„Being was the first; determinate being, being for another, being with negation was the second. The third is being-for-itself, simple relation to itself through negation of the other, of determinate being. Here we have ideality; in determinate being, reality. Ideality means that the finite is posited only as sublated; ideality is nothing else than this, that everything finite has no true being, but that being is something sublated, a negative. Being is only a moment of something that is truth. Ideality is then taken in the sense of subjective idealism, that everything is only my representation; therein the things’ own self-subsistence is sublated — in that I know the things, they are sublated. That is this formal ideality. Subjective idealism is a trivial abstraction, for what matters is the content, how it is constituted; in it I too am something very finite, my representing has no true reality. In comprehending, my subjectivity is itself overcome, for when I comprehend something, I am in the matter itself. Every true philosophy is idealism, that is, ideality of the finite.“ (Lectures on the Science of Logic II, GW 23,2, p. 737)
„The proposition that the finite is ideal constitutes idealism. The idealism of philosophy consists in nothing else than in refusing to recognize the finite as a true being. Every philosophy is essentially idealism, or at least has idealism for its principle.“ (Science of Logic. First Volume. The Doctrine of Being (1832), GW 21, p. 142)
In everyday usage „idealism“ has two meanings, neither of which is meant here: either (morally) someone who follows high ideals, or (pejoratively) someone who denies reality. Hegel’s philosophical idealism has nothing to do with either.
The core claim stands in the second quotation: „The proposition that the finite is ideal constitutes idealism.“ To understand it, two expressions need clarifying — „the finite“ and „ideal“.
A note on the words: the German has a pair that English lacks. Ideell — here rendered „ideal“ — is the opposite of self-subsistently real; it has nothing to do with ideal in the sense of perfect, which in German would be ideal. Where this page says „ideal“, read: not standing on its own.
1. What is „the finite“?
„The finite“ is everything we meet with in the world when we consider it in isolation.
- A chair, a stone, a planet.
- A single thought, a feeling, a mood.
- A single person, a single law, an isolated event.
All these things exist, but they are „finite“. That is: they are not out of themselves. They are dependent, limited and incomplete. They have their cause and their sense not in themselves.
2. What is „ideal“?
„Ideal“ is the opposite of „self-subsistently real“. When it is said that the finite is ideal, what is meant is: these isolated, finite things — the chair, the thought, the law — have no true being.
Their truth or their actuality lies not in their isolation. They are sublated (see the glossary): only a moment — a non-self-subsistent but necessary part — of something greater, of a whole which alone is truly real.
An analogy. Consider a single brushstroke in Rembrandt’s „Night Watch“.
- This brushstroke is „the finite“. It exists.
- But is it truly a being? No. Its whole truth, its sense and its reality consist only as a moment of the entire painting.
- Isolate the brushstroke, cut it out, and it loses its sense and its actuality. It is ideal.
A second analogy: sentimental value. An everyday example that makes this usage plausible is what German calls the ideeller Wert of an object — as against its merely material value. Think of an old, worn wedding ring.
- Its material value (the gold) is „finite“ — taken in isolation it is next to nothing (a).
- Its ideal value (the memory, the marriage) is however beyond measure (b).
What is called „ideal“ here is exactly what is meant: the ring has its true being not in itself as a finite thing, but only as a moment of a whole — the relationship lived out, the Idea. Its real being as a thing is sublated in its ideal meaning. The thing made of metal (a) is, although it really exists, in truth ideal: its reality (a) is sublated in its truth (b).
3. What idealism is not
The commonest misunderstanding. As the first quotation from the logic lectures already shows, Hegel never confuses his idealism — the absolute — with the subjective.
- Subjective idealism is the view, trivial in Hegel’s eyes, that „everything is only my representation“ — that the world is in the individual’s head.
- Against this he holds: the I, subjective representing, is just as finite as the chair it represents. The I too is only a moment of the whole.
4. What is absolute idealism?
Absolute idealism is the insight that the only thing that truly is — not finite, not ideal — is the whole itself: reason, the concept, the Idea, spirit. It is the position that the logical structure of reason and the deep structure of actuality are the same.
For reading the Groundlines this means:
- Abstract right (property) is finite. It is ideal.
- Morality (conscience) is finite. It is ideal.
- Both truly are only as sublated moments in ethical life — family, society, state — which is the concrete Idea of freedom.