[p. 546]
|546| at the same time the consciousness of substance; or, in bringing forth substance as subject through its sacrifice, this subject remains its own self. What is thereby achieved is that, whereas in the two propositions – in the first, that of substantiality, the subject only vanishes, and in the second substance is only predicate, and both sides are thus present in each with the opposite inequality of value -, the union and interpenetration of both natures comes forth, in which both, with equal value, are just as essential as they are only moments; thereby, then, spirit is just as much consciousness of itself as of its objective substance as it is simple self-consciousness remaining within itself.
The religion of art belongs to the ethical spirit, which we earlier saw perish in the condition of right, i.e. in the proposition: the self as such, the abstract person, is absolute essence. In ethical life the self is sunk in the spirit of its people; it is fulfilled universality. Simple singularity, however, raises itself out of this content, and its levity purifies it into the person, into the abstract universality of right. In this the reality of the ethical spirit is lost; the spirits of the individual peoples, emptied of content, are gathered into one pantheon, not into a pantheon of representation, whose powerless form lets each have its way, but into the pantheon of abstract universality, of pure thought, which disembodies them and confers being-in-and-for-itself on the spiritless self, the single person.
But this self has, through its emptiness, let the content go free; consciousness is the essence only within itself; its own existence, the legal recognition of the person, is unfulfilled abstraction; it thus possesses rather only the thought of itself, or, as it is there and knows itself as object, it is the non-actual. It is therefore only the stoic independence of thinking, and this, passing
