Author: wbauer

The self-determination of the will is at the same time a moment of its concept, and subjectivity is not only the side of its existence but its own determination (§ 104). The will determined as subjective, free for itself, at first as concept, must itself have existence in order to be as Idea. The moral…

The subjective will, as immediately for itself and distinguished from the will existing in itself (§ 106 Remark), is therefore abstract, restricted, and formal. Subjectivity, however, is not merely formal but, as the infinite self-determining of the will, constitutes its formal element. Because, in this its first emergence in the individual will, it is not…

This formal element contains, according to its general determination, in the first place the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity and the activity relating itself thereto (§ 8) — whose moments, more closely considered, are these: existence and determinacy are identical in the concept (compare § 104), and the will as subjective is itself this concept…

This identity of content, however, receives, on the moral standpoint — where freedom, this identity of the will with itself, is for the will (§ 105) — its closer, distinctive determination. a) The content is, for me, determined as mine in such a way that, in its identity, it is not only my inner purpose…

b) The content, even though it contains something particular (this may be taken from wherever it will), has, as the content of the will that is reflected into itself in its determinacy, and hence identical with itself and universal, α) the determination of being appropriate, in itself, to the will existing in itself, or of…

c) Since I preserve my subjectivity in carrying out my purposes (§ 110), I thereby sublate, in this objectification, this subjectivity at the same time as immediate, that is, as this single subjectivity of mine. But this external subjectivity, thus identical with me, is the will of others (§ 73). — The ground of the…

The utterance of the will as subjective, or moral, is action. Action contains the determinations set forth: α) to be known by me, in its externality, as mine; β) the essential relation to the concept, as an ought; and γ) the relation to the will of others. Only the utterance of the moral will is…

The right of the moral will contains three sides: a) The abstract or formal right of the action — that, as it is carried out in immediate existence, its content in general is mine, so that it is the purpose of the subjective will. b) The particular aspect of the action is its inner content:…

First Section. Purpose and Responsibility The finitude of the subjective will in the immediacy of acting consists, immediately, in this: that for its acting it has a presupposed external object with manifold circumstances. The deed posits a change in this existence that lies before it, and the will has responsibility for this in general, insofar…

The will that itself acts has, in its purpose directed at the existence that lies before it, a representation of its circumstances. But because it is, on account of this presupposition, finite, the objective appearance is contingent for it and may contain in itself something other than what is in its representation. The right of…

The action, furthermore, as translated into external existence, which develops in every direction according to its connection within external necessity, has manifold consequences. The consequences, as the shape that has the purpose of the action for its soul, belong to the action (are what pertains to it) — but at the same time, as the…

Second Section. Intention and Welfare The external existence of the action is a manifold connection that can be regarded as infinitely divided into singularities, and the action may be regarded as touching, in the first instance, only such a single point. But the truth of the single is the universal, and the determinacy of the…

The right of intention is that the universal quality of the action should not merely be in itself, but should be known by the agent, and thus should already have lain in his subjective will; just as, conversely, the right of the objectivity of the action, as it may be called, is to assert itself,…

The universal quality of the action is the manifold content of the action in general, reduced to the simple form of universality. But the subject, as reflected into itself, and hence particular as against the objective particularity, has, in its purpose, its own particular content, which is the determining soul of the action. That this…

Through this particular element the action has subjective value, interest, for me. As against this purpose — the intention, according to its content — the immediate content of the action, in its further content, is reduced to a means. Insofar as such a purpose is itself finite, it can in turn be reduced to a…

For the content of these purposes there is present here, α), only the formal activity itself — that the subject be, with its activity, engaged in what it should regard and further as its purpose; that for which human beings interest themselves, or ought to interest themselves, as being their own, for that they wish…

Since the subjective satisfaction of the individual (including the recognition of that individual in honour and fame) is itself contained in the carrying out of purposes valid in and for themselves, it is an empty assertion of abstract understanding to demand that only such a purpose should appear as willed and attained, or to hold…

The subjective element, with the particular content of welfare, stands, as reflected into itself, infinite, at the same time in relation to the universal, the will existing in itself. This moment, posited at first on this very particularity, is the welfare of others too — in a complete but wholly empty determination, the welfare of…

My particularity, however, as well as that of others,1 (in the manuscript: particularity — β) free abstract personality) is in general only a right insofar as I am a free being. It cannot, therefore, assert itself in contradiction with this its substantial basis; and an intention directed at my welfare, and at the welfare of…