Encyclopaedia, Introduction

§ 1

Philosophy lacks the advantage enjoyed by the other sciences of being able to presuppose its objects as immediately granted by representation, and the method of cognition, for beginning and advance, as already accepted. It does, indeed, have its objects at first in common with religion. Both have the truth as their object, and indeed in the highest sense – in the sense that God is the truth and he alone is the truth. Both then further treat of the domain of the finite, of nature and of the human spirit, of their relation to each other and to God as to their truth. Philosophy may therefore well presuppose an acquaintance with its objects – indeed it must presuppose such an acquaintance, as well as an interest in them in any case – if only because consciousness, in the order of time, forms representations of objects before it forms concepts of them, and thinking spirit even advances to thinking cognition and comprehension only by passing through representing and turning towards it.

But in thinking consideration it soon becomes apparent that it includes the demand to show the necessity of its content, to prove both the very being and the determinations of its objects. That acquaintance with them thus appears insufficient, and making or accepting presuppositions and assurances appears inadmissible. At the same time, however, the difficulty of making a beginning arises, since a beginning, as something immediate, makes its presupposition, or rather is itself one.

§ 2

Philosophy can at first be determined in general as the thinking consideration of objects. But if it is correct (and it will indeed be correct) that the human being is distinguished from the animal by thinking, then everything human is human through this and through this alone, that it is brought about by thinking. Since, however, philosophy is a peculiar mode of thinking, a mode by which thinking becomes cognition, and comprehending cognition, its thinking will also be different from the thinking that is active in everything human, indeed that brings about the humanity of the human, however much it is identical with it and in itself only one thinking. This distinction is connected with the fact that the human content of consciousness, grounded by thinking, does not at first appear in the form of thought, but as feeling, intuition, representation – forms that are to be distinguished from thinking as form.

It is an old prejudice, a proposition that has become trivial, that the human being is distinguished from the animal by thinking; it may seem trivial, but it would also have to seem strange if there were a need to recall such an old belief. Yet it can be considered a need in view of the prejudice of the present time, which separates feeling and thinking from each other in such a way that they are supposed to be opposed, even so hostile that feeling, especially religious feeling, is defiled, perverted, indeed perhaps even annihilated by thinking, and that religion and religiosity essentially do not have their root and place in thinking. In such a separation it is forgotten that only the human being is capable of religion, while the animal has no religion, any more than right and morality belong to it. When that separation of religion from thinking is asserted, what one usually has in mind is the thinking that can be described as reflection – reflecting thinking, which has thoughts as such for its content and brings them to consciousness. It is the negligence in knowing and heeding the distinction that philosophy determinately states with regard to thinking that produces the crudest representations of and reproaches against philosophy. Since religion, right and ethical life belong only to the human being, and only because he is a thinking being, thinking in general has not been inactive in the religious, the legal and the ethical – be it feeling and faith or representation; its activity and its productions are present and contained in them. But it is one thing to have such feelings and representations determined and permeated by thinking – and another to have thoughts about them. The thoughts about those modes of consciousness produced by reflection are what is comprised under reflection, argumentation and the like, and then also philosophy. In this connection it has happened, and the misunderstanding has prevailed still more often, that such reflection has been asserted to be the condition, indeed the only way, by which we arrive at the representation of and the holding-to-be-true of the eternal and true. Thus, for example, the (now rather former) metaphysical proofs of the existence of God have been passed off as though belief in and conviction of the existence of God could essentially and solely be brought about through knowledge of them and conviction of them. Such an assertion would amount to saying that we could not eat until we had acquired knowledge of the chemical, botanical or zoological determinations of our food, and that we would have to wait with digestion until we had completed the study of anatomy and physiology. If that were so, these sciences in their field, like philosophy in its own, would of course gain greatly in usefulness; indeed their usefulness would be raised to an absolute and universal indispensability; but rather, instead of being indispensable, they would all not exist at all.

§ 3

The content that fills our consciousness, of whatever kind it may be, constitutes the determinacy of feelings, intuitions, images, representations, of purposes, duties and so on, and of thoughts and concepts. Feeling, intuition, image and so on are in this respect the forms of such content, which remains one and the same whether it is felt, intuited, represented, willed, and whether it is only felt or felt, intuited and so on with an admixture of thoughts, or thought entirely unmixed. In any one of these forms, or in the mixture of several, the content is an object of consciousness. In this objectivity, however, the determinacies of these forms also come over into the content; so that with each of these forms a particular object seems to arise, and what is in itself the same can look like a different content.

Since the determinacies of feeling, intuition, desire, will and so on, insofar as they are known, are in general called representations, it can be said in general that philosophy puts thoughts, categories, but more precisely concepts, in the place of representations. Representations in general can be regarded as metaphors of thoughts and concepts. But by having representations one does not yet know their significance for thinking, not yet their thoughts and concepts. Conversely, too, it is two different things to have thoughts and concepts and to know which representations, intuitions, feelings correspond to them. – One side of what is called the unintelligibility of philosophy relates to this. The difficulty lies partly in an inability, which in itself is only lack of practice, to think abstractly, that is, to hold fast pure thoughts and to move in them. In our ordinary consciousness thoughts are clothed in and united with familiar sensuous and spiritual material, and in thinking over, reflecting and arguing we mix feelings, intuitions, representations with thoughts (in every proposition of entirely sensuous content – “this leaf is green” – categories, being, singularity are already mixed in). But it is another thing to make the thoughts themselves, unmixed, the object. – The other part of the unintelligibility is the impatience of wanting to have before oneself, in the manner of representation, what is in consciousness as thought and concept. One meets the expression that one does not know what one is to think in connection with a concept that has been grasped; in connection with a concept there is nothing further to think than the concept itself. But the sense of that expression is a longing for an already known, familiar representation; it is to consciousness as if, with the mode of representation, the ground had been withdrawn from it on which it otherwise has its firm and homely standing. When it finds itself transported into the pure region of concepts, it does not know where in the world it is. – Hence writers, preachers, orators and so on are found most intelligible who recite to their readers or listeners things that these already know by heart, that are familiar to them and that are self-evident.

§ 4

In relation to our common consciousness, philosophy would first have to demonstrate, or even to awaken, the need for its peculiar mode of cognition. In relation to the objects of religion, however, to truth in general, it would have to prove its ability to know them from out of itself; in relation to a difference from religious representations that comes to light, it would have to justify its divergent determinations.

§ 5

For the purpose of a preliminary understanding about the distinction stated and about the insight connected with it, that the true content of our consciousness is preserved in its translation into the form of thought and concept, indeed only then set in its proper light, another old prejudice may be recalled, namely that in order to find out what is true in objects and events, and also in feelings, intuitions, opinions, representations and so on, reflection is required. But reflection at least does this in any case: it transforms feelings, representations and so on into thoughts.

Insofar as it is only thinking that philosophy claims as the peculiar form of its business, while every human being can think by nature, there occurs, by virtue of this abstraction, which leaves out the distinction stated in § 3, the opposite of what was mentioned before as a complaint about the unintelligibility of philosophy. This science often suffers the contempt that even those who have not taken any trouble with it express the conceit that they understand by nature what philosophy is all about, and are able, just as they go and stand in an ordinary education, especially on the basis of religious feelings, to philosophize and to judge it. One grants that one must have studied the other sciences in order to know them, and that only by virtue of such knowledge is one entitled to have a judgement about them. One grants that in order to make a shoe one must have learned and practised it, although everyone possesses in his foot the measure for it, and hands, and in them the natural skill for the required business. Only for philosophizing itself is such study, learning and effort supposed not to be required. – This comfortable opinion has in the most recent times received its confirmation through the doctrine of immediate knowing, knowing through intuition.

§ 6

On the other side it is just as important that philosophy be clear that its content is none other than the substance originally produced and producing itself in the domain of living spirit, made into the world, the outer and inner world of consciousness – that its content is actuality. The first consciousness of this content we call experience. A thoughtful consideration of the world already distinguishes what, in the wide realm of outer and inner existence, is only appearance, transient and insignificant, and what in itself truly deserves the name of actuality. Since philosophy is distinguished from other ways of becoming conscious of this one and the same substance only by form, its agreement with actuality and experience is necessary. Indeed, this agreement can be regarded as an at least external touchstone of the truth of a philosophy, just as it is to be regarded as the highest final purpose of science to bring about, through the cognition of this agreement, the reconciliation of self-conscious reason with reason that is, with actuality.

In the Preface to my Philosophy of Right the following propositions are found:

What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational.

These simple propositions have seemed striking to many and have met with hostility, and indeed even from those who do not want to deny that they possess philosophy, and certainly religion. It will be unnecessary to cite religion in this respect, since its doctrines of the divine government of the world express these propositions too determinately. But as regards the philosophical sense, so much education is to be presupposed that one knows not only that God is actual – that he is the most actual, that he alone is truly actual – but also, as regards the formal side, that existence in general is partly appearance and only partly actuality. In common life one calls any notion, error, evil and whatever belongs on this side, as well as any existence, however stunted and transient, an actuality, contingently. But even to an ordinary feeling a contingent existence will not deserve the emphatic name of something actual; – the contingent is an existence that has no greater value than that of something possible, that can just as well not be as be. But when I have spoken of actuality, it should go without saying in what sense I use this expression, since in a detailed Logic I have also treated actuality and have distinguished it precisely not only from the contingent, which after all also has existence, but more closely from existence, concrete existence and other determinations.1 – The actuality of the rational is already opposed by the representation both that ideas, ideals are nothing but chimeras and philosophy a system of such figments of the brain, and conversely that ideas and ideals are something far too excellent to have actuality, or likewise something too impotent to procure it for themselves. But the separation of actuality from the idea is especially popular with the understanding, which takes the dreams of its abstractions for something true and is vain about the ought that it likes to prescribe, especially in the political field too, as if the world had waited for it in order to learn how it ought to be but is not; if the world were as it ought to be, what would become of the precocious wisdom of its ought? When it turns with the ought against trivial, external and transient objects, institutions, conditions and so on, which may also have a great relative importance for a certain time, for particular circles, it may well be right and in such a case find much that does not correspond to universal correct determinations; who would not be clever enough to see much in his surroundings that is in fact not as it ought to be? But this cleverness is wrong to imagine that with such objects and their ought it finds itself within the interests of philosophical science. This science has to do only with the idea, which is not so impotent as merely to ought to be and not to be actual, and thereby with an actuality of which those objects, institutions, conditions and so on are only the superficial outside.

§ 7

Since reflection in general first contains the principle (also in the sense of the beginning) of philosophy, and after it had blossomed again in its independence in more recent times (after the times of the Lutheran Reformation), the name philosophy, since reflection did not from the outset keep merely abstract, as in the philosophizing beginnings of the Greeks, but at the same time threw itself upon the seemingly measureless material of the world of appearance, has been given to all that knowledge which occupies itself with the cognition of the fixed measure and the universal in the sea of empirical singularities, and of the necessary, of laws, in the apparent disorder of the infinite mass of the contingent, and which has thereby at the same time taken its content from its own intuiting and perceiving of the outer and the inner, from present nature as well as from present spirit and the breast of the human being.

The principle of experience contains the infinitely important determination that, for the acceptance and holding-to-be-true of a content, the human being must himself be present in it, more determinately, that he must find such content at one with and united with the certainty of himself. He must himself be present in it, be it only with his external senses or with his deeper spirit, his essential self-consciousness. – This principle is the same as what is nowadays called faith, immediate knowing, revelation in the external and above all in one’s own inner being. We call those sciences which have been named philosophy empirical sciences, from the starting point they take. But the essential thing they aim at and bring forth are laws, universal propositions, a theory; the thoughts of what is there. Thus Newtonian physics has been called natural philosophy, whereas, for example, Hugo Grotius, by putting together the historical conduct of peoples towards one another and with the support of an ordinary argumentation, set up universal principles, a theory, which can be called philosophy of external state law. – Among the English the name philosophy still generally has this determination; Newton continues to enjoy the fame of the greatest philosopher; even down to the price lists of instrument makers, those instruments which are not brought under a particular heading of magnetic or electrical apparatus, thermometers, barometers and so on, are called philosophical instruments; of course, not a combination of wood, iron and so on, but thinking alone ought to be called the instrument of philosophy.2 – Thus in particular the science of political economy, which we owe to the most recent times, is also called philosophy, what we usually call rational state economy or perhaps state economy of intelligence.3

§ 8

However satisfying this cognition is at first in its field, there appears, in the first place, yet another circle of objects that are not comprised in it – freedom, spirit, God. They are not to be found on that ground, not because they are supposed not to belong to experience – they are indeed not experienced sensuously, but whatever is in consciousness at all is experienced; this is even a tautological proposition -, but because these objects present themselves at once, according to their content, as infinite.

There is an old proposition which is usually ascribed falsely to Aristotle, as if it were meant to express the standpoint of his philosophy: “nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu” – there is nothing in thinking that has not been in the sense, in experience. It would only be a misunderstanding if speculative philosophy did not want to grant this proposition. But conversely it will just as much assert: “nihil est in sensu, quod non fuerit in intellectu” – in the entirely general sense that the νους, and in a deeper determination spirit, is the cause of the world, and in the closer sense (see § 2) that legal, ethical, religious feeling is a feeling and thereby an experience of such a content as has its root and its seat only in thinking.

§ 9

In the second place, subjective reason demands its further satisfaction as regards form; this form is necessity in general (see § 1). In that scientific mode, on the one hand the universal contained in it, the genus and so on, is undetermined for itself, not connected for itself with the particular; rather the two are external and contingent to each other, just as the particularities combined are for themselves mutually external and contingent. On the other hand, the beginnings are everywhere immediacies, something found, presuppositions. In both respects the form of necessity is not satisfied. Reflection, insofar as it is directed to satisfying this need, is properly philosophical, speculative thinking. As reflection, therefore, which in its community with that first reflection is at the same time different from it, it has, besides the common forms, also peculiar ones, the universal one of which is the concept.

The relationship of speculative science to the other sciences is in this respect only this: that it does not leave the empirical content of the latter aside but recognizes and uses it, that it likewise recognizes the universal of these sciences, the laws, the genera and so on, and employs it for its own content, but that it also further introduces other categories into these categories and gives them validity. The difference relates in this respect solely to this alteration of the categories. Speculative logic contains the former logic and metaphysics, preserves the same forms of thought, laws and objects, but at the same time develops and transforms them further with further categories. From the concept in the speculative sense, what has usually been called concept is to be distinguished. It is in the latter, one-sided sense that the assertion has been set up, and repeated thousands upon thousands of times and made into a prejudice, that the infinite cannot be grasped through concepts.

§ 10

This thinking of the philosophical mode of cognition itself needs to be grasped in its necessity as well as justified in its ability to know the absolute objects. But such an insight is itself philosophical cognition, which therefore falls only within philosophy. A preliminary explication would thus have to be an unphilosophical one and could be no more than a tissue of presuppositions, assurances and argumentations – that is, of contingent assertions against which the opposite ones could be asserted with the same right.

A main point of view of the critical philosophy is that before going on to know God, the essence of things and so on, the faculty of cognition itself must first be examined as to whether it is capable of accomplishing this; one must get to know the instrument first, before undertaking the work that is to be accomplished by means of it; if it were insufficient, all effort would otherwise be wasted in vain. – This thought has seemed so plausible that it has aroused the greatest admiration and assent and has led cognition back from its interest in objects and its business with them to itself, to the formal. If, however, one does not want to deceive oneself with words, it is easy to see that other instruments may well be examined and judged in some other way than by undertaking the peculiar work for which they are destined. But the examination of cognition cannot take place otherwise than by cognizing; in the case of this so-called tool, to examine it means nothing other than to cognize it. But to want to cognize before one cognizes is as absurd as the wise resolution of that scholastic to learn to swim before he ventured into the water. Reinhold4 , who recognized the confusion that prevails in such a beginning, proposed as a remedy to begin provisionally with a hypothetical and problematic philosophizing and to carry on in it, one does not know how, until it should perhaps turn out further on that by such a path one had reached the primordially true. Considered more closely, this path would come down to the usual thing, namely to the analysis of an empirical foundation or of a provisional assumption put into a definition. It is not to be denied that there is a correct consciousness in declaring the usual course of presuppositions and provisional measures to be a hypothetical and problematic procedure. But the correct insight does not change the character of such a procedure; it at once expresses its insufficiency.

§ 11

More precisely, the need for philosophy can be determined as follows: since spirit, as feeling and intuiting, has the sensuous as its objects, as imagination images, as will purposes and so on, it also, in opposition to or merely in distinction from these forms of its existence and of its objects, procures satisfaction for its highest inwardness, thinking, and gains thinking as its object. Thus it comes to itself, in the deepest sense of the word, for its principle, its unmixed selfhood, is thinking. But in this business of its own it happens that thinking entangles itself in contradictions, that is, loses itself in the fixed non-identity of thoughts, thus does not reach itself, but rather remains caught in its opposite. The higher need goes against this result of merely understanding thinking and is grounded in this, that thinking does not let go of itself, remains true to itself even in this conscious loss of its being-with-itself, “that it may overcome”, and accomplishes in thinking itself the resolution of its own contradictions.

The insight that the nature of thinking itself is dialectic, that as understanding it must fall into the negative of itself, into contradiction, constitutes a main side of logic. Thinking, despairing of being able to accomplish from out of itself the resolution of the contradiction into which it has put itself, returns to the resolutions and pacifications that have fallen to the lot of spirit in other of its modes and forms. In this return, however, thinking would not need to fall into the misology of which Plato already had experience before him, and to behave polemically against itself, as happens in the assertion of so-called immediate knowing as the exclusive form of the consciousness of truth.

§ 12

The origin of philosophy, which proceeds from the need just named, has experience, immediate and argumentative consciousness, as its starting point. Stimulated by this as by an incitement, thinking behaves essentially in such a way that it raises itself above natural, sensuous and argumentative consciousness into the unmixed element of itself and thus at first gives itself a distancing, negative relationship to that beginning. It thus first finds its satisfaction in itself, in the idea of the universal essence of these appearances; this idea (the absolute, God) can be more or less abstract. Conversely, the empirical sciences bring with them the incitement to conquer the form in which the wealth of their content is offered as something merely immediate and found, a manifold placed side by side, and hence altogether contingent, and to raise this content to necessity – this incitement tears thinking out of that universality and the satisfaction granted in itself and drives it to development from out of itself. This development is on the one hand only a taking up of the content and its given determinations, and on the other hand at the same time gives it the shape of proceeding freely, in the sense of original thinking, only according to the necessity of the matter itself.

Of the relationship of immediacy and mediation in consciousness we shall have to speak expressly and in more detail below. Here attention need only be drawn provisionally to this: even if the two moments appear as distinct, neither of them can be lacking, and they are in inseparable connection. – Thus knowledge of God, as of everything supersensuous in general, essentially contains an elevation above sensuous sensation or intuition; it thereby contains a negative attitude towards this first, but in that, mediation. For mediation is a beginning and a having advanced to a second, so that this second is only insofar as one has come to it from something other than it. But knowledge of God is no less independent of that empirical side for this; indeed it gives itself its independence essentially through this negation and elevation. – If mediation is made into conditionedness and one-sidedly singled out, one can say – but not much is said by it – that philosophy owes its first origin to experience (the a posteriori) – in fact thinking is essentially the negation of something immediately present -, just as much as one owes eating to food, for without food one could not eat; eating is, of course, represented in this relationship as ungrateful, for it is the consuming of that to which it is supposed to owe itself. Thinking is in this sense no less ungrateful. But the proper immediacy of thinking, reflected into itself and therefore mediated within itself (the a priori), is universality, its being-with-itself in general; in it thinking is satisfied in itself, and to that extent indifference towards particularization, and thereby towards its development, is native to it. Just as religion, whether more developed or uncultivated, whether developed into scientific consciousness or kept in unprejudiced faith and heart, possesses the same intensive nature of satisfaction and blessedness. If thinking stops at the universality of the ideas – as is necessarily the case in the first philosophies (for example the being of the Eleatic school, the becoming of Heraclitus and the like) -, it is rightly reproached with formalism; even in a developed philosophy it can happen that only the abstract propositions or determinations, for example that in the absolute all is one, the identity of the subjective and the objective, are grasped and merely repeated in the particular. In relation to the first abstract universality of thinking, it has a correct and thorough sense that the development of philosophy is owed to experience. The empirical sciences, on the one hand, do not stop at perceiving the singularities of appearance; thinking, they have worked the material up to meet philosophy by finding the universal determinations, genera and laws; they thus prepare that content of the particular for being able to be taken up into philosophy. On the other hand, they thereby contain the compulsion for thinking to advance itself to these concrete determinations. The taking up of this content, in which thinking sublates the immediacy still clinging to it and its being given, is at the same time a development of thinking out of itself. Since philosophy thus owes its development to the empirical sciences, it gives their content the most essential shape of the freedom (of the a priori) of thinking and the confirmation of necessity, instead of the warrant of finding it and of the experienced fact, so that the fact becomes the presentation and imitation of the original and completely independent activity of thinking.

§ 13

In the peculiar shape of external history, the origin and development of philosophy is represented as the history of this science. This shape gives the stages of development of the idea the form of a contingent succession and perhaps of a mere diversity of principles and of their elaborations in their philosophies. But the master builder of this labour of millennia is the one living spirit, whose thinking nature it is to bring to its consciousness what it is, and, since this has thus become an object, to be at the same time already raised above it and a higher stage within itself. The history of philosophy shows in the philosophies that appear different partly only one philosophy at different stages of development, partly that the particular principles, one of which lay at the basis of each system, are only branches of one and the same whole. The philosophy that is last in time is the result of all preceding philosophies and must therefore contain the principles of all; it is therefore, if it is otherwise philosophy, the most developed, richest and most concrete.

In view of the appearance of so many different philosophies, the universal and the particular must be distinguished according to their proper determination. The universal, taken formally and placed beside the particular, itself also becomes something particular. Such a position would of itself strike one as inappropriate and clumsy with objects of common life, as when, for example, someone who asked for fruit refused cherries, pears, grapes and so on because they were cherries, pears, grapes, but not fruit. With regard to philosophy, however, one allows oneself to justify disdaining it on the ground that there are such different philosophies and each is only a philosophy, not philosophy itself – as if cherries were not fruit too. It also happens that a philosophy whose principle is the universal is placed beside those whose principle is a particular one, indeed even beside doctrines that assure us there is no philosophy at all, in the sense that both are only different views of philosophy, much as if light and darkness were called only two different kinds of light.

§ 14

The same development of thinking which is presented in the history of philosophy is presented in philosophy itself, but freed from that historical externality, purely in the element of thinking. The free and true thought is concrete within itself, and so it is idea, and in its whole universality the idea or the absolute. The science of it is essentially system, because the true, as concrete, is only as unfolding itself within itself and taking and holding itself together in unity, that is, as totality, and only through distinguishing and determining its distinctions can it be their necessity and the freedom of the whole.

A philosophizing without system can be nothing scientific; besides the fact that such philosophizing for itself expresses rather a subjective cast of mind, it is contingent in its content. A content has its justification only as a moment of the whole, but outside it an unfounded presupposition or subjective certainty; many philosophical writings confine themselves to expressing in this way only dispositions and opinions. – By a system is falsely understood a philosophy with a limited principle distinguished from others; on the contrary, it is the principle of true philosophy to contain all particular principles within itself.

§ 15

Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle closing in upon itself, but in each the philosophical idea is in a particular determinacy or element. The single circle, because it is totality within itself, also breaks through the limit of its element and grounds a further sphere; the whole therefore presents itself as a circle of circles, each of which is a necessary moment, so that the system of their peculiar elements constitutes the whole idea, which likewise appears in each single one.

§ 16

As encyclopaedia, science is not presented in the detailed development of its particularization, but is to be confined to the beginnings and the basic concepts of the particular sciences.

How much of the particular parts belongs to constituting a particular science is undetermined insofar as the part must be not only an isolated moment but itself a totality in order to be something true. The whole of philosophy therefore truly constitutes one science, but it can also be regarded as a whole of several particular sciences. – The philosophical encyclopaedia distinguishes itself from another, ordinary encyclopaedia in that the latter is supposed to be something like an aggregate of the sciences, which are taken up contingently and empirically, and among which there are also those that only bear the name of sciences but are otherwise themselves a mere collection of pieces of knowledge. The unity into which the sciences are brought together in such an aggregate is, because they are taken up externally, likewise an external one – an order. For the same reason, and since the materials too are of a contingent nature, this order must remain an attempt and always show unsuitable sides. – Besides the fact, then, that the philosophical encyclopaedia excludes 1. mere aggregates of pieces of knowledge – as, for example, philology appears at first -, it also excludes in any case 2. those that have mere arbitrariness as their ground, as for example heraldry; sciences of the latter kind are the thoroughly positive ones. 3. Other sciences are also called positive which nevertheless have a rational ground and beginning. This component belongs to philosophy; but the positive side remains peculiar to them. The positive in the sciences is of various kinds. 1. Their beginning, rational in itself, passes over into the contingent because they have to bring the universal down into empirical singularity and actuality. In this field of changeability and contingency, not the concept but only reasons can be made to count. Jurisprudence, for example, or the system of direct and indirect taxes require ultimate precise decisions which lie outside the being-determined-in-and-for-itself of the concept and therefore admit a latitude for determination that can be grasped in one way according to one reason and in another according to another, and is capable of no certain ultimate. Likewise the idea of nature, in its singularization, runs off into contingencies, and natural history, geography, medicine and so on get into determinations of existence, into species and distinctions that are determined by external chance and by play, not by reason. History too belongs here, insofar as the idea is its essence, while its appearance is in contingency and in the field of arbitrariness. 2. Such sciences are also positive insofar as they do not recognize their determinations as finite, nor show the transition of these and of their whole sphere into a higher one, but accept them as simply valid. Connected with this finitude of form, as the first is the finitude of material, is 3. that of the ground of cognition, which is partly argumentation, partly feeling, faith, the authority of others, in general the authority of inner or outer intuition. Philosophy too which wants to ground itself on anthropology, facts of consciousness, inner intuition or outer experience belongs here. [4.] It may further be that merely the form of scientific presentation is empirical, but that meaningful intuition arranges what are only appearances in the way that the inner sequence of the concept is. It belongs to such empiricism that, through the opposition and manifoldness of the appearances put together, the external, contingent circumstances of the conditions sublate themselves, whereby the universal then comes before the mind. – A thoughtful experimental physics, history and so on will in this way present the rational science of nature and of human events and deeds in an external image that mirrors the concept.

§ 17

For the beginning that philosophy has to make, it seems in general to begin, like the other sciences, with a subjective presupposition, namely to have to make a particular object – as elsewhere space, number and so on, so here thinking – the object of thinking. But this is the free act of thinking, to place itself at the standpoint where it is for itself and thereby itself produces and gives itself its object. Further, the standpoint which thus appears as immediate must, within the science, make itself into the result, and indeed into its last result, in which it reaches its beginning again and returns into itself. In this way philosophy shows itself as a circle returning into itself, which has no beginning in the sense of other sciences, so that the beginning has a relation only to the subject, as the one who wants to resolve to philosophize, but not to the science as such. – Or, what is the same, the concept of the science, and thus the first concept – and because it is the first, it contains the separation that thinking is an object for a (as it were external) philosophizing subject – must be grasped by the science itself. This is even its sole purpose, deed and goal: to arrive at the concept of its concept and so at its return and satisfaction.

§ 18

Just as no preliminary, general representation can be given of a philosophy, for only the whole of the science is the presentation of the idea, so too its division can only be comprehended from the idea; like the idea, from which it is to be taken, it is something anticipated. But the idea proves to be thinking that is simply identical with itself, and this at the same time as the activity of setting itself over against itself in order to be for itself, and in this other to be only with itself. Thus the science falls into three parts: I. Logic, the science of the idea in and for itself; II. The philosophy of nature, as the science of the idea in its otherness; III. The philosophy of spirit, as of the idea that returns into itself out of its otherness.

It was remarked above in § 15 that the distinctions of the particular philosophical sciences are only determinations of the idea itself, and that it is the idea alone that presents itself in these different elements. In nature it is nothing other than the idea that would be known, but it is in the form of externalization, just as in spirit it is the very same idea as being for itself and becoming in and for itself. Such a determination, in which the idea appears, is at the same time a fluid moment; hence the single science is just as much this: to know its content as an object that is, as also this: to know immediately in it its transition into its higher circle. The representation of division therefore has the incorrectness of placing the particular parts or sciences side by side, as if they were only static and, in their distinction, substantial, like species.

  1. Science of Logic, Book 2, Section 3: “Actuality” ↩︎
  2. The journal edited by Thomson also has the title: Annals of Philosophy; or, Magazine of Chemistry, Mineralogy, Mechanics, Natural History, Agriculture, and the Arts. [Thomas Thomson, Annals of Philosophy; or, Magazine of Chemistry, Mineralogy, Mechanics, Natural History, Agriculture, and the Arts, 16 vols., London 1813-1820] – From this one can imagine for oneself what sort of materials are called philosophical here. – Among the announcements of newly published books I recently found the following in an English newspaper: The Art of preserving the Hair on philosophical principles, neatly printed in post 8., price 7 sh. – By philosophical principles of the preservation of the hair, chemical, physiological and similar ones are probably meant. ↩︎
  3. In the mouths of English statesmen, in relation to the universal principles of political economy, the expression philosophical principles occurs frequently, also in public speeches. In the parliamentary session of 1825 (2 Feb.), Brougham, on the occasion of the address with which the speech from the throne was to be answered, expressed himself thus: “the statesmanlike and philosophical principles of free trade – for they are undoubtedly philosophical -, on the adoption of which His Majesty has today congratulated Parliament”. – But not only this member of the opposition; at the annual dinner which (in the same month) the Shipowners’ Society held under the chairmanship of the First Minister, Earl Liverpool, with the Secretary of State Canning and the Paymaster General of the Army, Sir Charles Long, at his sides, the Secretary of State Canning said in reply to the toast to his health: “A period has recently begun in which ministers have had it in their power to apply the right maxims of profound philosophy to the administration of this country.” – However English philosophy may differ from German, when elsewhere the name philosophy is used only as a nickname and in mockery or as something odious, it is always gratifying to see it still honoured in the mouths of English ministers of state. ↩︎
  4. Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Beiträge zur leichtern Übersicht des Zustandes der Philosophie beim Anfange des 19. Jahrhunderts [Contributions to an Easier Survey of the State of Philosophy at the Beginning of the 19th Century], Hamburg 1801 ↩︎

DE