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126

My particularity, however, as well as that of others,1 (in the manuscript: particularity — β) free abstract personality) is in general only a right insofar as I am a free being. It cannot, therefore, assert itself in contradiction with this its substantial basis; and an intention directed at my welfare, and at the welfare of others — in which case it is called, in particular, a moral intention — cannot justify an unrightful action.

It is one of the corrupt maxims of our time — stemming partly from the pre-Kantian period of the “good heart”, and constituting, for instance, the quintessence of well-known, moving dramatic representations — to take an interest, in the case of unrightful actions, in the so-called moral intention, and to represent bad subjects as possessing a heart that is supposed to be good, that is, one that wills its own welfare and perhaps also the welfare of others; but this doctrine has, in an intensified form, been warmed up again, and inward enthusiasm and the heart — that is, the form of particularity as such — have been made the criterion of what is right, rational, and excellent, so that crimes and the thoughts guiding them, however flat, hollow, and foolish the notions, would for that reason be right, rational, and excellent, because they come from the heart and from enthusiasm; on this, see further below, § 140 Remark. — It should, moreover, be noted at what standpoint right and welfare are here considered, namely as formal right and as the particular welfare of the individual; the so-called general good, the welfare of the state — that is, the right of the actual concrete spirit — is a wholly different sphere, in which formal right is just as much a subordinate moment as the particular welfare and happiness of the individual. That it is one of the frequent errors of abstraction to assert private right and private welfare as in and for themselves valid against the universal of the state has already been remarked above (§ 29).

DE

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2 responses to “126”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    [zu § 126] Well-being is a whole – a universal. Drive: α) something particula[r] – β) within a whole. – This whole itself is my particularity, – only the universal of it.
    My well-being of itself immediately expands into the well-being of others, since my well-being cannot subsist without the well-being of others – however self-interested that may be – yet this universality of well-being is itself an end in itself, because that connection is rational; the well-being of others involving the setting-aside, the sacrifice, of my own – precisely the inward, the particular, passes over into the character of universality – into the negation of my particularity.
    Universal love of humanity – the universal [is] empty – for human beings are concretely particular [individuals]. – The well-being of individuals, insofar as I can make it my end, is something wholly limited, for it is grounded in the state, in the ethical condition, in the objective – not in subjective opinion.
    This is what is preeminently called an action moral in its content – good on its own account. What is otherwise called moral, or a moral human being, such as an upright man who wills, asserts, and does what is right – who duly discharges the duties of his station and office – here morality is meant in the formal sense: it is right in itself; do it with the determinate consciousness that it is right in itself – But the well-being of others is not in itself absolutely determined as my end – the content [being] well-being in general (– in the state this is otherwise – but in the case of the individual it is a matter of contingency, of arbitrary choice, of his own particular resolve) – it is particularity, a particularity distinct from me, another’s particularity – generosity, which has something to spare. – It is another matter to render services to another unselfconsciously – there it is simply not worth mentioning. But as soon as the matter enters into reflection, it is determined as a matter of choice, because the object here, essentially according to its determination, is determined as something particular. – My own well-being I can set aside – nothing necessary in and for itself – likewise the well-being of others, and even more so – for I ought first of all to look after my own well-being, just as others [ought to look after] theirs; – only because they could not avoid neglecting it, in short, external, contingent want, or their own fault, which I am to remedy. –
    Well-being is determined only through the particular, through opinion – it is a matter for each individual in particular, wherein he places his well-being.
    Particular ends, – particularity in general [as against] the universal in general, that which is determined in and for itself – right.
    Well-being is only content, as against right; – this [is] personality as such – that the interest of particular individuality.
    Well-being – something so multiform, capable of being turned so many ways –
    Strict right [is] one-sided – like the mere moral end. Self-righteousness – hiding behind formal right.
    The general good – if the end of the state is determined thus – likewise arbitrariness, caprice, despotism.
    Human beings are more inclined toward benevolent actions, generosity – than, say, to paying [their] debts – wrong – yet again a different wrong than, say, that of Saint Crispin – stealing leather in order to make [shoes] for the poor – belongs in the penitentiary. – Debts – to defraud [someone’s] trust – yet something different from stealing – the trust of others, my own intention, calculation, the possibility of paying them. – Trust stakes its case on opinion – he has deceived only himself.
    For the sake of particular well-being, right too is violated – see the following §.
    Mediation – in the state – both one-sided – abstract; what can be said in general terms here – a) the gener[al] – the content of well-being, life, itself … [?] and the reality of personality.
    Much idle talk can be produced here back and forth, often nothing more than the hope or intention of some great gain.

    [zu § 126 Anm.] What is significant belongs to ethical, universal life – and the questions that [relate] to these oppositions between well-being and right – including the right of necessity – concern only cases within a highly limited sphere; for very little remains for such a sphere. The great interests of the human being, his true relation, lie in the sphere of ethical life – these moral [interests] are mere trimmings.

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    Here belongs the famous reply given to the pamphleteer who excused himself by saying, I have to live, after all: I don’t see the necessity of that. Life is not necessary as against the higher [claim] of freedom. If Saint Crispin steals leather to make shoes for the poor, then the action is moral and unlawful, and thus invalid.
    cf. Rousseau, Emile III, ed. Garnier 1964, p. 223

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