The determinations of reflection, appearance and actuality. From the Groundlines, the footnotes to § 26 (§§ 115 ff.), § 163 (§§ 150 ff.), § 181 (§§ 112 ff., §§ 131 ff.) and § 273 (§ 134) refer here.
The text follows the third edition of 1830 as given in the Werkausgabe, with the Additions from the lectures. The versions of 1827 and 1817 will be added later.
Contents
- The Doctrine of Essence: § 112 · § 113 · § 114
- The Doctrine of Essence → A. Essence as Ground of Existence → a. The Pure Determinations of Reflection → α. Identity: § 115
- The Doctrine of Essence → A. Essence as Ground of Existence → a. The Pure Determinations of Reflection → β. Distinction: § 116 · § 117 · § 118 · § 119 · § 120
- The Doctrine of Essence → A. Essence as Ground of Existence → a. The Pure Determinations of Reflection → γ. Ground: § 121 · § 122
- The Doctrine of Essence → A. Essence as Ground of Existence → b. Concrete Existence: § 123 · § 124
- The Doctrine of Essence → A. Essence as Ground of Existence → c. The Thing: § 125 · § 126 · § 127 · § 128 · § 129 · § 130
- The Doctrine of Essence → B. Appearance: § 131
- The Doctrine of Essence → B. Appearance → a. The World of Appearance: § 132
- The Doctrine of Essence → B. Appearance → b. Content and Form: § 133 · § 134
- The Doctrine of Essence → B. Appearance → c. The Relationship: § 135 · § 136 · § 137 · § 138 · § 139 · § 140 · § 141
- The Doctrine of Essence → C. Actuality: § 142 · § 143 · § 144 · § 145 · § 146 · § 147 · § 148 · § 149
- The Doctrine of Essence → C. Actuality → a. Relationship of Substantiality: § 150 · § 151 · § 152
- The Doctrine of Essence → C. Actuality → b. Relationship of Causality: § 153 · § 154
- The Doctrine of Essence → C. Actuality → c. Reciprocity: § 155 · § 156 · § 157 · § 158 · § 159
The Doctrine of Essence
§ 112
Essence is the concept as posited concept; the determinations are in essence only relative, not yet as utterly reflected into themselves; that is why the concept is not yet as for itself. Essence, as being that mediates itself with itself through its own negativity, is relation to itself only insofar as it is relation to other, which, however, is immediately not as something that is but as something posited and mediated. – Being has not vanished; rather, first, essence, as simple relation to itself, is being; secondly, however, being, according to its one-sided determination of being immediate, is reduced to something merely negative, to a semblance. – Essence is thereby being as shining within itself.
The absolute is essence. – This definition is the same as the one that it is being, insofar as being is likewise simple relation to itself; but it is at the same time higher, because essence is being that has gone into itself, that is, its simple relation to itself is this relation posited as the negation of the negative, as its mediation within itself with itself. – But when the absolute is determined as essence, negativity is often taken only in the sense of an abstraction from all determinate predicates. This negative doing, abstracting, then falls outside essence, and essence itself is thus only a result without this its premise, the caput mortuum of abstraction. But since this negativity is not external to being but is its own dialectic, its truth, essence, is as being that has gone into itself or that is within itself; its distinction from immediate being is constituted by that reflection, its shining within itself, and this is the peculiar determination of essence itself.
Addition. When we speak of essence, we distinguish being from it as the immediate and regard this, with respect to essence, as a mere semblance. But this semblance is not nothing at all, not a nothing, but being as sublated. – The standpoint of essence is in general the standpoint of reflection. The expression reflection is first used of light, insofar as in its rectilinear progress it strikes a mirroring surface and is thrown back by it. We thus have here something twofold: first something immediate, something that is, and then second the same as something mediated or posited. But this is precisely the case when we reflect on an object or (as one also usually says) think it over, insofar as here the object does not count in its immediacy, but we want to know it as mediated. The task or purpose of philosophy is also often conceived as being to know the essence of things, and by this is understood precisely only that things are not to be left in their immediacy but shown to be mediated or grounded by something else. The immediate being of things is here represented, as it were, as a rind or a curtain behind which essence is hidden. – When it is further said that all things have an essence, it is thereby expressed that they truly are not what they immediately show themselves to be. Nor is the matter settled by a mere roaming from one quality into another and a mere advance from the qualitative into the quantitative and vice versa; rather there is something abiding in things, and this is first essence. As regards the other meaning and use of the category of essence, it may first be recalled here how in German we use the expression Wesen [essence] with the auxiliary verb sein [to be] to designate the past, in that we designate past being as gewesen [been]. This irregularity of linguistic usage is based on a correct intuition of the relationship of being to essence, insofar as we can indeed regard essence as past being, in which connection it need only be noted that what is past is not therefore abstractly negated but only sublated and thus at the same time preserved. If we say, for example: Caesar has been in Gaul, only the immediacy of what is stated here of Caesar is negated, but not his stay in Gaul altogether, for it is precisely this that forms the content of this statement, which content, however, is represented here as sublated. – When essence [Wesen] is spoken of in common life, this often has only the meaning of a combination or a sum total, and accordingly one speaks, for example, of the newspaper system [Zeitungswesen], the postal system [Postwesen], the tax system [Steuerwesen] and so on, by which is understood only that these things are to be taken not singly in their immediacy but as a complex and then perhaps further in their various relations. Such linguistic usage contains only approximately what has resulted for us as essence. – One also speaks of finite beings [Wesen] and calls the human being a finite being. When essence is spoken of, however, one is actually beyond finitude, and this designation of the human being is to that extent inexact. When it is further said that there is a highest being [Wesen], and God is supposed to be designated thereby, two things are to be noted about this. First, the expression there is [es gibt] is one that points to the finite, and so we say, for example: there are so-and-so many planets, or: there are plants of such and plants of such a character. What there thus is, is therefore something outside and beside which there is also something else. But God, as the utterly infinite, is not one who merely is there and outside and beside whom there are also other beings. Whatever else there is besides God has, in its separation from God, no essentiality; rather in this isolation it is to be regarded as something without hold or essence in itself, as a mere semblance. But this also implies, secondly, that it must be called insufficient to speak of God merely as the highest being. The category of quantity applied here in fact has its place only in the domain of the finite. Thus we say, for example: this is the highest mountain on earth, and have the representation that besides this highest mountain there are also other mountains that are likewise high. It is the same when we say of someone that he is the richest or the most learned man in his country. God, however, is not merely a being, nor merely the highest, but rather the essence, in which connection it must at once be noted that, although this conception of God forms an important and necessary stage in the development of religious consciousness, the depth of the Christian representation of God is by no means yet exhausted by it. If we consider God only as essence pure and simple and stop there, we know him only as the universal, irresistible power, or, expressed otherwise, as the Lord. Now the fear of the Lord is indeed the beginning, but also only the beginning, of wisdom. – It is first the Jewish and then further the Mohammedan religion in which God is grasped as the Lord and essentially only as the Lord. The defect of these religions consists in general in this, that here the finite does not come into its right, while holding fast the finite for itself (be it as something natural or as something finite of spirit) constitutes what is characteristic of the heathen and thus at the same time polytheistic religions. – Further, it has also often happened that it has been asserted that God, as the highest being, cannot be known. This is in general the standpoint of the modern Enlightenment and more precisely of the abstract understanding, which contents itself with saying: il y a un être suprême, and then leaves it at that. When one speaks in this way and God is regarded only as the highest being beyond, one has the world before one in its immediacy as something fixed, positive, and forgets that essence is precisely the sublation of everything immediate. God as the abstract essence beyond, outside of which distinction and determinacy thereby fall, is in fact a mere name, a mere caput mortuum of the abstracting understanding. The true knowledge of God begins with knowing that things in their immediate being have no truth. Not only with regard to God but also in other respects it often happens that the category of essence is used in an abstract way, and that then, in considering things, their essence is fixed as something indifferent to the determinate content of their appearance and subsisting for itself. Thus it is especially said that with human beings what matters is only their essence and not their doing and their conduct. This contains the correct point that what a human being does is to be regarded not in its immediacy but only as mediated by his inner being and as manifestation of his inner being. Only it must not be overlooked that essence, and then further the inner, prove themselves as such precisely only by stepping out into appearance; whereas that appeal of people to their essence as distinct from the content of their doing usually rests only on the intention of asserting their mere subjectivity and evading what is valid in and for itself.
§ 113
Relation-to-itself in essence is the form of identity, of reflection-into-itself; this has here taken the place of the immediacy of being; both are the same abstractions of relation-to-itself.
The thoughtlessness of sensibility, which takes everything limited and finite for something that is, passes over into the obstinacy of the understanding, which grasps it as something identical with itself, not contradicting itself within itself.
§ 114
This identity, as coming from being, appears at first only burdened with the determinations of being and related to them as to something external. If this is taken thus separated from essence, it is called the inessential. But essence is being-within-itself; it is essential only insofar as it has the negative of itself within itself, relation-to-other, mediation within itself. It therefore has the inessential within itself as its own semblance. But since distinguishing is contained in shining or mediating, while what is distinguished, in its distinction from that identity from which it comes and in which it is not, or lies as semblance, itself receives the form of identity, it is thus in the manner of self-related immediacy, or of being; the sphere of essence thereby becomes a still imperfect linking of immediacy and mediation. In it everything is posited in such a way that it relates itself to itself and at the same time has gone beyond itself – as a being of reflection, a being in which an other shines and which shines in an other. – It is therefore also the sphere of posited contradiction, which in the sphere of being is only in itself.
In the development of essence, because the one concept is the substantial in everything, the same determinations occur as in the development of being, but in reflected form. Thus instead of being and nothing the forms of the positive and negative now enter, the former at first corresponding to being without opposition as identity, the latter developed (shining within itself) as distinction; – so further becoming as ground, at once itself of existence, which, as reflected onto the ground, is concrete existence, and so on. – This (the most difficult) part of logic contains chiefly the categories of metaphysics and of the sciences in general – as products of the reflecting understanding, which assumes the distinctions as independent and at the same time also posits their relativity, but connects both only side by side or one after the other by an also, and does not bring these thoughts together, does not unite them into the concept.
The Doctrine of Essence → A. Essence as Ground of Existence → a. The Pure Determinations of Reflection → α. Identity
§ 115
Essence shines within itself or is pure reflection; thus it is only relation to itself, not as immediate but as reflected – identity with itself.
This identity is formal identity or identity of the understanding insofar as it is held fast and abstracted from distinction. Or abstraction is rather the positing of this formal identity, the transformation of something concrete in itself into this form of simplicity – be it that a part of the manifold present in the concrete is left out (through so-called analysing) and only one of them taken out, or that, leaving out their difference, the manifold determinacies are contracted into one. Identity connected with the absolute as subject of a proposition gives: the absolute is what is identical with itself. – True as this proposition is, it is ambiguous whether it is meant in its truth; it is therefore at least incomplete in its expression: for it is undecided whether abstract identity of the understanding is meant, that is, in opposition to the other determinations of essence, or identity as concrete within itself; as such it is, as will emerge, first the ground and then, in higher truth, the concept. – The word “absolute” itself also often has no further meaning than that of “abstract“; thus absolute space, absolute time means nothing more than abstract space and abstract time. Taken as essential determinations, the determinations of essence become predicates of a presupposed subject, which, because they [are] essential, is everything. The propositions that thereby arise have been stated as the universal laws of thought. The principle of identity accordingly reads: “Everything is identical with itself; A = A”; and negatively: “A cannot at the same time be A and not A”. – This proposition, instead of being a true law of thought, is nothing but the law of the abstract understanding. The form of the proposition itself already contradicts it, since a proposition also promises a distinction between subject and predicate, while this one does not accomplish what its form demands. But it is sublated especially by the following so-called laws of thought, which make the opposite of this law into laws. – If it is asserted that this proposition cannot be proved, but that every consciousness proceeds according to it and, according to experience, at once agrees with it as soon as it hears it, this alleged experience of the school must be opposed by the universal experience that no consciousness thinks according to this law, nor has representations and so on, nor speaks, that no existence, of whatever kind, exists according to it. Speaking according to this supposed law of truth (a planet is – a planet; magnetism is – magnetism; spirit is – a spirit) counts with full justification as silly; this is indeed universal experience. The school in which alone such laws count has long since, with its logic which seriously propounds them, forfeited its credit with sound common sense as well as with reason.
Addition. Identity is at first again the same as what we had earlier as being, but as having become through the sublation of immediate determinacy, and thus being as ideality. – It is of great importance to come to a proper understanding of the true meaning of identity, to which it belongs above all that it is not grasped merely as abstract identity, that is, not as identity excluding distinction. This is the point by which all bad philosophy is distinguished from what alone deserves the name of philosophy. Identity in its truth, as ideality of what immediately is, is a high determination, both for our religious consciousness and for all other thinking and consciousness in general. One can say that true knowledge of God begins with knowing him as identity – as absolute identity, which at the same time implies that all the power and all the glory of the world collapses before God and can subsist only as the shining of his power and his glory. – Likewise it is identity as consciousness of oneself by which the human being distinguishes himself from nature in general and more precisely from the animal, which does not attain to grasping itself as I, that is, as pure unity of itself within itself. – As regards further the meaning of identity in relation to thinking, what matters here above all is not to confuse true identity, which contains being and its determinations within itself as sublated, with abstract, merely formal identity. All those reproaches of one-sidedness, hardness, lack of content and so on so often made against thinking, especially from the standpoint of feeling and immediate intuition, have their ground in the perverse presupposition that the activity of thinking is only that of abstract positing-as-identical, and it is formal logic itself which confirms this presupposition by setting up the allegedly highest law of thought examined in the above §. If thinking were nothing more than that abstract identity, it would have to be declared the most superfluous and tedious business. The concept, and further the idea, are indeed identical with themselves, but only insofar as they at the same time contain distinction within themselves.
The Doctrine of Essence → A. Essence as Ground of Existence → a. The Pure Determinations of Reflection → β. Distinction
§ 116
Essence is pure identity and shining within itself only insofar as it is self-relating negativity, and thus repelling of itself from itself; it therefore essentially contains the determination of distinction.
Otherness is here no longer qualitative otherness, determinacy, limit; rather, as in essence, which relates itself to itself, negation is at the same time as relation, distinction, positedness, being mediated.
Addition. When it is asked: how does identity come to distinction?, this question presupposes that identity as mere, that is, abstract identity is something for itself, and then likewise distinction is something else, likewise for itself. But this presupposition makes answering the question raised impossible, for if identity is regarded as different from distinction, one in fact has merely distinction, and the advance to distinction cannot be shown for the reason that that from which the advance is to be made is not present at all for the one who asks about the how of the advance. This question therefore proves, looked at more closely, to be altogether thoughtless, and the one who raises it would first have to be asked the other question, what he thinks by identity, whereupon it would turn out that he thinks precisely nothing by it and that identity is for him merely an empty name. Further, as we have seen, identity is indeed something negative, but not abstract, empty nothing in general, but the negation of being and its determinations. As such, however, identity is at the same time relation, and indeed negative relation to itself, or distinguishing of itself from itself.
§ 117
Distinction is 1. immediate distinction, difference, in which each of the distinct terms is for itself what it is and indifferent to its relation to the other, which is therefore external to it. Because of the indifference of the different terms to their distinction, it falls outside them into a third, something that compares. This external distinction is, as identity of the related terms, likeness, as their non-identity, unlikeness.
The understanding lets these determinations themselves fall apart in such a way that, although the comparison has one and the same substrate for likeness and unlikeness, these are supposed to be different sides and respects in it; but likeness for itself is only the former, identity, and unlikeness for itself is distinction. Difference too has been transformed into a proposition, namely that everything is different, or that there are no two things which are completely like each other. Here everything is given the opposite predicate to the identity ascribed to it in the first proposition, and thus a law contradicting the first is given. But insofar as difference is supposed to belong only to external comparison, something is supposed to be for itself only identical with itself, and so this second proposition is supposed not to contradict the first. But then difference does not belong to the something or to everything either; it constitutes no essential determination of this subject; in this way this second proposition cannot be stated at all. – But if, according to the proposition, the something is itself different, it is so through its own determinacy; but then what is meant is no longer difference as such but determinate distinction. – This is also the sense of the Leibnizian proposition.
Addition. When the understanding sets about considering identity, it is in fact already beyond it, and what it has before it is distinction in the shape of mere difference. For if we say, according to the so-called law of thought of identity: the sea is the sea, the air is the air, the moon is the moon and so on, these objects count for us as indifferent to one another, and it is thus not identity but distinction that we have before us. But further we do not stop at regarding things merely as different; rather we compare them with one another, and thereby we obtain the determinations of likeness and unlikeness. The business of the finite sciences consists to a large extent in the application of these determinations, and nowadays, when scientific treatment is spoken of, one usually understands by it preferably that procedure which aims at comparing the objects drawn into consideration with one another. It is not to be denied that many very important results have been reached in this way, and in this respect one should recall especially the great achievements of recent times in the fields of comparative anatomy and comparative linguistics. In this connection, however, it must not only be noted that one has gone too far in thinking that this comparative procedure can be applied with equal success to all fields of cognition, but it must also be emphasized especially that mere comparison cannot ultimately satisfy the scientific need, and that results of the kind mentioned before are to be regarded only as (indeed indispensable) preliminary work for truly comprehending cognition. – Incidentally, insofar as what matters in comparing is to reduce existing distinctions to identity, mathematics must be regarded as the science in which this goal is most completely reached, and indeed because quantitative distinction is only the wholly external distinction. Thus, for example, in geometry a triangle and a quadrangle, which are qualitatively different, are set equal to each other according to their magnitude by abstracting from this qualitative distinction. That mathematics is not to be envied this advantage either by the empirical sciences or by philosophy was already discussed earlier (§ 99 Addition), and [it] also follows from what was noted before about mere identity of the understanding. – It is told that when Leibniz once stated the principle of difference at court, the courtiers and ladies of the court, strolling about the garden, endeavoured to find two leaves that could not be distinguished from each other, in order to refute the philosopher’s law of thought by showing them. This is no doubt a convenient way of occupying oneself with metaphysics, still popular even today; but with regard to the Leibnizian proposition it must be noted that distinction is precisely to be grasped not merely as external and indifferent difference but as distinction in itself, and that it therefore belongs to things in themselves to be distinguished.
§ 118
Likeness is an identity only of such things as are not the same, not identical with one another – and unlikeness is relation of the unlike. The two therefore do not fall apart indifferently into different sides or respects; rather one is a shining into the other. Difference is therefore distinction of reflection, or distinction in itself, determinate distinction.
Addition. While the merely different prove to be indifferent to one another, likeness and unlikeness, by contrast, are a pair of determinations that relate utterly to each other and one of which cannot be thought without the other. This advance from mere difference to opposition is then also already found in ordinary consciousness insofar as we concede that comparing only has a sense on the presupposition of an existing distinction, and likewise conversely distinguishing only on the presupposition of existing likeness. Accordingly, when the task is set of stating a distinction, one does not ascribe great acuteness to someone who only distinguishes objects whose distinction lies immediately to hand (such as a pen and a camel), just as on the other hand one will say that someone has not got far in comparing who only knows how to compare things that lie close to each other – a beech with an oak, a temple with a church. We thus demand identity in distinction and distinction in identity. Nevertheless it very often happens in the field of the empirical sciences that one of these two determinations is forgotten over the other, and that at one time scientific interest is placed only in reducing existing distinctions to identity and at another, just as one-sidedly, in finding new distinctions. This is the case especially in natural science. Here one first makes it one’s business to discover new and ever more new substances, forces, genera, species and so on, or, by another turn, to show bodies which had hitherto counted as simple to be composite, and modern physicists and chemists may well smile at the ancients, who contented themselves with only four elements, and not even simple ones. On the other hand, however, mere identity is again kept in view, and accordingly, for example, not only electricity and chemism are regarded as essentially the same, but even the organic processes of digestion and assimilation as a merely chemical process. It was already noted earlier (§ 103 Addition) that, if recent philosophy has not infrequently been mockingly called identity philosophy, it is precisely philosophy, and first of all speculative logic, that shows the nullity of mere identity of the understanding, which abstracts from distinction, but then of course insists just as much on not leaving it at mere difference, but on knowing the inner unity of everything that is.
§ 119
2. Distinction in itself is essential distinction, the positive and the negative, such that the former is identical relation to itself in such a way that it is not the negative, and the latter is the distinct for itself in such a way that it is not the positive. Since each is for itself insofar as it is not the other, each shines in the other and is only insofar as the other is. The distinction of essence is therefore opposition, according to which the distinct has over against it not an other in general but its other; that is, each has its own determination only in its relation to the other, is reflected into itself only insofar as it is reflected into the other, and likewise the other; each is thus the other’s own other.
Distinction in itself gives the proposition: “Everything is something essentially distinct” – or, as it has also been expressed: “Of two opposed predicates only one belongs to something, and there is no third“. – This principle of opposition contradicts the principle of identity most expressly, since according to the one something is supposed to be only relation to itself, but according to the other something opposed, relation to its other. It is the peculiar thoughtlessness of abstraction to place two such contradictory propositions side by side as laws without even comparing them. – The principle of the excluded third is the principle of the determinate understanding, which wants to keep contradiction away from itself and, in doing so, commits it. A is supposed to be either +A or -A; this already states the third, the A which is neither + nor -, and which is just as well also posited as +A and as -A. If +W means 6 miles in the direction of west, but -W 6 miles in the direction of east, and + and – cancel each other, the 6 miles of way or space remain what they were without and with the opposition. Even the mere plus and minus of number or of abstract direction have, if one likes, zero as their third; but it is not to be denied that the empty opposition of + and – of the understanding also has its place with such abstractions as number, direction and so on. In the doctrine of contradictory concepts, one concept is called, for example, blue (even something like the sensuous representation of a colour is called a concept in such a doctrine), the other not-blue, so that this other would not be something affirmative, say yellow, but is supposed to be held fast only [as] the abstractly negative. – That the negative is in itself just as much positive, see the following §; this also lies already in the determination that what is opposed to an other is its other. – The emptiness of the opposition of so-called contradictory concepts had its full presentation in the, so to speak, grandiose expression of a universal law, that of all predicates so opposed one belongs to every thing and the other does not, so that spirit is either white or not white, yellow or not yellow, and so on to infinity. By forgetting that identity and opposition are themselves opposed, the principle of opposition is also taken for that of identity in the form of the principle of contradiction, and a concept to which neither (see above) or both of two mutually contradictory marks belong is declared logically false, as for example a square circle. Now although a polygonal circle and a rectilinear arc of a circle conflict just as much with this principle, geometers nevertheless have no hesitation in regarding and treating the circle as a polygon with rectilinear sides. But something like a circle (its mere determinacy) is not yet a concept; in the concept of the circle centre and periphery are equally essential, both marks belong to it; and yet periphery and centre are opposed to and contradict each other. The representation of polarity, which counts for so much in physics, contains within itself the more correct determination of opposition; but if physics holds, as regards thoughts, to ordinary logic, it would easily be frightened if it developed polarity for itself and came to the thoughts that lie in it.
Addition 1. The positive is again identity, but in its higher truth, as identical relation to itself and at the same time in such a way that it is not the negative. The negative for itself is nothing other than distinction itself. The identical as such is at first what is without determination; the positive, by contrast, is what is identical with itself, but as determined against an other, and the negative is distinction as such in the determination of not being identity. This is the distinction of distinction within itself. – In positive and negative one thinks one has an absolute distinction. But both are in themselves the same, and one could therefore also call the positive the negative and likewise conversely the negative the positive. Thus assets and debts are not two particular kinds of assets subsisting for themselves. What is something negative for the one, as debtor, is something positive for the other, the creditor. It is likewise with a road to the east, which is at the same time a road to the west. Positive and negative are therefore essentially conditioned by each other and are only in their relation to each other. The north pole of the magnet cannot be without the south pole, and the south pole not without the north pole. If one cuts a magnet in two, one does not have the north pole on one piece and the south pole on the other. Likewise in electricity positive and negative electricity are not two different fluids subsisting for themselves. In opposition the distinct has over against it in general not merely an other but its other. Ordinary consciousness regards the distinct terms as indifferent to one another. Thus one says: I am a human being, and around me there is air, water, animals and other things in general. Everything there falls apart. The purpose of philosophy, by contrast, is to banish indifference and to know the necessity of things, so that the other appears as standing over against its other. Thus, for example, inorganic nature is not to be regarded merely as something other than the organic, but as its necessary other. Both are in essential relation to each other, and the one of the two is only insofar as it excludes the other from itself and precisely thereby relates itself to it. Likewise nature is not without spirit, and spirit is not without nature. It is in general an important step when in thinking one has got away from saying: now something else is also possible. When one speaks in this way, one is still burdened with the contingent, whereas, as was noted before, true thinking is a thinking of necessity. – When modern natural science has come to recognize the opposition first perceived in magnetism as polarity as running through the whole of nature, as a universal law of nature, this is without doubt to be regarded as an essential advance of science; only it would first be important here not simply to let mere difference count again alongside opposition. Yet one regards, for example, colours at one time rightly as standing over against one another in polar opposition (as so-called complementary colours), but then again as the indifferent and merely quantitative difference of red, yellow, green and so on.
Addition 2. Instead of speaking according to the principle of the excluded third (which is the principle of the abstract understanding), one should rather say: everything is opposed. There is in fact nowhere, neither in heaven nor on earth, neither in the spiritual nor in the natural world, such an abstract either-or as the understanding asserts. Everything that is at all is something concrete, thus distinct and opposed within itself. The finitude of things then consists in their immediate existence not corresponding to what they are in themselves. Thus, for example, in inorganic nature acid is in itself at the same time base, that is, its being is utterly only this: to be related to its other. Thereby, however, acid too is not what quietly persists in opposition, but strives to posit itself as what it is in itself. What moves the world in general is contradiction, and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction cannot be thought. The correct point in this assertion is only this: that the matter cannot rest with contradiction and that contradiction sublates itself through itself. But sublated contradiction is not abstract identity, for this is itself only the one side of the opposition. The next result of opposition posited as contradiction is ground, which contains both identity and distinction within itself as sublated and reduced to merely ideal moments.
§ 120
The positive is that different term which is supposed to be for itself and at the same time not indifferent to its relation to its other. The negative is supposed likewise to be independent, negative relation to itself, to be for itself, but at the same time, as utterly negative, to have this its relation to itself, its positive, only in the other. Both are thus posited contradiction; both are in themselves the same. Both are this also for themselves, since each is the sublating of the other and of itself. They thereby go to the ground [zu Grunde gehen: perish, go to ground]. – Or, immediately, essential distinction, as distinction in and for itself, is only the distinction of itself from itself and thus contains the identical; to the whole distinction that is in and for itself, therefore, belong both distinction itself and identity. – As self-relating distinction it is likewise already expressed as what is identical with itself, and the opposed is in general that which contains within itself the one and its other, itself and its opposite. The being-within-itself of essence, so determined, is ground.
33) cf. Leibniz, Monadology, § 9
The Doctrine of Essence → A. Essence as Ground of Existence → a. The Pure Determinations of Reflection → γ. Ground
§ 121
Ground is the unity of identity and distinction; the truth of what distinction and identity have proved to be – reflection-into-itself that is just as much reflection-into-other, and vice versa. It is essence posited as totality.
The principle of ground reads: “Everything has its sufficient ground“, that is, neither the determination of something as identical with itself, nor as different, nor as merely positive or merely negative, is the true essentiality of something, but that it has its being in an other, which, as its identical-with-itself, is its essence. This is just as much not abstract reflection into itself but into other. Ground is essence that is within itself, and this is essentially ground, and it is ground only insofar as it is ground of something, of an other.
Addition. When it is said of ground that it is the unity of identity and distinction, this unity is not to be understood as abstract identity, since otherwise we would have only another name, but according to thought only identity of the understanding itself, already recognized as untrue. To meet that misunderstanding one can therefore also say that ground is not only the unity but just as much also the distinction of identity and distinction. Ground, which first resulted for us as the sublation of contradiction, thereby appears as a new contradiction. As such, however, it is not what quietly persists within itself, but rather repulsion of itself from itself. Ground is ground only insofar as it grounds; but what has proceeded from the ground is ground itself, and herein lies the formalism of ground. The grounded and the ground are one and the same content, and the distinction between the two is the mere distinction of form between simple relation to itself and mediation or positedness. When we ask about the grounds of things, this is in general the standpoint of reflection already mentioned earlier (§ 112 Addition); we then want to see the matter double, as it were, once in its immediacy and second in its ground, where it is no longer immediate. This is then also the simple sense of the so-called law of thought of sufficient ground, by which it is expressed precisely only that things are essentially to be regarded as mediated. Incidentally, in setting up this law of thought formal logic gives the other sciences a bad example insofar as it demands that they not let their content count immediately, while it itself sets up this law of thought without deriving it and showing its mediation. With the same right with which the logician asserts that our faculty of thought is simply so constituted that we must ask for a ground in everything, the physician, when asked why a person who falls into the water drowns, could answer that the human being is simply so constituted as not to be able to live under water, and likewise a jurist, asked why a criminal is punished, that civil society is simply so constituted that crimes may not remain unpunished. But even if one sets aside the demand to be made of logic for a grounding of the law of thought of ground, logic must at least answer the question what is to be understood by ground. The usual explanation, that ground is what has a consequence, appears at first sight more illuminating and comprehensible than the determination of the concept stated above. But if one asks further what the consequence is, and receives the answer that the consequence is what has a ground, it turns out that the comprehensibility of this explanation consists only in its presupposing what has resulted for us as the result of a preceding movement of thought. But the business of logic is precisely only this: to show the thoughts that are merely represented, and as such uncomprehended and unproved, as stages of self-determining thinking, whereby they are at the same time comprehended and proved. – In ordinary life and likewise in the finite sciences one very often uses this form of reflection with the intention of finding out, by applying it, how matters really stand with the objects drawn into consideration. Now although there is nothing to object to this mode of consideration insofar as it concerns, so to speak, only the immediate household needs of cognition, it must at the same time be noted that it cannot afford definitive satisfaction in either theoretical or practical respects, and indeed because ground does not yet have a content determined in and for itself, and thus by regarding something as grounded we obtain only the mere distinction of form between immediacy and mediation. Thus one sees, for example, an electrical phenomenon and asks for its ground; if we receive the answer that electricity is the ground of this phenomenon, this is the same content that we had immediately before us, only translated into the form of something inner. – But further, ground is not merely what is simply identical with itself but also distinguished, and different grounds can therefore be stated for one and the same content, which difference of grounds, according to the concept of distinction, then advances further to opposition in the form of grounds for and against the same content. – If we consider, for example, an action, say more precisely a theft, this is a content in which several sides can be distinguished. Property has thereby been violated; but the thief, who was in need, has thereby also obtained the means of satisfying his needs, and it may further be the case that the person who was robbed did not make good use of his property. It is indeed correct that the violation of property that has taken place here is the decisive point of view, before which the others must recede; but this decision does not lie in the law of thought of ground. To be sure, according to the usual formulation of this law of thought, it is not merely ground in general but sufficient ground that is spoken of, and one could therefore think that the points of view brought out in the action mentioned as an example besides the violation of property are indeed grounds, but that these grounds are not sufficient. About this, however, it must be noted that when a sufficient ground is spoken of, this predicate is either idle or of such a kind that the category of ground as such is thereby gone beyond. The predicate in question is idle and tautological if it is supposed to express merely the capacity to ground in general, since ground is ground precisely only insofar as it possesses this capacity. When a soldier runs away from the battle in order to save his life, he does indeed act contrary to duty, but it is not to be asserted that the ground which determined him to act so was not sufficient, since otherwise he would have stayed at his post. Further, however, it must also be said that, just as on the one hand all grounds are sufficient, so on the other hand no ground as such is sufficient, and indeed because, as was already noted above, ground does not yet have a content determined in and for itself and is thus not self-active and productive. Such a content, determined in and for itself and therefore self-active, will soon result for us as the concept, and it is this that is at issue with Leibniz when he speaks of sufficient ground and insists on considering things from this point of view. Leibniz first has in view the merely mechanical mode of conception still so popular with many today, which he rightly declares insufficient. Thus it is, for example, a merely mechanical conception when the organic process of the circulation of the blood is traced back merely to the contraction of the heart, and equally mechanical are those theories of criminal law which regard rendering harmless, deterrence or other such external grounds as the purpose of punishment. One in fact does Leibniz great wrong in thinking that he contented himself with something as meagre as the formal law of thought of ground. The mode of consideration he asserted is precisely the opposite of that formalism which, where comprehending cognition is at issue, lets the matter rest with mere grounds. In this respect Leibniz opposes causae efficientes and causae finales to each other and demands that one not stop at the former but penetrate through to the latter. According to this distinction, light, warmth, moisture, for example, would indeed have to be regarded as causae efficientes, but not as causa finalis of the growth of plants, which causa finalis is then precisely nothing other than the concept of the plant itself. – It can further be noted here that stopping at mere grounds, especially in the field of the legal and the ethical, is in general the standpoint and the principle of the Sophists. When sophistry is spoken of, one often understands by it merely such a mode of consideration as aims at distorting the right and the true and in general at presenting things in a false light. But this tendency does not lie immediately in sophistry, whose standpoint is at first no other than that of argumentation. The Sophists appeared among the Greeks at a time when mere authority and tradition no longer sufficed for them in the religious and ethical field and they felt the need to become conscious of what was to count for them as a content mediated by thinking. The Sophists met this demand by giving instruction in seeking out the various points of view from which things can be considered, which various points of view are at first precisely nothing other than grounds. Now since, as was noted before, ground does not yet have a content determined in and for itself, and grounds can be found for the unethical and unlawful no less than for the ethical and lawful, the decision about which grounds are to count falls to the subject, and what it decides for depends on its individual disposition and intentions. The objective ground of what is valid in and for itself, recognized by all, is thereby undermined, and it is this negative side of sophistry that has deservedly brought it into the bad repute mentioned before. Socrates, as is well known, fought the Sophists everywhere, not, however, by simply opposing authority and tradition to their argumentation, but rather by showing dialectically the lack of hold of mere grounds and asserting against it the just and the good, in general the universal or the concept of the will. When nowadays, not only in discussions of worldly matters but also in sermons, one often proceeds preferably by mere argumentation, and so, for example, all possible grounds for gratitude towards God are brought forward, Socrates and likewise Plato would not have hesitated to declare such things sophistry, since, as said, what is at issue in it is at first not the content, which may well be the true one, but the form of grounds, by which everything can be defended, but also everything attacked. In our age, rich in reflection and given to argumentation, one must not have got far if one does not know how to state a good ground for everything, even for the worst and most perverse. Everything that has been ruined in the world has been ruined for good reasons. When grounds are appealed to, one is at first inclined to step back before them; but once one has had experience of how matters stand with them, one becomes deaf to them and no longer lets oneself be impressed by them.
§ 122
Essence is at first shining and mediation within itself; as totality of mediation its unity with itself is now posited as the self-sublating of distinction and thus of mediation. This is therefore the restoration of immediacy or of being, but of being insofar as it is mediated through the sublation of mediation – concrete existence.
Ground does not yet have a content determined in and for itself, nor is it purpose; therefore it is neither active nor productive; rather a concrete existence merely proceeds forth from the ground. The determinate ground is therefore something formal, some determinacy insofar as it is posited as related to itself, as affirmation, in relation to the immediate existence connected with it. Precisely by being a ground it is also a good ground, for “good“, taken quite abstractly, means no more than something affirmative, and every determinacy is good that can in any way be expressed as something admittedly affirmative. A ground can therefore be found and stated for everything, and a good ground (for example a good motive for acting) may bring something about or may not, may have a consequence or may not. It becomes a motive that brings something about, for example, through being taken up into a will, which first makes it active and a cause.
The Doctrine of Essence → A. Essence as Ground of Existence → b. Concrete Existence
§ 123
Concrete existence is the immediate unity of reflection-into-itself and reflection-into-other. It is therefore the indeterminate multitude of existing things as reflected into themselves, which at the same time just as much shine into other, are relative, and form a world of mutual dependence and of an infinite connection of grounds and grounded. The grounds are themselves concrete existences, and the existing things are likewise in many respects both grounds and grounded.
Addition. The expression existence (derived from existere) points to a having-proceeded, and concrete existence is being that has proceeded from the ground, restored through the sublation of mediation. Essence, as sublated being, first proved to us to be shining within itself, and the determinations of this shining are identity, distinction and ground. Ground is the unity of identity and distinction, and as such at the same time distinguishing of itself from itself. But what is distinguished from the ground is just as little mere distinction as ground itself is abstract identity. Ground is the sublating of itself, and that into which it sublates itself, the result of its negation, is concrete existence. This, as what has proceeded from the ground, contains the ground within itself, and the ground does not remain behind concrete existence; rather it is precisely only this: to sublate itself and translate itself into existence. This is then also found in ordinary consciousness insofar as, when we consider the ground of something, this ground is not something abstractly inner but rather itself again something existing. Thus we regard, for example, as the ground of a conflagration the flash of lightning that set a building on fire, and likewise as the ground of a people’s constitution its customs and conditions of life. This, then, is in general the shape in which the existing world first presents itself to reflection, as an indeterminate multitude of existing things which, as reflected at the same time into themselves and into other, relate to one another mutually as ground and as grounded. In this motley play of the world, as the sum total of what exists, there is at first nowhere a firm hold; everything appears here only as something relative, conditioned by other things and likewise conditioning other things. The reflecting understanding makes it its business to ascertain and pursue these all-round relations; but the question about a final purpose remains unanswered in this, and the need of comprehending reason therefore strides beyond this standpoint of mere relativity with the further development of the logical idea.
§ 124
But the reflection-into-other of what exists is unseparated from reflection-into-itself; ground is their unity, from which concrete existence has proceeded. What exists therefore contains relativity and its manifold connection with other existing things in itself and is reflected into itself as ground. Thus what exists is a thing.
The thing-in-itself, which has become so famous in the Kantian philosophy, shows itself here in its origin, namely as abstract reflection-into-itself, which is held fast against reflection-into-other and against the distinct determinations in general as their empty foundation.
Addition. When it is asserted that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, this is to be granted insofar as by cognition one has to understand grasping an object in its concrete determinacy, while the thing-in-itself is nothing other than the wholly abstract and undetermined thing in general. Incidentally, with the same right with which the thing-in-itself is spoken of, one could also speak of quality-in-itself, of quantity-in-itself and likewise further of all the other categories, and these categories would be understood in their abstract immediacy, that is, apart from their development and inner determinacy. It is to that extent to be regarded as an arbitrariness of the understanding when precisely only the thing is fixed in its in-itself. But further the in-itself is also usually applied to the content of the natural as well as the spiritual world, and accordingly one speaks, for example, of electricity or of the plant in itself, and likewise of the human being or of the state in itself, and by the in-itself of these objects one understands what is right and proper in them. It is no different with this than with the thing-in-itself in general, and more precisely in such a way that, if one stops at the mere in-itself of objects, they are grasped not in their truth but in the one-sided form of mere abstraction. Thus, for example, the human-being-in-itself is the child, whose task consists in not persisting in this abstract and undeveloped in-itself, but in becoming also for itself what it at first is only in itself – namely a free and rational being. Likewise the state-in-itself is the still undeveloped, patriarchal state, in which the various political functions lying in the concept of the state have not yet reached their constitution in accordance with the concept. In the same sense the seed too can be regarded as the plant-in-itself. From these examples it can be gathered that one is very much in error in thinking that the in-itself of things, or the thing-in-itself in general, is something inaccessible to our cognition. All things are at first in themselves, but the matter does not rest there, and just as the seed, which is the plant in itself, is only this: to develop itself, so the thing in general also advances beyond its mere in-itself, as abstract reflection-into-itself, to proving itself also as reflection-into-other, and thus it has properties.
The Doctrine of Essence → A. Essence as Ground of Existence → c. The Thing
§ 125
The thing is the totality as the development, posited in one, of the determinations of ground and of concrete existence. According to one of its moments, reflection-into-other, it has the distinctions in it, according to which it is a determinate and concrete thing. α) These determinations are different from one another; they have their reflection-into-itself in the thing, not in themselves. They are properties of the thing, and their relation to it is having.
Having, as relation, takes the place of being. Something does indeed also have qualities in it, but this transfer of having to what is is inexact, because determinacy as quality is immediately one with the something, and something ceases to be when it loses its quality. The thing, however, is reflection-into-itself, as identity that is also distinguished from distinction, from its determinations. – Having is used in many languages to designate the past – rightly, since the past is sublated being and spirit is its reflection-into-itself, in which alone it still has subsistence, but which also distinguishes this being sublated within it from itself.
Addition. In the thing all the determinations of reflection recur as existing. Thus the thing, at first as thing-in-itself, is what is identical with itself. But identity, as we have seen, is not without distinction, and the properties which the thing has are existing distinction, in the form of difference. While earlier the different terms proved to be indifferent to one another, and their relation to one another was posited only by the comparison external to them, we now have in the thing a bond that links the different properties with one another. Incidentally, property is not to be confused with quality. One does indeed also say that something has qualities. But this designation is unsuitable insofar as having indicates an independence that does not yet belong to the something immediately identical with its quality. Something is what it is only through its quality, whereas the thing likewise exists only insofar as it has properties, but is not bound to this or that determinate property and can therefore also lose it without thereby ceasing to be what it is.
§ 126
β) But reflection-into-other is also in the ground immediately in itself reflection-into-itself; therefore the properties are just as much identical with themselves, independent and freed from their being bound to the thing. But because they are the determinacies of the thing distinguished from one another as reflected-into-themselves, they are not themselves things, which are concrete, but existences reflected into themselves as abstract determinacies, matters.
The matters, for example magnetic, electrical matters, are not called things either. – They are qualities proper, one with their being, determinacy that has attained immediacy, but to a being that is a reflected one, concrete existence.
Addition. The making independent of the properties which the thing has into matters or substances of which it consists is indeed grounded in the concept of the thing and is therefore also found in experience; but it is as contrary to thought as to experience to conclude, from the fact that certain properties of a thing, such as colour, smell and so on, can be presented as a particular colouring matter, odorous matter and so on, that everything is thereby settled, and that, in order to find out how matters really stand with things, one has nothing further to do than to decompose them into the substances of which they are composed. This decomposing into independent substances has its proper place only in inorganic nature, and the chemist is within his right when, for example, he decomposes common salt or gypsum into their substances and then says that the former consists of hydrochloric acid and soda and the latter of sulphuric acid and lime. Likewise geognosy rightly regards granite as composed of quartz, feldspar and mica. These substances of which the thing consists are then partly themselves again things, which as such can be decomposed once more into more abstract substances, as for example sulphuric acid, which consists of sulphur and oxygen. Now while such substances or matters can actually be presented as subsisting for themselves, it also often happens that other properties of things are likewise regarded as particular matters, to which, however, this independence does not belong. Thus one speaks, for example, of caloric, of electrical and of magnetic matter, which substances and matters are, however, to be regarded as mere fictions of the understanding. This is in general the way of the abstract reflection of the understanding: to seize arbitrarily on single categories that have their validity only as determinate stages of development of the idea, and then to handle them, as it is said, for the purpose of explanation, but in contradiction with unprejudiced intuition and experience, in such a way that all objects drawn into consideration are reduced to them. So the thing’s consisting of independent substances is also often applied in fields where it no longer has any validity. Already within nature, in organic life, this category proves insufficient. One may say that this animal consists of bones, muscles, nerves and so on, but it is immediately evident that this is a different matter from a piece of granite consisting of the substances named before. These substances behave completely indifferently towards their union and can just as well subsist without it, whereas the various parts and members of the organic body have their subsistence only in their union and, separated from one another, cease to exist as such.
§ 127
Matter is thus abstract or undetermined reflection-into-other, or reflection-into-itself at the same time as determinate; it is therefore existent thinghood, the subsistence of the thing. In this way the thing has its reflection-into-itself in the matters (the opposite of § 125), subsists not in itself but of the matters, and is only their superficial connection, an external linking of them.
§ 128
γ) Matter, as the immediate unity of concrete existence with itself, is also indifferent to determinacy; the many different matters therefore come together into the one matter, concrete existence in the determination of reflection of identity, over against which these distinct determinacies and their external relation to one another in the thing are form – the determination of reflection of distinction, but as existing and as totality.
This one matter without determination is also the same as the thing-in-itself, only the latter as wholly abstract within itself, the former as being in itself also for-other, first of all for form.
Addition. The various matters of which the thing consists are in themselves the one the same as the other. We thereby obtain the one matter in general, in which distinction is posited as external to it, that is, as mere form. The conception of things as all having one and the same matter as their foundation and as differing merely externally, according to their form, is very familiar to reflecting consciousness. Matter counts here as in itself altogether undetermined, yet capable of every determination and at the same time utterly permanent and remaining equal to itself in all change and alteration. This indifference of matter to determinate forms is indeed found in finite things; thus, for example, it is indifferent to a block of marble whether it is given the form of this or that statue or also of a column. In this, however, it must not be overlooked that such matter as a block of marble is only relatively (in relation to the sculptor) indifferent to form, but by no means formless altogether. Accordingly the mineralogist also regards the only relatively formless marble as a determinate formation of stone, in its distinction from other equally determinate formations, such as sandstone, porphyry and the like. It is thus only the abstracting understanding that fixes matter in its isolation and as formless in itself, whereas in fact the thought of matter altogether includes the principle of form within itself, and for that reason a formless matter nowhere occurs as existing in experience either. The conception of matter as originally present and as formless in itself is, incidentally, very old and meets us already among the Greeks, first in the mythical shape of chaos, which is represented as the formless foundation of the existing world. It lies in the consequence of this representation to regard God not as the creator of the world but as a mere shaper of the world, as demiurge. The deeper intuition, by contrast, is that God created the world out of nothing, whereby it is expressed in general, on the one hand, that no independence belongs to matter as such, and on the other, that form does not come to matter from outside but, as totality, carries the principle of matter within itself, which free and infinite form will soon result for us as the concept.
§ 129
The thing thus falls apart into matter and form, each of which is the totality of thinghood and independent for itself. But matter, which is supposed to be positive, undetermined concrete existence, contains, as concrete existence, reflection-into-other just as much as being-within-itself; as unity of these determinations it is itself the totality of form. But form, already as totality of determinations, contains reflection-into-itself, or, as self-relating form, it has what is supposed to constitute the determination of matter. Both are in themselves the same. This unity of theirs, posited, is in general the relation of matter and form, which are equally distinct.
§ 130
The thing as this totality is the contradiction of being, according to its negative unity, the form in which matter is determined and reduced to properties (§ 125), and at the same time of consisting of matters, which in the reflection of the thing into itself are at the same time as independent as they are negated. The thing, thus being essential concrete existence as one that sublates itself within itself, is appearance.
The negation likewise posited in the thing, as independence of the matters, occurs in physics as porosity. Each of the many matters (colouring matter, odorous matter and other substances, among them according to some also sonorous matter, then of course caloric, electrical matter and so on) is also negated, and in this its negation, its pores, are the many other independent matters, which are just as porous and so let the others mutually exist within them. The pores are nothing empirical, but fictions of the understanding, which represents the moment of negation of the independent matters in this way and covers up the further development of the contradictions with that nebulous confusion in which all are independent and all are equally negated in one another. – When in the same way the faculties or activities in spirit are hypostatized, their living unity likewise becomes the confusion of the influence of the one on the other. Just as the pores (not those in the organic, those of wood, of skin, are meant, but [those] in the so-called matters, as in colouring matter, caloric and so on, or in metals, crystals and the like) do not have their confirmation in observation, so too matter itself, further a form separated from it, first the thing and its consisting of matters, or that it itself subsists and only has properties, is a product of the reflecting understanding, which, while it observes and pretends to state what it observes, rather produces a metaphysics that is contradiction on all sides, which, however, remains hidden from it.
The Doctrine of Essence → B. Appearance
§ 131
Essence must appear. Its shining within it is the sublating of itself into immediacy, which, as reflection-into-itself, is subsistence (matter) just as much as it is form, reflection-into-other, self-sublating subsistence. Shining is the determination by which essence is not being but essence, and developed shining is appearance. Essence is therefore not behind or beyond appearance; rather, because it is essence that exists, concrete existence is appearance.
Addition. Concrete existence, posited in its contradiction, is appearance. This is not to be confused with mere semblance. Semblance is the next truth of being or immediacy. The immediate is not what we think we have in it, not something independent and resting on itself, but only semblance, and as such it is gathered into the simplicity of essence that is within itself. This is at first totality of shining within itself, but does not then stop at this inwardness; rather it steps out as ground into concrete existence, which, as having its ground not in itself but in an other, is precisely only appearance. When we speak of appearance, we connect with it the representation of an indeterminate manifold of existing things whose being is utterly only mediation and which therefore do not rest on themselves but have their validity only as moments. But this also implies at the same time that essence does not remain behind or beyond appearance but is rather, as it were, the infinite goodness of releasing its semblance into immediacy and granting it the joy of existence. The appearance thereby posited does not stand on its own feet and has its being not in itself but in an other. God as essence, just as he is the goodness of creating a world by bestowing existence on the moments of his shining within himself, proves at the same time to be the power over it and the justice of manifesting the content of this existing world, insofar as it wants to exist for itself, as mere appearance. Appearance is in general a very important stage of the logical idea, and one can say that philosophy distinguishes itself from common consciousness by regarding as mere appearance what counts for the latter as something that is and is independent. What matters here, however, is that the meaning of appearance be properly grasped. For when it is said of something that it is only appearance, this can be misunderstood as though, in comparison with this merely appearing thing, what is or is immediate were the higher. In fact it is precisely the other way round, namely that appearance is something higher than mere being. Appearance is in general the truth of being and a richer determination than being, insofar as it contains united within itself the moments of reflection-into-itself and reflection-into-other, whereas being or immediacy is still what is one-sidedly relationless and (seemingly) resting only on itself. But further that only of appearance does indeed point to a defect, and this consists in appearance still being what is broken within itself, not having its hold in itself. What is higher than mere appearance is first actuality, which will be dealt with later as the third stage of essence. – In the history of modern philosophy it is Kant to whom the merit is due of having first reasserted the distinction mentioned before between common and philosophical consciousness. Kant, however, stopped halfway insofar as he grasped appearance only in the subjective sense and fixed outside it abstract essence as the thing in itself inaccessible to our cognition. To be only appearance is the very nature of the immediately objective world itself, and in knowing it as such we at the same time know essence, which does not remain behind or beyond appearance but manifests itself as essence precisely by reducing it to mere appearance. – Incidentally, unprejudiced consciousness, in its demand for a totality, is not to be blamed if it hesitates to rest content with the assertion of subjective idealism that we are dealing utterly only with appearances. Only it easily happens to this unprejudiced consciousness, when it sets about rescuing the objectivity of cognition, that it returns to abstract immediacy and simply holds this fast as the true and actual. Fichte, in a little work entitled “Sonnenklarer Bericht an das größere Publikum über das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie; ein Versuch, den Leser zum Verstehen zu zwingen” [A Crystal-Clear Report to the Wider Public on the Real Essence of the Newest Philosophy; an Attempt to Compel the Reader to Understand] [Berlin 1801], treated the opposition between subjective idealism and immediate consciousness in popular form as a dialogue between the author and the reader and endeavoured to show the justification of the subjectively idealist standpoint. In this dialogue the reader complains to the author of his distress that he simply cannot manage to put himself at that standpoint, and expresses himself disconsolately about the things that surround him being supposed to be not actual things but mere appearances. The reader is indeed not to be blamed for this distress insofar as he is expected to regard himself as banished into an impenetrable circle of merely subjective representations; but apart from the merely subjective conception of appearance, it must be said that we have every reason to be content that in the things surrounding us we are dealing merely with appearances and not with fixed and independent existences, since in that case we would soon starve, bodily as well as spiritually.
The Doctrine of Essence → B. Appearance → a. The World of Appearance
§ 132
What appears exists in such a way that its subsistence is immediately sublated, this being only one moment of form itself; form comprises subsistence or matter within itself as one of its determinations. What appears thus has its ground in form as its essence, its reflection-into-itself as against its immediacy, but thereby only in another determinacy of form. This its ground is just as much something that appears, and appearance thus goes on to an infinite mediation of subsistence through form, and thus likewise through non-subsistence. This infinite mediation is at the same time a unity of relation to itself, and concrete existence [is] developed into a totality and world of appearance, of reflected finitude.
The Doctrine of Essence → B. Appearance → b. Content and Form
§ 133
The being-outside-one-another of the world of appearance is totality and is wholly contained in its relation-to-itself. The relation of appearance to itself is thus completely determined, has form in itself, and, because in this identity, as essential subsistence. Thus form is content and, according to its developed determinacy, the law of appearance. Into form as not reflected into itself falls the negative of appearance, the dependent and alterable – it is indifferent, external form.
With the opposition of form and content it is essential to hold fast that content is not formless but has form in itself just as much as form is something external to it. The doubling of form is present, which at one time, as reflected into itself, is content, at another, as not reflected into itself, is external existence indifferent to content. In itself the absolute relationship of content and form is present here, namely their turning over into each other, so that content is nothing but the turning over of form into content, and form nothing but the turning over of content into form. This turning over is one of the most important determinations. But it is posited only in the absolute relationship.
Addition. Form and content are a pair of determinations that the reflecting understanding very often uses, and indeed chiefly in such a way that content is regarded as the essential and independent, form, by contrast, as the inessential and dependent. Against this, however, it must be noted that in fact both are equally essential, and that, while there is as little a formless content as a formless stuff, these two (content and stuff or matter) are distinguished from each other precisely in that the latter, although in itself not without form, nevertheless proves in its existence to be indifferent to it, whereas content as such is what it is only by containing developed form within itself. But further we also find form as an existence indifferent to content and external to it, and this is the case because appearance in general is still burdened with externality. If we consider a book, for example, it is indeed indifferent to its content whether it is written or printed, whether it is bound in paper or in leather. But this by no means says that, apart from such external and indifferent form, the content of the book itself is formless. There are of course enough books which can not unjustly be designated as formless also with regard to their content; in this relation to content, however, formlessness is synonymous with shapelessness, by which is to be understood not the absence of form in general but only the absence of the right form. But this right form is so little indifferent to content that it is rather content itself. A work of art which lacks the right form is for that very reason not a right, that is, not a true work of art, and it is a poor excuse for an artist as such when it is said that the content of his works is indeed good (indeed even excellent), but that they lack the right form. True works of art are precisely only those whose content and form prove to be altogether identical. One can say of the Iliad that its content is the Trojan War, or more precisely the wrath of Achilles; with that we have everything and yet only very little, for what makes the Iliad the Iliad is the poetic form into which that content has been developed. Likewise the content of Romeo and Juliet is the downfall of two lovers brought about by the discord of their families; but this is not yet Shakespeare’s immortal tragedy. – As regards further the relationship of content and form in the scientific field, one should recall in this respect the distinction between philosophy and the other sciences. The finitude of the latter consists in general in this, that here thinking, as merely formal activity, takes up its content as something given from outside, and that the content is not known as determined from within by the thoughts underlying it, so that form and content do not completely permeate each other, whereas in philosophy this separation falls away, and philosophy is therefore to be designated as infinite cognition. Nevertheless philosophical thinking too is very often regarded as mere activity of form, and especially of logic, which admittedly has to do only with thoughts as such, its lack of content counts as a settled matter. If by content one understands only what is tangible in general, what is sensuously perceptible, then it will indeed readily be granted of philosophy in general, and of logic in particular, that it has no content, that is, no such sensuously perceptible content. But even ordinary consciousness and general linguistic usage by no means stop merely at sensuous perceptibility, or at mere existence in general, with regard to what is understood by content. When a book without content is spoken of, one understands by it, as is well known, not merely a book with blank pages but one whose content is as good as none, and on closer consideration it will turn out in the final analysis that for an educated consciousness what is first designated as content has no other meaning than that of conformity to thought. But this also concedes at the same time that thoughts are not to be regarded as forms indifferent to content and empty in themselves, and that, as in art, so also in all other fields, the truth and solidity of content rests essentially on its proving to be identical with form.
§ 134
But immediate concrete existence is determinacy of subsistence itself as well as of form; it is therefore just as external to the determinacy of content as this externality, which content has through the moment of its subsistence, is essential to it. Appearance, so posited, is the relationship in which one and the same, the content, is as developed form, as the externality and opposition of independent existences and their identical relation, in which relation alone the distinct terms are what they are.
The Doctrine of Essence → B. Appearance → c. The Relationship
§ 135
α) The immediate relationship is that of the whole and the parts: content is the whole and consists of the parts (form), its opposite. The parts are different from one another and are what is independent. But they are parts only in their identical relation to one another, or insofar as, taken together, they constitute the whole. But the together is the opposite and negation of the part.
Addition. The essential relationship is the determinate, wholly universal mode of appearing. Everything that exists stands in relationship, and this relationship is what is true in every concrete existence. What exists is thereby not abstractly for itself but only in an other; but in this other it is relation to itself, and the relationship is the unity of relation to itself and relation to other. The relationship of whole and parts is untrue insofar as its concept and reality do not correspond to each other. The concept of the whole is to contain parts; but if the whole is then posited as what it is according to its concept, if it is divided, it thereby ceases to be a whole. There are indeed things that correspond to this relationship, but for that very reason they are also only low and untrue existences. In this connection it must be recalled in general that when something untrue is spoken of in a philosophical discussion, this must not be understood as though such a thing did not exist. A bad state or a diseased body may well exist; but these objects are untrue, for their concept and their reality do not correspond to each other. – The relationship of whole and parts, as the immediate relationship, is in general one that lies very close to the reflecting understanding and with which it therefore often contents itself even where deeper relationships are in fact at issue. Thus, for example, the members and organs of a living body are not to be regarded merely as its parts, since they are what they are only in their unity and by no means behave indifferently towards it. These members and organs become mere parts only under the hands of the anatomist, who, however, is then no longer dealing with living bodies but with cadavers. This is not to say that such dissection should not take place at all, but rather that the external and mechanical relationship of whole and parts is not sufficient to know organic life in its truth. – This is the case to a much higher degree with the application of this relationship to spirit and the formations of the spiritual world. Even if in psychology parts of the soul or of spirit are not expressly spoken of, the merely understanding treatment of this discipline is nevertheless likewise based on the representation of that finite relationship insofar as the various forms of spiritual activity are enumerated and described one after another merely in their isolation, as so-called particular forces and faculties.
§ 136
β) The one and the same of this relationship, the relation to itself present in it, is thus immediately negative relation to itself, and indeed as the mediation that one and the same is indifferent to distinction, and that it is the negative relation to itself which repels itself, as reflection-into-itself, into distinction and posits itself as existing reflection-into-other, and conversely leads this reflection-into-other back to relation to itself and to indifference – force and its expression.
The relationship of whole and parts is the immediate, and therefore thoughtless, relationship and turning over of identity-with-itself into difference. One passes over from the whole to the parts and from the parts to the whole, and in each the opposition to the other is forgotten, since each for itself, at one time the whole, at another the parts, is taken as an independent existence. Or, since the parts are supposed to subsist in the whole and the whole of the parts, at one time the one, at another the other is what subsists, and likewise each time its other is the inessential. The mechanical relationship consists in its superficial form in general in the parts being independent with respect to one another and to the whole. The progress to infinity which concerns the divisibility of matter can also use this relationship and is then the thoughtless alternation between its two sides. A thing is at one time taken as a whole, then one passes over to the determination of part; this determination is now forgotten and what was part is regarded as a whole; then the determination of part enters again, and so on to infinity. But this infinity, taken as the negative it is, is the negative relation of the relationship to itself, force, the whole identical with itself as being-within-itself – and as sublating this being-within-itself and expressing itself, and conversely the expression which vanishes and goes back into force. Force, despite this infinity, is also finite; for the content, the one and the same of force and expression, is only in itself this identity; the two sides of the relationship are not yet themselves each for itself its concrete identity, not yet the totality. They are therefore different for each other, and the relationship is a finite one. Force therefore needs solicitation from outside, acts blindly, and because of this defectiveness of form the content too is limited and contingent. It is not yet truly identical with form, is not yet as concept and purpose, which is what is determined in and for itself. – This distinction is most essential, but not easy to grasp; it has to be determined more closely only in the concept of purpose itself. If it is overlooked, this leads to the confusion of grasping God as force, a confusion from which Herder’s God chiefly suffers. It is usually said that the nature of force itself is unknown and only its expression is known. On the one hand, the whole determination of the content of force is the very same as that of expression; the explanation of an appearance from a force is therefore an empty tautology. What is supposed to remain unknown is thus in fact nothing but the empty form of reflection-into-itself, by which alone force is distinguished from expression – a form which is likewise something well known. This form adds not the least to the content and the law, which are supposed to be known only from appearance alone. It is also assured everywhere that nothing is thereby to be asserted about force; so it cannot be seen why the form of force has been introduced into the sciences. – On the other hand, however, the nature of force is indeed something unknown, because the necessity of the connection of its content within itself, as well as [the necessity] of that content insofar as it is limited for itself and therefore has its determinacy by means of an other outside it, is still lacking.
Addition 1. The relationship of force and its expression is, looking back to the immediate relationship of whole and parts, to be regarded as infinite, since in it the identity of the two sides, which in the latter relationship was present only in itself, is posited. The whole, although in itself consisting of parts, nevertheless ceases to be a whole when it is divided, whereas force proves itself as force only by expressing itself and returns to itself in its expression, for the expression is itself again force. But further this relationship too is again finite, and its finitude consists in general in this being mediated, just as conversely the relationship of whole and parts proved to be finite because of its immediacy. The finitude of the mediated relationship of force and its expression shows itself first in this, that every force is conditioned and needs for its subsistence something other than itself. Thus, for example, magnetic force, as is well known, has its bearer chiefly in iron, whose other properties (colour, specific gravity, relation to acids and so on) are independent of this relation to magnetism. It is the same with all other forces, which throughout prove to be conditioned and mediated by something other than themselves. – The finitude of force shows itself further in this, that in order to express itself it needs solicitation. That by which force is solicited is itself again the expression of a force, which in order to express itself must likewise be solicited. In this way we obtain either the infinite progress again or the reciprocity of soliciting and being solicited, in which, however, an absolute beginning of the movement is still always lacking. Force is not yet, like purpose, what determines itself within itself; the content is a determinately given one, and when force expresses itself it is, as one usually says, blind in its effect, by which is to be understood precisely the distinction between abstract expression of force and purposive activity.
Addition 2. Although the so often repeated assertion that only the expression of forces, but not forces themselves, can be known must be rejected as unfounded, because force is precisely only this: to express itself, and we therefore know force itself at the same time in the totality of expression grasped as law, it must not be overlooked that this assertion of the unknowability of the in-itself of forces contains a correct presentiment of the finitude of this relationship. The single expressions of a force at first confront us in indeterminate manifoldness and in their isolation as contingent; we then reduce this manifold to its inner unity, which we designate as force, and, by recognizing the law prevailing in it, become conscious of what seemed contingent as something necessary. But the various forces are themselves again a manifold and appear in their mere being-side-by-side as contingent. Accordingly in empirical physics one speaks of forces of gravity, magnetism, electricity and so on, and likewise in empirical psychology of the force of memory, of imagination, of will and all sorts of other forces of the soul. Here the need recurs to become conscious of these various forces likewise as a unified whole, and this need would not be satisfied by reducing the various forces to some primordial force common to them. In such a primordial force we would in fact have only an empty abstraction, as empty of content as the abstract thing in itself. Add to this that the relationship of force and its expression is essentially the mediated relationship, and that it therefore contradicts the concept of force when it is grasped as original or resting on itself. – Given this state of affairs with the nature of force, we may well accept it when it is said that the existing world is an expression of divine forces; but we will hesitate to regard God himself as mere force, because force is still a subordinate and finite determination. In this sense, too, the Church, when at the so-called reawakening of the sciences people set about tracing the single appearances of nature back to forces underlying them, declared this undertaking godless, because if it is the forces of gravitation, of vegetation and so on that bring about the motion of the heavenly bodies, the growth of plants and so on, nothing remains for divine world-government to do, and God is thus reduced to an idle spectator of such a play of forces. Now natural scientists, and especially Newton, in using the form of reflection of force to explain natural appearances, did indeed first expressly advocate that no detriment should thereby be done to the honour of God as creator and ruler of the world; but it lies in the consequence of this explaining from forces that the argumentative understanding advances to fixing the single forces each for itself and holding them fast in this finitude as something ultimate, over against which finitized world of independent forces and substances only the abstract infinity of an unknowable highest being beyond remains for the determination of God. This is then the standpoint of materialism and of the modern Enlightenment, whose knowledge of God, renouncing the what, reduces itself to the mere that of his being. Now although the Church and religious consciousness are to be given right in the polemic mentioned here insofar as the finite forms of the understanding are indeed not sufficient to know either nature or the formations of the spiritual world in their truth, on the other hand the formal justification, first of empirical science, must not be overlooked either, which justification consists in general in claiming the existing world in the determinacy of its content for thinking cognition and not leaving it merely at abstract faith in the world’s being created and governed by God. When our religious consciousness, supported by the authority of the Church, teaches us that it is God who created the world by his almighty will, and that it is he who guides the stars in their courses and grants all creatures their subsistence and thriving, the why still remains to be answered, and it is the answering of this question in general that forms the common task of science, both empirical and philosophical. When religious consciousness, not recognizing this task and the right contained in it, appeals to the unsearchableness of the divine decrees, it thereby itself steps onto the standpoint mentioned before of mere Enlightenment of the understanding, and such an appeal is to be regarded only as an arbitrary assurance, contradicting the express command of the Christian religion to know God in spirit and in truth, of a humility that is by no means Christian but arrogantly fanatical.
§ 137
Force, as the whole which is in itself negative relation to itself, is this: to repel itself from itself and to express itself. But since this reflection-into-other, the distinction of the parts, is just as much reflection-into-itself, expression is the mediation by which force, returning into itself, is as force. Its expression is itself the sublating of the difference of the two sides present in this relationship and the positing of the identity which in itself constitutes the content. Its truth is therefore the relationship whose two sides are distinguished only as inner and outer.
§ 138
γ) The inner is the ground as it is as the mere form of the one side of appearance and of the relationship, the empty form of reflection-into-itself, over against which concrete existence likewise stands, as the form of the other side of the relationship, with the empty determination of reflection-into-other, as outer. Their identity is the fulfilled identity, the content, the unity of reflection-into-itself and reflection-into-other posited in the movement of force; both are the same one totality, and this unity makes them the content.
§ 139
The outer is therefore, first, the same content as the inner. What is inner is also present outwardly, and vice versa; appearance shows nothing that is not in essence, and in essence there is nothing that is not manifested.
§ 140
Second. But inner and outer are also, as determinations of form, opposed to each other, and indeed utterly, as the abstractions of identity with itself and of mere manifoldness or reality. But since, as moments of the one form, they are essentially identical, what is posited only in the one abstraction is immediately also only in the other. What is therefore only something inner is thereby also only something outer, and what is only something outer is also only something inner.
It is the usual error of reflection to take essence as the merely inner. If it is taken merely in this way, this consideration too is a wholly external one, and that essence is the empty external abstraction.
Into the inner of nature – says a poet – no created spirit penetrates; too happy if he knows only the outer shell.
It should rather have been said that precisely when the essence of nature is determined for him as inner, he knows only the outer shell. – Because in being in general, or also in merely sensuous perception, the concept is only the inner, it is something external to it – a subjective being as well as thinking, without truth. – In nature, as in spirit, insofar as concept, purpose, law are only inner dispositions, pure possibilities, they are only an external inorganic nature, the science of a third, an alien power and so on. – As the human being [is] outwardly, that is, in his actions (not, of course, in his merely bodily externality), so he is inwardly; and if he is only inwardly, that is, only in intentions and dispositions, virtuous, moral and so on, and his outer is not identical with this, the one is as hollow and empty as the other.
Addition. The relationship of inner and outer, as the unity of the two preceding relationships, is at the same time the sublation of mere relativity and of appearance in general. But when the understanding nevertheless holds fast inner and outer in their separation, they are a pair of empty forms, the one as null as the other. – It is of great importance, in considering nature as well as the spiritual world, to keep properly in view how matters stand with the relationship of inner and outer, and to beware of the error that only the former is the essential, what really matters, while the latter is the inessential and indifferent. We meet this error first when, as often happens, the distinction between nature and spirit is reduced to the abstract distinction of outer and inner. As regards the conception of nature here, nature is indeed not only what is external for spirit but also what is external in itself in general. This in general, however, is not to be taken in the sense of abstract externality, for there is no such thing at all, but rather in such a way that the idea, which forms the common content of nature and spirit, is present in nature as only outer, but precisely for that reason also at the same time as only inner. However much the abstract understanding with its either-or may resist this conception of nature, it is nevertheless also found in our other consciousness, and most determinately in our religious consciousness. According to this, nature no less than the spiritual world is a revelation of God, and the two are distinguished from each other in that, while nature does not attain to becoming conscious of its divine essence, this is the express task of (thereby first finite) spirit. Those who regard the essence of nature as something merely inner and therefore inaccessible to us thereby take the standpoint of those ancients who regarded God as envious, against which, however, Plato and Aristotle already declared themselves. What God is, he communicates, he reveals, and indeed first through nature and in it. – Further, the defect or imperfection of an object consists in general in being only something inner and thereby at the same time only something outer, or, what is the same, only something outer and thereby only something inner. Thus, for example, the child, as a human being in general, is indeed a rational being, but the reason of the child as such is at first present only as something inner, that is, as disposition, vocation and so on, and this merely inner has at the same time for the child, as the will of its parents, the knowledge of its teachers, in general as the rational world surrounding it, the form of something merely outer. The upbringing and education of the child then consists in its becoming also for itself what it at first is only in itself and thereby for others (the adults). Reason, present in the child at first only as inner possibility, is actualized through upbringing, and likewise conversely the child becomes conscious of ethical life, religion and science, at first regarded as external authority, as its own and inner. – As with the child, so it is in this respect also with the adult insofar as he, contrary to his vocation, remains caught in the naturalness of his knowing and willing; thus, for example, for the criminal the punishment to which he is subjected has indeed the form of an external force, but in fact it is only the manifestation of his own criminal will. – From the discussion so far it can also be gathered what is to be thought when someone, in face of his meagre achievements, indeed reprehensible deeds, appeals to the inwardness, to be distinguished from them, of his allegedly excellent intentions and dispositions. It may indeed be the case in particular instances that well-meant intentions are frustrated by the unfavourableness of external circumstances, that purposeful plans are stunted in their execution; in general, however, the essential unity of inner and outer holds here too, in such a way that it must be said: what the human being does, that he is; and the lying vanity which warms itself in the consciousness of inner excellence is to be confronted with that saying of the Gospel: “By their fruits you shall know them”. This great word holds, as first in ethical and religious respects, so also further with regard to scientific and artistic achievements. As regards the latter, a keen-sighted teacher, noticing decided talents in a boy, may express the opinion that a Raphael or a Mozart is hidden in him, and success will then teach to what extent such an opinion was well founded. But if a bungling painter and a bad poet consoled themselves that their inner being is full of lofty ideals, this is poor consolation, and if they demand that they be judged not by their achievements but by their intentions, such a pretension is rightly rejected as empty and unfounded. Conversely it is also often the case that in judging others who have accomplished something right and capable, the untrue distinction of inner and outer is used to assert that this is only their outer, but inwardly they were concerned with something quite different, with the satisfaction of their vanity or other reprehensible passions. This is the disposition of envy, which, incapable of accomplishing anything great itself, strives to drag the great down to itself and belittle it. Against this one should recall Goethe’s fine saying that against great merits in others there is no other remedy than love. When, further, hypocrisy is spoken of in connection with praiseworthy achievements of others in order to belittle them, it must be noted against this that the human being can indeed dissemble in particular instances and hide many things, but not his inner being in general, which infallibly makes itself known in the decursus vitae, so that in this respect too it must be said that the human being is nothing other than the series of his deeds. It is especially so-called pragmatic historiography that has in recent times often sinned against great historical characters through this untruthful separation of inner from outer and has clouded and distorted the pure conception of them. Instead of contenting itself with simply narrating the great deeds accomplished by the world-historical heroes and recognizing their inner being as corresponding to the content of these deeds, it has considered itself entitled and obliged to sniff out allegedly secret motives behind what lies openly to hand, and has then thought that historical research is all the more profound the more it succeeds in stripping what had hitherto been celebrated and praised of its halo and reducing it, as regards its origin and its real significance, to the level of common mediocrity. For the purpose of such pragmatic historical research the study of psychology has then also often been recommended, because one obtains from it information about what the real mainsprings are by which human beings are determined to act. The psychology referred to here, however, is nothing other than that petty knowledge of human nature which, instead of the universal and essential in human nature, chiefly makes only the particular and contingent of isolated drives, passions and so on the object of its consideration. Incidentally, while with this psychological-pragmatic procedure, with regard to the motives underlying great deeds, the historian would at first still have the choice between the substantial interests of the fatherland, of justice, of religious truth and so on, on the one hand, and the subjective and formal interests of vanity, lust for power, avarice and so on, on the other, the latter are regarded as what really moves because otherwise the presupposition of the opposition between the inner (the disposition of the agents) and the outer (the content of the action) would not receive confirmation. But since in truth inner and outer have the same content, it must also be expressly asserted against that schoolmasterly cleverness that, if the historical heroes had been concerned merely with subjective and formal interests, they would not have accomplished what they did accomplish, and, in view of the unity of inner and outer, it must be recognized that great men willed what they did and did what they willed.
§ 141
The empty abstractions through which the one identical content is supposed still to be in the relationship sublate themselves in the immediate passing over, the one into the other; the content is itself nothing other than their identity (§ 138); they are the semblance of essence posited as semblance. Through the expression of force the inner is posited in concrete existence; this positing is mediating through empty abstractions; it vanishes within itself into immediacy, in which inner and outer are identical in and for themselves and their distinction is determined as only positedness. This identity is actuality.
34) cf. among others Gott. Einige Gespräche [God. Some Conversations], Gotha 1787
35)*cf. Goethe’s indignant exclamation, Zur Naturwissenschaft [Zur Morphologie] vol. I, no. 3 [1820; p. 304]: That I have heard repeated for sixty years, and curse it, but in secret, … Nature has neither kernel nor shell, she is everything at once, etc.
36) cf. Albrecht von Haller, “Die Falschheit der menschlichen Tugenden” [The Falseness of Human Virtues] (in: Versuch schweizerischer Gedichte, Bern 1732), ll. 289 f.: “Ins Innere der Natur dringt kein erschaffner Geist, / Zu glücklich, wenn sie noch die äußre Schale weist!” [Into the inner of nature no created spirit penetrates, / too happy if she still shows the outer shell!] The context shows that Hegel means “weißt” (= knows) and not “weist” (shows) as in Haller’s poem, where the subject is nature.
37) Matt. 7:16
The Doctrine of Essence → C. Actuality
§ 142
Actuality is the unity, become immediate, of essence and concrete existence, or of inner and outer. The expression of the actual is the actual itself, so that in it the actual likewise remains something essential and is something essential only insofar as it is in immediate external existence.
Earlier, being and concrete existence occurred as forms of the immediate; being is in general unreflected immediacy and passing over into other. Concrete existence is immediate unity of being and reflection, therefore appearance; it comes from the ground and goes to the ground. The actual is the positedness of that unity, the relationship that has become identical with itself; it is therefore withdrawn from passing over, and its externality is its energy; in it, it is reflected into itself; its existence is only the manifestation of itself, not of an other.
Addition. Actuality and thought, more precisely the idea, are usually trivially opposed to each other, and accordingly one can often hear it said that there is indeed nothing to object to the correctness and truth of a certain thought, but that such a thing is not found in actuality or cannot be carried out in actuality. Those who speak in this way, however, prove thereby that they have properly grasped neither the nature of thought nor that of actuality. For on the one hand, in such talk, thought is taken as synonymous with subjective representation, plan, intention and the like, and on the other hand actuality as synonymous with external, sensuous existence. In common life, where one does not take the categories and their designation so precisely, such things may pass, and it may well be the case that, for example, the plan or the so-called idea of a certain tax arrangement is in itself quite good and purposeful, but that such a thing is not found in what is likewise so-called actuality and cannot be carried through under the given circumstances. But when the abstract understanding takes hold of these determinations and intensifies their distinction into regarding them as a fixed and firm opposition, in such a way that in this actual world one must get ideas out of one’s head, such a thing is to be rejected most decisively in the name of science and of sound reason. For on the one hand ideas are not at all lodged merely in our heads, and the idea is in general not something so impotent that its realization would first have to be brought about, or not brought about, at our discretion; rather it is what is utterly effective [das schlechthin Wirkende] and at the same time also actual [Wirkliche]; and on the other hand actuality is not so bad and irrational as thoughtless practitioners, or practitioners at odds with thinking and run down, imagine. Actuality, as distinct from mere appearance, first as unity of inner and outer, stands so little over against reason as something other that it is rather what is altogether rational, and what is not rational is for that very reason not to be regarded as actual either. Educated linguistic usage also corresponds to this, incidentally, insofar as one will hesitate, for example, to recognize a poet or a statesman who knows how to accomplish nothing capable and rational as an actual poet or an actual statesman. – In the common conception of actuality discussed here, and in its confusion with what is tangible and immediately perceptible, the ground is also to be sought of that widespread prejudice regarding the relationship of the Aristotelian to the Platonic philosophy. According to this prejudice, the distinction between Plato and Aristotle is supposed to consist in this, that while the former recognizes the idea and only the idea as the true, the latter, rejecting the idea, holds to the actual and is for that reason to be regarded as the founder and commander of empiricism. About this it must be noted that actuality does indeed form the principle of the Aristotelian philosophy, but not the common actuality of what is immediately present, but the idea as actuality. Aristotle’s polemic against Plato then consists more precisely in designating the Platonic idea as mere δύναμις and asserting against this that the idea, which is recognized by both equally as the only true, is essentially to be regarded as ἐνέϱγεια, that is, as the inner which is utterly out, thus as the unity of inner and outer, or as actuality in the emphatic sense of the word discussed here.
§ 143
Actuality, as this concrete, contains those determinations and their distinction, and is therefore also their development, so that in it they are at the same time determined as semblance, as only posited (§ 141). α) As identity in general it is first possibility; – reflection-into-itself, which, as against the concrete unity of the actual, is posited as abstract and inessential essentiality. Possibility is what is essential to actuality, but in such a way that it is at the same time only possibility.
It is no doubt the determination of possibility that enabled Kant to regard it, and with it actuality and necessity, as modalities, ‘since these determinations do not in the least increase the concept as object but only express the relationship to the faculty of cognition’. In fact possibility is the empty abstraction of reflection-into-itself, what was called the inner before, only that it is now determined as the sublated, merely posited, external inner and is thus indeed also posited as a mere modality, as an insufficient abstraction, taken more concretely belonging only to subjective thinking. Actuality and necessity, by contrast, are truly anything but a mere mode and manner for an other; rather precisely the opposite: they are posited as the concrete that is not merely posited but complete within itself. – Because possibility, at first as against the concrete as actual, is the mere form of identity-with-itself, the rule for it is only that something not contradict itself within itself, and so everything is possible; for this form of identity can be given to every content by abstraction. But everything is just as much impossible, for in every content, since it is something concrete, determinacy can be grasped as determinate opposition and thus as contradiction. – There is therefore no emptier talk than that of such possibility and impossibility. In philosophy in particular there must be no talk of showing that something is possible, or that something else too is possible, and that something, as one also puts it, is conceivable. The historian is likewise immediately directed not to use this category, already declared untrue for itself; but the sense of the empty understanding takes most pleasure in the hollow devising of possibilities, and a great many possibilities.
Addition. Possibility at first appears to representation as the richer and more comprehensive determination and actuality, by contrast, as the poorer and more limited one. Accordingly one says: everything is possible; but not everything that is possible is therefore also actual. In fact, however, that is, according to thought, actuality is the more comprehensive, since, as concrete thought, it contains possibility within itself as an abstract moment. This is then also found in our ordinary consciousness insofar as, when the possible is spoken of as distinct from the actual, we designate it as something only possible. – Of possibility it is usually said in general that it consists in conceivability. But by thinking is understood here only the grasping of a content in the form of abstract identity. Now since every content can be brought into this form, and all that is required is that it be separated from the relations in which it stands, even the most absurd and nonsensical can be regarded as possible. It is possible that this evening the moon will fall onto the earth, for the moon is a body separated from the earth and can therefore fall down as well as a stone thrown into the air; – it is possible that the Turkish emperor will become pope, for he is a human being, can as such convert to Christianity, become a Catholic priest and so on. In this talk of possibilities it is chiefly the law of thought of ground that is handled in the way discussed earlier, and accordingly it is said that what is possible is that for which a ground can be stated. The more uneducated someone is, the less he knows the determinate relations of the objects on which he directs his consideration, the more inclined he usually is to indulge in all sorts of empty possibilities, as is the case, for example, in the political field with the so-called pot-house politicians. Further, in practical respects it also not infrequently happens that ill will and sloth hide behind the category of possibility in order thereby to evade determinate obligations, and in this respect the same holds as was noted earlier about the use of the law of thought of ground. Rational, practical people do not let themselves be impressed by the possible, precisely because it is only possible, but hold to the actual, by which, however, is of course not to be understood merely what immediately exists. In common life, incidentally, there is no lack of all sorts of proverbs expressing the just disdain for abstract possibility. Thus one says, for example: a sparrow in the hand is better than ten sparrows on the roof. – But further, with the same right with which everything is regarded as possible, everything is to be regarded as impossible, and indeed insofar as every content, which as such is always something concrete, contains within itself not only different but also opposed determinations. Thus, for example, nothing is more impossible than that I am, for I is at the same time simple relation to itself and utterly relation to other. It is likewise with every other content of the natural and the spiritual world. One can say: matter is impossible, for it is the unity of repulsion and attraction. The same holds of life, of right, of freedom, and above all of God himself as the true, that is, the triune God, which concept has then also been rejected by the abstract Enlightenment of the understanding, according to its principle, as allegedly contradicting thought. It is in general the empty understanding that knocks about in these empty forms, and the business of philosophy with regard to them consists only in showing their nullity and lack of content. Whether this is possible or impossible depends on the content, that is, on the totality of the moments of actuality, which in its unfolding proves to be necessity.
§ 144
β) But the actual, in its distinction from possibility as reflection-into-itself, is itself only the external concrete, the inessential immediate. Or, immediately, insofar as it is first (§ 142) as the simple, itself immediate unity of inner and outer, it is as inessential outer and is thus at the same time (§ 140) the merely inner, the abstraction of reflection-into-itself; it itself is thus determined as something merely possible. In this value of a mere possibility the actual is something contingent, and conversely possibility is mere chance itself.
§ 145
Possibility and contingency are the moments of actuality, inner and outer, posited as mere forms which constitute the externality of the actual. They have their reflection-into-itself in the actual determined within itself, in the content, as their essential ground of determination. The finitude of the contingent and possible therefore consists more precisely in the distinctness of the determination of form from the content, and whether something is contingent and possible therefore depends on the content.
Addition. Possibility, as the merely inner of actuality, is precisely thereby also merely outer actuality, or contingency. The contingent is in general something that has the ground of its being not in itself but in another. This is the shape in which actuality first presents itself to consciousness and which is often confused with actuality itself. The contingent, however, is only the actual in the one-sided form of reflection-into-other, or the actual in the meaning of something merely possible. Accordingly we regard the contingent as something that can be or also not be, that can be thus or also otherwise, and whose being or non-being, whose being thus or otherwise, is grounded not in itself but in another. To overcome this contingent is in general, on the one hand, the task of cognition, just as, on the other hand, in the field of the practical it is a matter of not stopping at the contingency of willing or at arbitrariness. Nevertheless it has often happened, especially in recent times, that contingency has been unduly exalted and been ascribed, with regard to nature as well as to the spiritual world, a value that does not in fact belong to it. As regards first nature here, it is not infrequently admired chiefly only for the sake of the wealth and manifoldness of its formations. This wealth as such, apart from the unfolding of the idea present in it, offers no higher interest of reason, and in the great manifoldness of inorganic and organic formations gives us only the intuition of contingency running off into the indeterminate. In any case the motley play of the single varieties of animals and plants, conditioned by external circumstances, the manifoldly changing figuration and grouping of clouds and the like, is not to be esteemed higher than the equally contingent notions of spirit indulging itself in its arbitrariness, and the admiration devoted to such appearances is a very abstract attitude, from which one must advance to closer insight into the inner harmony and lawfulness of nature. – Of particular importance next is the proper appraisal of contingency with regard to the will. When freedom of the will is spoken of, one often understands by it merely arbitrariness, that is, the will in the form of contingency. Now arbitrariness, as the capacity to determine oneself to this or that, is indeed an essential moment of the will that is free according to its concept, but by no means freedom itself; it is at first only formal freedom. The truly free will, which contains arbitrariness within itself as sublated, is conscious of its content as something fixed in and for itself and at the same time knows it utterly as its own. By contrast, the will that stops at the stage of arbitrariness, even if it decides for what is true and right in content, is nevertheless still burdened with the vanity that, had it so pleased, it could also have decided for something else. Considered more closely, moreover, arbitrariness proves to be a contradiction insofar as form and content still stand over against each other here. The content of arbitrariness is a given one and is known as grounded not in the will itself but in external circumstances. Freedom with regard to such content therefore consists only in the form of choosing, which formal freedom is then also to be regarded as a merely supposed freedom insofar as in the final analysis it will be found that it must also be ascribed to the same externality of circumstances, in which the content found by the will is grounded, that the will decides precisely for this and not for that. Now although contingency, according to the discussion so far, is only a one-sided moment of actuality and is therefore not to be confused with actuality itself, it is nevertheless entitled, as a form of the idea in general, to its right in the objective world too. This holds first of nature, on whose surface, so to speak, contingency has its free play, which is then also to be recognized as such, without the pretension (sometimes wrongly ascribed to philosophy) of wanting to find in it a being able to be only thus and not otherwise. Likewise the contingent also asserts itself in the spiritual world, as was already noted before with regard to the will, which contains the contingent within itself in the shape of arbitrariness, but only as a sublated moment. With regard to spirit and its activity, too, one must beware of letting oneself be misled by the well-meant striving for rational cognition into wanting to show as necessary, or, as one usually says, to construct a priori, appearances to which the character of contingency belongs. Thus, for example, in language, although it is, as it were, the body of thinking, chance undoubtedly also plays its decided role, and it is likewise with the formations of right, of art and so on. It is quite correct that the task of science, and more precisely of philosophy, consists in general in knowing the necessity hidden under the semblance of contingency; but this must not be understood as though the contingent belonged merely to our subjective representation and were therefore to be utterly removed in order to arrive at truth. Scientific endeavours that one-sidedly pursue this direction will not escape the just reproach of empty trifling and stiff pedantry.
§ 146
That externality of actuality contains more precisely this: that contingency, as immediate actuality, is what is identical with itself essentially only as positedness, which, however, is likewise sublated, an existent externality. It is thus something presupposed, whose immediate existence is at the same time a possibility and has the determination of being sublated – of being the possibility of an other – condition.
Addition. The contingent, as immediate actuality, is at the same time the possibility of an other, no longer, however, merely that abstract possibility which we first had, but possibility as being, and thus it is condition. When we speak of the condition of a matter, this implies two things: first an existence, a concrete existence, something immediate in general, and second the determination of this immediate to be sublated and to serve the actualization of an other. – Immediate actuality as such is in general not what it ought to be, but a finite actuality broken within itself, and it is its determination to be consumed. But the other side of actuality is its essentiality. This is first the inner, which, as mere possibility, is likewise determined to be sublated. As sublated possibility it is the emergence of a new actuality, which had the first immediate actuality as its presupposition. This is the alternation that the concept of condition contains within itself. When we consider the conditions of a matter, they appear as something quite innocent. In fact, however, such immediate actuality contains within itself the seed of something quite different. This other is at first only something possible, but this form then sublates itself and translates itself into actuality. This new actuality, which thus emerges, is the very inner of the immediate actuality which it uses up. Thus a quite different shape of things comes about, and also nothing different comes about: for the first actuality is only posited according to its essence. The conditions that sacrifice themselves, that perish and are used up, only come together with themselves in the other actuality. – Of this kind, then, is the process of actuality in general. It is not merely something immediately existing, but, as essential being, sublation of its own immediacy and thereby mediating itself with itself.
§ 147
γ) This externality, so developed, is a circle of the determinations of possibility and immediate actuality, their mediation through each other, real possibility in general. As such a circle it is further the totality, thus the content, the matter [Sache] determined in and for itself, and likewise, according to the distinction of the determinations in this unity, the concrete totality of form for itself, the immediate self-translating of the inner into the outer and of the outer into the inner. This self-moving of form is activity, activation of the matter as the real ground that sublates itself into actuality, and activation of contingent actuality, of the conditions, namely their reflection-into-itself and their sublating themselves into another actuality, into the actuality of the matter. When all the conditions are present, the matter must become actual, and the matter is itself one of the conditions, for it is at first, as inner, itself only something presupposed. Developed actuality, as the coinciding alternation of inner and outer, the alternation of their opposed movements united into one movement, is necessity.
Necessity has indeed been correctly defined as the unity of possibility and actuality. But expressed only in this way, this determination is superficial and therefore unintelligible. The concept of necessity is very difficult, and indeed because it is the concept itself, but its moments are still as actualities, which are at the same time to be grasped only as forms, as broken within themselves and as passing over. The exposition of the moments that constitute necessity shall therefore be given in still greater detail in the two following §§.
Addition. When it is said of something that it is necessary, we first ask why. The necessary is thus supposed to prove itself as something posited, as something mediated. But if we stop at mere mediation, we do not yet have what is understood by necessity. What is merely mediated is what it is not through itself but through an other, and it is thereby also merely something contingent. Of the necessary, by contrast, we demand that it be what it is through itself, and thus, though mediated, at the same time contain mediation within itself as sublated. Accordingly we say of the necessary: it is, and so it counts for us as simple relation to itself, in which being conditioned by an other falls away. – It is usually said of necessity that it is blind, and indeed rightly insofar as in its process purpose is not yet present as such for itself. The process of necessity begins with the concrete existence of scattered circumstances which seem to have nothing to do with one another and no connection within themselves. These circumstances are an immediate actuality which collapses within itself, and from this negation a new actuality emerges. We have here a content which according to form is doubled within itself: first as content of the matter at issue, and second as content of the scattered circumstances, which appear as something positive and at first assert themselves as such. This content, as something null within itself, is accordingly inverted into its negative and thus becomes content of the matter. The immediate circumstances perish as conditions but are at the same time also preserved as content of the matter. One then says that something quite different has emerged from such circumstances and conditions, and therefore calls the necessity which this process is blind. If we consider purposive activity, on the other hand, we have here in the purpose a content that is already known beforehand, and this activity is therefore not blind but seeing. When we say that the world is governed by providence, this implies that purpose in general is what is effective, as what is determined beforehand in and for itself, so that what comes out corresponds to what was known and willed beforehand. Incidentally, the conception of the world as determined by necessity and the belief in a divine providence are by no means to be regarded as mutually exclusive. What underlies divine providence according to thought will soon result for us as the concept. This is the truth of necessity and contains it within itself as sublated, just as conversely necessity is in itself the concept. Necessity is blind only insofar as it is not comprehended, and there is therefore nothing more perverse than the reproach of a blind fatalism made against the philosophy of history because it regards its task as the cognition of the necessity of what has happened. The philosophy of history thereby receives the significance of a theodicy, and those who think they honour divine providence by excluding necessity from it in fact degrade it, through this abstraction, to a blind, irrational arbitrariness. Unprejudiced religious consciousness speaks of God’s eternal and inviolable decrees, and this implies the express recognition of necessity as belonging to the essence of God. The human being, in his distinction from God, with his particular opinions and wishes, proceeds according to mood and arbitrariness, and so it happens to him that in his doing something quite different comes out from what he meant and willed, whereas God knows what he wills, is not determined in his eternal will by inner or outer chance, and also irresistibly accomplishes what he wills. – The standpoint of necessity is in general of great importance with regard to our disposition and our conduct. When we regard what happens as necessary, this seems at first sight to be a completely unfree relationship. The ancients, as is well known, grasped necessity as fate, and the modern standpoint, by contrast, is that of consolation. This consists in general in this, that when we give up our purposes, our interests, we do so in the prospect of receiving a compensation for them. Fate, by contrast, is without consolation. If we now consider more closely the disposition of the ancients with regard to fate, it nevertheless by no means gives us the intuition of unfreedom but rather that of freedom. This lies in the fact that unfreedom is grounded in holding fast to opposition, in such a way that we regard what is and what happens as standing in contradiction with what ought to be and happen. In the disposition of the ancients, by contrast, there lay this: because such is, so it is, and as it is, so it ought to be. Here, then, there is no opposition and thus also no unfreedom, no pain and no suffering. This attitude towards fate is indeed, as was noted before, without consolation; but such a disposition does not need consolation either, and indeed because here subjectivity has not yet reached its infinite significance. It is this point of view that must be kept in view as the decisive one in comparing the ancient disposition and our modern, Christian one. If by subjectivity one understands merely finite immediate subjectivity with the contingent and arbitrary content of its particular inclinations and interests, in general what is called person, as distinct from the matter in the emphatic sense of the word (in which sense one usually says, and rightly, that what matters is the matter and not the person), one will not be able to help admiring the calm submission of the ancients to fate and recognizing this disposition as higher and worthier than that modern one which obstinately pursues its subjective purposes and, when it then sees itself compelled after all to renounce their attainment, consoles itself only with the prospect of receiving compensation for them in another shape. But further, subjectivity is not merely bad and finite subjectivity standing over against the matter; rather, according to its truth, it is immanent in the matter and, as thereby infinite subjectivity, the truth of the matter itself. Understood in this way, the standpoint of consolation receives a quite different and higher significance, and it is in this sense that the Christian religion is to be regarded as the religion of consolation, and indeed of absolute consolation. Christianity, as is well known, contains the doctrine that God wills that all human beings be helped, and this expresses that subjectivity has an infinite value. More precisely, what is consoling in the Christian religion lies in this: that since here God himself is known as absolute subjectivity, while subjectivity contains the moment of particularity within itself, our particularity too is thereby recognized not merely as something to be abstractly negated but at the same time as something to be preserved. The gods of the ancients were indeed likewise regarded as personal; but the personality of a Zeus, an Apollo and so on is not an actual but only a represented one, or, expressed otherwise, these gods are mere personifications, which as such do not know themselves but are only known. We then also find this defect and this impotence of the ancient gods in the religious consciousness of the ancients insofar as they regarded not only human beings but also the gods themselves as subject to fate (the πεπϱωμένον or the εἱμαϱμένη), which fate is to be represented as unrevealed necessity and thus as what is altogether impersonal, selfless and blind. The Christian God, by contrast, is the God who is not merely known but utterly knows himself, and not merely represented but rather absolutely actual personality. – While, incidentally, for the further elaboration of the points touched on here one must refer to the philosophy of religion, it may further be pointed out here how important it is that a human being grasp what befalls him in the sense of that old proverb which says: everyone is the smith of his own fortune. This implies that the human being in general gets to enjoy only himself. The opposite view is that we shift the blame for what falls on us onto other people, onto the unfavourableness of circumstances and the like. This is again the standpoint of unfreedom and at the same time the source of discontent. When, by contrast, the human being recognizes that what happens to him is only an evolution of himself and that he bears only his own guilt, he behaves as a free person and has, in everything that befalls him, the faith that no wrong is done to him. The person who lives in discord with himself and his lot commits much that is perverse and skewed precisely because of the false opinion that wrong is done to him by others. Now in what happens to us there is indeed also much that is contingent. This contingent, however, is grounded in the naturalness of the human being. But since the human being otherwise has the consciousness of his freedom, the harmony of his soul, the peace of his mind, is not destroyed by the disagreeable things that befall him. It is therefore the view of necessity by which the contentment and discontent of human beings, and thus their fate itself, is determined.
§ 148
Among the three moments, condition, matter and activity, a. condition is α) what is presupposed; as only posited it is only as relative to the matter, but as pre-[supposed] it is as for itself – a contingent, external circumstance that exists without regard to the matter; but in this contingency at the same time with regard to the matter, which is the totality, this presupposed is a complete circle of conditions. β) The conditions are passive, are used as material for the matter and thereby enter into the content of the matter; they are likewise in conformity with this content and already contain its whole determination within themselves. b. The matter is likewise α) something presupposed; as posited, at first only something inner and possible, and as pre-[supposed], a content independent for itself; β) through the use of the conditions it receives its external concrete existence, the realization of its determinations of content, which correspond mutually to the conditions, so that it likewise proves itself as matter from them and emerges from them. c. Activity is α) likewise for itself (a human being, a character), existing independently, and at the same time it has its possibility solely in the conditions and in the matter; β) it is the movement of translating the conditions into the matter, and the matter into the conditions as into the side of concrete existence, but rather only of setting the matter out of the conditions, in which it is present in itself, and of giving the matter concrete existence by sublating the existence that the conditions have. Insofar as these three moments have the shape of independent concrete existence with respect to one another, this process is as external necessity. – This necessity has a limited content as its matter. For the matter is this whole in simple determinacy; but since this whole is external to itself in its form, it is thereby also external to itself in itself and in its content, and this externality in the matter is the limit of its content.
§ 149
Necessity is therefore in itself the one, self-identical but content-rich essence, which shines within itself in such a way that its distinctions have the form of independent actual things, and this identical is at the same time, as absolute form, the activity of sublating [immediacy] into being mediated and mediation into immediacy. – What is necessary is so through an other, which has fallen apart into the mediating ground (the matter and the activity) and into an immediate actuality, a contingent thing that is at the same time condition. The necessary, as through an other, is not in and for itself but something merely posited. But mediation is just as immediately the sublating of itself; the ground and the contingent condition are translated into immediacy, whereby that positedness is sublated into actuality and the matter has come together with itself. In this return into itself the necessary is utterly, as unconditioned actuality. – The necessary is thus: mediated by a circle of circumstances – it is so because the circumstances are so; and at the same time it is thus: unmediated – it is so because it is.
38)Critique of Pure Reason, B 266
39) For other readings of this sentence cf. the edition by Nicolin and Pöggeler, Phil. Bibl. vol. 33 (1959), note to p. 142, 13 ff.
The Doctrine of Essence → C. Actuality → a. Relationship of Substantiality
§ 150
The necessary is within itself absolute relationship, that is, the process developed (in the preceding §§) in which the relationship likewise sublates itself into absolute identity. In its immediate form it is the relationship of substantiality and accidentality. The absolute identity of this relationship with itself is substance as such, which as necessity is the negativity of this form of inwardness and thus posits itself as actuality, but is likewise the negativity of this external, according to which the actual, as immediate, is only something accidental, which through this its mere possibility passes over into another actuality; a passing over which is substantial identity as activity of form (§§ 148, 149).
§ 151
Substance is thereby the totality of the accidents, to which it reveals itself as their absolute negativity, that is, as absolute power and at the same time as the wealth of all content. But this content is nothing but this manifestation itself, since the determinacy reflected into itself as content is itself only a moment of form that passes over in the power of substance. Substantiality is absolute activity of form and the power of necessity, and all content only a moment belonging solely to this process – the absolute turning over of form and content into each other.
Addition. In the history of philosophy we meet substance as the principle of the Spinozist philosophy. About the meaning and value of this philosophy, which is as famous as it is decried, there has been great misunderstanding since Spinoza’s appearance, and much has been said back and forth about it. It is chiefly the reproach of atheism, and then further that of pantheism, that is usually raised against the Spinozist system, and indeed because in it God has been grasped as substance and only as substance. What is to be thought of these reproaches follows first from the place that substance occupies in the system of the logical idea. Substance is an essential stage in the process of development of the idea, but not the idea itself, not the absolute idea, but the idea in the still limited form of necessity. Now God is indeed necessity, or, as one can also say, the absolute matter, but at the same time also the absolute person, and this is the point which Spinoza did not reach and with respect to which it must be admitted that the Spinozist philosophy fell short of the true concept of God, which forms the content of Christian religious consciousness. Spinoza was by descent a Jew, and it is in general the oriental intuition, according to which everything finite appears merely as something passing, as something vanishing, that has found its expression in thought in his philosophy. This oriental intuition of substantial unity does indeed form the foundation of all true further development, but one cannot stop there; what it still lacks is the occidental principle of individuality, which in philosophical shape first emerged, at the same time as Spinozism, in the Leibnizian monadology. – Looking back from here to the reproach of atheism made against Spinoza’s philosophy, it is to be rejected as unfounded insofar as according to this philosophy God is not only not denied but rather recognized as what alone truly is. Nor can it be asserted that Spinoza does indeed speak of God as the only true, but that this Spinozist God is not the true one and therefore as good as no God. With the same right all the other philosophers who have stopped with their philosophizing at a subordinate stage of the idea would then have to be accused of atheism, and likewise not only the Jews and the Mohammedans because they know God merely as the Lord, but also all the many Christians who regard God merely as the unknowable, highest being beyond. The reproach of atheism made against the Spinozist philosophy reduces on closer consideration to this, that in it the principle of difference or of finitude does not come into its right; and since according to it there is really no world at all in the sense of something that positively is, this system would therefore have to be designated not as atheism but rather conversely as acosmism. From this it then also follows what is to be thought of the reproach of pantheism. If, as very often happens, by pantheism one understands a doctrine which regards finite things as such and their complex as God, one will not be able to avoid acquitting the Spinozist philosophy of the reproach of pantheism, since according to it absolutely no truth belongs to finite things or to the world in general; on the other hand this philosophy is indeed pantheistic, precisely because of its acosmism. The defect thereby recognized with regard to content then also proves at the same time to be a defect with regard to form, and first insofar as Spinoza places substance at the head of his system and defines it as the unity of thought and extension without showing how he arrives at this distinction and at its reduction to substantial unity. The further treatment of the content then follows in the so-called mathematical method, and accordingly definitions and axioms are first set up, to which theorems are attached whose proof consists merely in reduction, in the manner of the understanding, to those unproved presuppositions. Now although the Spinozist philosophy is usually praised for the strict consistency of its method even by those who utterly reject its content and results, this unconditional recognition of the form is in fact as unfounded as the unconditional rejection of the content. The defect of the Spinozist content consists precisely in form not being known as immanent in it and therefore approaching it only as external, subjective form. Substance, as it is grasped immediately by Spinoza without preceding dialectical mediation, is, as the universal negative power, as it were only this dark, shapeless abyss which swallows up into itself all determinate content as null from the outset and produces from itself nothing that has a positive subsistence within itself.
§ 152
According to the moment that substance, as absolute power, is the power relating itself to itself as to merely inner possibility and thereby determining itself to accidentality, and [that] the externality thereby posited is distinguished from it, it is relationship proper, just as in the first form of necessity it is substance – relationship of causality.
40) Lasson proposes the following supplement: ” … which in the power of substance passes over into another moment”.
The Doctrine of Essence → C. Actuality → b. Relationship of Causality
§ 153
Substance is cause insofar as, against its passing over into accidentality, it is reflected into itself and thus is the original matter, but just as much sublates reflection-into-itself or its mere possibility, posits itself as the negative of itself and thus produces an effect, an actuality which is thus only a posited one, but through the process of effecting at the same time a necessary one.
Cause, as the original matter, has the determination of absolute independence and of a subsistence maintaining itself against the effect; but in necessity, whose identity constitutes that originality itself, it has only passed over into the effect. There is no content in the effect, insofar as a determinate content can again be spoken of, that is not in the cause; – that identity is absolute content itself; but likewise it is also the determination of form: the originality of the cause is sublated in the effect, in which it makes itself a positedness. But the cause has not thereby vanished, so that the actual would be only the effect. For this positedness is likewise immediately sublated; it is rather the reflection of the cause into itself, its originality; only in the effect is the cause actual and cause. The cause is therefore in and for itself causa sui. – Jacobi, fixed in the one-sided representation of mediation, took (Letters on Spinoza, 2nd ed., p. 416) the causa sui (the effectus sui is the same), this absolute truth of the cause, merely for a formalism. He also stated that God must be determined not as ground but essentially as cause; that this does not gain what he intended would have emerged from more thorough reflection on the nature of cause. Even in the finite cause and its representation this identity with regard to content is present; the rain, the cause, and the wetness, the effect, are one and the same existing water. With regard to form, the cause (the rain) thus falls away in the effect (the wetness); but thereby also the determination of the effect, which is nothing without the cause, and only indifferent wetness remains. The cause in the common sense of the causal relationship is finite insofar as its content is finite (as in finite substance) and insofar as cause and effect are represented as two different independent existences – which, however, they are only insofar as the relationship of causality is abstracted from in them. Because in finitude one stops at the distinction of the determinations of form in their relation, the cause is alternately determined also as something posited or as effect; this then again has another cause; so here too the progress from effects to causes to infinity arises. Likewise the descending one, since the effect, according to its identity with the cause, is itself determined as cause and at the same time as another one, which again has other effects, and so on to infinity.
Addition. However much the understanding usually resists substantiality, causality, that is, the relationship of cause and effect, is all the more familiar to it. When it is a matter of grasping a content as necessary, it is chiefly to the relationship of causality that reflection of the understanding makes it its business to reduce it. Now this relationship does indeed belong to necessity, but it is only the one side in the process of necessity, which is just as much this: to sublate the mediation contained in causality and to prove itself as simple relation-to-itself. If one stops at causality as such, one does not have it in its truth but merely as finite causality, and the finitude of this relationship then consists in cause and effect being held fast in their distinction. But these two are not only distinct but just as much also identical, and this is then also found in our ordinary consciousness in such a way that we say of the cause that it is cause only insofar as it has an effect, and of the effect that it is effect only insofar as it has a cause. Cause and effect are thus both one and the same content, and their distinction is at first only that of positing and being posited, which distinction of form, however, likewise sublates itself again, in such a way that the cause is not only cause of an other but also cause of itself, and the effect not only effect of an other but also effect of itself. The finitude of things accordingly consists in this: that while cause and effect are identical according to their concept, these two forms occur separated in such a way that the cause is indeed also effect and the effect also cause, but the former not in the same respect in which it is cause and the latter not in the same respect in which it is effect. This again gives the infinite progress in the shape of an endless series of causes, which at the same time shows itself as an endless series of effects.
§ 154
The effect is different from the cause; it is as such positedness. But positedness is likewise reflection-into-itself and immediacy, and the effecting of the cause, its positing, is at the same time presupposing, insofar as the difference of the effect from the cause is held fast. There is thereby present another substance on which the effect takes place. This, as immediate, is not self-relating negativity and active, but passive. But as substance it is likewise active, sublates the presupposed immediacy and the effect posited in it, reacts, that is, it sublates the activity of the first substance, which, however, is likewise this sublating of its immediacy or of the effect posited in it, thereby sublates the activity of the other and reacts. Causality has thereby passed over into the relationship of reciprocity.
In reciprocity, although causality is not yet posited in its true determination, the progress of causes and effects to infinity is sublated as progress in a true way, since the rectilinear going out from causes to effects and from effects to causes is bent round and back into itself. This bending round of the infinite progress into a relationship closed within itself is, as everywhere, the simple reflection that in that thoughtless repetition there is only one and the same, namely one and another cause and their relation to each other. The development of this relation, reciprocal action, is, however, itself the alternation of distinguishing, not of causes, but of the moments, in each of which for itself, again according to the identity that the cause is cause in the effect (and vice versa) – according to this inseparability, the other moment is likewise posited.
41)Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn [On the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Mr Moses Mendelssohn] (1785), new enlarged edition, 1789
The Doctrine of Essence → C. Actuality → c. Reciprocity
§ 155
The determinations held fast as distinct in reciprocity are α) in themselves the same; the one side is cause, original, active, passive and so on, like the other. Likewise the presupposing of an other and the acting upon it, immediate originality and positedness through the alternation, are one and the same. The cause assumed as first is, because of its immediacy, passive, positedness and effect. The distinction of the causes named as two is therefore empty, and there is in itself only one cause present, which in its effect sublates itself as substance just as much as it first makes itself independent in this effecting.
§ 156
[β] But this unity is also for itself, since this whole alternation is the cause’s own positing and only this its positing is its being. The nullity of the distinctions is not only in itself or our reflection (preceding §); rather reciprocity is itself this: to sublate again each of the posited determinations and invert it into the opposite, thus to posit that nullity of the moments which is in itself. An effect is posited into originality, that is, originality is sublated; the action of a cause becomes reaction, and so on.
Addition. Reciprocity is the relationship of causality posited in its complete development, and it is this relationship, too, in which reflection usually takes refuge when the consideration of things from the point of view of causality does not prove sufficient to it because of the infinite progress mentioned before. Thus, for example, in historical considerations the question is first discussed whether the character and customs of a people are the cause of its constitution and its laws or whether, conversely, they are their effect, and one then advances to grasping these two, character and customs on the one hand and constitution and laws on the other, from the point of view of reciprocity, in such a way that the cause, in the same respect in which it is cause, is at the same time effect, and that the effect, in the same respect in which it is effect, is at the same time cause. The same then also happens in considering nature, and especially the living organism, whose single organs and functions likewise prove to stand to one another in the relationship of reciprocity. Reciprocity is indeed the next truth of the relationship of cause and effect, and it stands, so to speak, on the threshold of the concept; but precisely for that reason one must not content oneself with applying this relationship insofar as comprehending cognition is at issue. If one stops at considering a given content merely from the point of view of reciprocity, this is in fact an altogether conceptless attitude; one is then dealing merely with a dry fact, and the demand for mediation, which is first at issue in applying the relationship of causality, again remains unsatisfied. What is insufficient in applying the relationship of reciprocity consists, considered more closely, in this: that this relationship, instead of being able to count as an equivalent for the concept, itself rather wants first to be comprehended, and this happens by its two sides not being left as something immediately given, but, as was shown in the two preceding §§, being recognized as moments of a third, higher, which is precisely the concept. If we consider, for example, the customs of the Spartan people as the effect of their constitution, and conversely the latter as the effect of their customs, this consideration may well be correct; but this conception affords no ultimate satisfaction, because through it in fact neither the constitution nor the customs of this people are comprehended, which happens only by recognizing those two, and likewise all the other particular sides that the life and history of the Spartan people show, as grounded in this concept.
§ 157
[γ] This pure alternation with itself is thereby unveiled or posited necessity. The bond of necessity as such is identity as still inner and hidden, because it is the identity of such things as count as actual, whose independence, however, is precisely supposed to be necessity. The course of substance through causality and reciprocity is therefore only the positing that independence is infinite negative relation to itself – negative in general, in which distinguishing and mediating become an originality of actual things independent of one another – infinite relation to itself, since their independence is precisely only as their identity.
§ 158
This truth of necessity is thus freedom, and the truth of substance is the concept – independence which is the repelling of itself from itself into distinct independent terms, identical with itself as this repelling, and this alternating movement remaining with itself is only with itself.
Addition. Necessity is usually called hard, and rightly so insofar as one stops at it as such, that is, in its immediate shape. We have here a state of affairs, or in general a content, which has its subsistence for itself, and necessity first implies that something else comes over such content by which it is ruined. This is what is hard and sad in immediate or abstract necessity. The identity of the two, which appear in necessity as bound to each other and thereby lose their independence, is at first only an inner one and not yet present for those who are subject to necessity. So at this standpoint freedom too is at first only abstract freedom, which is saved only by renouncing what one immediately is and has. – But further, as we have seen so far, the process of necessity is of such a kind that through it the rigid externality first present is overcome and its inner revealed, whereby it then shows itself that what is bound to each other is in fact not alien to each other but only moments of one whole, each of which is with itself in its relation to the other and comes together with itself. This is the transfiguration of necessity into freedom, and this freedom is not merely the freedom of abstract negation but rather concrete and positive freedom. From this it can also be gathered how perverse it is to regard freedom and necessity as mutually exclusive. Necessity as such is indeed not yet freedom; but freedom has necessity as its presupposition and contains it within itself as sublated. The ethical human being is conscious of the content of his doing as something necessary, valid in and for itself, and thereby suffers so little detriment to his freedom that it is rather only through this consciousness that it becomes actual freedom full of content, as distinct from arbitrariness as freedom still without content and merely possible. A criminal who is punished may regard the punishment that strikes him as a limitation of his freedom; in fact, however, the punishment is not an alien force to which he is subjected but only the manifestation of his own doing, and in recognizing this he thereby behaves as a free person. In general, this is the highest independence of the human being: to know himself as utterly determined by the absolute idea, which consciousness and attitude Spinoza designates as amor intellectualis Dei.
§ 159
The concept is thereby the truth of being and of essence, since the shining of reflection within itself is at the same time independent immediacy, and this being of different actuality is immediately only a shining within itself.
Since the concept has proved to be the truth of being and essence, both of which have gone back into it as into their ground, it has conversely developed itself out of being as out of its ground. The former side of the advance can be regarded as a deepening of being into itself, whose inner has been unveiled by this advance, the latter side as an emergence of the more perfect from the less perfect. Since such development has been considered only according to the latter side, philosophy has been reproached for it. The more determinate meaning which the superficial thoughts of less perfect and more perfect have here is the distinction that being, as immediate unity with itself, has from the concept, as free mediation with itself. Since being has shown itself to be a moment of the concept, the concept has thereby proved itself to be the truth of being; as this its reflection-into-itself and as sublation of mediation, it is the presupposing of the immediate – a presupposing that is identical with the return-into-itself, which identity constitutes freedom and the concept. If, therefore, the moment is called the imperfect, the concept, the perfect, is indeed this: to develop itself out of the imperfect, for it is essentially this sublation of its presupposition. But at the same time it is the concept alone which, as positing itself, makes the presupposition, as has resulted in causality in general and more precisely in reciprocity. The concept is thus determined, in relation to being and essence, as being essence that has gone back to being as simple immediacy, whose shining thereby has actuality and whose actuality is at the same time free shining within itself. In this way the concept has being as its simple relation to itself, or as the immediacy of its unity within itself; being is so poor a determination that it is the least that can be shown in the concept. The transition from necessity to freedom, or from the actual into the concept, is the hardest, because independent actuality is supposed to be thought as having its substantiality solely in the passing over and identity with the independent actuality that is other to it; so too the concept is the hardest, because it is itself precisely this identity. But actual substance as such, the cause, which in its being-for-itself wants to let nothing penetrate into it, is already subject to necessity or to the fate of passing over into positedness, and this subjection is rather what is hardest. The thinking of necessity, by contrast, is rather the dissolution of that hardness; for it is the coming together of itself in the other with itself – liberation, which is not the flight of abstraction, but having, in the other actual thing with which the actual is bound together by the power of necessity, itself not as other but as its own being and positing. As existing for itself this liberation is called I, as developed into its totality free spirit, as feeling love, as enjoyment blessedness. – The great intuition of Spinozist substance is only in itself the liberation from finite being-for-itself; but the concept itself is for itself the power of necessity and actual freedom.
Addition. When the concept, as has happened here, is designated as the truth of being and of essence, one must expect the question why the beginning was not made with it. The answer to this is that, where thinking cognition is at issue, one cannot begin with the truth, because the truth, as forming the beginning, rests on mere assurance, whereas the truth that is thought must as such prove itself to thinking. If the concept were placed at the head of logic and, as is quite correct according to content, defined as the unity of being and essence, the question would arise what one is to think by being and what by essence, and how these two come to be combined into the unity of the concept. But then one would have begun with the concept only in name and not in fact. The real beginning would be made with being, as has also happened here, only with the difference that the determinations of being and likewise those of essence would have to be taken up immediately from representation, whereas we have considered being and essence in their own dialectical development and recognized them as sublating themselves into the unity of the concept.
