[p. 509]
|509| after another, that is to put a law into effect, is made into a thing of thought.
If, then, it is for the judicial power to ascertain how the universal obligations of the Empire are to be compared with the particular rights of individuals, and a contradiction between them actually becomes the subject of judicial proceedings, it depends on the organisation which the court has, still without reference to execution, in its business of pronouncing judgement, whether the pronouncing of judgement [is] not already made difficult for it and – since the judgement, if it is not carried out, is in itself a mere thought – whether the arrangement is not such that even this thought does not come about, but that even this thought too remains a mere thing of thought.
With regard to the mere pronouncing of judgement, the organisation of the judicial power is already of such a kind that its essential side, which is under discussion here, that of making the universal ordinances of the state as state valid against individuals, suffers the greatest obstacles. In the judicial power of the Empire, the administration of civil justice and that administration of public-law justice are mixed together. Public law and private right are subject to the same courts. The courts of the Empire are the highest courts of appeal for civil disputes and for rights of the state. The extent of their judicial power over the latter, however restricted it otherwise is, in that the most important matters of this kind belong before the Imperial Diet, and much belonging here is also decided by arbitral instances, suffers infinite difficulties even merely as regards the pronouncing of judgement and is made dependent on a multitude of contingencies which become necessities for its ineffectiveness.
The combination of a civil and a public-law administration of justice has in general already the effect of so enlarging the volume of business of the existing courts of the Empire
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