[p. 472]
|472| a union is also to take place, there is no better means than to find a general expression that satisfies both [parties] and yet leaves both parties to their will, whereby the difference continues to exist as before or, if one party really must give way, the admission of yielding is at least avoided by that general expression.
If for centuries the Germans have put themselves off with such general expressions, a semblance of union in which in deed no part has given up the least of its claims to separateness, then reflection on this, especially if it is to be scientific, must hold fast to concepts and, in the judgement whether a country constitutes a state, not knock about with general expressions but take into consideration the extent of the power that is left to what is to be called a state; and since on closer view it turns out that what is named in general constitutional law are rights against the state, the question would be whether, notwithstanding this, a power still [accrues] to the state through which it is really a state. And on closer view of what is required for this, in comparison with the condition of Germany with regard to a state power, it will be shown that Germany can properly no longer be called a state. We go through the various principal powers which must be found in a state.
I. The Concept of the State
Cross-reference: The core of the text. Worked out in the Groundlines in § 257 ff.; on sovereignty within § 278, on the relation of states § 321 ff.
A multitude of men can call itself a state only if it is united for the common defence of the whole of its property. It goes without saying here, actually, but it is necessary to note,
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