The Groundlines presuppose not only the Psychology but also the section that precedes it: the Phenomenology of Spirit within the Encyclopaedia. Hegel refers to it explicitly twice – in § 35 for the transition from the natural will to the person (3rd ed. § 424) and in § 57 for the struggle for recognition and the relationship of lordship and bondage (3rd ed. § 430 ff.). In addition there is § 8, where the relationship of consciousness is designated as merely the side of appearance of the will.
All three versions are reproduced: the third edition of 1830 with the Additions, the second of 1827 and the first of 1817. The second and third editions have the same numbering here (§§ 413–439); the first edition has §§ 329–362. Hegel’s reference “§ 325 ff.” in § 57 of the Groundlines does not exactly fit the first edition – there the Phenomenology begins only with § 329, and lordship and bondage are in §§ 352–357.
Contents
| Subject matter | 1830 | 1827 | 1817 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consciousness as such (sensuous consciousness, perceiving, understanding) | § 413–423 | § 413–423 | § 329–343 |
| Self-consciousness (desire, recognitive and universal self-consciousness) | § 424–437 | § 424–437 | § 344–360 |
| Reason | § 438–439 | § 438–439 | § 361–362 |
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), §§ 413–439
- Consciousness as such: § 413 · § 414 · § 415 · § 416 · § 417 · § 418 · § 419 · § 420 · § 421 · § 422 · § 423
- Self-consciousness: § 424 · § 425 · § 426 · § 427 · § 428 · § 429 · § 430 · § 431 · § 432 · § 433 · § 434 · § 435 · § 436 · § 437
- Reason: § 438 · § 439
§ 413
Consciousness makes up the stage of reflection or of the relationship of spirit, of spirit as appearance. The I is the infinite relation of spirit to itself, but as subjective, as certainty of itself; the immediate identity of the natural soul is raised to this pure ideal identity with itself; the content of the former is object for this reflection being for itself. Pure abstract freedom for itself releases from itself its determinacy, the natural life of the soul, as equally free, as a self-standing object, and it is of this as external to it that the I first knows, and is thus consciousness. The I as this absolute negativity is in itself identity in otherness; the I is itself and overreaches the object as something sublated in itself, is one side of the relationship and the whole relationship; – the light that manifests itself and something else as well.
Addition. As was remarked in the Addition to the preceding paragraph, the I must be grasped as the individually determined universal that, in its determinacy, in its difference, relates only to itself. This already implies that the I is immediately negative relation to itself, consequently the unmediated opposite of its universality abstracted from all determinacy, thus the equally abstract, simple singularity. Not only do we, the observers, thus distinguish the I into its opposed moments; rather, by virtue of its singularity, universal within itself and thus distinguished from itself, the I is itself this distinguishing-itself-from-itself, for as relating itself to itself its excluding singularity excludes itself from itself, thus from singularity, and thereby posits itself as the opposite of itself, immediately joined together with it, as universality. But the determination essential to the I, that of abstractly universal singularity, makes up its being. I and my being are therefore inseparably bound up with each other; the difference of my being from me is a difference that is none. On the one hand, being as the absolutely immediate, indeterminate, undifferentiated must indeed be distinguished from thinking that distinguishes itself from itself and, through sublation of the difference, mediates itself with itself, from the I; on the other hand, however, being is identical with thinking, because thinking returns from all mediation to immediacy, from all its self-distinguishing to untroubled unity with itself. The I is therefore being, or has it as a moment within itself. In positing this being as something other than me and at the same time as identical with me, I am knowing and have the absolute certainty of my being. This certainty must not, as happens on the part of mere representation, be regarded as a kind of property of the I, as a determination in its nature, but is to be grasped as the very nature of the I; for the I cannot exist without distinguishing itself from itself and being with itself in what is distinguished from it, that is, precisely without knowing of itself, without having and being the certainty of itself. Certainty therefore relates to the I as freedom to the will. As the former makes up the nature of the I, so the latter the nature of the will. At first, however, certainty is to be compared only with subjective freedom, with arbitrariness; only objective certainty, truth, corresponds to the genuine freedom of the will. The I certain of itself is accordingly at the beginning still the wholly simple subjective, the wholly abstractly free, the completely indeterminate ideality or negativity of all limitedness. Repelling itself from itself, the I therefore first arrives only at something formally, not actually, distinguished from it. But, as is shown in logic, the difference that is in itself must also be posited, developed into an actual difference. With regard to the I this development takes place in such a way that the I – not falling back into the anthropological, into the unconscious unity of the spiritual and the natural, but remaining certain of itself and preserving itself in its freedom – lets its other unfold into a totality equal to the totality of the I and precisely thereby become, from something corporeal belonging to the soul, something that stands over against it self-standingly, an object in the proper sense of this word. Because the I is as yet only the wholly abstract subjective, the merely formal, contentless distinguishing-itself-from-itself, the actual difference, the determinate content, is found outside the I and belongs solely to the objects. But since in itself the I already has difference within itself, or, in other words, since it is in itself the unity of itself and its other, it is necessarily related to the difference existing in the object and immediately reflected into itself out of this its other. The I thus overreaches what is actually distinguished from it, is with itself in this its other and remains, in all intuition, certain of itself. Only in coming to grasp myself as I does the other become objective to me, step over against me and at the same time become posited in me as ideal, and thus led back to unity with me. That is why in the above paragraph the I has been compared with light. As light is the manifestation of itself and of its other, the dark, and can reveal itself only by revealing that other, so the I too is revealed to itself only insofar as its other is revealed to it in the shape of something independent of it. From this general exposition of the nature of the I it is already sufficiently evident that the I, because it enters into struggle with external objects, is something higher than the impotent natural soul caught in, so to speak, childlike unity with the world, into which, precisely because of its impotence, fall the spiritual states of illness considered by us earlier.
§ 414
The identity of spirit with itself, as it is first posited as I, is only its abstract, formal ideality. As soul in the form of substantial universality, it is now subjective reflection-into-itself, related to this substantiality as to its negative, as to something beyond it and dark. Consciousness is therefore, like relationship in general, the contradiction of the self-standingness of both sides and of their identity, in which they are sublated. Spirit as I is essence; but since reality in the sphere of essence is posited as immediately existing and at the same time as ideal, spirit as consciousness is only the appearing of spirit.
Addition. The negativity which the wholly abstract I or mere consciousness exercises on its other is a still thoroughly indeterminate, superficial, not absolute one. Therefore on this standpoint the contradiction arises that the object is on the one hand in me and on the other hand has a subsistence outside me just as self-standing as the dark outside the light. To consciousness the object appears not as one posited by the I but as an immediate, existing, given one; for consciousness does not yet know that the object is in itself identical with spirit and released into seemingly complete independence only through a self-division of spirit. That this is so only we know, who have penetrated to the Idea of spirit and have thus raised ourselves above the abstract, formal identity of the I.
§ 415
Since the I is for itself only as formal identity, the dialectical movement of the concept, the further determination of consciousness, is not for it its own activity; rather it is in itself and, for consciousness, an alteration of the object. Consciousness therefore appears determined differently according to the difference of the given object, and its further development as an alteration of the determinations of its object. The I, the subject of consciousness, is thinking; the logical further determination of the object is what is identical in subject and object, their absolute connection, that according to which the object is the subject’s own.
The Kantian philosophy can most determinately be regarded as having grasped spirit as consciousness and as containing entirely only determinations of the phenomenology, not of the philosophy, of spirit. It regards the I as relation to something lying beyond, which in its abstract determination is called the thing-in-itself; and it grasps both intelligence and will only according to this finitude. Although in the concept of reflective judgement it does arrive at the Idea of spirit, subject-objectivity, an intuitive understanding etc., as well as at the Idea of nature, this Idea itself is again reduced to an appearance, namely a subjective maxim (see § 58, Introd.). It is therefore to be regarded as a correct sense of this philosophy that it was grasped by Reinhold as a theory of consciousness, under the name of the faculty of representation. The Fichtean philosophy has the same standpoint, and the not-I is determined only as object of the I, only in consciousness; it remains as an infinite impulse, i.e. as a thing-in-itself. Both philosophies therefore show that they have not arrived at the concept and at spirit as it is in and for itself, but only as it is in relation to an other. With regard to Spinozism, by contrast, it is to be remarked that spirit, in the judgement by which it constitutes itself as I, as free subjectivity against determinacy, steps out of substance, and philosophy, since this judgement is for it the absolute determination of spirit, steps out of Spinozism.
Addition 1. Although the further determination of consciousness proceeds from its own inner and also has a negative direction against the object, which is thus altered by consciousness, this alteration nevertheless appears to consciousness as one that comes about without its subjective activity, and the determinations it posits in the object count for it as belonging only to the object, as existing.
Addition 2. In Fichte there always prevails the predicament of how the I is to cope with the not-I. No true unity of these two sides comes about here; this unity always remains only one that ought to be, because from the outset the false presupposition is made that I and not-I, in their separatedness, in their finitude, are something absolute.
§ 416
The goal of spirit as consciousness is to make this its appearance identical with its essence, to raise the certainty of itself to truth. The concrete existence that spirit has in consciousness has its finitude in being formal relation to itself, only certainty. Because the object is determined only abstractly as its own, or spirit is reflected in the object only into itself as abstract I, this concrete existence still has a content that is not as its own.
Addition. Mere representation does not distinguish between certainty and truth. What is certain for it, what it holds to be something subjective agreeing with the object, it calls true, however trivial and bad the content of this subjective may be. Philosophy, by contrast, must essentially distinguish the concept of truth from mere certainty, for the certainty which spirit has of itself on the standpoint of mere consciousness is still something untrue, self-contradictory, since spirit here, besides the abstract certainty of being with itself, has the directly opposite certainty of relating to something essentially other than itself. This contradiction must be sublated; the drive to resolve itself lies within it. Subjective certainty must not retain any limit in the object; it must receive true objectivity; and conversely the object for its part must become mine not merely in an abstract way but according to all sides of its concrete nature. This goal is already divined by reason believing in itself, but is reached only by the knowing of reason, by comprehending cognition.
§ 417
The stages of this raising of certainty to truth are that spirit is a. consciousness in general, which has an object as such, b. self-consciousness, for which the I is the object, c. unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, such that spirit intuits the content of the object as itself and itself as determined in and for itself; – reason, the concept of spirit.
Addition. The three stages of the raising of consciousness to reason given in the above paragraph are determined by the power of the concept active both in the subject and in the object, and can therefore be regarded as so many judgements. But of this, as already remarked earlier, the abstract I, mere consciousness, as yet knows nothing. Since, therefore, the not-I, which at first counts for consciousness as self-standing, is sublated by the power of the concept activating itself in it, and the object is given, instead of the form of immediacy, externality and singularity, the form of something universal, something inner, and consciousness takes this inwardized into itself, the I’s own becoming-inward, which precisely thereby comes about, appears to it as an inwardizing of the object. Only when the object is inwardized into the I and consciousness has in this way developed into self-consciousness does spirit know the power of its own inwardness as one present and effective in the object. What, then, in the sphere of mere consciousness is only for us, the observers, comes to be for spirit itself in the sphere of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness has consciousness as its object, thus sets itself over against it. At the same time, however, consciousness is also preserved as a moment in self-consciousness itself. Self-consciousness therefore necessarily proceeds, by repelling itself from itself, to set another self-consciousness over against itself and to give itself in it an object that is identical with it and yet at the same time self-standing. This object is at first an immediate, singular I. But if it is freed from the form of one-sided subjectivity still attaching to it in this way and grasped as a reality penetrated by the subjectivity of the concept, consequently as Idea, then self-consciousness advances from its opposition to consciousness to mediated unity with it and thereby becomes the concrete being-for-itself of the I, absolutely free reason cognizing itself in the objective world. It hardly needs remarking here that reason, which appears in our consideration as the third and last, is not something merely last, a result emerging from something alien to it, but rather what underlies consciousness and self-consciousness, thus the first, and that through the sublation of these two one-sided forms it proves to be their original unity and truth.
337)Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens, Prague and Jena 1789
§ 418
Consciousness is at first immediate, its relation to the object therefore the simple, unmediated certainty of it; the object itself is therefore likewise determined as immediate, as existing and reflected into itself, further as immediately singular; – sensuous consciousness.
Consciousness as relationship contains only the categories belonging to the abstract I or formal thinking, which are for it determinations of the object (§ 415). Sensuous consciousness therefore knows of the object only as something existing, a something, an existing thing, a singular and so forth. It appears as the richest in content but is the poorest in thoughts. That rich filling is made up of the determinations of feeling; they are the material of consciousness (§ 414), the substantial and qualitative which in the anthropological sphere the soul is and finds within itself. This material the reflection of the soul into itself, the I, separates from itself and gives it first the determination of being. – Spatial and temporal singularity, here and now, as I determined the object of sensuous consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 25 ff., properly belongs to intuiting. The object is here at first to be taken only according to the relationship it has to consciousness, namely as something external to it, not yet determined as external in itself or as being-outside-itself.
Addition. The first of the three stages of development of phenomenological spirit named in the preceding paragraph, namely consciousness, has within itself the three stages α) of sensuous, β) of perceiving and γ) of understanding consciousness. In this sequence a logical advance reveals itself. α) First the object is a wholly immediate, existing one; so it appears to sensuous consciousness. But this immediacy has no truth; from it one must advance to the essential being of the object. β) When the essence of things becomes the object of consciousness, consciousness is no longer sensuous but perceiving consciousness. On this standpoint the singular things are related to a universal, but also only related; therefore no true unity of the singular and the universal comes about here yet, but only a mixture of these two sides. In this lies a contradiction that drives on to the third stage of consciousness, γ) to understanding consciousness, and finds its resolution there insofar as there the object is reduced or raised to the appearance of an inner existing for itself. Such appearance is the living. In considering it self-consciousness kindles, for in the living the object turns over into the subjective – there consciousness discovers itself as what is essential in the object, reflects itself out of the object into itself, becomes objective to itself. After this general survey of the three stages of development of consciousness we now turn first more closely to sensuous consciousness. This is distinguished from the other modes of consciousness not by the object’s reaching me through the senses in its case alone, but rather by the object, whether external or internal, having on its standpoint no further determination of thought at all than, first, simply to be and, second, to be a self-standing other against me, something reflected into itself, a singular against me as a singular, immediate one. The particular content of the sensuous, for example smell, taste, colour etc., falls, as we saw in § 401, to sensation. But the form peculiar to the sensuous, being-external-to-itself, stepping asunder in space and time, is the determination of the object apprehended by intuition (as we shall see in § 448) – in such a way that for sensuous consciousness as such only the above-mentioned determination of thought remains, by virtue of which the manifold particular content of sensations gathers itself into a one existing outside me, which on this standpoint is known by me in an immediate, singularized way, comes contingently into my consciousness now and then disappears from it again, and is in general, as regards both its existence and its constitution, something given for me, thus something of which I do not know where it comes from, why it has this determinate nature and whether it is something true. From this brief statement of the nature of immediate or sensuous consciousness it is evident that it is a form thoroughly inadequate to the content of right, of the ethical and of religion, which is universal in and for itself, a form that corrupts such content, since in that consciousness the absolutely necessary, eternal, infinite, inner is given the shape of something finite, singularized, external to itself. If, therefore, in recent times people have wanted to admit only an immediate knowing of God, they have confined themselves to a knowing that can say of God only that he is, that he exists outside us and that to sensation he seems to possess such and such properties. Such consciousness gets no further than a self-assertive bluster, taking itself to be religious, with its contingent assurances regarding the nature of the divine that is beyond it.
§ 419
The sensuous as something becomes an other; the reflection of the something into itself, the thing, has many properties and, as singular in its immediacy, manifold predicates. The many singulars of sensuousness therefore become something broad – a manifoldness of relations, determinations of reflection and universalities. – These are logical determinations, posited by the thinking, i.e. here by the I. But for it, as appearing, the object has changed in this way. Sensuous consciousness in this determination of the object is perceiving.
Addition. The content of sensuous consciousness is dialectical in itself. It is supposed to be the singular; but precisely thereby it is not a singular but every singular; and precisely in excluding others from itself the singular content relates itself to others, proves to be going beyond itself, dependent on others, mediated by them, having others within itself. The next truth of the immediately singular is thus its being related to others. The determinations of this relation are what are called determinations of reflection, and the consciousness apprehending these determinations is perceiving.
§ 420
Consciousness that has gone beyond sensuousness wants to take the object in its truth [wahr-nehmen, i.e. to perceive], not as merely immediate but as mediated, reflected into itself and universal. The object is thus a combination of sensuous determinations and of expanded determinations of thought of concrete relationships and connections. With this the identity of consciousness with the object is no longer the abstract identity of certainty but a determinate one, a knowing.
The next stage of consciousness, on which the Kantian philosophy grasps spirit, is perceiving, which is in general the standpoint of our ordinary consciousness and more or less of the sciences. One starts from sensuous certainties of single apperceptions or observations, which are supposed to be raised to truth by being considered in their relation, by being reflected on, in general by becoming at the same time, according to determinate categories, something necessary and universal, experiences.
Addition. Although perceiving starts from the observation of sensuous material, it does not stop there, does not restrict itself to smelling, tasting, seeing, hearing and touching, but necessarily advances to relating the sensuous to a universal not immediately observable, to cognizing each singularized thing as something connected within itself – for example to gathering together in force all its expressions – and to seeking out the relations and mediations that take place between single things. Whereas, therefore, merely sensuous consciousness only points to things, i.e. merely shows them in their immediacy, perceiving by contrast grasps the connection of things, demonstrates that when these circumstances are present this follows from them, and so begins to show things to be true. This showing, however, is still deficient, not final. For that through which something is to be shown here is itself something presupposed, consequently in need of being shown, so that in this field one goes from presuppositions to presuppositions and gets into the progress to infinity. – On this standpoint stands experience. Everything must be experienced. But if there is to be talk of philosophy, one must raise oneself from that showing of empiricism, which remains bound to presuppositions, to the proving of the absolute necessity of things. Already at § 415, moreover, it was said that the further development of consciousness appears as an alteration of the determinations of its object. With reference to this point it may be mentioned here that, since perceiving consciousness sublates the singularity of things, posits it as ideal and thus negates the externality of the object’s relation to the I, the I goes into itself, itself gains in inwardness, but that consciousness regards this going-into-itself as falling into the object.
§ 421
This linking of the singular and the universal is a mixture, because the singular remains being that lies at the ground and fixed against the universal, to which it is at the same time related. It is therefore the many-sided contradiction – in general of the singular things of sensuous apperception, which are supposed to make up the ground of universal experience, and of universality, which is rather supposed to be the essence and the ground – of singularity, which makes up self-standingness taken in its concrete content, and of the manifold properties, which, free of this negative bond and of one another, are rather self-standing universal matters (see § 123 ff.) etc. Here properly falls the contradiction of the finite through all forms of the logical spheres, most concretely insofar as the something is determined as object (§ 194 ff.).
§ 422
The next truth of perceiving is that the object is rather appearance and its reflection-into-itself an inner and universal being for itself over against it. The consciousness of this object is the understanding. – That inner is on the one hand the sublated manifoldness of the sensuous and in this way abstract identity; on the other hand, however, it therefore also contains manifoldness, but as inner simple difference, which remains identical with itself in the change of appearances. This simple difference is the realm of the laws of appearance, its calm universal image.
Addition. The contradiction designated in the preceding paragraph receives its first resolution through the manifold determinations of the sensuous, self-standing against one another and against the inner unity of each single thing, being reduced to the appearance of an inner being for itself, and the object thus being developed further from the contradiction of its reflection-into-itself and its reflection-into-another to the essential relationship of itself to itself. But since consciousness raises itself from the observation of immediate singularity and from the mixture of the singular and the universal to the apprehension of the inner of the object, thus determines the object in a way equal to the I, it becomes understanding consciousness. Only in that non-sensuous inner does the understanding believe it has the true. At first, however, this inner is something abstractly identical, undifferentiated within itself; such an inner we have before us in the category of force and of cause. The true inner, by contrast, must be designated as concrete, as differentiated within itself. So grasped, it is what we call law. For the essence of law, whether it relates to external nature or to the ethical world order, consists in an inseparable unity, in a necessary inner connection of distinct determinations. Thus through the law punishment is necessarily bound up with crime; to the criminal it may indeed appear as something alien to him, but in the concept of crime its opposite, punishment, essentially lies. Likewise, as regards external nature, for example the law of the motion of the planets (according to which, as is well known, the squares of the periods of revolution are as the cubes of the distances) must be grasped as an inner necessary unity of distinct determinations. This unity is indeed comprehended only by the speculative thinking of reason, but is already discovered by understanding consciousness in the manifoldness of appearances. Laws are the determinations of the understanding indwelling in the world itself; in them, therefore, understanding consciousness finds its own nature again and thus becomes objective to itself.
§ 423
Law, at first the relationship of universal, abiding determinations, has its necessity in itself insofar as its difference is the inner one; the one of the determinations, as not externally distinguished from the other, lies immediately itself in the other. But in this way the inner difference is what it is in truth, difference in itself or the difference that is none. – In this form-determination in general consciousness, which as such contains the self-standingness of subject and object against each other, has disappeared in itself; the I as judging has an object that is not distinguished from it – itself; – self-consciousness.
Addition. What was said in the above paragraph of the inner difference making up the essence of law, namely that this difference is a difference that is none, holds just as much of the difference existing in the I that is objective to itself. Just as law is something distinguished not merely against something other but within itself, something identical with itself in its difference, so too is the I that has itself as its object, that knows of itself. Since, therefore, consciousness as understanding knows of laws, it relates to an object in which the I finds again the counter-image of its own self and thus is on the point of developing into self-consciousness as such. But since, as already remarked in the Addition to § 422, merely understanding consciousness does not yet attain to comprehending the unity of the distinct determinations present in law, i.e. to developing dialectically from one of these determinations its opposite, this unity still remains something dead for that consciousness, consequently something not in agreement with the activity of the I. In the living, by contrast, consciousness intuits the very process of the positing and sublating of the distinct determinations, perceives that the difference is no difference, i.e. no absolutely fixed difference. For life is that inner which does not remain an abstractly inner but enters wholly into its expression; it is something mediated through the negation of the immediate, the external, which itself sublates this its mediation into immediacy – a sensuous, external and at the same time absolutely inner concrete existence, something material in which the asunderness of the parts appears sublated, the singular reduced to something ideal, to a moment, to a member of the whole; in short, life must be grasped as end in itself, as a purpose that has its means in itself, as a totality in which each distinct term is at the same time purpose and means. In the consciousness of this dialectical, this living unity of the distinct, self-consciousness therefore kindles – consciousness of the simple ideal that is objective to itself and thus distinguished within itself, the knowing of the truth of the natural, of the I.
§ 424
The truth of consciousness is self-consciousness, and this is the ground of the former, so that in concrete existence all consciousness of another object is self-consciousness; I know of the object as mine (it is my representation), I therefore know of myself in it. – The expression of self-consciousness is I = I; – abstract freedom, pure ideality. – So it is without reality, for it itself, which is object of itself, is not such an object, since no difference between it and itself is present.
Addition. In the expression I = I the principle of absolute reason and freedom is expressed. Freedom and reason consist in my raising myself to the form of I = I, in my cognizing everything as mine, as I, in my grasping every object as a member in the system of what I myself am – in short, in my having I and the world in one and the same consciousness, finding myself again in the world and conversely having in my consciousness what is, what has objectivity. This unity of the I and the object, which makes up the principle of spirit, is, however, present only in an abstract way in immediate self-consciousness and is cognized only by us, the observers, not yet by self-consciousness itself. Immediate self-consciousness does not yet have I = I as its object, but only the I, and is therefore free only for us, not for itself – does not yet know of its freedom and has within itself only its foundation, but not yet truly actual freedom.
§ 425
Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness, and therefore also burdened with an external object, formally with the negation of itself; it is thus at the same time the preceding stage, consciousness, and is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and of itself as consciousness. Since the latter, and negation in general, is already sublated in itself in I = I, self-consciousness, as this certainty of itself against the object, is the drive to posit what it is in itself – i.e. to give content and objectivity to the abstract knowing of itself and conversely to free itself from its sensuousness, to sublate the given objectivity and posit it as identical with itself; both are one and the same; – the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness.
Addition. The defect of abstract self-consciousness lies in its and consciousness still being two things against each other, in the two not yet having balanced each other out. In consciousness we see the tremendous difference of the I, this wholly simple, on the one side and the infinite manifoldness of the world on the other. This opposition of I and world, not yet coming here to true mediation, makes up the finitude of consciousness. Self-consciousness, by contrast, has its finitude in its still wholly abstract identity with itself. In the I = I of immediate self-consciousness only a difference that ought to be is present, not yet a posited, not yet an actual difference. This split between self-consciousness and consciousness forms an inner contradiction of self-consciousness with itself, because the latter is at the same time the stage immediately preceding it, consciousness, consequently the opposite of itself. For since abstract self-consciousness is only the first, thus still conditioned, negation of the immediacy of consciousness and not yet absolute negativity, i.e. the negation of that negation, infinite affirmation, it itself still has the form of something existing, something immediate, something still filled with externality despite, or rather precisely because of, its undifferentiated inwardness; it therefore contains negation not merely within itself but also outside itself, as an external object, as a not-I, and is precisely thereby consciousness. The contradiction depicted here must be resolved, and this happens in such a way that self-consciousness, which has itself as consciousness, as I, for its object, develops the simple ideality of the I further into real difference, and thus, sublating its one-sided subjectivity, gives itself objectivity – a process identical with the reverse one, through which at the same time the object is posited subjectively by the I, sunk into the inwardness of the self, and so the dependence of the I on an external reality present in consciousness is annihilated. Thus self-consciousness comes to have consciousness not beside itself, not to be externally bound up with it, but truly to penetrate it and contain it within itself as dissolved. To reach this goal, self-consciousness has to run through three stages of development. α) The first of these stages presents to us the immediate singular self-consciousness, simply identical with itself and at the same time, in contradiction with this, related to an external object. So determined, self-consciousness is the certainty of itself as what exists, against which the object has the determination of something only seemingly self-standing but in fact null; – desiring self-consciousness. β) At the second stage the objective I receives the determination of another I, and thus arises the relationship of one self-consciousness to another self-consciousness, and between these two the process of recognition. Here self-consciousness is no longer merely singular self-consciousness; rather in it a union of singularity and universality already begins. γ) When then, further, the otherness of the selves standing over against each other sublates itself and these become identical with each other while remaining self-standing, the third of those stages comes forth – universal self-consciousness.
§ 426
Self-consciousness in its immediacy is a singular and desire – the contradiction of its abstraction, which is supposed to be objective, or of its immediacy, which has the shape of an external object and is supposed to be subjective. For the certainty of itself that has emerged from the sublation of consciousness the object is determined as something null, and for the relation of self-consciousness to the object its abstract ideality is likewise determined as something null.
Addition. As already remarked in the Addition to the preceding paragraph, desire is the form in which self-consciousness appears at the first stage of its development. Desire has here, in the second main part of the doctrine of subjective spirit, as yet no further determination than that of drive, insofar as, without being determined by thinking, it is directed to an external object in which it seeks to satisfy itself. But that the drive so determined exists in self-consciousness has its necessity in the fact that self-consciousness (as we have likewise already pointed out in the Addition to the preceding paragraph) is at the same time the stage immediately preceding it, namely consciousness, and knows of this inner contradiction. Where something identical with itself bears a contradiction within itself and is filled with the feeling of its identity with itself that is in itself as well as with the opposite feeling of its inner contradiction, there the drive necessarily comes forth to sublate this contradiction. The non-living has no drive, because it cannot bear contradiction but perishes when the other of itself penetrates into it. The ensouled, by contrast, and spirit necessarily have drive, since neither soul nor spirit can be without having contradiction within itself and either feeling it or knowing of it. But in immediate, therefore natural, singular, excluding self-consciousness, as already indicated above, the contradiction has the shape that self-consciousness, whose concept consists in relating to itself, in being I = I, on the contrary at the same time still relates to an immediate other not posited as ideal, to an external object, to a not-I, and is external to itself, since, although in itself totality, unity of the subjective and the objective, it nevertheless exists at first as something one-sided, as something merely subjective, which only through the satisfaction of desire comes to be totality in and for itself. – Despite that inner contradiction, however, self-consciousness remains absolutely certain of itself, because it knows that the immediate, external object has no true reality, is rather something null against the subject, something merely seemingly self-standing, but in fact such as neither deserves nor is able to subsist for itself, but must perish through the real power of the subject.
§ 427
Self-consciousness therefore knows itself in itself in the object, which in this relation is in accordance with the drive. In the negation of the two one-sided moments, as the I’s own activity, this identity comes to be for the I. The object can offer no resistance to this activity, being in itself and for self-consciousness the selfless; the dialectic that is its nature, to sublate itself, exists here as that activity of the I. The given object is herein just as much posited subjectively as subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness and becomes objective to itself.
Addition. The self-conscious subject knows itself to be in itself identical with the external object – knows that the latter contains the possibility of the satisfaction of desire, that the object is thus in accordance with desire and that for this very reason desire is aroused by it. The relation to the object is therefore necessary to the subject. The latter intuits in the former its own lack, its own one-sidedness, sees in the object something belonging to its own essence and yet lacking to it. Self-consciousness is able to sublate this contradiction, since it is not a being but absolute activity, and it sublates it by taking possession of the object, which only pretends, as it were, to be self-standing, satisfying itself by consuming it and, since it is an end in itself, preserving itself in this process. The object must perish in this; for both, subject and object, are here immediate, and these cannot be in one otherwise than by the immediacy, and indeed first that of the selfless object, being negated. Through the satisfaction of desire the identity of subject and object that is in itself is posited, the one-sidedness of subjectivity and the seeming self-standingness of the object are sublated. But since the object is annihilated by desiring self-consciousness, it can seem to succumb to a thoroughly alien force. This, however, is only a semblance. For the immediate object must sublate itself according to its own nature, its concept, since in its singularity it does not correspond to the universality of its concept. Self-consciousness is the appearing concept of the object itself. In the annihilation of the object by self-consciousness, the object therefore perishes through the power of its own concept, which is only inner to it and for that very reason seems to come to it only from outside. Thus the object is posited subjectively. But through this sublation of the object the subject, as already remarked, also sublates its own lack, its falling apart into an undifferentiated I = I and an I related to an external object, and gives objectivity to its subjectivity just as much as it makes its object subjective.
§ 428
The product of this process is that the I joins itself together with itself and is thereby satisfied for itself, something actual. On the external side it remains at first determined in this return as a singular and has preserved itself as such, because it relates only negatively to the selfless object, which to that extent is only consumed. Desire is thus in its satisfaction in general destructive, as it is selfish in its content, and since satisfaction has taken place only in the singular, which is transient, desire generates itself again in satisfaction.
Addition. The relationship of desire to the object is still thoroughly that of selfish destroying, not that of forming. Insofar as self-consciousness relates to the object as forming activity, the object receives only the form of the subjective, which gains a subsistence in it, but is preserved as regards its material. Through the satisfaction of self-consciousness caught in desire, by contrast, the self-standingness of the object is destroyed, since this self-consciousness does not yet possess the strength to bear the other as something independent, so that the form of the subjective attains no subsistence in it. But like the object of desire and desire itself, the satisfaction of desire too is necessarily something singular, transient, giving way to desire that awakens ever anew, an objectification that remains constantly in contradiction with the universality of the subject and is nevertheless again and again stimulated by the felt lack of immediate subjectivity, which never absolutely reaches its goal but only brings about the progress to infinity.
§ 429
But the self-feeling that comes to it [the I] in satisfaction does not, on the inner side or in itself, remain in abstract being-for-itself or in its singularity; rather, as the negation of immediacy and of singularity, the result contains the determination of universality and of the identity of self-consciousness with its object. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is the consciousness of a free object, in which the I has the knowing of itself as I, but which is also still outside it.
Addition. On the external side, as was remarked in the Addition to the preceding paragraph, immediate self-consciousness remains caught in the tedious alternation, continuing to infinity, of desire and its satisfaction, in subjectivity that falls back again and again into itself out of its objectification. On the inner side, by contrast, or according to the concept, self-consciousness, by sublating its subjectivity and the external object, has negated its own immediacy, the standpoint of desire, posited itself with the determination of otherness against itself, filled the other with the I, made it from something selfless into a free, a selfish object, into another I – thus set itself over against itself as a distinct I, but thereby raised itself above the selfishness of merely destructive desire.
§ 430
There is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness, at first immediately, as an other for an other. In it as I, I intuit myself, but also in it an immediately existing object, other and, as I, absolutely self-standing against me. The sublation of the singularity of self-consciousness was the first sublation; self-consciousness is thereby determined only as particular. – This contradiction gives the drive to show oneself as a free self and to be there as such for the other – the process of recognition.
Addition. The second stage of development of self-consciousness designated in the heading of the above paragraph has at first still in common with self-consciousness caught in desire, which forms its first stage of development, the determination of immediacy. In this determination lies the tremendous contradiction that – since the I is the wholly universal, the absolutely pervasive, interrupted by no limit, the essence common to all human beings – the two selves relating to each other here make up one identity, one light, so to speak, and yet at the same time are two, which in complete rigidity and brittleness towards each other subsist each as something reflected into itself, absolutely distinct from and impenetrable to the other.
§ 431
It is a struggle; for I cannot know myself in the other as myself insofar as the other is an immediate other existence for me; I am therefore directed to the sublation of this its immediacy. Equally I cannot be recognized as something immediate, but only insofar as I sublate immediacy in myself and thereby give existence to my freedom. But this immediacy is at the same time the corporeality of self-consciousness, in which, as in its sign and instrument, it has its own self-feeling as well as its being for others and its relation mediating it with them.
Addition. The more precise shape of the contradiction indicated in the Addition to the preceding paragraph is that the two self-conscious subjects relating to each other, because they have immediate existence, are natural, bodily, thus exist in the manner of a thing subject to alien force and come up against each other as such, but at the same time are absolutely free and may not treat each other as something only immediately existing, as something merely natural. To overcome this contradiction it is necessary that the two selves standing over against each other posit themselves in their existence, in their being-for-another, as what they are in themselves or according to their concept, and recognize themselves as such – namely as not merely natural but free beings. Only so does true freedom come about; for since this consists in the identity of myself with the other, I am truly free only when the other too is free and is recognized by me as free. This freedom of the one in the other unites human beings in an inner way, whereas need and want bring them together only externally. Human beings must therefore want to find themselves again in one another. But this cannot happen as long as they are caught in their immediacy, in their naturalness; for this is precisely what excludes them from one another and prevents them from being for one another as free. Freedom therefore demands that the self-conscious subject neither let its own naturalness subsist nor tolerate the naturalness of others, but rather, indifferent towards existence, in single immediate encounters stake its own and the other’s life for the winning of freedom. Only through struggle, then, can freedom be won; the assurance of being free does not suffice for this; only by man bringing himself, as well as others, into the danger of death does he prove on this standpoint his capacity for freedom.
§ 432
The struggle for recognition is thus a struggle of life and death; each of the two self-consciousnesses brings the life of the other into danger and exposes itself to it, but only as to danger, for each is equally directed to the preservation of its life as the existence of its freedom. The death of the one, which resolves the contradiction on one side through the abstract, therefore crude, negation of immediacy, is thus, on the essential side, the existence of recognition, which is at the same time sublated in it, a new contradiction, and the higher one compared with the first.
Addition. The absolute proof of freedom in the struggle for recognition is death. Already by exposing themselves to the danger of death the combatants posit their natural being on both sides as something negative, prove that they regard it as something null. But through death naturalness is actually negated, and thereby at the same time its contradiction with the spiritual, with the I, is resolved. This resolution, however, is only wholly abstract, only of a negative, not of a positive kind. For if even only one of the two fighting each other for their mutual recognition perishes, no recognition comes about; the survivor exists as recognized just as little as the dead one. Consequently, through death the new and greater contradiction arises that those who have proved their inner freedom through the struggle have nevertheless attained no recognized existence of their freedom. To prevent possible misunderstandings regarding the standpoint just depicted, we must still remark here that the struggle for recognition in the form indicated, driven to the extreme, can take place only in the state of nature, where human beings exist only as singulars, but remains remote from civil society and the state, because there what makes up the result of that struggle, namely being recognized, is already present. For although the state can also arise through force, it does not rest on it; in bringing it forth, force has only brought into existence something justified in and for itself, the laws, the constitution. In the state the spirit of the people, custom, law are what rule. There man is recognized and treated as a rational being, as free, as a person, and the singular for his part makes himself worthy of this recognition by obeying, overcoming the naturalness of his self-consciousness, a universal, the will being in and for itself, the law, and thus by conducting himself towards others in a universally valid way, recognizing them as what he himself wants to count as – as free, as a person. In the state the citizen receives his honour through the office he holds, through the trade he pursues and through his other working activity. His honour thereby has a substantial, universal, objective content no longer dependent on empty subjectivity, such as is still lacking in the state of nature, where individuals, however they may be and whatever they may do, want to compel recognition. But from what has just been said it is evident that the duel must by no means be confused with that struggle for recognition, which makes up a necessary moment in the development of the human spirit. The latter does not, like the former, fall into the natural state of human beings, but into an already more or less developed form of civil society and the state. The duel has its proper world-historical place in the feudal system, which was supposed to be a condition of right but was so only to a very small degree. There the knight, whatever he might have committed, wanted to count as having in no way compromised himself, as being completely spotless. This the duel was supposed to prove. Although the law of the fist had been brought into certain forms, it nevertheless had selfishness as its absolute foundation; through its exercise, therefore, what was given was not a proof of rational freedom and truly civic honour, but rather a proof of crudeness and often of the shamelessness of a mind that, despite its badness, laid claim to external honour. Among the ancient peoples the duel does not occur, for to them the formalism of empty subjectivity, the subject’s wanting to count in its immediate singularity, was entirely alien; they had their honour only in their solid unity with the ethical relationship that the state is. In our modern states, however, the duel can hardly be declared anything other than an artificial putting oneself back into the crudeness of the Middle Ages. At most, in the former military, the duel could have a tolerably rational sense, namely that the individual wanted to prove that he still had a higher purpose than to let himself be killed for the sake of a penny.
§ 433
Since life is as essential as freedom, the struggle ends at first, as one-sided negation, with the inequality that one of the combatants prefers life, preserves itself as singular self-consciousness but gives up its being recognized, while the other holds [fast] to its relation to itself and is recognized by the first as the subjugated one: – the relationship of lordship and bondage.
The struggle for recognition and subjugation under a lord is the appearance from which the living together of human beings, as a beginning of states, has emerged. Force, which is the ground in this appearance, is not on that account the ground of right, although it is the necessary and justified moment in the transition from the condition of self-consciousness sunk in desire and singularity to the condition of universal self-consciousness. It is the external or appearing beginning of states, not their substantial principle.
Addition. The relationship of lordship and bondage contains only a relative sublation of the contradiction between the particularity reflected into itself and the mutual identity of the distinct self-conscious subjects. For in this relationship the immediacy of particular self-consciousness is at first sublated only on the side of the bondsman, but preserved on the side of the lord. While the naturalness of life remains on both sides, the self-will of the bondsman gives itself up to the will of the lord and receives as its content the purpose of the master, who for his part takes into his self-consciousness not the will of the bondsman but merely the care for the preservation of his natural vitality, in such a way that in this relationship the posited identity of the self-consciousness of the subjects related to each other comes about only in a one-sided way. As regards the historical aspect of the relationship under discussion, it may be remarked here that the ancient peoples, the Greeks and Romans, had not yet raised themselves to the concept of absolute freedom, since they did not recognize that man as such, as this universal I, as rational self-consciousness, is entitled to freedom. Among them, rather, a human being was held to be free only if he was born free. Freedom thus still had among them the determination of naturalness. Therefore there was slavery in their free states, and among the Romans bloody wars arose in which the slaves sought to make themselves free, to attain recognition of their eternal human rights.
§ 434
This relationship is on the one hand, since the means of lordship, the bondsman, must likewise be preserved in his life, community of need and of care for its satisfaction. In place of the crude destruction of the immediate object there steps the acquisition, preservation and forming of it as the mediating term in which the two extremes of self-standingness and non-self-standingness join together; – the form of universality in the satisfaction of need is a lasting means and a provision that takes the future into account and secures it.
§ 435
Secondly, according to the difference, the lord has in the bondsman and his service the intuition of the validity of his singular being-for-itself; and indeed by means of the sublation of immediate being-for-itself, which, however, falls into another. – But this other, the bondsman, works off his singular will and self-will in the service of the lord, sublates the inner immediacy of desire, and in this divestment and the fear of the lord makes the beginning of wisdom – the transition to universal self-consciousness.
Addition. Since the bondsman works for the lord, and consequently not in the exclusive interest of his own singularity, his desire receives the breadth of being not only the desire of this one but of containing within itself at the same time that of another. Accordingly the bondsman raises himself above the selfish singularity of his natural will and to that extent stands higher in worth than the lord, who is caught in his selfishness, intuits in the bondsman only his immediate will and is recognized in a formal way by an unfree consciousness. That subjugation of the bondsman’s selfishness forms the beginning of the true freedom of man. The trembling of the singularity of the will, the feeling of the nullity of selfishness, the habit of obedience, is a necessary moment in the education of every human being. Without having experienced this discipline that breaks self-will, no one becomes free, rational and capable of commanding. To become free, to attain the capacity for self-government, all peoples have therefore first had to pass through the strict discipline of subjection to a lord. Thus, for example, it was necessary that, after Solon had given the Athenians democratic, free laws, Peisistratus procured for himself a power by which he compelled the Athenians to obey those laws. Only when this obedience had taken root did the rule of the Peisistratids become superfluous. So too Rome had to live through the strict government of the kings before, through the breaking of natural selfishness, that admirable Roman virtue of love of the fatherland ready for every sacrifice could arise. – Bondage and tyranny are thus a necessary stage in the history of peoples and therefore something relatively justified. Those who remain bondsmen suffer no absolute wrong; for whoever does not possess the courage to risk his life for the winning of freedom deserves to be a slave; and if, on the other hand, a people does not merely imagine that it wants to be free but actually has the energetic will to freedom, no human power will be able to hold it back in the bondage of merely passive being-governed. That servile obedience forms, as was said, only the beginning of freedom, because what the natural singularity of self-consciousness subjects itself to in it is not the truly universal, rational will being in and for itself, but the singular, contingent will of another subject. Thus here only the one moment of freedom comes forth, the negativity of selfish singularity; whereas the positive side of freedom receives actuality only when, on the one hand, servile self-consciousness, freeing itself both from the singularity of the lord and from its own singularity, grasps the rational in and for itself in its universality, independent of the particularity of subjects – and when, on the other hand, the self-consciousness of the lord, through the community of need and of care for its satisfaction taking place between him and the bondsman, as well as through the intuition of the sublation of the immediate singular will objective to him in the bondsman, is brought to cognize this sublation in relation to himself too as the true, and accordingly to subject his own selfish will to the law of the will being in and for itself.
§ 436
Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative knowing of itself in the other self, each of which, as free singularity, has absolute self-standingness, but, by virtue of the negation of its immediacy or desire, does not distinguish itself from the other, is universal [self-consciousness] and objective, and has real universality as reciprocity in such a way that it knows itself recognized in the free other and knows this insofar as it recognizes the other and knows it to be free.
This universal reappearance of self-consciousness, the concept that knows itself in its objectivity as subjectivity identical with itself and therefore as universal, is the form of consciousness of the substance of every essential spirituality, of the family, the fatherland, the state, as well as of all virtues, love, friendship, bravery, honour, fame. But this appearing of the substantial can also be separated from the substantial and held fast for itself in honour empty of import, vain fame etc.
Addition. The result of the struggle for recognition brought about by the concept of spirit is universal self-consciousness, forming the third stage in this sphere, i.e. that free self-consciousness for which the other self-consciousness objective to it is no longer, as at the second stage, an unfree one but one that is likewise self-standing. On this standpoint, then, the self-conscious subjects related to each other have, through sublation of their unequal particular singularity, raised themselves to consciousness of their real universality, of the freedom belonging to all, and thereby to the intuition of their determinate identity with one another. The lord standing over against the bondsman was not yet truly free, for he did not yet intuit himself thoroughly in the other. Consequently only through the bondsman’s becoming free does the lord too become completely free. In the condition of this universal freedom, in being reflected into myself I am immediately reflected into the other, and conversely, in relating to the other, I relate immediately to myself. We therefore have here the mighty diremption of spirit into different selves which, in and for themselves and for one another, are completely free, self-standing, absolutely brittle, resistant – and yet at the same time identical with one another, thus not self-standing, not impenetrable, but, as it were, flowed together. This relationship is thoroughly speculative in kind; and if one thinks the speculative is something remote and ungraspable, one need only consider the content of that relationship to convince oneself of the groundlessness of that opinion. The speculative, or the rational and true, consists in the unity of the concept or the subjective and of objectivity. This unity is evidently present on the standpoint in question. It forms the substance of ethical life, notably of the family, of sexual love (there that unity has the form of particularity), of love of the fatherland, this willing of the universal purposes and interests of the state, of love of God, also of bravery when this is a staking of life for a universal cause, and finally also of honour, if this has as its content not the indifferent singularity of the individual but something substantial, truly universal.
§ 437
This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness contains at first the singular selves as shining into one another. But their difference is in this identity the wholly indeterminate diversity, or rather a difference that is none. Their truth is therefore the universality and objectivity of self-consciousness being in and for itself – reason.
Reason as the Idea (§ 213) appears here in the determination that the opposition of concept and reality in general, whose unity it is, has had here the more precise form of the concept existing for itself, of consciousness, and of the object externally present over against it.
Addition. What we called universal self-consciousness in the preceding paragraph is in its truth the concept of reason – the concept insofar as it exists not as merely logical Idea but as the Idea developed into self-consciousness. For, as we know from logic, the Idea consists in the unity of the subjective or the concept and of objectivity. But universal self-consciousness has shown itself to us as such a unity, since we have seen that, in its absolute difference from its other, it is nevertheless at the same time absolutely identical with it. This identity of subjectivity and objectivity makes up the universality now reached by self-consciousness, which overreaches those two sides or particularities and into which they dissolve. But in attaining this universality self-consciousness ceases to be self-consciousness in the proper or narrower sense of the word, because holding fast to the particularity of the self belongs precisely to self-consciousness as such. Through giving up this particularity self-consciousness becomes reason. The name “reason” has at this point only the sense of the still abstract or formal unity of self-consciousness with its object. This unity grounds what one must call, in determinate distinction from the true, the merely correct. My representation is correct through its mere agreement with the object, even if the object corresponds extremely little to its concept and thus has almost no truth at all. Only when the true content becomes objective to me does my intelligence receive, in a concrete sense, the meaning of reason. In this meaning reason will have to be considered at the close of the development of theoretical spirit (§ 467), where, coming from an opposition of subjective and objective developed further than so far, we shall cognize reason as the unity of this opposition full of content.
§ 438
The truth being in and for itself which reason is, is the simple identity of the subjectivity of the concept and its objectivity and universality. The universality of reason therefore has just as much the meaning of the object, which in consciousness as such was only given but is now itself universal, penetrating and comprehending the I, as of the pure I, the pure form overreaching the object and comprehending it within itself.
§ 439
Self-consciousness, thus the certainty that its determinations are just as much objective, determinations of the essence of things, as they are its own thoughts, is reason, which as this identity is not only absolute substance but truth as knowing. For here it has as its peculiar determinacy, as its immanent form, the pure concept existing for itself, the I, the certainty of itself as infinite universality. – This knowing truth is spirit.
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), §§ 413–439
- Consciousness as such: § 413 · § 414 · § 415 · § 416 · § 417 · § 418 · § 419 · § 420 · § 421 · § 422 · § 423
- Self-consciousness: § 424 · § 425 · § 426 · § 427 · § 428 · § 429 · § 430 · § 431 · § 432 · § 433 · § 434 · § 435 · § 436 · § 437
- Reason: § 438 · § 439
§ 413
Consciousness makes up the stage of reflection or of the relationship of spirit, of spirit as appearance. The I is the infinite relation of spirit to itself, but as subjective, as certainty of itself. Pure abstract freedom for itself releases determinacy from itself as equally free, as a self-standing object. But the I as this absolute negativity is identity in otherness; the I is itself and overreaches the object as something sublated in itself, is one side of the relationship and the whole relationship; – the light that manifests itself and something else as well.
§ 414
The identity of spirit with itself, as it is first posited as I, is only its abstract, formal ideality. As soul in the form of substantial universality, spirit is, as subjective reflection-into-itself, related to this as to its negative, as to something beyond it and dark. Consciousness is therefore, like relationship in general, the contradiction of the self-standingness of the sides and of their identity, in which they are sublated. Spirit as I is essence, but since reality in the sphere of essence is relationship, spirit as consciousness is only the appearing of spirit.
§ 415
Since the I is for itself only as formal identity, the dialectical movement of consciousness is not for it its own activity; rather it is in itself, i.e. for consciousness, an alteration of the object. Consciousness therefore appears different according to the difference of the given object, and its further development as an alteration of the determinations of its object. The Kantian philosophy can most determinately be regarded as having grasped spirit as consciousness and as containing entirely only determinations of the phenomenology, not of the philosophy, of spirit. It regards the I as relation to something lying beyond, in its abstract determination the thing-in-itself, and so both intelligence and will; and although in the concept of reflective judgement it does come to speak of the Idea of spirit, subject-objectivity, an intuitive understanding etc., as well as of the Idea of nature, this Idea itself is again reduced to an appearance, namely a subjective maxim (see § 58, Introd.). It is therefore to be regarded as a correct sense of this philosophy that it was grasped by Reinhold as a theory of consciousness, under the name of the faculty of representation. The Fichtean philosophy has the same standpoint, and the not-I is determined only as object of the I, only in consciousness; it remains as an infinite impulse, i.e. as thing-in-itself. Both philosophies therefore show that they have not arrived at the concept or at spirit as it is in and for itself, but only as it is in relation to an other. With regard to Spinozism, by contrast, it is to be remarked that spirit, in the judgement by which it constitutes itself as I, as free subjectivity against determinacy, steps out of substance, and philosophy, since this judgement is for it the absolute determination of spirit, steps out of Spinozism.
§ 416
The goal of spirit as consciousness is to make this its appearance identical with its essence, to raise the certainty of itself to truth. The concrete existence that spirit has in consciousness has its finitude in being the formal one; because the object is determined only abstractly as its own, or spirit is reflected in it only into itself as abstract I, this concrete existence still has a content that is not as its own.
§ 417
The stages of this raising of certainty to truth are that spirit is a) consciousness in general, which has an object as such, b) self-consciousness, for which the I is the object, c) unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, such that spirit intuits the content of the object as itself and itself as determined in and for itself; – reason, the concept of spirit.
a. Consciousness as such.
§ 418
Consciousness is 1) at first immediate, its relation to the object therefore the simple unmediated certainty of it; the object itself is therefore likewise determined as immediate, as existing and reflected into itself, further as immediately singular; – sensuous consciousness. Consciousness as relationship contains only the categories belonging to the abstract I or formal thinking, which are for it determinations of the object. It therefore knows of the object only as something existing, a something, an existing thing, a singular. Sensuous consciousness, appearing as the richest in content, is the poorest in thoughts. That rich filling is made up of the determinations of sensation. Spatial and temporal singularity, here and now, as I determined the object of sensuous consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 25 ff., properly belongs to intuiting. The object is here at first to be taken only according to the relationship it has to consciousness, namely as something external to it, not yet as something external for itself or as itself a being-outside-itself.
§ 419
The sensuous as something becomes an other; the reflection of the something into itself, the thing, has many properties, and the singular in its immediacy manifold predicates. The many singulars of sensuousness therefore become something broad – a manifoldness of relations, determinations of reflection and universalities. – These are logical determinations, posited by the thinking, i.e. here by the I. But for it, as appearing, the object has changed in this way. Sensuous consciousness has in this determination become perceiving.
§ 420
2) Consciousness that has gone beyond sensuousness wants to take the object in its truth, not as merely immediate but as mediated within itself and reflected into itself. The object is thus a combination of sensuous determinations and determinations of thought, and consciousness in its sensuous conduct is here at the same time active reflection-into-itself. With this its identity with the object is no longer the abstract identity of certainty but a determinate one, a knowing. The next stage of consciousness, on which the Kantian philosophy grasps spirit, is perceiving, which is in general the standpoint of our ordinary consciousness and more or less of the sciences. One starts from sensuous certainties of single apperceptions or observations, which are supposed to be raised to truth by being considered in their relation, by being reflected on, in general by becoming at the same time, according to determinations of the understanding, something universal, experiences.
§ 421
This linking of the singular and the universal is a mixture, because the singular remains being that lies at the ground and fixed against the universal, to which it is at the same time related. It is therefore the many-sided contradiction – in general of the singular things of sensuous apperception, which are supposed to make up the ground of universal experience, and of universality, which is rather supposed to be the essence and the ground – and then of the singularity of the things themselves, which makes up their self-standingness, and of the manifold properties, which, free of this negative bond and of one another, are rather self-standing universal matters, etc. (see § 123 ff., appearance).
§ 422
The next truth of perceiving is that the object is rather appearance and its reflection-into-itself an inner being for itself over against it. The consciousness of this object is 3) the understanding. – That inner is on the one hand the sublated manifoldness of the sensuous and in this way abstract identity, but on the other hand it therefore also contains manifoldness, but as inner simple difference, which remains identical with itself in the change of appearance. This simple difference is the realm of the laws of appearance, its calm universal image.
§ 423
Law, at first the relationship of universal, abiding determinations, has its necessity in itself insofar as its difference is the inner one; the one of the determinations, as not externally distinguished from the other, lies immediately itself in the other. But in this way the inner difference is what it is in truth, difference in itself, or the difference that is none. – In this determination consciousness in its first form, which contains the self-standingness of subject and object against each other, has disappeared in itself; the I as judging has an object that is not distinguished from it – itself; – self-consciousness.
b. Self-consciousness.
§ 424
The truth of consciousness is self-consciousness, and this is the ground of the former, so that in concrete existence all consciousness of another object is at the same time self-consciousness. The expression of this is I = I; – abstract freedom, pure ideality. – So it is without reality, for it itself, which is object of itself, is not such an object, since no difference between it and itself is present.
§ 425
Since abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness, it is also burdened with an external object; it is therefore at the same time the preceding stage, consciousness, and is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and of itself as consciousness. But since the latter, and negation in general, is already sublated in itself, self-consciousness, as this certainty of itself against this negation, is the drive to posit what it is in itself – more precisely, to give content and objectivity to the abstract knowing of itself and conversely to free itself from its sensuousness, to sublate objectivity as given and posit it as identical with itself, or to make its consciousness equal to its self-consciousness. – Both are one and the same.
§ 426
1) Self-consciousness in its immediacy is a singular and desire – the contradiction of its abstraction, which is supposed to be objective, or of its immediacy, which is supposed to be subjective and which at the same time has the shape of an external object, according to which self-consciousness is consciousness. For its simple identity with itself the negation which is in it as abstraction is determined as something null, as is the object for the certainty of itself that has emerged from the sublation of consciousness.
§ 427
Self-consciousness is therefore to itself in itself in the object, which in this way is in accordance with the drive; in negativity, as the I’s own activity, this identity comes to be for the I. The object can offer no resistance to this activity, being in itself and for it the selfless; the dialectic that is its nature, to sublate itself, exists here as that activity of the I. The given object is herein just as much posited subjectively as subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness and thus becomes objective to itself.
§ 428
The product of this process is that the I joins itself together with itself and is thereby something actual for itself. On the external side it remains at first in this return determined only as a singular, and has only preserved itself, because it relates only negatively to the selfless object, which to that extent is only consumed. Desire is thus in its satisfaction in general destructive, and selfish.
§ 429
But self-consciousness already has in itself the certainty of itself in its abstraction (one-sided subjectivity) and in the immediate object. The self-feeling that comes to it in satisfaction is therefore, on the inner side, not only the abstract self-feeling of its being-for-itself or only of its singularity; rather, as the negation of the immediacy of its being-for-itself, the product is universal (at first, more precisely, particular) self-consciousness. The judgement or diremption of it is the consciousness of a free object, in which the I has the knowing of itself as I.
§ 430
2) There is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness, at first immediately, as an other for an other. In it as I, I immediately intuit myself, but also in it an immediately existing object, other and, as I, absolutely self-standing against me. This contradiction gives the drive to show oneself as a free self and to be there as such for the other – the process of recognition.
§ 431
It is a struggle; for I cannot know myself in the other as myself insofar as the other is an immediate other existence for me; I am therefore directed to the sublation of this its immediacy. Equally I cannot be recognized as something immediate, but only insofar as I sublate immediacy in myself and thereby give existence to my freedom. – But this immediacy is at the same time the corporeality of self-consciousness, in which, as in its sign and instrument, it has its own self-feeling and its being for others, and its relation mediating it with them.
§ 432
The struggle for recognition is thus a struggle of life and death; each of the two self-consciousnesses brings the life of the other into danger and exposes itself to it – but only as to danger, for each is equally directed to the preservation of its life, as the existence of its freedom. The death of the one, which resolves the contradiction on one side through the abstract, therefore crude, negation of immediacy, is, on the essential side, the existence of recognition – thus the greater – contradiction.
§ 433
Since life is as essential as freedom, the struggle ends at first as one-sided negation, with the inequality that one of the combatants prefers life, preserves itself as singular self-consciousness but gives up its being recognized, while the other holds to its relation to itself and is recognized by the first as the subjugated one: – the relationship of lordship and bondage. The struggle for recognition and subjugation under a lord is the appearance in which the living together of human beings, as a beginning of states, has emerged. Force, which is the ground in this appearance, is not on that account the ground of right, although it is the necessary and justified moment in the transition from the condition of self-consciousness sunk in desire and singularity to the condition of universal self-consciousness. – It is the external or appearing beginning of states, not their substantial principle.
§ 434
This relationship is, first, according to its identity, a community of the need of desire and of the care for its satisfaction; in place of the crude destruction of the immediate object there steps the acquisition, preservation and forming of it as the mediating term in which the two extremes of self-standingness and non-self-standingness join together.
§ 435
Secondly, according to the difference, the lord has in the bondsman and his service the intuition of the objectivity of his singular being-for-itself; this is his validity for him by means of the sublation of immediate being-for-itself, which, however, falls into another. – But this other, the bondsman, works off his singular will or self-will in the service of the lord, sublates his inner immediacy, and through this divestment and the fear of the lord makes the beginning of wisdom – the transition to universal self-consciousness.
§ 436
3) Universal self-consciousness is the positive knowing of itself in the other self, each of which, as free singularity, has absolute self-standingness, but, by virtue of the negation of its immediacy or desire, does not distinguish itself from the other, is universal and objective, and has real universality in such a way that it knows itself recognized in the free other and knows this insofar as it recognizes the other and knows it to be free. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness, the concept that knows itself in its objectivity as subjectivity identical with itself and therefore as universal, is the form of consciousness of the substance of every essential spirituality, of the family, the fatherland, the state; as well as of all virtues – love, friendship, bravery, honour, fame.
§ 437
This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness has at first the singular selves subsisting as being for themselves and shining into one another. But their difference is in this identity the wholly indeterminate diversity, or rather a difference that is none. Their truth is therefore the unmediated universality and objectivity of self-consciousness being in and for itself – reason. Reason as the Idea appears here in the determination that the opposition of concept and reality in general, whose unity it is, has had here the more precise form of consciousness and of the object externally present over against it.
c. Reason.
§ 438
The truth being in and for itself which reason is, is the simple identity of the subjectivity of the concept and its objectivity and universality. The universality of reason therefore has just as much the meaning of the object, which in consciousness as such was only given but is itself a universal object, as of the pure I in self-consciousness. This is thus posited as determined in and for itself, and therefore as the certainty that its determinations are just as much objective, determinations of the essence of things, as they are its own thoughts.
§ 439
Reason as this identity is not only absolute substance but also truth as knowing. For here it has as its peculiar determinacy the pure concept existing for itself, the I – the certainty of itself as infinite universality. – This knowing truth is spirit.
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), §§ 329–362
- Consciousness as such: § 329 · § 330 · § 331 · § 332 · § 333 · § 334 · § 335 · § 336 · § 337 · § 338 · § 339 · § 340 · § 341 · § 342 · § 343
- Self-consciousness: § 344 · § 345 · § 346 · § 347 · § 348 · § 349 · § 350 · § 351 · § 352 · § 353 · § 354 · § 355 · § 356 · § 357 · § 358 · § 359 · § 360
- Reason: § 361 · § 362
§ 329
Consciousness makes up the stage of reflection or of the relationship of spirit, of spirit as appearance. The I is the infinite relation of spirit to itself, but as subjective, as certainty of itself. As this absolute negativity it is identity in its otherness; the I is itself and overreaches the object, is one side of the relationship and the whole relationship; – the light that manifests itself and something else as well.
§ 330
But the identity is only the formal one. Spirit, which as soul is in the form of substantial universality, of gravity being within itself, is, as subjective reflection into itself, related to something dark, and consciousness is, like relationship in general, the contradiction of the self-standingness of the sides and of their identity, in which they are sublated.
§ 331
The object, as released in its judgement from the infinite reflection of spirit into itself, has this infinite relation to itself as its essence, and is determined as something existing and given against the being-for-itself of the I.
§ 332
Since the I is not as the concept but as formal identity, the dialectical movement of consciousness is not for it its own activity; rather it is in itself, i.e. for consciousness, an alteration of the object. Consciousness therefore appears different according to the difference of the given object, and its further development as a further development of the object; but the consideration of the object’s necessary alteration, the concept, falls into us, because the concept is still inner as such. The Kantian philosophy can most determinately be regarded as having grasped spirit as consciousness and as containing entirely only determinations of the phenomenology, not of the philosophy, of spirit. It regards the I as relation to a thing-in-itself lying beyond, and so both intelligence and will; and although in the concept of reflective judgement it does come to speak of the Idea of spirit, subject-objectivity, an intuitive understanding etc., as well as of the Idea of nature, this Idea itself is again reduced to an appearance, namely a subjective maxim. It is therefore to be regarded as a correct sense of this philosophy that it was grasped by Reinhold as a theory of consciousness, under the name of the faculty of representation. The Fichtean philosophy has the same standpoint, and the not-I is determined only as object of the I, only in consciousness; it remains as an infinite impulse, i.e. as a thing-in-itself. Both philosophies therefore show that they have not arrived at the concept or at spirit as it is in and for itself, but only as it is in relation to an other.
§ 333
The goal of spirit as consciousness is to make this its appearance identical with its essence, to raise the certainty of itself to truth. The concrete existence that spirit has in consciousness is the formal or universal one as such; because the object is determined only abstractly as its own, or spirit is reflected in it only into itself as abstract I, this concrete existence still has a content that is not as its own.
§ 334
The stages of this raising of certainty to truth are that spirit is a) consciousness in general, which has an object as such, b) self-consciousness, for which the I is the object, c) unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, such that spirit intuits the content of the object as itself and itself as determined in and for itself; – reason, the concept of spirit.
a. Consciousness as such.
§ 335
Consciousness is 1) at first immediate, its relation to the object therefore the simple unmediated certainty of it; the object itself is determined as existing, but as reflected into itself, further as immediately singular; – sensuous consciousness. To sensuousness there belong, indeed, as content the determinations of feeling, external or internal, and as form the spatial and temporal. But both of these belong to spirit in its concrete form, to its feeling and intuition. Consciousness as relationship contains only the determination of the object that enters into relationship with the abstract I as such, the first or immediate therefore only as existing, and immediacy as determined in and for itself, something, an existing thing, a singular. What the object otherwise is in its concretion concerns spirit; the I as concrete is spirit. The determinations of feeling too are sensuous only through the form of immediacy; their content can be of a quite different nature. The I is in consciousness still abstract thinking and therefore has in its object at first those abstract determinations of thought. Spatial and temporal singularity is here and now, as I determined the object of sensuous consciousness in my Phenomenology of Spirit (Bamberg 1807), p. ff. It is taken more essentially only according to the identity of the relationship through which it has its determination; through this it is external only to consciousness, not external for itself or itself a being-outside-itself. This freedom the other can receive only through the freedom of spirit.
§ 336
The sensuous as something becomes an other; the reflection of the something into itself, the thing, has many properties, and the singular in its immediacy manifold predicates. The many singulars of sensuousness therefore become something broad – a manifoldness of relations, determinations of reflection and universalities. Since the object has changed in this way, sensuous consciousness has become perceiving.
§ 337
2) Consciousness that has gone beyond sensuousness wants to take the object in its truth, not as merely immediate but as mediated within itself and reflected into itself. The object is thus a combination of sensuous determinations and determinations of thought; just as consciousness in its sensuous conduct is here at the same time reflection-into-itself. With this its identity with the object is no longer the abstract identity of certainty but a determinate one, a knowing. The next stage of consciousness, on which the Kantian philosophy grasps spirit, is perceiving, which is in general the standpoint of our ordinary consciousness and more or less of the sciences. One starts from sensuous certainties of single apperceptions or observations, which are supposed to be raised to truth by being considered in their relation, by being reflected on, in general by becoming at the same time, according to determinations of the understanding, something universal, experiences.
§ 338
This linking of the singular and the universal is a mixture, because the singular is being that lies at the ground, while the universal by contrast is reflected into itself. It is therefore the many-sided contradiction – in general of the singular things of sensuous apperception, which are supposed to make up the ground of universal experience, and of universality, which is rather supposed to be the essence and the ground – and of the singularity of the things themselves, which makes up their self-standingness, and of the manifold properties, which, free of this negative bond and of one another, are rather self-standing universal matters.
§ 339
The truth of perceiving, which instead of the identity of the singular object and the universality of consciousness, or of the singularity of the object itself and its universality, is rather contradiction, is therefore that the object is rather appearance and its reflection-into-itself an inner being for itself over against it. The consciousness that receives this object, into which the object of perception has passed over, is the understanding.
§ 340
3) For the understanding the things of perception count as appearances; their inner, which it has as its object, is on the one hand their sublated manifoldness and in this way abstract identity, but on the other hand it therefore also contains manifoldness, but as inner simple difference, which remains identical with itself in the change of appearance. This simple difference is at first the realm of the laws of appearance, its calm universal image.
§ 341
Law, at first the relationship of universal, abiding determinations, has its necessity in itself insofar as its difference is the inner one; the one of the determinations, as not externally distinguished from the other, lies immediately itself in the other. But in this way the inner difference is what it is in truth, difference in itself, or the difference that is none.
§ 342
Consciousness, which as understanding has at first only the abstract inner and then the universal difference as law for its object, now has the concept as its object. But insofar as it is still consciousness and the object is something given to it, it intuits it as something living – an inwardness that is universality determined in and for itself, truth.
§ 343
But in the consciousness of life self-consciousness kindles; for as consciousness it has an object as something distinct from it; but precisely this in life, that the difference is no difference. The immediacy in which the living object of consciousness is, is precisely this moment reduced to appearance or to negation, which now, as inner difference or concept, is the negation of itself against consciousness.
b. Self-consciousness.
§ 344
The truth of consciousness is self-consciousness, and this is the ground of the former, so that all consciousness of another object is at the same time self-consciousness. The expression of this is I = I.
§ 345
But so it is still without reality, for it itself, which is object of itself, is not such an object, for it has no difference; but the I, the concept itself, is the absolute diremption of judgement; with this self-consciousness is for itself the drive to sublate its subjectivity and to realize itself.
§ 346
Since abstract self-consciousness is the immediate and the first negation of consciousness, it is in itself existing and sensuously concrete. Self-determination is therefore on the one hand negation as its moment posited by it within itself, on the other hand as an external object. Or the whole that is its object is the preceding stage, consciousness, and it itself is still this.
§ 347
The drive of self-consciousness is therefore in general to sublate its subjectivity; more precisely, to give content and objectivity to the abstract knowing of itself and conversely to free itself from its sensuousness, to sublate objectivity as given and posit it as identical with itself, or to make its consciousness equal to its self-consciousness. – Both are one and the same.
§ 348
1) Self-consciousness in its immediacy is a singular and desire, the contradiction of its abstraction, which is supposed to be objective, or of its immediacy, which is supposed to be subjective, against I = I, the concept, which is in itself the Idea, unity of itself and of reality. – Its immediacy, which is determined as what is to be sublated, has at the same time the shape of an external object, according to which self-consciousness is consciousness. But the object is determined as null in itself for the certainty of itself that has emerged from the sublation of consciousness; self-consciousness is therefore to itself in itself in the object, which in this way [is] in accordance with the drive, and in negativity, as the I’s own activity, this identity comes to be for the I.
§ 349
The object can offer no resistance to this activity, because it is in itself and for it the selfless; the dialectic that is its nature, to sublate itself, is here as that activity which the I thereby at the same time intuits as external. The given object herein becomes just as much subjective as subjectivity divests itself and becomes objective to itself.
§ 350
The product of this process is that the I joins itself together with itself in this reality; but in this return it gives itself at first only singular existence, because it relates only negatively to the selfless object,2 and that this is only consumed; desire is therefore in its satisfaction in general destructive, and selfish.
§ 351
But self-consciousness already has in itself the certainty of itself in the immediate object; the self-feeling that comes to it in satisfaction is therefore not the abstract self-feeling of its being-for-itself or only of its singularity, but something objective; satisfaction is the negation of its own immediacy, and its diremption therefore into the consciousness of a free object, in which the I has the knowing of itself as I.
§ 352
2) There is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness, at first immediately, as an other for an other. In the I, I immediately intuit myself, but also in it an immediately existing object, other and, as I, absolutely self-standing. This contradiction, that I am I only as negativity of immediate existence, gives the process of recognition.
§ 353
It is a struggle; for I cannot know myself in the other as myself insofar as the other is an immediate other existence for me. I am therefore directed to the sublation of this immediacy. But it is at the same time the existence of self-consciousness, in which, as in its sign and instrument, it has its own self-feeling and its being for others, and its universality mediating it with them. Equally I cannot be recognized as something immediate, but only insofar as I sublate immediacy in myself and thereby give existence to my freedom.
§ 354
The struggle for recognition is thus a struggle of life and death; each of the two self-consciousnesses brings the life of the other into danger and exposes itself to it – but only as to danger, for each is equally directed to the preservation of its life, as an essential moment. The death of the one, which resolves the contradiction on one side through the abstract, therefore crude, negation of immediacy, is, on the essential side, the existence of recognition, thus the greater contradiction.
§ 355
Since life is as essential as freedom, the struggle, since in this sphere the immediate singularity of the two self-consciousnesses is presupposed, ends at first with the inequality that one of the combatants prefers life and preserves itself as abstract or singular self-consciousness but gives up its being recognized, while the other holds to this universality and is recognized by the first as the subjugated one: – the relationship of lordship and bondage. The struggle for recognition and subjugation under a lord is the appearance in which the living together of human beings, as a beginning of states, has emerged. Force, which is the ground in this appearance, is not on that account the ground of right, although it is the necessary and justified moment in the transition from the condition of self-consciousness sunk in desire and singularity to the condition of universal self-consciousness.
§ 356
This relationship is, first, according to its identity, a community of the need of desire and of the care for its satisfaction, and in place of the crude destruction of the immediate object there steps the acquisition, preservation and forming of it as the mediating term in which the two extremes of self-standingness and non-self-standingness join together.
§ 357
Secondly, according to its difference, the lord has in the bondsman and his service the intuition of the objectivity of his singular being-for-itself, in the sublation of it, but insofar as it belongs to another. – But the bondsman works off his singular will or self-will in the service of the lord, sublates his inner immediacy, and through this divestment and the fear of the lord makes the beginning of wisdom – the transition to universal self-consciousness.
§ 358
3) Universal self-consciousness is the positive knowing of itself in the other self, each of which, as free singularity, has absolute self-standingness, but through the negation of its immediacy does not distinguish itself from the other, is universal and objective, and has real universality in such a way that it knows itself recognized in the free other and knows this insofar as it recognizes the other and knows it to be free. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness, the concept that knows itself in its objectivity as subjectivity identical with itself and therefore as universal, is the substance of every essential spirituality, of the family, the fatherland, the state; as well as of all virtues – love, friendship, bravery, honour, fame.
§ 359
This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness has at first the singular selves subsisting against one another as being for themselves. But their difference is in this identity the wholly indeterminate diversity, or rather a difference that is none. Their truth is therefore the unmediated universality and objectivity of self-consciousness being in and for itself – reason. C.
c. Reason.
§ 360
The truth being in and for itself which reason is, is the simple identity of the subjectivity of the concept and its objectivity and universality. The universality of reason therefore has just as much the meaning of the object given in consciousness as of the I in self-consciousness.
§ 361
Reason is therefore determined in and for itself as pure singularity of subjectivity, and is therefore the certainty that the determinations of self-consciousness are just as much objective, determinations of the essence of things, as they are its own thoughts.
§ 362
Reason as this identity is absolute substance, which is truth. The peculiar determinacy it has here, after the object presupposed against the I, as well as the I that is selfish against the object, has sublated its one-sidedness, is substantial truth, whose determinacy is the pure concept being for itself, the I – the certainty of itself as infinite universality. This knowing truth is spirit. C. SPIRIT.
