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272

I. The Internal Constitution as such

The constitution is rational in so far as the state differentiates and determines its activity within itself according to the nature of the concept, and indeed in such a way that each of these powers is itself, within itself, the totality, in that it has the other moments effectively present and contained within it, and in that, because they express the difference of the concept, they remain simply within its ideality, and constitute only one individual whole.

In recent times there has been an infinite amount of chatter about the constitution, as about reason itself, and in Germany the shallowest of it has been brought into the world by those who persuaded themselves that they understood best — indeed to the exclusion of all others, and better than governments themselves — what a constitution is, and who supposed themselves to have the unassailable warrant for this in the belief that religion and piety ought to be the foundation of all these shallow notions of theirs. It is no wonder that this chatter has had the consequence that, to reasonable men, the words reason, enlightenment, right, and so forth, like constitution and freedom, have become distasteful, and that one might be ashamed even to join in speaking about political constitution any longer. But at least one may hope for the effect of this weariness, that the conviction should become more general that a philosophical cognition of such subjects cannot proceed from ratiocination, from purposes, grounds, and utilities — still less from feeling, love, and enthusiasm — but solely from the concept, and that those who hold the divine to be incomprehensible and the cognition of the true to be a futile undertaking must refrain from joining in the discussion. Whatever they produce out of their feeling and enthusiasm, whether undigested chatter or mere edification, neither of the two can, at any rate, lay claim to philosophical attention.

Among the circulating representations, one to be mentioned in connection with §269 is that of the necessary division of powers of the state — a highly important determination which, if it had indeed been taken in its true sense, could rightly be regarded as the guarantee of public freedom — a representation, however, of which precisely those who suppose themselves to be speaking out of enthusiasm and love know nothing and wish to know nothing; for it is precisely in it that the moment of rational determinacy lies. The principle of the division of powers contains, namely, the essential moment of difference, of real rationality; but as the abstract understanding grasps it, there lies in it, on the one hand, the false determination of the absolute independence of the powers in relation to one another, and, on the other, the one-sidedness of conceiving their relation to one another as something negative, as mutual limitation. On this view it becomes a hostility, an anxiety of each toward the other, since each produces against the other, as against an evil, the determination to oppose it, and, through these counterweights, to bring about a general equilibrium rather than a living unity. It is only the self-determination of the concept within itself, and not any other purposes or utilities, that contains the absolute origin of the differentiated powers, and it is only for this reason that the organization of the state is something rational in itself and the image of eternal reason. — How the concept, and then, in a concrete way, the Idea, determine themselves within themselves, and thereby posit their moments abstractly as universality, particularity, and individuality, is to be recognized from logic — though certainly not from the logic otherwise current.1 In general, to take the negative as one’s starting point, to make the willing of evil and mistrust of it the first thing, and then, on this presupposition, cleverly to contrive dams which, as the condition of their efficacy, require only mutual damming — this characterizes, in point of thought, the negative understanding, and, in point of disposition, the outlook of the rabble (see above §244). — With the independence of the powers — for example, of what have been called the executive and the legislative power — the shattering of the state is immediately posited, as has also been seen on the grand scale; or, in so far as the state essentially maintains itself, there arises instead the struggle whereby the one power subordinates the other to itself, thereby bringing about, in the first instance, unity of whatever kind, and so alone rescuing what is essential — the subsistence of the state.

  1. Hegel gives no reference. What is meant are the three moments of the concept – universality, particularity, singularity – which do not lie side by side but issue from one another; “not the logic otherwise current” means: not the school logic of concept, judgement and syllogism as mere forms of thought (Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed. § 163–165). – See Die Grammatik der logischen Begriffe: Der Gang der Logik – Der Begriff (in German). ↩︎

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5 responses to “272”

  1. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1817)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), §§ 439, 441:

    § 439. The constitution contains the determinations as to the manner in which the rational will, insofar as it is only in itself the universal will of individuals, is understood and found, and is maintained in actuality through the efficacy of the government and its particular branches, and is likewise protected both against their contingent individuality and against that of individuals.

    § 441. That the ethical spirit, which is here substance, comprehends itself, and grasps and constitutes its universal essence and its articulation, belongs to wisdom and science, to the universal estate, in general to a higher sphere than that of its substantial being, in which the disposition of individuals is ethical life, and their relation to the actuality of the substance, as something distinguished from their singularity and reflection, is trust (§ 432). But insofar as they, as abstract moral persons, are to recognize their explicit individual will (§ 435) in the universal will, this participation — because it is partly semblance and partly real and guaranteeing — is to be regulated in such a way that the cognition, determination, and exercise of the universal will is secured, above all, against the individuals’ own particularity and their bent toward private interest.

  2. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1827)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), § 539:

    § 539. The constitution is the articulation of the power of the state, which has the universal as its purpose; it contains the determinations as to the manner in which the rational will, insofar as it is only in itself the universal will of individuals, is to come, in part, to an understanding of itself and be found, and, in part, to be posited in actuality through the efficacy of the government and its particular branches and maintained therein, and likewise be protected both against their contingent individuality and against that of individuals. It is existing justice, as the actuality of freedom in the development of all its rational determinations.

    Freedom and equality are the simple categories into which what was supposed to constitute the basic determination and the ultimate end and result of the constitution has often been condensed. True as this is, the deficiency of these determinations lies, first of all, in the fact that they are wholly abstract, and, held fast in this form of abstraction, they are precisely what rejects everything concrete, i.e., the articulation of the state, i.e., a constitution as such. It is chiefly on account of this deficiency that they have, more or less, lost their importance in ordinary representation and have been forgotten. But it is of interest to consider them more closely, insofar as thought of itself returns to them. As for equality, in the first place, the familiar proposition that all human beings are by nature equal contains the misunderstanding of confusing the natural with the concept; it must be said that, by nature, human beings are rather only unequal. But the concept of freedom — not merely as the in-itself, the inward, something merely thought or even merely meant, but existing — is abstract subjectivity as person, which is capable of property; this single abstract determination of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. That this equality exists, that it is the human being — and not, as in Greece, Rome, etc., only some human beings — who is recognized as a person and counts as such in law, this is so little a matter of nature that it is rather only the product and result of the consciousness of the deepest principle of spirit and of the universality and cultivation of this consciousness. – That citizens are equal before the law contains a high truth, but is a tautology, for it merely expresses the legal condition as such, namely that the laws rule. But the laws express only the determinations of the reason of the will that are universal in themselves; with regard to the concrete, citizens are equal before the law only in that in which they are otherwise equal outside it. Only the equality of fortune, age, physical strength, talent, skill, etc., or likewise of crimes, etc., that has otherwise come about contingently, in whatever way, can and should justify, in the concrete, an equal treatment of these before the law — with regard to taxes, liability to military service, admission to state offices, etc. — punishment, etc.

    As for freedom, it is taken most immediately, partly in the negative sense as directed against alien arbitrary will and lawless treatment, and partly in the affirmative sense of subjective freedom, both as a great latitude for one’s own arbitrary will and activity in pursuit of one’s particular purposes, and for one’s own insight, and for busy engagement and participation in general affairs. Formerly, the legally determined rights — both private and public rights of a nation, a city, etc. — were called its freedoms. Indeed, every true law is a freedom, for it contains a rational determination of objective spirit, and thus a content of freedom. By contrast, nothing has become more common than the representation that everyone must limit his freedom in relation to the freedom of others, and that the state is the condition of this mutual limitation and the laws are the limitations. In such representations, freedom is conceived only as contingent liking and arbitrary will. – Thus it has also been said that modern peoples are capable only, or more, of equality than of freedom. On the contrary, it must be said that it is precisely the high development and cultivation of modern states that brings forth the highest concrete inequality of individuals in actuality, while, through the deeper rationality of the laws and the consolidation of the lawful condition, it brings about a freedom all the greater and better grounded. The more freedom, and the security of property, and the possibility of developing and asserting one’s talents and good qualities, etc., are consolidated, the more this freedom appears to go without saying; consciousness and appreciation of freedom then turn chiefly toward its subjective sense. But this itself — the freedom of activity trying itself out in every direction and proceeding according to its own pleasure in pursuit of particular and of universal spiritual interests, the independence of individual particularity, as well as the inner freedom in which the subject has principles, its own insight and conviction, and thereby gains moral self-sufficiency — itself grows only under the condition of that objective freedom. If, along with this, the multitude of needs and the difficulty of satisfying them, reasoning and pretending to know better, and its unsatisfied vanity increase without measure, this belongs to the particularity that has been abandoned to itself, which is left to generate for itself, within its own sphere, every possible entanglement and to come to terms with them; this is, admittedly, the field of limitations, because freedom here is caught up in naturalness, in liking, and in arbitrary will.

    As for political freedom, however — namely as the formal participation, in the public affairs of the state, of the will and busy activity even of those individuals who otherwise make the particular purposes and business of civil society their chief occupation — it has become customary, in part, to call “constitution” only that side of the state which concerns the participation of those individuals in general affairs, and to regard a state in which this does not formally take place as a state without a constitution. This meaning is too restricted if by constitution is understood the determination of rights, i.e., of freedoms as such, and the organization of their actualization. That participation is determined by the greater or lesser development of the rationality of the state, of which more will be said below.

  3. Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830) Avatar
    Hegel (Encyclopedia 1830)

    Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), § 539:

    § 539. The state, as living spirit, exists at all only as an organized whole, differentiated into particular functions which, proceeding from the one concept (even though not known as a concept) of the rational will, continually produce that same will as their result. The constitution is this articulation of the power of the state. It contains the determinations as to the manner in which the rational will, insofar as in individuals it is only in itself the universal will, is to come, in part, to consciousness and understanding of itself and be found, and, in part, to be posited in actuality through the efficacy of the government and its particular branches and maintained therein, and likewise be protected both against their contingent subjectivity and against that of individuals. It is existing justice, as the actuality of freedom in the development of all its rational determinations. Freedom and equality are the simple categories into which what was supposed to constitute the basic determination and the ultimate end and result of the constitution has often been condensed. True as this is, the deficiency of these determinations lies, first of all, in the fact that they are wholly abstract; held fast in this form of abstraction, it is they that do not allow the concrete, i.e., an articulation of the state, i.e., a constitution and government as such, to arise at all, or that destroy it. With the state, inequality enters in — the difference between governing powers and the governed, magistracies, authorities, directors, etc. The consistent principle of equality rejects all distinctions and so allows no kind of condition of the state to subsist. – To be sure, they [those determinations] are the foundations of this sphere, but, as the most abstract, they are also the most superficial, and for that very reason readily the most common; it is therefore of interest to consider them a little more closely. As for equality, in the first place, the familiar proposition that all human beings are by nature equal contains the misunderstanding of confusing the natural with the concept; it must be said that, by nature, human beings are rather only unequal. But the concept of freedom, as it exists at first, without further determination and development, simply as such, is abstract subjectivity as person, which is capable of property, § 488; this single abstract determination of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. That this equality exists, that it is the human being — and not, as in Greece, Rome, etc., only some human beings — who is recognized as a person and counts as such in law, this is so little a matter of nature that it is rather only the product and result of the consciousness of the deepest principle of spirit and of the universality and cultivation of this consciousness. – That citizens are equal before the law contains a high truth, but one which, expressed in this way, is a tautology; for it merely states the legal condition as such, namely that the laws rule. But with regard to the concrete, citizens, apart from their personality, are equal before the law only in that in which they are otherwise equal outside it. Only the equality of fortune, age, physical strength, talent, skill, etc., or likewise of crimes, etc., that, otherwise, in whatever way it may be, happens to be contingently present, can and should make possible, in the concrete, an equal treatment before the law — with regard to taxes, liability to military service, admission to state offices, etc., punishment, etc. The laws themselves, except insofar as they concern that narrow circle of personality, presuppose unequal conditions and determine the unequal legal competencies and duties arising from them. As for freedom, it is taken most immediately, partly in the negative sense as directed against alien arbitrary will and lawless treatment, and partly in the affirmative sense of subjective freedom; but to this freedom is given a great latitude, both for one’s own arbitrary will and activity in pursuit of one’s particular purposes, and with regard to the claim to one’s own insight, and to busy engagement and participation in general affairs. Formerly, the legally determined rights — both private and public rights of a nation, a city, etc. — were called its freedoms. Indeed, every true law is a freedom, for it contains a rational determination of objective spirit, and thus a content of freedom. By contrast, nothing has become more common than the representation that everyone must limit his freedom in relation to the freedom of others, and that the state is the condition of this mutual limitation, and the laws are the limitations. In such representations, freedom is conceived only as contingent liking and arbitrary will. – Thus it has also been said that modern peoples are capable only, or more, of equality than of freedom, and indeed for no other reason, probably, than that one could not, in actuality, manage with an assumed determination of freedom (chiefly the participation of all in the affairs and actions of the state), since actuality is more rational and at the same time more powerful than abstract presuppositions. – On the contrary, it must be said that it is precisely the high development and cultivation of modern states that brings forth the highest concrete inequality of individuals in actuality, while, through the deeper rationality of the laws and the consolidation of the lawful condition, it brings about a freedom all the greater and better grounded, and can allow and sustain it. Even the superficial distinction lying in the words freedom and equality points to the fact that the former tends toward inequality; but, conversely, the current, common notions of freedom lead back only to equality. But the more freedom, as the security of property, as the possibility of developing and asserting one’s talents and good qualities, etc., is consolidated, the more it appears to go without saying; consciousness and appreciation of freedom then turn chiefly toward its subjective sense. But this itself — the freedom of activity trying itself out in every direction and proceeding according to its own pleasure in pursuit of particular and universal spiritual interests, the independence of individual particularity, as well as the inner freedom in which the subject has principles, its own insight and conviction, and thereby gains moral self-sufficiency — contains, in part, in itself, the highest cultivation of the particularity in which human beings are unequal, and, through this culture, make themselves even more unequal, and, in part, grows only under the condition of that objective freedom, and has been, and could be, able to grow to this height only in modern states. If, along with this cultivation of particularity, the multitude of needs and the difficulty of satisfying them, reasoning and pretending to know better, and its unsatisfied vanity increase without measure, this belongs to the particularity that has been abandoned to itself, which is left to generate for itself, within its own sphere, every possible entanglement and to come to terms with them. This sphere is then, admittedly, at the same time the field of limitations, because freedom here is caught up in naturalness, in liking, and in arbitrary will, and therefore has to limit itself — indeed, no doubt also in accordance with the naturalness, liking, and arbitrary will of others, but chiefly and essentially in accordance with rational freedom. As for political freedom, however — namely in the sense of a formal participation, in the public affairs of the state, of the will and busy activity even of those individuals who otherwise make the particular purposes and business of civil society their chief occupation — it has become customary, in part, to call “constitution” only that side of the state which concerns such a participation of those individuals in general affairs, and to regard a state in which this does not formally take place as a state without a constitution. About this meaning, for now, only this much need be said: that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights, i.e., of freedoms as such, and the organization of their actualization, and that political freedom can in any case constitute only a part of this; more will be said of it in the following §§.

  4. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    In the state one must want nothing but what is an expression of rationality. The state is the world that spirit has made for itself; it therefore has a determinate course that is in and for itself. How often one speaks of the wisdom of God in nature; but one must not believe that the physical natural world is something higher than the world of spirit, for as high as spirit stands above nature, so high does the state stand above physical life. One must therefore revere the state as something earthly-divine and recognize that, if it is difficult to comprehend nature, it is infinitely harder still to grasp the state. It is of the utmost importance that in more recent times determinate views about the state in general have been gained, and that people have occupied themselves so much with talking about and making constitutions. But this does not settle the matter; it is necessary that one bring to a rational subject also the reason of insight, that one know what is essential, and that what is striking not always constitute what is essential. The powers of the state must indeed be distinguished in this way, but each must in itself form a whole and contain the other moments within itself. When one speaks of the distinct efficacy of the powers, one must not fall into the enormous error of assuming this to mean that each power should stand for itself in the abstract, since the powers are rather to be distinguished only as moments of the concept. If, on the other hand, the distinctions subsist abstractly for themselves, it is plain that two independent entities cannot constitute a unity, but must rather produce conflict, whereby either the whole is thrown into disorder or unity is restored again by force. Thus in the French Revolution now the legislative power swallowed up the so-called executive, now the executive swallowed up the legislative power, and it remains tasteless to raise here, say, the moral demand for harmony. For if one throws the matter onto sentiment, one has of course spared oneself all trouble; but although ethical feeling is indeed necessary, it does not have it in itself to determine the powers of the state. What matters, then, is that, since the determinations of the powers are in themselves the whole, they should also, in their existence, all together constitute the whole concept. When one commonly speaks of three powers, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, the first corresponds to universality, the second to particularity, but the judicial power is not the third of the concept, for its singularity lies outside those spheres.

  5. Karl Marx Avatar
    Karl Marx

    The constitution is thus rational insofar as its moments can be resolved into the abstract-logical. The state does not have to distinguish and determine its efficacy according to its specific nature, but according to the nature of the concept, which is the mystified mobile of abstract thought. The rationality of the constitution is thus abstract logic, and |218| not the concept of the state. Instead of the concept of the constitution, we obtain the constitution of the concept. Thought does not orient itself by the nature of the state; rather, the state orients itself by a ready-made thought.

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