[p. 490]
|490| to it, which, as all the world knows, protects nothing and is denied, lawfully and rightfully, by the right to conclude alliances. Under such circumstances it becomes necessary that the weaker place themselves under the protection of such powerful fellow estates as are friends with the enemy, and thereby likewise diminish the general mass of the common force; in which way those powerful estates then gain not only by sparing themselves their exertions, but also by procuring advantages from the enemy for their inactivity, and finally, in that they weaken the general mass at the same time by the contribution of those whom they compel under their protection, likewise draw profit from these for the protection afforded.
Even if several large contingents have in fact come together, the instability of their relations and the unreliability of their remaining together disturb the common activity. There is no free disposition over these army corps such as is necessary [for] the security of the execution of a plan of war, and the plan, not only of a campaign but of single operations, requires for its deed not so much orders as negotiations. Nor can it fail that the calculation enters whether the contingent of a single estate is used too much, others on the other hand spared, and the equality of right violated, just as in other relations of the state there was formerly dispute over the first place of danger and dissatisfaction over non-employment.
The jealousy of the various corps, which regard themselves as different nations, the possibility that they withdraw in the most critical moments — all these circumstances make it necessary that an army of the Empire, even one considerable in number and military substance, can produce no proportionate effect at all.
If the military weakness of Germany is neither a consequence of cowardice nor of military unfitness and unacquaintance with those skills
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