Since subjectivity now constitutes the determinacy of the concept, and is distinguished from the concept as such — the will existing in itself — and since, indeed, the will of the subject, as the individual existing for itself, at the same time is (still having immediacy attached to it as well), subjectivity constitutes the existence of the concept. — With this, a higher ground has been determined for freedom: in the Idea, the side of existence, or its real moment, is now the subjectivity of the will. Only in the will as subjective can freedom, or the will existing in itself, be actual.

The second sphere, morality, thus presents, on the whole, the real side of the concept of freedom, and the process of this sphere is to sublate the will that is at first only for itself — a will immediately identical in itself only with the will existing in itself, or the universal will — with respect to this difference, into which it deepens itself, and to posit it for itself as identical with the will existing in itself. This movement is accordingly the working-out of this now-attained ground of freedom, subjectivity — which is at first abstract, namely distinguished from the concept — so as to make it equal to the concept, and thereby to procure for the Idea its true realization: that the subjective will determines itself to be equally objective, and hence truly concrete.