Only a partial or temporary use, and likewise a partial or temporary possession (as itself the partial or temporary possibility of using the thing), belonging to me, is therefore distinct from the ownership of the thing itself. If the entire compass of use were mine, while the abstract ownership were to belong to another, then the thing, as mine, would be wholly permeated by my will (previous §, and § 52), and yet there would at the same time be within it something impenetrable for me — the, indeed empty, will of another; I would be, in the thing, as a positive will, at once objective to myself and not objective to myself — the relation of an absolute contradiction. – Property is therefore essentially free, full property.

The distinction between the right to the entire compass of use and abstract ownership belongs to the empty understanding, for which the Idea — here as the unity of ownership, or indeed of the personal will in general, and its reality — is not the truth, but for which these two moments, in their separation from one another, count as something true. This distinction, therefore, taken as an actual relation, is that of an empty lordship, which (if the derangement were not spoken of merely in respect of the bare representation of the subject and of its actuality, the two of which stand in immediate contradiction within one and the same thing) might be called a derangement of personality, since mine, in one and the same object, would unmediatedly have to be both my own single exclusive will and another single exclusive will. – In the Institutes, book II, title IV, it is said: ‘Usufruct is the right to use and enjoy the fruits of a thing belonging to another, while preserving the substance of the thing.’ It goes on to say, in the same place: ‘yet lest properties should become altogether useless through the perpetual separation of the usufruct from them, it has been decided that the usufruct is, under certain circumstances, extinguished and reverts to the property.’ – Placuit [it has been decided] — as though it were merely a matter of pleasure or decree to give that empty distinction some sense through this provision. A property perpetually separated from its usufruct would not merely be useless, but would no longer be a property at all. – To discuss other distinctions within ownership itself, such as that between res mancipi and nec mancipi, dominium Quiritarium and Bonitarium, and the like, does not belong here, since they bear on no conceptual determination of ownership and are merely the historical curiosities of this branch of law; but the relations of dominium directum and dominium utile, the emphyteutic contract, and the further relations of feudal estates with their hereditary and other rents, guild dues, transfer fees, and so forth, in their manifold determinations — where such burdens are inalienable — contain, on the one hand, the above distinction, and, on the other hand, do not, precisely insofar as burdens are attached to the dominium utile, whereby the dominium directum itself becomes a dominium utile. Were such relations to contain nothing but that distinction in its strict abstraction, then what would properly stand opposed within them would not be two lords (domini), but an owner and an empty lord. But on account of the burdens involved, it is two owners who stand in this relation. They are not, however, in the relation of a joint ownership. The transition from the former relation to this latter one lies closest at hand — a transition that has already begun wherever, in respect of the dominium directum, the yield is calculated and regarded as the essential factor, so that the incalculable element of lordship over a property — which may once have been held to be the noble factor — is subordinated to the utile, which is here the rational factor.

It is now some fifteen hundred years since the freedom of the person began to flourish through Christianity and became a universal principle among, moreover, only a small portion of the human race. The freedom of property, however, has, one might say, been recognized as a principle here and there only since yesterday. – An example, from world history, of the length of time spirit requires in order to progress in its self-consciousness — and a caution against the impatience of opinion.

‘Usufruct is the right to use a thing belonging to another and to draw its fruits, while the substance of the thing is preserved.’ – ‘So that properties should not, through the perpetual separation of the usufruct from them, become altogether useless, it was established that under certain circumstances the usufruct is extinguished and reverts to the property.’