has to do with this alone – that every stage of the progress is a peculiar determination of this concrete unity, and that the deepest and last of the determinations of unity is that of absolute spirit. Those who want to judge philosophy and pronounce on it might be expected to engage with these determinations of unity and to take pains to know them, at least to know so much as that there is a great multiplicity of these determinations and a great diversity among them. But they show so little knowledge of this, and still less any effort with it, that rather, as soon as they hear of unity – and relation at once contains unity – they stop at wholly abstract, indeterminate unity and abstract from that in which alone all interest lies, namely the mode of the determinacy of unity. So they know nothing to say about philosophy except that dry identity is its principle and result and that it is the system of identity. Holding fast to this concept-less thought of identity, they have grasped precisely nothing of concrete unity, of the concept and the content of philosophy, but rather its opposite. They proceed in this field as physicists do in the physical one, who likewise know well that they have before them manifold sensuous properties and materials – or usually only materials (for the properties too turn into materials for them) – and that these materials also stand in relation to one another. Now the question is of what kind this relation is, and the peculiarity and the whole difference of all natural, inorganic and living things rests solely on the different determinacy of this unity. But instead of cognizing this unity in its different determinacies, ordinary physics (chemistry included) grasps only one, the most external and worst, namely composition, applies only it throughout the whole series of natural formations and thereby makes it impossible for itself to grasp any one of them. – That stale pantheism thus arises immediately from that stale identity; those who use this product of their own to accuse philosophy learn from the consideration of the relation of God to the world that of this category, relation, the one, but also only the one moment, and indeed the moment of indeterminacy, is identity; now they stop at this half-measure of grasping and assert, factually falsely, that philosophy asserts the identity of God and the world; and since for them at the same time both, the world as much as God, have firm substantiality, they conclude that in the philosophical Idea God is composed of God and the world; and this then is the representation they form of pantheism and ascribe to philosophy. Those who in their thinking and grasping of thoughts do not get beyond such categories, and, starting from them, carry them into philosophy, where nothing of the sort is present, and fasten the itch on it in order to be able to scratch it, avoid at once and very easily all the difficulties that arise in grasping the relation of God to the world by admitting that this relation contains for them a contradiction of which they understand nothing; hence they must rest content with the wholly indeterminate representation of such a relation and likewise of its more specific modes, e.g. omnipresence, providence etc. Faith in this sense means nothing other than not going on to a determinate representation, not wanting to engage further with the content. That human beings and classes of uncultivated understanding are satisfied with indeterminate representations is consistent; but when a cultivated understanding and an interest in reflective consideration want to content themselves with indeterminate representations in what is recognized as a higher and the highest interest, it is hard to distinguish whether spirit is in fact in earnest with the content. But if those who cling to the bare understanding indicated were to become earnest, e.g. with the assertion of the omnipresence of God, in the sense of making the belief in it present to themselves in a determinate representation, into what difficulty would the belief they have in the true reality of sensuous things entangle them? They would hardly want to let God dwell, like Epicurus, in the intervals between things, i.e. in the pores of the physicists, since these pores are the negative that is supposed to be beside the materially real. Already in this beside they would have their pantheism of spatiality – their everything, determined as the asunderness of space. But in ascribing to God an efficacy on and in filled space, on and in the world, in his relation to it, they would have the infinite splintering of divine actuality into infinite materiality; they would in fact have the bad representation that they call pantheism or the doctrine of the All-One only as the necessary consequence of their own bad representations of God and the world. To saddle philosophy with such things as the much-discussed unity or identity, however, shows so great a carelessness about justice and truth that it could be made comprehensible only by the difficulty of getting thoughts and concepts into one’s head, i.e. not abstract unity but the many-shaped modes of its determinacy. When factual assertions are put forward and the facts are thoughts and concepts, it is indispensable to grasp them. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has made itself superfluous through its having long since become a settled prejudice that philosophy is pantheism, a system of identity, the doctrine of the All-One, so that whoever did not know this fact would be treated either merely as ignorant of a well-known matter or as seeking evasions for some purpose. – For the sake of this chorus I believed I had to explain myself at greater length and exoterically on the external and internal untruth of this alleged fact; for about the external grasping of concepts as mere facts, by which concepts are precisely turned into their opposite, one can at first speak only exoterically. The esoteric consideration of God and of identity, as of cognition and of concepts, however, is philosophy itself.
2) Werkausgabe: Bhagavad-gita, ed. August Wilhelm von Schlegel, Bonn 1823
3) Werkausgabe: Henry Thomas Colebrooke, 1756–1837, principal founder of Indology
4) Hegel’s footnote. I cannot refrain from citing here, for the sake of a closer representation, some passages which may at the same time give an idea of the admirable art of translation of Mr Rückert [Friedrich Rückert, “Mewlana Dschelaleddin Rumi”, in Taschenbuch der Damen auf das Jahr 1821; Hegel quotes only single couplets, not the complete poems], from which they are taken [Rückert’s German verses are given here in a literal English rendering]:
III. I looked up, and saw in all spaces One,
Down, and saw in all the foam of waves One.
I looked into the heart; it was a sea, a space of worlds
Full of a thousand dreams; I saw in all the dreams One.
Air, fire, earth and water are melted into One
In fear of you, so that not One dares rear up against you.
Of the hearts of all life between earth and heaven
Not One shall be slow to beat in worship of you.
V. Though the sun is but a little gleam of your gleam,
Yet my light and yours are originally only One.
Though the heaven that circles is dust at your feet,
Yet One is, and One, my being and yours alone.
Heaven turns to dust, and dust turns to heaven,
And One remains, and One, your essence and mine alone.
How do words of life that pass through heaven come
To rest only in the narrow space of the heart’s shrine?
How do the sun’s rays, to blossom more brightly,
Hide only in the brittle husks of the gem?
How may earth’s mould, feeding and drinking water’s mire,
Form itself only into the transfiguration of the rose grove?
How did what the mute shell sucked in as a little drop
Become, as the lustre of pearls, the bliss of sunshine alone?
Heart, whether you swim in floods or glow in fires:
Flood and fire are one water; be only yours, pure.
IX. I tell you how man was formed from clay:
Because God breathed into the clay the breath of love.
I tell you why the heavens ever circle:
Because God’s throne fills them with the reflection of love.
I tell you why the morning winds blow:
To open ever freshly the rose grove of love.
I tell you why the night hangs on its veil:
To consecrate the world as a bridal tent of love.
I can tell you all the riddles of creation:
For the solution of all riddles is love alone.
XV. Death indeed ends the need of life,
Yet life shudders before death.
So a heart shudders before love,
As if it were threatened by death.
For where love awakens, there dies
The I, the dark despot.
Let it die in the night
And breathe freely in the dawn.
Who will recognize in this poetry, which soars above the external and sensuous, the prosaic representation that is formed of so-called pantheism, which rather brings the divine down into the external and sensuous? The rich communications that Mr Tholuck gives us in his work Blütensammlung aus der morgenländischen Mystik [Berlin 1825] from the poems of Jalal ad-Din and others are made precisely from the point of view under discussion here. In the introduction Mr Th. proves how deeply his heart has grasped mysticism; there he also determines more precisely the character of the Oriental and that of the Western and Christian mysticism as against it. With their difference they have the common determination of being mysticism. The connection of mysticism with so-called pantheism, he says on p. 33, contains the inner vitality of heart and spirit, which consists essentially in annihilating that external everything that is usually ascribed to pantheism. Otherwise Mr Th. leaves it at the usual unclear representation of pantheism; a more thorough discussion of it had, to begin with, no interest for the standpoint of feeling of the author; but one sees him himself seized with wonderful inspiration by a mysticism that, in the usual expression, would have to be called wholly pantheistic. Where, however, he engages in philosophizing (pp. 12 f.), he does not get beyond the usual standpoint of the metaphysics of the understanding and its uncritical categories.
§ 574
This concept of philosophy is the Idea that thinks itself, the knowing truth (§ 236), the logical with the significance that it is the universality proved in the concrete content as in its actuality. In this way science has gone back into its beginning, and the logical is its result as the spiritual, in that from the presupposing judging, in which the concept was only in itself and the beginning something immediate, and thus from the appearance that it had therein, it has raised itself into its pure principle, at the same time as into its element.
§ 575
It is this appearing that first grounds the further development. The first appearance is constituted by the syllogism that has the logical as its ground and starting point and nature as its middle, which joins spirit together with the logical. The logical becomes nature and nature becomes spirit. Nature, which stands between spirit and its essence, does indeed not separate them into extremes of finite abstraction, nor itself from them into something self-standing that, as other, would only join others together; for the syllogism is in the Idea, and nature is essentially determined only as a point of passage and negative moment and is in itself the Idea; but the mediation of the concept has the external form of transition, and science that of the course of necessity, so that only in the one extreme is the freedom of the concept posited as its joining together with itself.
§ 576
This appearance is sublated in the second syllogism in so far as this is already the standpoint of spirit itself, which is what mediates the process, presupposes nature and joins it together with the logical. It is the syllogism of spiritual reflection in the Idea; science appears as a subjective cognition, whose end is freedom and which is itself the way of bringing freedom forth for itself.
§ 577
The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy, which has self-knowing reason, the absolutely universal, as its middle, which divides itself into spirit and nature, making the former the presupposition, as the process of the subjective activity of the Idea, and the latter the universal extreme, as the process of the Idea that is in itself, objectively. The self-judging of the Idea into the two appearances (§§ 575/6) determines them as its (self-knowing reason’s) manifestations, and it unites in it that it is the nature of the matter, the concept, that moves itself forward and develops, and that this movement is just as much the activity of cognition, the eternal Idea that is in and for itself eternally activating, producing and enjoying itself as absolute spirit.
