Why read Hegel laboriously when AI can explain it?

In brief: For information about Hegel an AI is excellent — this edition was itself made with its help. For what actually matters in Hegel it is useless, and the reason can be read in Hegel himself: a result without the path that leads to it is, for him, not knowledge but the opposite.

Why the result alone is of no use

The sentence stands in the Preface to the Phenomenology and is unusually drastic:

For the matter is not exhausted in its purpose but in its working out, nor is the result the actual whole, but the result together with its coming to be; […] the naked result is the corpse which has left the tendency behind it.

Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface

A summary is exactly that: a naked result. Whoever is told that § 41 determines property as the first existence of freedom has a piece of information. Whoever reads the paragraph carries out the transition along with it — and learns in his own thinking why the will must externalize itself in a thing, and what is not self-evident about that. Only in the second case can one also dispute that the transition succeeds. A summary one can believe or not; an argument one can examine.

Memory without sense

Hegel described the case of knowledge mastered without sense long before there were machines to embody it. It is about learning by heart series of words in whose connection there is no understanding:

The capacity to retain by heart series of words in whose connection there is no understanding, or which are already senseless in themselves (a series of proper names), is for that reason so utterly remarkable because spirit is essentially this: to be with itself — whereas here spirit is as though externalized within itself, and its activity is a mechanism.

Encyclopaedia (1830), § 463 Remark

One need not apply this passage to language models to see what is at issue: spirit is for Hegel not a store but an act — „to be with itself“. Knowledge that merely lies ready to be retrieved is, on this determination, not yet with itself. Whether a machine could ever be so is a separate question: Can a machine have spirit?

The uncomfortable turn: who is the bondsman here?

It is tempting to call the AI the bondsman who takes over the work. It is precisely here that Hegel becomes awkward. For in the Phenomenology it is not the lord who gains something from the relation but the bondsman: because he works, and in working forms the object, he comes to consciousness of himself. The lord, who only enjoys and does not work, remains dependent and gets no further.

Transposed: whoever gives away the effort does not give away the trouble but the yield. That is no argument against the tool — it is an argument for using it in the right place.

What the AI is good for here

For a great deal, and this edition makes use of it. It finds parallel passages across the whole edition of the works. It checks whether a famous quotation really stands in the printed text or only in a transcript (see Is this sentence even Hegel’s?). It can recast an obscure sentence in everyday language — which teachers of Hegel regard as the hardest and most important exercise there is. It can formulate objections against which one tests one’s own reading.

What it is not good for is replacing the reading. And it has a practical fault that is particularly expensive with Hegel: it invents quotations that sound plausible. Anyone who receives an answer about a passage in Hegel should look it up in the text — here, on the page of the paragraph in question.

And for listening

Which video series and lecture courses are actually worth it is set out in the answer to Which videos are there as an introduction to Hegel’s philosophy? – including why there is still no continuous course on the Groundlines.

Sources. Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface (result and coming to be); chapter IV A (lordship and bondage; the formative labour of the bondsman). – Encyclopaedia (1830) § 463 Remark (mechanical memory), §§ 381–384. – Groundlines § 41 ff. – On the pedagogy: Robert C. Solomon, „Teaching Hegel“, Teaching Philosophy 2 (1977), holds the reformulation of Hegelian sentences in one’s own words to be „the single most difficult pedagogical task“ – and the only one that shows whether something has been understood.

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