Karl Marx: Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction

Karl Marx, Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Einleitung [Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Introduction] — written at the end of 1843 to January 1844, published in the “Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher”, Paris 1844. German text after: Karl Marx / Friedrich Engels, Werke, (Karl) Dietz Verlag, Berlin/GDR 1976, vol. 1, pp. 378–391. The English translation is our own.

Marx’s actual commentary on the Groundlines, paragraph by paragraph in the narrower sense, begins only with his (unfinished) manuscript “Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State” on §§ 261–313 (placed there as comments on the respective §§). The “Introduction”, by contrast, is an independent programmatic piece written some two months later without reference to particular §§; only its opening section on the critique of religion – with the famous phrase about the “opium of the people” – is placed as a comment at § 270 (relationship of state and church). The complete text follows here as a whole.

For Germany the critique of religion is essentially completed, and the critique of religion is the presupposition of all critique.

The profane existence of error is compromised once its heavenly oratio pro aris et focis |prayer for altar and hearth| has been refuted. The human being who, in the fantastic actuality of heaven, where he sought a superhuman being, has found only the reflection of himself will no longer be inclined to find only the semblance of himself, only the non-human being, where he seeks and must seek his true actuality.

The foundation of irreligious critique is: the human being makes religion; religion does not make the human being. And indeed religion is the self-consciousness and self-feeling of the human being who has either not yet acquired himself or has already lost himself again. But the human being – that is no abstract being squatting outside the world. The human being – that is the world of the human being, state, society. This state, this society produce religion, an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world. Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritualist point d’honneur |point of honour|, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its general ground of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence, because the human essence possesses no true actuality. The struggle against religion is therefore indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.

Religious misery is at once the expression of real misery and at once the protest against real misery. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the soul of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people.

The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for its real happiness. The demand to give up the illusions about a condition is the demand to give up a condition that needs illusions. The critique of religion is therefore in germ the critique of the vale of tears whose halo is religion. Critique has plucked the imaginary flowers from the chain, not so that the human being should wear the chain without fantasy or consolation, but so that he should throw off the chain and pluck the living flower. The critique of religion disillusions the human being so that he thinks, acts and shapes his actuality like a disillusioned human being who has come to his senses, so that he moves around himself and thus around his real sun. Religion is only the illusory sun that moves around the human being as long as he does not move around himself. It is therefore the task of history, once the beyond of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world. It is first the task of philosophy, which stands in the service of history, once the holy shape of human self-alienation has been unmasked, to unmask self-alienation in its unholy shapes. The critique of heaven thereby turns into the critique of the earth, the critique of religion into the critique of right, the critique of theology into the critique of politics.

The following exposition – a contribution to this work – attaches itself at first not to the original but to a copy, to German philosophy of state and right, for no other reason than that it attaches itself to Germany.

If one wanted to start from the German status quo itself, even in the only appropriate way, that is, negatively, the result would always remain an anachronism. Even the negation of our political present is already found as a dusty fact in the historical lumber room of the modern peoples. If I negate powdered pigtails, I still have unpowdered pigtails. If I negate the German conditions of 1843, I stand, by French reckoning, scarcely in the year 1789, still less in the focus of the present.

Indeed, German history flatters itself on a movement which no people in the historical firmament has either done before it or will do after it. For we have shared the restorations of the modern peoples without sharing their revolutions. We were restored, first, because other peoples dared a revolution, and second, because other peoples suffered a counter-revolution, the one time because our masters were afraid, and the other time because our masters were not afraid. We, with our shepherds at our head, only ever found ourselves once in the company of freedom, on the day of its burial.

A school which legitimizes the baseness of today by the baseness of yesterday, a school which declares every cry of the serf against the knout rebellious as soon as the knout is an aged, an ancestral, a historical knout, a school to which history, like the God of Israel to his servant Moses, shows only its a posteriori |hindquarters| – the historical school of law – would therefore have invented German history, were it not itself an invention of German history. Shylock, but Shylock the servant, it swears for every pound of flesh cut from the heart of the people by its bond, by its historical bond, by its Christian-Germanic bond.

Good-natured enthusiasts, on the other hand, Teutomaniacs by blood and liberals by reflection, seek our history of freedom beyond our history, in the Teutonic primeval forests. But how does our history of freedom differ from the history of freedom of the wild boar, if it is only to be found in the forests? Besides, it is well known: as one shouts into the forest, so it echoes back out of the forest. So peace to the Teutonic primeval forests!

War on German conditions! By all means! They stand below the level of history, they are beneath all criticism, but they remain an object of criticism, just as the criminal who stands below the level of humanity remains an object of the executioner. In struggle with them, critique is not a passion of the head, it is the head of passion. It is not an anatomical knife, it is a weapon. Its object is its enemy, which it wants not to refute but to annihilate. For the spirit of those conditions is refuted. In and for themselves they are not objects worthy of thought, but existences as contemptible as they are despised. Critique for itself needs no self-understanding with this object, for it has settled with it. It no longer gives itself out as an end in itself, but only as a means. Its essential pathos is indignation, its essential work denunciation.

What is required is the depiction of a mutual dull pressure of all social spheres upon one another, of a general, inactive ill-humour, of a narrow-mindedness that recognizes as much as it misrecognizes itself, framed in a system of government which, living off the preservation of all wretchedness, is itself nothing but wretchedness in government.

What a spectacle! The division of society, going on to infinity, into the most manifold races, which confront one another with petty antipathies, bad consciences and brutal mediocrity, and which, precisely because of their mutually ambiguous and suspicious position, are all, without distinction, though with different formalities, treated by their masters as licensed existences. And even the fact that they are dominated, governed, possessed, they must recognize and confess as a concession from heaven! On the other side those rulers themselves, whose greatness stands in inverse proportion to their number!

The critique that deals with this content is critique in hand-to-hand combat, and in hand-to-hand combat the point is not whether the opponent is a noble, equal, interesting opponent; the point is to hit him. The point is not to grant the Germans a single moment of self-deception and resignation. One must make the real pressure still more oppressive by adding to it the consciousness of pressure, the shame still more shameful by publicizing it. One must depict every sphere of German society as the partie honteuse |shameful part| of German society; one must force these petrified conditions to dance by singing to them their own melody! One must teach the people to be terrified of itself in order to give it courage. One thereby fulfils an irrefutable need of the German people, and the needs of peoples are in their own person the ultimate grounds of their satisfaction.

And even for the modern peoples this struggle against the narrow-minded content of the German status quo cannot be without interest, for the German status quo is the candid completion of the ancien régime, and the ancien régime is the hidden defect of the modern state. The struggle against the German political present is the struggle against the past of the modern peoples, and they are still burdened by reminiscences of this past. It is instructive for them to see the ancien régime, which lived through its tragedy among them, play a comedy as a German revenant. Its history was tragic as long as it was the pre-existing power of the world, and freedom, on the other hand, a personal notion, in a word, as long as it itself believed and had to believe in its justification. As long as the ancien régime, as the existing world order, struggled with a world only coming into being, there stood on its side a world-historical error, but not a personal one. Its downfall was therefore tragic.

The present German regime, on the other hand, an anachronism, a flagrant contradiction of generally recognized axioms, the nullity of the ancien régime exhibited for the world to see, only imagines that it believes in itself and demands the same imagination from the world. If it believed in its own essence, would it hide it under the semblance of an alien essence and seek its salvation in hypocrisy and sophism? The modern ancien régime is now only the comedian of a world order whose real heroes are dead. History is thorough and goes through many phases when it carries an old shape to the grave. The last phase of a world-historical shape is its comedy. The gods of Greece, who had already once been tragically wounded to death in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, had to die once more comically in the dialogues of Lucian. Why this course of history? So that humanity may part cheerfully from its past. This cheerful historical destiny we claim for the political powers of Germany.

As soon, however, as modern political-social actuality itself is subjected to critique, as soon, therefore, as critique rises to truly human problems, it finds itself outside the German status quo, or else it would grasp its object below its object. An example! The relationship of industry, of the world of wealth in general, to the political world is a main problem of modern times. In what form does this problem begin to occupy the Germans? In the form of protective tariffs, of the prohibitive system, of national economy. Teutomania has passed out of the human being into matter, and so one morning our cotton knights and iron heroes saw themselves transformed into patriots. So in Germany one begins to recognize the sovereignty of monopoly internally by lending it sovereignty externally. So in Germany one is now beginning to begin with what in France and England one is beginning to end. The old rotten condition against which these countries are theoretically in revolt, and which they now bear only as one bears chains, is greeted in Germany as the rising dawn of a beautiful future which hardly yet dares to pass over from cunning theory into ruthless practice. While in France and England the problem reads: political economy, or the rule of society over wealth, in Germany it reads: national economy, or the rule of private property over nationality. So in France and England it is a matter of abolishing monopoly, which has proceeded to its last consequences; in Germany it is a matter of proceeding to the last consequences of monopoly. There it is a question of the solution; here it is only a question of the collision. A sufficient example of the German form of modern problems, an example of how our history, like a clumsy recruit, has so far only had the task of drilling again in history that has been done to death.

If, then, the whole of German development did not go beyond German political development, a German could at most take part in the problems of the present in the way a Russian can take part in them. But if the single individual is not bound by the limits of the nation, the whole nation is still less liberated by the liberation of one individual. The Scythians did not take a single step towards Greek culture because Greece counts a Scythian among its philosophers. Fortunately we Germans are not Scythians. Just as the ancient peoples lived their prehistory in imagination, in mythology, so we Germans have lived our post-history in thought, in philosophy. We are philosophical contemporaries of the present without being its historical contemporaries. German philosophy is the ideal prolongation of German history. If, therefore, instead of the oeuvres incomplètes |unfinished works| of our real history we criticize the oeuvres posthumes |posthumous works| of our ideal history, philosophy, our critique stands in the midst of the questions of which the present says: That is the question. What among the advanced peoples is a practical break with modern political conditions is in Germany, where these conditions do not yet exist, first a critical break with the philosophical reflection of these conditions.

German philosophy of right and of the state is the only German history that stands al pari with the official modern present. The German people must therefore add this dream history of theirs to their existing conditions and subject to critique not only these existing conditions but at the same time their abstract continuation. Its future can be limited neither to the immediate negation of its real political and legal conditions nor to the immediate realization of its ideal ones, for it possesses the immediate negation of its real conditions in its ideal conditions, and it has almost outlived again the immediate realization of its ideal conditions in the view of its neighbouring peoples. The practical political party in Germany therefore rightly demands the negation of philosophy. Its wrong consists not in the demand but in stopping at the demand, which it neither seriously fulfils nor can fulfil. It believes it accomplishes that negation by turning its back on philosophy and, with averted head, muttering a few annoyed and banal phrases about it. The narrowness of its horizon does not count philosophy as likewise within the bounds of German actuality, or even imagines it to be below German practice and the theories that serve it. You demand that one should start from real germs of life, but you forget that the real germ of life of the German people has so far proliferated only inside its skull. In a word: you cannot abolish philosophy without realizing it.

The same wrong, only with the factors reversed, was committed by the theoretical political party, which dates from philosophy. It saw in the present struggle only the critical struggle of philosophy with the German world; it did not consider that previous philosophy itself belongs to this world and is its complement, even if an ideal one. Critical towards its adversary, it behaved uncritically towards itself, by starting from the presuppositions of philosophy and either stopping at its given results or passing off demands and results fetched from elsewhere as immediate demands and results of philosophy, although these – their justification presupposed – can on the contrary be obtained only through the negation of previous philosophy, of philosophy as philosophy. A more detailed depiction of this party we reserve for later. Its basic defect can be reduced to this: it believed it could realize philosophy without abolishing it.

The critique of German philosophy of state and right, which received its most consistent, richest and final form through Hegel, is both the critical analysis of the modern state and of the actuality connected with it and the decisive negation of the whole previous mode of German political and legal consciousness, whose most distinguished, most universal expression, raised to science, is precisely speculative philosophy of right itself. If speculative philosophy of right was possible only in Germany – this abstract, extravagant thinking of the modern state, whose actuality remains a beyond, even if this beyond lies only beyond the Rhine -, then, just as much conversely, the German thought-image of the modern state, abstracted from the actual human being, was possible only because and insofar as the modern state itself abstracts from the actual human being or satisfies the whole human being only in an imaginary way. In politics the Germans have thought what the other peoples have done. Germany was their theoretical conscience. The abstraction and arrogance of its thinking always kept pace with the one-sidedness and stuntedness of their actuality. If, therefore, the status quo of the German political system expresses the completion of the ancien régime, the completion of the thorn in the flesh of the modern state, the status quo of German political science expresses the incompleteness of the modern state, the defectiveness of its flesh itself.

Already as the decisive adversary of the previous mode of German political consciousness, the critique of speculative philosophy of right does not run off into itself but into tasks for whose solution there is only one means: practice. The question is: can Germany attain a practice à la hauteur des principes |that rises to the height of principles|, that is, a revolution that raises it not only to the official level of the modern peoples but to the human height that will be the near future of these peoples?

The weapon of critique certainly cannot replace the critique of weapons; material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory too becomes material force as soon as it grips the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem |on the human being|, and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp the matter at the root. But for the human being the root is the human being himself. The evident proof of the radicalism of German theory, and thus of its practical energy, is its starting from the decisive positive abolition of religion. The critique of religion ends with the doctrine that the human being is the highest being for the human being, thus with the categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which the human being is a degraded, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being – relations that cannot be better described than by the exclamation of a Frenchman at a planned dog tax: Poor dogs! They want to treat you like human beings!

Even historically, theoretical emancipation has a specifically practical significance for Germany. For Germany’s revolutionary past is theoretical; it is the Reformation. As then the monk, so now it is the philosopher in whose brain the revolution begins.

Luther, to be sure, overcame servitude out of devotion by putting servitude out of conviction in its place. He broke faith in authority by restoring the authority of faith. He turned priests into laymen by turning laymen into priests. He freed the human being from external religiosity by making religiosity the inner human being. He emancipated the body from the chain by putting the heart in chains. But if Protestantism was not the true solution, it was the true posing of the task. It was now no longer a matter of the layman’s struggle with the priest outside him, but of the struggle with his own inner priest, his priestly nature. And if the Protestant transformation of German laymen into priests emancipated the lay popes, the princes together with their clergy, the privileged and the philistines, then the philosophical transformation of the priestly Germans into human beings will emancipate the people. But just as little as emancipation will stop with the princes, so little will the secularization of property stop with the robbery of the churches that hypocritical Prussia above all set to work. At that time the Peasant War, the most radical fact of German history, foundered on theology. Today, when theology itself has foundered, the most unfree fact of German history, our status quo, will be shattered on philosophy. On the day before the Reformation, official Germany was the most unconditional servant of Rome. On the day before its revolution it is the unconditional servant of less than Rome, of Prussia and Austria, of country squires and philistines.

A radical German revolution, however, seems to face one main difficulty.

For revolutions need a passive element, a material basis. Theory is only ever realized in a people insofar as it is the realization of its needs. Will the enormous discrepancy between the demands of German thought and the answers of German actuality now be matched by the same discrepancy of civil society with the state and with itself? Will theoretical needs be immediately practical needs? It is not enough that thought presses towards realization; actuality must itself press towards thought.

But Germany did not climb the intermediate stages of political emancipation at the same time as the modern peoples. Even the stages it has overcome theoretically it has not yet reached practically. How should it, with a salto mortale, leap not only over its own limits but at the same time over the limits of the modern peoples, over limits that in actuality it must feel and strive for as liberation from its real limits? A radical revolution can only be the revolution of radical needs, whose presuppositions and birthplaces are precisely lacking.

But if Germany has accompanied the development of the modern peoples only with the abstract activity of thought, without taking an active part in the real struggles of this development, it has on the other hand shared the sufferings of this development without sharing its enjoyments, its partial satisfaction. Abstract activity on the one side corresponds to abstract suffering on the other. Germany will therefore one morning find itself at the level of European decay before it has ever stood at the level of European emancipation. One will be able to compare it to a fetish-worshipper who is wasting away from the diseases of Christianity.

If one first considers the German governments, one finds them driven by the circumstances of the time, by the situation of Germany, by the standpoint of German education, and finally by their own fortunate instinct, to combine the civilized defects of the modern political world, whose advantages we do not possess, with the barbaric defects of the ancien régime, which we enjoy to the full, so that Germany must participate more and more, if not in the reason, then at least in the unreason of political formations that lie beyond its status quo. Is there, for example, a country in the world which so naively shares all the institutions of the constitutional political system without sharing its realities as so-called constitutional Germany? Or was it not necessarily a German governmental notion to combine the torments of censorship with the torments of the French September laws, which presuppose freedom of the press! Just as one found the gods of all nations in the Roman Pantheon, so one will find the sins of all forms of state in the Holy Roman German Empire. That this eclecticism will reach a hitherto unsuspected height is guaranteed in particular by the political-aesthetic gourmandise of a German king who intends to play all the roles of kingship – feudal as well as bureaucratic, absolute as well as constitutional, autocratic as well as democratic – if not through the person of the people, then in his own person, if not for the people, then for himself. Germany, as the defect of the political present constituted into a world of its own, will not be able to throw down the specifically German limits without throwing down the general limit of the political present.

It is not the radical revolution that is a utopian dream for Germany, not universal human emancipation, but rather the partial, merely political revolution, the revolution that leaves the pillars of the house standing. On what does a partial, merely political revolution rest? On a part of civil society emancipating itself and attaining general rule, on a particular class undertaking, from its particular situation, the general emancipation of society. This class liberates the whole of society, but only on the presupposition that the whole of society is in the situation of this class, thus, for example, possesses money and education or can acquire them at will.

No class of civil society can play this role without arousing a moment of enthusiasm in itself and in the mass, a moment in which it fraternizes and merges with society in general, is confused with it and felt and recognized as its general representative, a moment in which its claims and rights are in truth the rights and claims of society itself, in which it is really the social head and the social heart. Only in the name of the general rights of society can a particular class claim general rule for itself. To storm this emancipatory position, and thus to exploit politically all spheres of society in the interest of its own sphere, revolutionary energy and intellectual self-confidence alone are not sufficient. For the revolution of a people and the emancipation of a particular class of civil society to coincide, for one estate to count as the estate of the whole of society, all the defects of society must conversely be concentrated in another class; a particular estate must be the estate of general offence, the incorporation of the general limit; a particular social sphere must count as the notorious crime of the whole of society, so that liberation from this sphere appears as general self-liberation. For one estate to be par excellence the estate of liberation, another estate must conversely be the manifest estate of subjugation. The negative-general significance of the French nobility and the French clergy conditioned the positive-general significance of the class immediately adjoining and opposing them, the bourgeoisie.

But every particular class in Germany lacks not only the consistency, the sharpness, the courage, the ruthlessness that could stamp it as the negative representative of society. Every estate equally lacks that breadth of soul which identifies itself, if only momentarily, with the soul of the people, that genius which inspires material power to political force, that revolutionary boldness which hurls at its opponent the defiant slogan: I am nothing, and I should be everything. The main stock of German morality and honesty, not only of individuals but also of classes, is rather formed by that modest egoism which asserts its narrowness and allows it to be asserted against itself. The relationship of the various spheres of German society is therefore not dramatic but epic. Each of them begins to feel itself and to settle down beside the others with its particular claims, not as soon as it is oppressed, but as soon as, without its doing, the circumstances of the time create a social basis on which it can in its turn exert pressure. Even the moral self-confidence of the German middle class rests only on the consciousness of being the general representative of the philistine mediocrity of all the other classes. It is therefore not only the German kings who come to the throne mal-à-propos |at the wrong time|; it is every sphere of civil society that experiences its defeat before it has celebrated its victory, develops its own limit before it has overcome the limit facing it, asserts its narrow-hearted essence before it could assert its magnanimous essence, so that even the opportunity of a great role is always past before it was there, so that every class, as soon as it begins the struggle with the class above it, is entangled in the struggle with the class below it. Hence the princely power is in struggle against the monarchy, the bureaucrat in struggle against the nobility, the bourgeois in struggle against them all, while the proletarian is already beginning to find himself in struggle against the bourgeois. The middle class hardly dares to conceive the thought of emancipation from its own standpoint, and already the development of social conditions as well as the progress of political theory declare this standpoint itself antiquated or at least problematic.

In France it is enough for someone to be something in order to want to be everything. In Germany no one may be anything if he is not to renounce everything. In France partial emancipation is the ground of universal emancipation. In Germany universal emancipation is the conditio sine qua non of any partial one. In France it is the actuality, in Germany it is the impossibility of gradual liberation that must give birth to complete freedom. In France every class of the people is a political idealist and feels itself at first not as a particular class but as the representative of social needs in general. The role of emancipator therefore passes in turn, in dramatic movement, to the various classes of the French people, until it finally arrives at the class which no longer realizes social freedom on the presupposition of certain conditions lying outside human beings and yet created by human society, but rather organizes all the conditions of human existence on the presupposition of social freedom. In Germany, on the other hand, where practical life is as spiritless as spiritual life is unpractical, no class of civil society has the need and the capacity for general emancipation until it is forced to it by its immediate situation, by material necessity, by its very chains.

Where, then, is the positive possibility of German emancipation?

Answer: in the formation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which possesses a universal character through its universal sufferings and claims no particular right, because no particular wrong but wrong as such is done to it; which can no longer appeal to a historical title but only to the human title; which stands in no one-sided opposition to the consequences but in an all-round opposition to the presuppositions of the German political system; a sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all the other spheres of society and thereby emancipating all the other spheres of society; which, in a word, is the complete loss of the human being and can therefore win itself only through the complete regaining of the human being. This dissolution of society as a particular estate is the proletariat.

The proletariat is only beginning to come into being for Germany through the incoming industrial movement; for it is not naturally arising poverty but artificially produced poverty, not the mass of people mechanically pressed down by the weight of society but the mass of people arising from its acute dissolution, especially from the dissolution of the middle estate, that forms the proletariat – although, as goes without saying, naturally arising poverty and Christian-Germanic serfdom gradually also enter its ranks.

When the proletariat proclaims the dissolution of the previous world order, it only expresses the secret of its own existence, for it is the factual dissolution of this world order. When the proletariat demands the negation of private property, it only raises to the principle of society what society has raised to its principle, what is already embodied in it, without its doing, as the negative result of society. The proletarian then finds himself, in relation to the world coming into being, with the same right as the German king, in relation to the world that has come into being, when he calls the people his people as he calls the horse his horse. The king, in declaring the people his private property, only expresses that the private owner is king.

Just as philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its spiritual weapons in philosophy, and as soon as the lightning of thought has struck thoroughly into this naive soil of the people, the emancipation of the Germans into human beings will be accomplished.

Let us sum up the result: the only practically possible liberation of Germany is liberation from the standpoint of the theory that declares the human being to be the highest being for the human being. In Germany emancipation from the Middle Ages is possible only as emancipation at the same time from the partial overcomings of the Middle Ages. In Germany no kind of servitude can be broken without breaking every kind of servitude. Thorough Germany cannot revolutionize without revolutionizing from the ground up. The emancipation of the German is the emancipation of the human being. The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart the proletariat. Philosophy cannot realize itself without the abolition of the proletariat; the proletariat cannot abolish itself without the realization of philosophy. When all the inner conditions are fulfilled, the German day of resurrection will be proclaimed by the crowing of the Gallic cock.

DE