The good stands to the particular subject in the relation of being the essential element of its will, so that the subject has, quite simply, its obligation therein. Since particularity is distinguished from the good and falls within the subjective will, the good at first has only the determination of universal, abstract essentiality — duty. Because of this determination of duty, duty ought to be done for duty’s sake.
β) Law, good – here as [coming] out of me – particular, peculiar content – enter into difference –
α) essentiality – obligation – duty
β) duty for duty’s sake – not for the sake of its particular content, but because [it is] duty – separation of the content from essentiality as such –
The essential [element] of the will is, for me, duty; but if I now know nothing more than that the good is my duty, I still remain standing at the abstraction of it. I am to do my duty for its own sake, and it is my own objectivity in the true sense that I accomplish in duty: in doing it, I am with myself and free. It has been the merit and the lofty standpoint of Kantian philosophy, in its practical part, to have brought out this significance of duty.
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