[p. 565]
|565| their stepping apart and the one having an unequal value as against the other. This inequality is therefore twofold, and there arise two connections whose common moments are those stated. In the one the divine essence counts as the essential, but natural existence and the self as the inessential and what is to be sublated; in the other, on the contrary, being-for-itself counts as the essential and the simple divine as the inessential. Their still empty middle is existence in general, the mere commonality of their two moments.
The resolution of this opposition does not happen so much through the struggle of the two, which are represented as separated and independent essences. It lies in their independence that in itself, through its concept, each must dissolve itself in itself; the struggle occurs only where both cease to be these mixtures of thought and independent existence and where they stand over against each other only as thoughts. For then, as determinate concepts, they are essentially only in the opposed relation; as independent, on the other hand, they have their essentiality outside the opposition; their movement is thus the free movement of their own selves. As, then, the movement of both is the movement in itself, because it is to be considered in them themselves, so too it is begun by that one of the two which is determined as what is in itself as against the other. This is represented as a voluntary doing; but the necessity of its externalization lies in the concept that what is in itself, being determined so only in opposition, for that very reason has no true subsistence; – it is thus the one for which not being-for-itself but the simple counts as the essence that externalizes itself, goes into death and thereby reconciles the absolute essence with itself. For in this movement it presents itself as spirit; the abstract essence is alienated from itself; it has natural existence and selflike actuality; this its otherness or its sensuous
