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1. 

   Karl Marx

   13. August 1843

   Here we find a new opposition of civil society and the estates — a mobile, and hence also an immobile, part of the same (that of landed property). This opposition has also been presented as an opposition of space and time, etc., conservative and progressive. On this, see the preceding paragraph. Incidentally, Hegel has likewise made the mobile part of society into a stable one, through the corporations, etc.

   The second opposition is that the first, just-developed part of the estates element — the primogeniture-lords — are legislators as such; that the legislative power is an attribute of their empirical person; that they are not deputies, but are themselves — whereas, with the second estate, election and deputation take place.

   Hegel gives two reasons why this mobile part of civil society can enter the political state, the legislative power, only through deputies. The first — their multitude — he himself designates as external, and thus spares us the need to reply to it.

   The essential reason, however, is said to be the »nature of their determination and occupation.« »Political activity« and »occupation« are something foreign to »the nature of their determination and occupation.«

   Hegel now comes back again to his old refrain, to these estates as »deputies of civil society.« They must, it is said, »do this as what they are.« They must, rather, do it as what they are not — for it is unpolitical society, and it is here to perform a political act as an act essential to it, arising out of itself. Thereby it is »atomistically dissolved into individuals,« »assembling only for a single, temporary act, for a moment, without any further permanence.« In the first place, its political act is a single and temporary one, and can therefore, in its realization, appear only as such. It is an éclat-making act of political society, an ecstasy of the same, and it must appear as such. In the second place: Hegel has taken no offense at, has even constructed as necessary, the fact that civil society materially separates itself (appearing only as a second society, deputized from itself) from its civil actuality and posits, as itself, what it is not — how, then, can he now want formally to reject this?

   Hegel thinks that, by society deputizing within its corporations, etc., »its associations, already constituted anyway,« etc., »in this way receive a political connection.« But they either receive a significance that is not their significance, or their connection, as such, is already the political one, and does not first »receive« the political tincture, as developed above, but rather »politics« receives its connection from them. By designating only this part of the estates element as that |318| of the »deputy,« Hegel has unconsciously designated the essence of the two chambers (wherever they really stand in the relation to one another that he designates). Chamber of deputies and chamber of peers (or whatever else they are called) are here not different existences of the same principle, but belong to two essentially different principles and social states. The chamber of deputies here is the political constitution of civil society in the modern sense, the chamber of peers in the estates sense. Chamber of peers and chamber of deputies here stand opposed to each other as the estates and the political representation of civil society. The one is the existing estates principle of civil society, the other the realization of its abstract political existence. It is thus self-evident that the latter cannot again be present as representation of estates, corporations, etc., for it represents, precisely, not the estates existence, but the political existence of civil society. It is then self-evident that only the estates part of civil society — »sovereign landed property,« the hereditarily seated nobility — has a seat in the first chamber; for it is not one estate among other estates, but rather the estates principle of civil society as real social, hence political, principle now exists only in it. It is the estate. Civil society then has, in the estates chamber, the representative of its medieval existence, and, in the chamber of deputies, of its political (modern) existence. The progress here, as against the Middle Ages, consists only in this, that estates-politics has been degraded to a particular political existence alongside citizen-of-the-state politics. The empirical political existence Hegel has in view (England) thus has a wholly different sense from the one he foists upon it.

   The French constitution is, in this respect too, a progress. It has, indeed, reduced the chamber of peers to sheer nullity; but this chamber, within the principle of constitutional kingship as Hegel professed to develop it, can by its very nature be only a nullity — the fiction of harmony between prince and civil society, or of the legislative power, or of the political state, with itself, as a particular, and thereby precisely again oppositional, existence.

   The French have let the life-tenure of the peers stand, in order to express their equal independence from election by the government and by the people. But they have abolished the medieval expression — heredity. Their progress consists in this, that they, too, no longer let the chamber of peers arise out of real civil society, but have likewise created it in abstraction from it. They let its election proceed from the existing political state, from the prince, without binding it to any other civil qualification. The dignity of peer is, in this constitution, really an estate within civil society that is purely political, created from the standpoint of the abstraction of the political state; but it appears more as a political decoration than as a real estate endowed with particular rights. The chamber of peers under the Restoration was a reminiscence. The chamber of peers of the July Revolution is a real creature of constitutional monarchy.

   Since, in modern times, the Idea of the state could appear in no other way than in the abstraction of the »merely political state,« or of the abstraction of civil society from itself, from its real condition, it is a merit of the French to have held fast to this abstract actuality, to have produced it, and thereby to have produced the political principle itself. What is reproached to them as abstraction is thus true consequence and the product of a disposition toward the state rediscovered, even if at first only in an opposition — but a necessary opposition. The merit of the French is thus, here, to have posited the chamber of peers as a peculiar product of the political state, or, in general, to have made the political principle, in its peculiarity, the determining and efficacious one.

   Hegel further remarks that, in the deputation constructed by him, in the »entitlement of the corporations, etc., to such deputation,« »the existence of the estates and their assembly finds a constituted, peculiar guarantee.« The guarantee of the existence of the estates assembly, its true primitive existence, thus becomes the privilege of the corporations, etc. With this, Hegel has entirely sunk down to the medieval standpoint, and has wholly abandoned his »abstraction of the political state as the sphere of the state as state, the universal in and for itself.«

   In the modern sense, the existence of the estates assembly is the political existence of civil society, the guarantee of its political existence. Calling its existence into doubt is thus doubt about the existence of the state itself. Just as, earlier in Hegel, the »disposition toward the state,« the essence of the legislative power, found its guarantee in »independent private property,« so its existence finds its guarantee in the »privileges of the corporations.«

   But the estates element is, rather, the political privilege of civil society, or its privilege of being political. It can therefore nowhere be the privilege of a particular, civil mode of its existence, still less find its guarantee in it, since it is, rather, supposed to be the universal guarantee.

   Thus Hegel everywhere sinks to the point of depicting the »political state« not as the highest actuality, existing in and for itself, of social existence, but of giving it a precarious actuality, dependent in relation to something else — of depicting it not as the true existence of the other sphere, but rather of letting it find its true existence in the other sphere. Everywhere it stands in need of the guarantee of spheres lying outside itself. It is not realized power. It is propped-up impotence; it is not the power over these props, but the power of the prop. The prop is the powerful thing.

   What sort of lofty existence is this, whose existence stands in need of a guarantee outside itself, and which is at the same time supposed to be the universal existence of this very guarantee — that is, its real guarantee? In general, Hegel sinks back, throughout the entire development of the legislative power, from the philosophical standpoint to that other standpoint which does not consider the matter in relation to itself.

   If the existence of the estates stands in need of a guarantee, then they are no real, but only a fictitious, existence of the state. The guarantee for the existence of the estates, in constitutional states, is the law. Their existence is thus a legal existence, dependent on the universal essence of the state, and not on the power or impotence of individual corporations, associations, but as the actuality of the association of the state. (The corporations, etc., the particular circles of civil society, are, after all, supposed to receive their universal existence only here for the first time, and now Hegel again anticipates this universal existence as privilege, as the existence of these particularities.)

   Political right as the right of corporations, etc., contradicts entirely political right as political, as the right of the state, of citizenship of the state; for it is precisely not supposed to be the right of this existence as particular existence, not right as this particular existence.

   Before we now pass on to the category of election as the political act through which civil society secretes itself into a political committee, let us bring in a few more determinations from the Remark to this paragraph.

   »That all, individually, should take part in the deliberation and resolution on the universal affairs of the state, because these are all members of the state, and its affairs are the affairs of all, in which they have the right to take part with their knowledge and will — this representation, which wanted to put the democratic |321| element, without any rational form, into the organism of the state, which is what it is only through such form, suggests itself so readily because it stops short at the abstract determination of being a member of the state, and superficial thought clings to abstractions.« [§ 308]

   In the first place, Hegel calls it an »abstract determination, to be a member of the state,« although, according to the Idea, according to the doctrine of his own development, it is itself the highest, most concrete social determination of the legal person, of the member of the state. To stop short at the »determination of being a member of the state,« and to grasp the individual in this determination, does not, therefore, seem to be exactly the »superficial thought that clings to abstractions.« But that the »determination of being a member of the state« is an »abstract« determination — that is not the fault of this thought, but of Hegel’s own development and of real modern relations, which presuppose the separation of real life from the life of the state and make the quality of the state into an »abstract determination« of the real member of the state.

   The immediate participation of all in the deliberation and resolution on the universal affairs of the state, according to Hegel, admits »the democratic element, without any rational form, into the organism of the state, which is what it is only through such form« — that is, the democratic element can be admitted into a state organism, which is only the formalism of the state, only as a formal element. The democratic element must, rather, be the real element that gives itself its rational form within the entire organism of the state. If, by contrast, it enters into the state organism, or state formalism, as a »particular« element, then by the »rational form of its existence« is understood taming, accommodation — a form in which it does not turn outward the peculiarity of its essence, or in which it enters in only as a formal principle.

   We have already once indicated that Hegel develops only a formalism of the state. The properly material principle for him is the Idea, the abstract thought-form of the state as a subject — the absolute Idea, which has no passive, no material moment within itself. Against the abstraction of this Idea, the determinations of the real, empirical formalism of the state appear as content, and therefore the real content appears as formless, unorganized stuff (here, real man, real society, etc.).

   Hegel had placed the essence of the estates element in this, that here »empirical universality« becomes the subject of the universal existing in and for itself. Does this mean anything other than that the affairs of the state »are the affairs of all, in which they have the right to be present with their knowledge and |322| will« — and are the estates not supposed to be precisely their realized right? And is it, then, any wonder that all should also want the »actuality« of this their right?

   »That all, individually, should take part in the deliberation and resolution on the universal affairs of the state.«

   In a really rational state, one could reply: »Not all, individually, should take part in the deliberation and resolution on the universal affairs of the state« — for the »individuals« take part, as »all,« that is, within society and as members of society, in the deliberation and resolution on universal affairs. Not all individually, but the individuals as all.

   Hegel poses the dilemma to himself. Either civil society (the many, the multitude) takes part, through deputies, in the deliberation and resolution on the universal affairs of the state, or all do this as individuals. This is not an opposition of essence, as Hegel later tries to present it, but one of existence — and indeed of the most external existence, of number — so that the ground which Hegel himself has designated as »external« — the multitude of members — always remains the best ground against the immediate participation of all. The question whether civil society should take part in the legislative power in such a way that it enters through deputies, or in such a way that »all, individually,« participate immediately, is itself a question within the abstraction of the political state, or within the abstract political state; it is an abstract political question.

   It is, in both cases, as Hegel has himself developed, the political significance of »empirical universality.«

   The opposition, in its proper form, is: the individuals do it as all, or the individuals do it as few, as not-all. In both cases, allness remains only as external plurality or totality of the individuals. Allness is no essential, spiritual, real quality of the individual. Allness is not something through which he would lose the determination of abstract singularity; rather, allness is only the full number of singularity. One singularity, many singularities, all singularities. The one, the many, the all — none of these determinations transforms the essence of the subject, of singularity.

   »All« are supposed to take part, »individually,« in the »deliberation and resolution on the universal affairs of the state«; that is, all are supposed to take this part not as all, but as »individuals.«

   The question seems to stand in contradiction with itself in a twofold respect.

   The universal affairs of the state are the affair of the state, the state as real affair. Deliberation and resolution are the effectuation of the state as real affair. That, then, all members of the state have a relation to the state as their real affair seems to be self-evident. It already lies in the very concept of member of the state that they are a member of the state, a part of it — that it takes them as its part. But if they are a part of the state, then, as is self-evident, their social existence is already their real participation in it. They are not merely a part of the state, but the state is their part. To be a conscious part of something is to take, with consciousness, a part of it for oneself, to take conscious part in it. Without this consciousness, the member of the state would be an animal.

   When one says »the universal affairs of the state,« the semblance is produced that the »universal affairs« and »the state« are something different. But the state is the »universal affair« — that is, in reality, the »universal affairs.«

   To take part in the universal affairs of the state, and to take part in the state, are thus identical. That, then, a member of the state, a part of the state, takes part in the state, and that this taking part can appear only as deliberation or resolution, or in similar forms — that, then, every member of the state takes part in the deliberation and resolution (if these functions are grasped as the functions of the real participation of the state) on the universal affairs of the state — is a tautology. If, then, we are speaking of real members of the state, this participation cannot be spoken of as an ought. It would otherwise, rather, be speaking of subjects who are supposed to be, and want to be, members of the state, but are not really so.

   On the other hand: if we are speaking of determinate affairs, of an individual act of state, then it is again self-evident that not all, individually, accomplish it. The individual would otherwise be the true society, and would make society superfluous. The individual would have to do everything at once, whereas society lets him act for the others, just as it lets the others act for him.

   The question whether all, individually, »should take part in the deliberation and resolution on the universal affairs of the state« is a question that arises out of the separation of the political state and civil society.

   We have seen: the state exists only as political state. The totality of the political state is the legislative power. To take part in the legislative power is, therefore, to take part in the political state, is to prove and realize one’s existence as a member of the political state, as member of the state. That all, individually, want to take part in the legislative power is thus nothing but the will of all to be real (active) members of the state, or to give themselves a political existence, or to prove and effectuate their existence as a political one. We have further seen that the estates element is civil society as legislative power, its political existence. That civil society, then, should press en masse, if possible entirely, into the legislative power — that real civil society wants to substitute itself for the fictitious civil society of the legislative power — is nothing but the striving of civil society to give itself political existence, or to make political existence into its real existence. The striving of civil society to transform itself into political society, or to make political society into real society, shows itself as the striving for the most universal possible participation in the legislative power.

   Number is not without significance here. Just as the increase of the estates element is already a physical and intellectual reinforcement of one of the hostile forces — and we have seen that the various elements of the legislative power stand opposed to one another as hostile forces — so, by contrast, the question whether all, individually, should be members of the legislative power, or whether they should enter through deputies, is the calling-into-question of the representative principle from within the representative principle, from within the fundamental conception of the political state that finds its existence in constitutional monarchy. 1. It is a conception of the abstraction of the political state that the legislative power is the totality of the political state. Because this one act is the sole political act of civil society, all are supposed to, and want to, take part in it at once. 2. All as individuals. In the estates element, legislative activity is not considered as social, as a function of sociality, but rather as the act in which individuals first enter into a really and consciously social function — that is, into a political function. The legislative power is here no outflow, no function, of society, but rather, for the first time, its formation. This formation into legislative power requires that all members of civil society consider themselves as individuals; they really stand opposed to one another as individuals. The determination of »being members of the state« is their »abstract determination,« a determination not realized in their living actuality.

   Either separation of the political state and civil society obtains — in which case not all, individually, can take part in the legislative power. The political state is an existence separated from civil society. Civil society would, on the one hand, give itself up if all were legislators; on the other hand, the political state standing opposed to it can only tolerate it in a form commensurate with its own measure. Or, rather, the participation of civil society in the political state through deputies is precisely the expression of its separation and merely dualistic unity.

   Or, conversely: civil society is real political society. Then it is nonsense to raise a demand that arises only out of the representation of the political state as an existence separated from civil society — a demand that has arisen only out of the theological representation of the political state. In this condition, the significance of the legislative power as a representative power vanishes entirely. The legislative power is here representation in the sense in which every function is representative — just as, for example, the shoemaker, insofar as he performs a social need, is my representative; just as every determinate social activity, as generic activity, represents only the genus, that is, a determination of my own essence; just as every human being is the representative of the other. He is here representative not through something else that he represents, but through what he is and does.

   The »legislative« power is striven for not on account of its content, but on account of its formal political significance. In and for itself, for example, governmental power would have to be much more the goal of the people’s wishes than the legislative power, the metaphysical function of the state. The legislative function is the will, not in its practical, but in its theoretical energy. Here the will is not supposed to count in place of the law; rather, what is at stake is discovering and formulating the real law.

   From this dual nature of the legislative power — as real legislative function and as representative, abstract-political function — there arises a peculiarity that asserts itself chiefly in France, the land of political culture.

   (In governmental power we always have two things: the real doing, and the reason of state for this doing, as another real consciousness, which, in its total articulation, is the bureaucracy.)

   The properly content of the legislative power is treated (insofar as the ruling particular interests do not fall into significant conflict with the objectum quaestionis |the object of the inquiry|) very much à part, as a side matter. A question excites particular attention only once it becomes political — that is, either as soon as a question of ministerial responsibility, hence the power of the legislative power over governmental power, can be tied to it, or as soon as it concerns rights that stand in connection with political formalism at all. Whence this phenomenon? Because the legislative power is, at the same time, the representation of the political existence of civil society; because the political essence of a question consists, in general, in its relation to the various powers of the political state; because the legislative power represents political consciousness, and this can prove itself political only in conflict with governmental power. This essential demand — that every social need, law, etc., be elucidated politically, that is, as determined by the state as a whole, in its social sense — takes, in the state of political abstraction, the turn of being given a formal turn against another power (content), outside its real content. This is no abstraction peculiar to the French, but the necessary consequence, because the real state exists only as the political state-formalism under consideration. Opposition within representative power is the chief political existence of representative power. Within this representative constitution, however, the elucidated question takes a different turn from the one in which Hegel has considered it. What is at issue here is not whether civil society should exercise the legislative power through deputies or as all individually, but rather the extension and greatest possible generalization of election — both the active and the passive right to vote. That is the real point of contention of political reform, both in France and in England.

   One does not consider election philosophically — that is, in its peculiar essence — if one grasps it straightaway in relation to princely or governmental power. Election is the real relation of real civil society to the civil society of the legislative power, to the representative element. Or: election is the immediate, the direct — not merely represented, but actually existing — relation of civil society to the political state. It is therefore self-evident that election forms the chief political interest of real civil society. In unrestricted election, both active and passive, civil society has, for the first time, really raised itself to the abstraction from itself, to political existence as its true, universal, essential existence. But the completion of this abstraction is at the same time the abolition of the abstraction. In that civil society has really posited its political existence as its true one, it has, at the same time, posited its civil existence, in its distinction from its political existence, as inessential; and with the one, separated term, its other, its opposite, falls too. Electoral reform is, therefore, within the abstract political state, the demand for its dissolution — but equally for the dissolution of civil society.

   We shall meet the question of electoral reform later, in another form, namely from the side of interests. Likewise, we shall discuss later the other conflicts that arise out of the double determination of the legislative power (at one time deputy, mandatary of civil society, at another time, rather, only now its political existence, and a peculiar existence within political state-formalism).

   We return, for the time being, to the Remark to our paragraph.

   »Rational consideration, the consciousness of the Idea, is concrete, and coincides, in this respect, with the true practical sense, which is itself nothing other than the rational sense, the sense of the Idea.« »The concrete state is the whole articulated into its particular circles; the member of the state is a member of such an estate; only in this, its objective determination, can it come into consideration within the state.« [§ 308]

   On this, what is necessary has already been said above.

   »Its« (the member of the state’s) »universal determination, in general, contains the doubled moment of being a private person and, as thinking, equally consciousness and volition of the universal; but this consciousness and volition is not empty, but fulfilled and really alive, only when it is filled with particularity — and this is the particular estate and determination; or: the individual is genus, but has its immanent universal actuality as proximate genus.«

   All that Hegel says here is correct, with the qualification: 1. that he posits particular estate and determination as identical; 2. that this determination — the species, the proximate genus — would also have to be posited really, not merely in itself, but for itself, as species of the universal genus, as its particularization. But Hegel contents himself, in the state which he demonstrates as the self-conscious existence of ethical spirit, with the fact that this ethical spirit is the determining factor only in itself, according to the universal Idea. He does not let society arrive at real determining, because a real subject is needed for that, and he has only an abstract one, an imagination.

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