In brief: No — he declared it insufficient, and gave his reasons. That is something other than a misunderstanding, but it is not a refutation of formal logic either. Whoever makes the charge must show that Hegel’s reasons do not hold.
The charge
Sentences like „being is nothing“ (Logic) or „the state is the actuality of the ethical Idea“ (§ 257) sound absurd to formal logic. The suspicion: that Hegel confuses two different meanings of the copula —
- the „is“ of predication — „the sky is blue“: a property is ascribed to a subject;
- the „is“ of identity — „Berlin is the capital of Germany“: A = B.
„Being is nothing“ would accordingly be a predication passed off as an identity. That would indeed be nonsense.
Why this misses the point
The charge presupposes that the sentence describes a state of affairs. That is precisely what Hegel disputes — not covertly but expressly, and with an analysis of his own in the Preface to the Phenomenology. In the ordinary sentence the subject lies at rest and has a property attached to it; in the speculative sentence the subject passes over into the predicate and dissolves in it. Thinking, accustomed to running on along predicates, suffers in this „a counter-thrust“ — and that is why such sentences have to be read twice (at length: Why are Hegel’s texts so hard to read?).
In a philosophical context, then, Hegel’s „is“ mostly does not stand for „has the property“ but for: passes over into · turns into · proves to be · has its truth in.
At the model case: „Being is nothing“ (Encyclopaedia §§ 86–88) does not say that the category being has the property nothing. It says: pure, wholly indeterminate being, thought through consistently, has no content whatever by which it could be distinguished from pure nothing — and has thereby passed over into it. The subject does not remain what it was.
The same in the philosophy of right
„Wrong is the semblance of right against right“ (§ 82) does not mean that a property belongs to wrong, but: abstract right brings forth its own opposite out of itself. And „the state is the actuality of the ethical Idea“ (§ 257) does not mean that the state is distinguished by a property, but: freedom comes to itself in this shape — the state is the result of a movement whose beginning is made by § 4.
A warning on this: the textbook formula thesis – antithesis – synthesis is useless for describing this movement and does not come from Hegel. He uses it in reporting on Kant and expressly rejects schematic triads. What he actually describes is determinate negation: from the negation there follows not nothing, but a determinate further thing.
What the objection retains
Two things. First: Hegel writes a language whose rules he lays down himself, and thereby makes understanding depend on assent to his procedure — a circle one can and should argue about. Second: not every passage in which the „is“ remains obscure is speculative on that account. Some things in Hegel are simply unclearly put. The distinction is work on the particular case and cannot be replaced by a reference to the speculative sentence.
Sources. Phenomenology of Spirit, Preface (the speculative sentence, the „counter-thrust“). – Science of Logic I, First Chapter; Encyclopaedia (1830) §§ 86–88 (being, nothing, becoming), §§ 79–82 (the three sides of the logical). – Groundlines § 4, § 82, § 257. – That the formula thesis – antithesis – synthesis does not come from Hegel but was popularized through Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus was shown by Gustav E. Mueller („The Hegel Legend of ‚Thesis–Antithesis–Synthesis‘“, Journal of the History of Ideas 19, 1958). – In the glossary: the speculative, determinate negation, understanding, syllogism.