The Doctrine of the Concept (Enc. §§ 160–244)

Concept, judgement and syllogism, the object and the idea. From the Groundlines, the footnotes to §§ 7, 119 and 272 (§§ 163–165), § 24 (§§ 166–180), § 81 (§§ 166 ff.), § 88 (§ 173), § 302 (§§ 181 ff.), § 280 (§ 193), § 161 (§§ 216 ff.), § 141 (§§ 233–236) and §§ 2 and 31 (§§ 238–242) refer here.

The text follows the third edition of 1830 as given in the Werkausgabe, with the Additions from the lectures. The versions of 1827 and 1817 will be added later.

Contents

The Doctrine of the Concept
§ 160

→ Groundlines § 7

The concept is what is free, as the substantial power that is for itself, and is totality, since each of the moments is the whole that it is and is posited as unseparated unity with it; thus in its identity with itself it is what is determined in and for itself.

Addition. The standpoint of the concept is in general that of absolute idealism, and philosophy is comprehending cognition insofar as in it everything that counts for other consciousness as something that is and as independent in its immediacy is known merely as an ideal moment. In the logic of the understanding the concept is usually regarded as a mere form of thinking and more precisely as a universal representation, and it is this subordinate conception of the concept to which the assertion, so often repeated from the side of feeling and the heart, refers, that concepts as such are something dead, empty and abstract. In fact, however, it is precisely the other way round, and the concept is rather the principle of all life and thereby at the same time what is utterly concrete. That this is so has resulted as the result of the whole logical movement so far and therefore need not first be proved here. As regards in particular the opposition of form and content asserted with respect to the concept as supposedly merely formal, it lies, together with all the other oppositions held fast by reflection, already behind us as dialectical, that is, as overcome through itself, and it is precisely the concept which contains all the earlier determinations of thinking within itself as sublated. The concept is indeed to be regarded as form, but as infinite, creative form, which encloses the fullness of all content within itself and at the same time releases it from itself. Likewise the concept may well be called abstract if by the concrete one understands only the sensuously concrete, in general what is immediately perceptible; the concept as such cannot be grasped with the hands, and in general, when the concept is at issue, hearing and seeing must have left us. Nevertheless the concept, as was noted before, is at the same time what is utterly concrete, and indeed insofar as it contains being and essence, and thus the whole wealth of these two spheres, within itself in ideal unity. – If, as was noted earlier, the various stages of the logical idea can be regarded as a series of definitions of the absolute, the definition of the absolute that results for us here is that it is the concept. In this connection one must of course grasp the concept in a different and higher sense than happens in the logic of the understanding, according to which the concept is regarded merely as a form of our subjective thinking, empty of content in itself. Here the question could first only be raised why, if in speculative logic the concept has such a quite different meaning from what one otherwise usually connects with this expression, this quite different thing is nevertheless called concept here, thereby giving occasion to misunderstanding and confusion. To such a question one would have to reply that, however great the distance between the concept of formal logic and the speculative concept may be, on closer consideration it nevertheless turns out that the deeper meaning of the concept is by no means so alien to general linguistic usage as at first seems to be the case. One speaks of the derivation of a content, for example of the legal determinations concerning property from the concept of property, and likewise conversely of the reduction of such a content to the concept. But this recognizes that the concept is not merely a form empty of content in itself, since on the one hand nothing could be derived from such a form, and on the other hand, by reducing a given content to the empty form of the concept, the content would only be robbed of its determinacy but not known.

§ 161

→ Groundlines § 7 · Groundlines § 33

The advance of the concept is no longer passing over nor shining into other, but development, since what is distinguished is immediately posited at the same time as identical with one another and with the whole, and determinacy is as a free being of the whole concept.

Addition. Passing over into other is the dialectical process in the sphere of being, and shining into other in the sphere of essence. The movement of the concept, by contrast, is development, through which only that is posited which is already present in itself. In nature it is organic life that corresponds to the stage of the concept. Thus, for example, the plant develops from its seed. The seed already contains the whole plant within itself, but in an ideal way, and its development is therefore not to be conceived as though the various parts of the plant, root, stem, leaves and so on, were already present in the seed realiter, but only very small. This is the so-called hypothesis of encasement, whose defect thus consists in regarding what is present only in an ideal way as already existing. The correct point in this hypothesis, on the other hand, is that the concept remains with itself in its process and that through it nothing new is posited as regards content, but only a change of form is brought about. This nature of the concept, to prove itself in its process as development of itself, is also what one has in view when one speaks of ideas innate in human beings or, as Plato did, regards all learning merely as recollection, which, however, must likewise not be understood as though what constitutes the content of consciousness educated through instruction had already been present beforehand in that same consciousness in its determinate unfolding. – The movement of the concept is to be regarded, as it were, only as a play; the other that is posited through it is in fact not an other. In Christian religious doctrine this is expressed by saying that God has not only created a world that stands over against him as an other, but has also from eternity begotten a son in whom he, as spirit, is with himself.

§ 162

The doctrine of the concept divides into the doctrine 1. of the subjective or formal concept, 2. of the concept as determined to immediacy, or of objectivity, 3. of the idea, the subject-object, the unity of the concept and objectivity, absolute truth.

Ordinary logic comprises only the materials that occur here as a part of the third part of the whole, besides the so-called laws of thought that occurred above, and, in applied logic, some things concerning cognition, with which psychological, metaphysical and other empirical material is further combined, because those forms of thinking finally no longer sufficed for themselves; but thereby this science has lost its firm direction. – Those forms, which at least belong to the proper domain of logic, are, moreover, taken only as determinations of conscious thinking, and indeed of thinking that is merely understanding, not rational. The preceding logical determinations, the determinations of being and essence, are indeed not mere determinations of thought; in their passing over, the dialectical moment, and in their return into themselves and totality, they prove to be concepts. But they are (cf. §§ 84 and 112) only determinate concepts, concepts in themselves or, what is the same, for us, since the other into which each determination passes over or in which it shines and thereby is as something relative is not determined as particular, nor its third as singular or subject, and the identity of the determination in its opposite, its freedom, is not posited, because it is not universality. – What is usually understood by concepts are determinations of the understanding, or merely universal representations: hence in general finite determinations; cf. § 62. The logic of the concept is usually understood as merely formal science in such a way that what matters to it is the form as such of concept, judgement and syllogism, but not at all whether something is true; rather this is supposed to depend solely on the content. If the logical forms of the concept really were dead, ineffective and indifferent containers of representations or thoughts, knowledge of them would be a history very superfluous and dispensable for truth. In fact, however, they are conversely, as forms of the concept, the living spirit of the actual, and of the actual only that is true which is true by virtue of these forms, through them and in them. But the truth of these forms for themselves has never been considered and investigated so far, any more than their necessary connection.

The Doctrine of the Concept → A. The Subjective Concept → a. The Concept as Such
§ 163

→ Groundlines § 7 · Groundlines § 119 · Groundlines § 272

The concept as such contains the moments of universality, as free equality with itself in its determinacy – of particularity, the determinacy in which the universal remains untroubled and equal to itself – and of singularity, as the reflection-into-itself of the determinacies of universality and particularity, which negative unity with itself is what is determined in and for itself and at the same time identical with itself or universal.

The singular is the same as the actual, only that it has proceeded from the concept and is thus posited as universal, as negative identity with itself. The actual, because it is at first only in itself or immediately the unity of essence and concrete existence, can act; but the singularity of the concept is utterly what acts, and indeed no longer, like the cause, with the semblance of producing an other, but what produces itself. – Singularity, however, is not to be taken in the sense of merely immediate singularity, according to which we speak of single things, human beings; this determinacy of singularity occurs only with judgement. Each moment of the concept is itself the whole concept (§ 160), but singularity, the subject, is the concept posited as totality.

Addition 1. When the concept is spoken of, it is usually only abstract universality that one has in view, and the concept is then also often defined [as] a universal representation. Accordingly one speaks of the concept of colour, of the plant, of the animal and so on, and these concepts are supposed to arise by leaving out the particular by which the various colours, plants, animals and so on are distinguished from one another, and holding fast what is common to them. This is the way the understanding grasps the concept, and feeling is right when it declares such concepts hollow and empty, mere schemata and shadows. But the universal of the concept is not merely something common, over against which the particular has its subsistence for itself, but rather what particularizes (specifies) itself and remains with itself in untroubled clarity in its other. It is of the greatest importance both for cognition and for our practical conduct that the merely common not be confused with the truly universal, the universal proper. All the reproaches usually raised against thinking in general, and more precisely philosophical thinking, from the standpoint of feeling, and the so often repeated assertion of the dangerousness of thinking allegedly pushed too far, have their ground in that confusion. The universal in its true and comprehensive meaning is, incidentally, a thought of which it must be said that it took millennia before it entered human consciousness, and which reached its full recognition only through Christianity. The Greeks, otherwise so highly educated, knew neither God nor the human being in their true universality. The gods of the Greeks were only the particular powers of spirit, and the universal God, the God of the nations, was for the Athenians still the hidden God. So for the Greeks there was an absolute gulf between themselves and the barbarians, and the human being as such was not yet recognized in his infinite worth and his infinite entitlement. The question has been raised what the reason is that slavery has disappeared in modern Europe, and now this, now that particular circumstance has been cited to explain this phenomenon. The true reason why there are no longer any slaves in Christian Europe is to be sought in nothing other than the principle of Christianity itself. The Christian religion is the religion of absolute freedom, and only for the Christian does the human being as such count, in his infinity and universality. What the slave lacks is the recognition of his personality; but the principle of personality is universality. The master regards the slave not as a person but as a selfless thing, and the slave does not count as an I himself; rather the master is his I. – The distinction mentioned before between the merely common and the truly universal is aptly expressed in Rousseau’s well-known Contrat social by saying that the laws of a state must proceed from the universal will (the volonté générale) but need not for that reason be the will of all (volonté de tous). Rousseau would have achieved something more thorough with regard to the theory of the state if he had always kept this distinction in view. The universal will is the concept of the will, and the laws are the particular determinations of the will grounded in this concept.

Addition 2. With regard to the discussion, usual in the logic of the understanding, of the origin and formation of concepts, it must further be noted that we do not form concepts at all, and that the concept is not to be regarded at all as something that has arisen. The concept is indeed not merely being or the immediate; mediation also belongs to it; but this lies in it itself, and the concept is what is mediated through itself and with itself. It is perverse to assume that first there are the objects which form the content of our representations, and then afterwards our subjective activity comes along and forms their concepts through the operation mentioned before of abstracting and combining what is common to the objects. The concept is rather what is truly first, and things are what they are through the activity of the concept dwelling in them and revealing itself in them. In our religious consciousness this occurs in our saying that God created the world out of nothing or, expressed otherwise, that the world and finite things have proceeded from the fullness of the divine thoughts and the divine decrees. This recognizes that thought, and more precisely the concept, is infinite form, or free, creative activity, which does not need a material present outside it in order to realize itself.

§ 164

→ Groundlines § 7 · Groundlines § 119 · Groundlines § 272

The concept is what is utterly concrete, because the negative unity with itself, as being-determined-in-and-for-itself, which is singularity, itself constitutes its relation to itself, universality. The moments of the concept cannot to that extent be separated; the determinations of reflection are supposed to be grasped and to count each for itself, separated from the opposite one; but since in the concept their identity is posited, each of its moments can be grasped immediately only from and with the others.

Universality, particularity and singularity, taken abstractly, are the same as identity, distinction and ground. But the universal is what is identical with itself expressly in the meaning that the particular and singular are at the same time contained in it. Further, the particular is the distinct or determinacy, but in the meaning that it is universal within itself and as singular. Likewise the singular has the meaning of being subject, foundation, which contains genus and species within itself and is itself substantial. This is the posited unseparatedness of the moments in their distinction (§ 160) – the clarity of the concept, in which every distinction makes no interruption, no clouding, but is equally transparent. Nothing is heard more commonly than that the concept is something abstract. This is correct partly insofar as its element is thinking in general and not the empirically concrete sensuous, partly insofar as it is not yet the idea. To that extent the subjective concept is still formal, but not at all as though it were ever to have or receive any other content than itself. – As absolute form itself it is all determinacy, but as determinacy is in its truth. Although it is therefore abstract, it is the concrete, and indeed the utterly concrete, the subject as such. The absolutely concrete is spirit (see Remark § 159) – the concept insofar as it exists as concept, distinguishing itself from its objectivity, which, however, despite the distinguishing, remains its own. Everything else concrete, however rich it may be, is not so intimately identical with itself and therefore not so concrete in itself, least of all what is commonly understood by the concrete, a manifold held together externally. – What are also called concepts, and indeed determinate concepts, for example human being, house, animal and so on, are simple determinations and abstract representations – abstractions which take from the concept only the moment of universality and leave out particularity and singularity, are thus not developed in themselves and thereby precisely abstract from the concept.

§ 165

→ Groundlines § 7 · Groundlines § 119 · Groundlines § 272

The moment of singularity first posits the moments of the concept as distinctions, since it is the concept’s negative reflection-into-itself, and therefore at first its free distinguishing as the first negation, whereby the determinacy of the concept is posited, but as particularity, that is, in such a way that the distinct terms, first, have only the determinacy of the moments of the concept with respect to one another, and second, their identity, that the one is the other, is likewise posited; this posited particularity of the concept is judgement.

The usual kinds of clear, distinct and adequate concepts belong not to the concept but to psychology, insofar as by clear and distinct concept representations are meant, by the former an abstract, simply determined one, by the latter one in which, however, a mark, that is, some determinacy, is singled out as a sign for subjective cognition. Nothing is so much itself the mark of the externality and decline of logic as the favourite category of the mark. The adequate concept alludes more to the concept, indeed even to the idea, but still expresses nothing but the formal side of the agreement of a concept, or also of a representation, with its object, an external thing. – The so-called subordinate and coordinate concepts are based on the conceptless distinction of universal and particular and their relationship in an external reflection. Further, however, an enumeration of kinds of contrary and contradictory, affirmative, negative concepts and so on is nothing but a gathering up at random of determinacies of thought which for themselves belong to the sphere of being or essence, where they have already been considered, and which have nothing to do with the determinacy of the concept itself as such. – The true distinctions of the concept, the universal, particular and singular, nevertheless also constitute kinds of it only insofar as they are held apart by an external reflection. – The immanent distinguishing and determining of the concept is present in judgement, for judging is the determining of the concept.

The Doctrine of the Concept → A. The Subjective Concept → b. Judgement
§ 166

→ Groundlines § 24 · Groundlines § 81

Judgement is the concept in its particularity, as distinguishing relation of its moments, which are posited as being for themselves and at the same time as identical with themselves, not with one another.

Usually, in judgement, one first thinks of the independence of the extremes, subject and predicate: that the former is a thing or a determination for itself, and likewise the predicate a universal determination outside that subject, say in my head – which is then brought together by me with the former, and thereby a judgement is made. But since the copula “is” states the predicate of the subject, that external, subjective subsuming is sublated again and judgement is taken as a determination of the object itself. – The etymological meaning of Urteil [judgement] in our language is deeper and expresses the unity of the concept as the first and its distinguishing as the original division [ur-teilen], which is what judgement in truth is. The abstract judgement is the proposition: “the singular is the universal“. These are the determinations which subject and predicate first have with respect to each other, since the moments of the concept are taken in their immediate determinacy or first abstraction. (The propositions: “the particular is the universal“, and: “the singular is the particular“, belong to the further determination of judgement.) It is to be regarded as an astonishing lack of observation not to find stated in the logics the fact that in every judgement such a proposition is expressed: “the singular is the universal“, or still more determinately: “the subject is the predicate” (for example “God is absolute spirit”). Of course the determinations singularity and universality, subject and predicate, are also distinct, but the wholly universal fact nonetheless remains that every judgement states them as identical. The copula “is” comes from the nature of the concept, to be identical with itself in its externalization; the singular and the universal are, as its moments, such determinacies as cannot be isolated. The earlier determinacies of reflection also have relation to each other in their relationships, but their connection is only having, not being, not identity posited as such or universality. Judgement is therefore the first true particularity of the concept, for it is its determinacy or distinguishing, which, however, remains universality.

Addition. Judgement is usually regarded as a combination of concepts, and indeed of concepts of different kinds. The correct point in this conception is that the concept does indeed form the presupposition of judgement and appears in judgement in the form of distinction; on the other hand it is false to speak of concepts of different kinds, for the concept as such, although concrete, is nevertheless essentially one, and the moments contained in it are not to be regarded as different kinds; and it is equally false to speak of a combination of the sides of judgement, since, when a combination is spoken of, the things combined are thought of as present for themselves even without the combination. This external conception shows itself still more determinately when it is said of judgement that it comes about by a predicate being attributed to a subject. The subject counts here as subsisting for itself out there and the predicate as located in our head. But the copula “is” already contradicts this representation. When we say: “this rose is red”, or: “this painting is beautiful”, it is thereby expressed that it is not we who first externally make the rose red or the painting beautiful, but that these are the very determinations of these objects. A further defect of the conception of judgement usual in formal logic then consists in this, that according to it judgement in general appears merely as something contingent, and that the advance from concept to judgement is not shown. But the concept as such is not, as the understanding thinks, persisting processless within itself, but rather, as infinite form, utterly active, as it were the punctum saliens of all life, and thus distinguishing itself from itself. This division of the concept into the distinction of its moments, posited through the concept’s own activity, is judgement, whose meaning is accordingly to be grasped as the particularization of the concept. The concept is indeed already in itself the particular, but in the concept as such the particular is not yet posited but still in transparent unity with the universal. Thus, for example, as was noted earlier (§ 160 Addition), the seed of a plant already contains the particular of the root, the branches, the leaves and so on, but this particular is present only in itself and is posited only when the seed opens up, which is to be regarded as the judgement of the plant. This example can also serve to point out that neither the concept nor judgement is located merely in our head and formed merely by us. The concept is what dwells in things themselves, by which they are what they are, and to comprehend an object therefore means to become conscious of its concept; if we then proceed to judging the object, it is not our subjective doing by which this or that predicate is attributed to the object; rather we consider the object in the determinacy posited by its concept.

§ 167

Judgement is usually taken in a subjective sense, as an operation and form occurring merely in self-conscious thinking. But this distinction is not yet present in the logical sphere; judgement is to be taken quite universally: all things are a judgement – that is, they are singular things which are a universality or inner nature within themselves, or a universal that is singularized; universality and singularity are distinguished in them, but are at the same time identical.

That merely subjective supposed sense of judgement, as though I attributed a predicate to a subject, is contradicted by the rather objective expression of judgement: “the rose is red”, “gold is metal” and so on; it is not I who first attribute something to them. – Judgements are distinguished from propositions; the latter contain a determination of the subjects that does not stand in the relationship of universality to them – a state, a single action and the like; “Caesar was born in Rome in such and such a year, waged war in Gaul for 10 years, crossed the Rubicon” and so on are propositions, not judgements. It is further something quite empty to say that such propositions, for example “I slept well last night” or also “Present arms!”, can be brought into the form of a judgement. Only then would a proposition [such as] “a carriage is driving past” be a judgement, and indeed a subjective one, if it could be doubtful whether what is moving past is a carriage, or whether the object is moving and not rather the standpoint from which we observe it; where, therefore, the interest is directed towards finding the determination for [a] representation not yet properly determined.

§ 168

The standpoint of judgement is finitude, and the finitude of things consists, at this standpoint, in their being a judgement, in their existence and their universal nature (their body and their soul) being indeed united, otherwise things would be nothing, but in these their moments being both already different and in general separable.

§ 169

In the abstract judgement “the singular is the universal” the subject, as what relates itself negatively to itself, is what is immediately concrete, the predicate, by contrast, the abstract, the undetermined, the universal. But since they are connected by “is“, the predicate too must contain in its universality the determinacy of the subject; thus this universality is particularity, and this is the posited identity of subject and predicate; as what is thereby indifferent to this distinction of form, it is the content.

The subject first has its express determinacy and content in the predicate; for itself it is therefore a mere representation or an empty name. In the judgements “God is the most real” and so on, or “the absolute is identical with itself” and so on, God, the absolute, is a mere name; what the subject is is first said in the predicate. What it might otherwise be as something concrete does not concern this judgement (cf. § 31).

Addition. If one says: “the subject is that of which something is stated, and the predicate is what is stated”, this is something very trivial, and one learns nothing more precise about the distinction between the two. The subject, according to its thought, is first the singular and the predicate the universal. In the further development of judgement it then happens that the subject does not remain merely the immediately singular and the predicate not merely the abstractly universal; subject and predicate soon also receive the meaning, the former of the particular and the universal, and the latter of the particular and the singular. It is this change in the meaning of the two sides of judgement that takes place under the two names subject and predicate.

§ 170

As regards the more precise determinacy of subject and predicate, the former, as negative relation to itself (§ 163, § 166 Remark), is the fixed thing lying at the basis, in which the predicate has its subsistence and is ideal (it inheres in the subject); and since the subject is in general and immediately concrete, the determinate content of the predicate is only one of the many determinacies of the subject, and the subject is richer and wider than the predicate.

Conversely, the predicate, as the universal, subsists for itself and is indifferent as to whether this subject is or not; it goes beyond the subject, subsumes it under itself and is for its part wider than the subject. The determinate content of the predicate (preceding §) alone constitutes the identity of the two.

§ 171

Subject, predicate and the determinate content or identity are at first posited in judgement, in their very relation, as different, falling apart. In themselves, however, that is, according to the concept, they are identical, since the concrete totality of the subject is this: to be not some undetermined manifold, but solely singularity, the particular and universal in one identity, and precisely this unity is the predicate (§ 170). – In the copula, further, the identity of subject and predicate is indeed posited, but at first only as an abstract is. According to this identity the subject is also to be posited in the determination of the predicate, whereby the latter too receives the determination of the former and the copula fulfils itself. This is the further determination of judgement, through the copula filled with content, into the syllogism. Within judgement itself, its further determination is first the determining of the at first abstract, sensuous universality into allness, genus and species and into developed universality of the concept.

Knowledge of the further determination of judgement first gives both a connection and a sense to what is usually presented as kinds of judgement. Besides looking wholly contingent, the usual enumeration is something superficial and even desolate and wild in stating the distinctions; how positive, categorical, assertoric judgement are distinguished is partly plucked out of the air altogether, partly remains undetermined. The various judgements are to be regarded as following necessarily from one another and as a further determining of the concept, for judgement itself is nothing but the determinate concept. In relation to the two preceding spheres of being and essence, the determinate concepts, as judgements, are reproductions of these spheres, but posited in the simple relation of the concept.

Addition. The various kinds of judgement are to be grasped not merely as an empirical manifold but as a totality determined by thinking, and it belongs to Kant’s great merits to have first asserted this demand. Now although the division of judgements set up by Kant, according to the schema of his table of categories, into judgements of quality, quantity, relation and modality cannot be recognized as sufficient, partly because of the merely formal application of the schema of these categories, partly also because of its content, it is nevertheless based on the true intuition that it is the universal forms of the logical idea itself by which the various kinds of judgement are determined. Accordingly we first obtain three main kinds of judgement, which correspond to the stages of being, essence and concept. The second of these main kinds is then, in keeping with the character of essence as the stage of difference, again doubled within itself. The inner ground of this systematic arrangement of judgement is to be sought in this: that since the concept is the ideal unity of being and essence, its unfolding, which comes about in judgement, also has first to reproduce these two stages in a transformation according to the concept, while the concept itself then proves to be what determines itself as the true judgement. – The various kinds of judgement are to be regarded not as standing side by side with equal value but rather as forming a sequence of stages, and their distinction rests on the logical meaning of the predicate. This is then also already found in ordinary consciousness insofar as one will without hesitation ascribe only a very slight power of judgement to someone who usually makes only such judgements as, for example, “this wall is green”, “this stove is hot” and so on, and will only say of someone that he truly knows how to judge when his judgements concern whether a certain work of art is beautiful, whether an action is good and the like. In judgements of the kind first mentioned the content forms only an abstract quality, about whose presence immediate perception suffices to decide, whereas when it is said of a work of art that it is beautiful, or of an action that it is good, the objects named are compared with what they ought to be, that is, with their concept.

The Doctrine of the Concept → A. The Subjective Concept → b. Judgement → α. Qualitative Judgement
§ 172

→ Groundlines § 119

The immediate judgement is the judgement of existence; the subject posited in a universality, as its predicate, which is an immediate (and thus sensuous) quality. 1. Positive judgement: the singular is a particular. But the singular is not a particular; more precisely, such a single quality does not correspond to the concrete nature of the subject; 2. negative judgement.

It is one of the most essential logical prejudices that such qualitative judgements as “the rose is red” or “is not red” can contain truth. Correct they may be, that is, within the limited circle of perception, of finite representing and thinking; this depends on the content, which is likewise a finite one, untrue for itself. But truth rests only on form, that is, on the posited concept and the reality corresponding to it; such truth, however, is not present in the qualitative judgement.

Addition. Correctness and truth are very often regarded as synonymous in common life, and accordingly the truth of a content is often spoken of where mere correctness is at issue. Correctness concerns in general only the formal agreement of our representation with its content, whatever this content may otherwise be like. Truth, by contrast, consists in the agreement of the object with itself, that is, with its concept. It may well be correct that someone is ill or that someone has stolen; but such a content is not true, for a diseased body is not in agreement with the concept of life, and likewise theft is an action that does not correspond to the concept of human doing. From these examples it can be gathered that an immediate judgement, in which an abstract quality is stated of something immediately singular, however correct that quality may be, can nevertheless contain no truth, since subject and predicate in it do not stand to each other in the relationship of reality and concept. – Further, the untruth of the immediate judgement consists in its form and content not corresponding to each other. When we say: “this rose is red”, the copula “is” implies that subject and predicate agree with each other. But the rose, as something concrete, is not merely red; it also smells, has a determinate form and many other determinations that are not contained in the predicate “red“. On the other hand, this predicate, as something abstractly universal, does not belong merely to this subject. There are also other flowers and in general other objects that are likewise red. Subject and predicate in the immediate judgement thus touch each other, as it were, only at one point, but they do not cover each other. It is different with the judgement of the concept. When we say: “this action is good”, this is a judgement of the concept. One notices at once that here there is not that loose and external relationship between subject and predicate as in the immediate judgement. While in the latter the predicate consists in some abstract quality which may or may not belong to the subject, in the judgement of the concept, by contrast, the predicate is, as it were, the soul of the subject, by which the subject, as the body of this soul, is determined through and through.

§ 173

→ Groundlines § 88

In this negation, as first negation, there still remains the relation of the subject to the predicate, which is thereby as something relatively universal whose determinacy alone has been negated; (“the rose is not red” implies that it still has colour – at first another one, which, however, would again only be a positive judgement). But the singular is also not a universal. Thus 3. judgement falls apart within itself aa) into the empty identical relation: the singular is the singular – identical judgement; and bb) within itself as the complete inadequacy, present as such, of subject and predicate; so-called infinite judgement.

Examples of the latter are: “spirit is no elephant”, “a lion is no table” and so on – propositions which are correct but absurd, just like the identical propositions: “a lion is a lion”, “spirit is spirit”. These propositions are indeed the truth of the immediate, so-called qualitative judgement, but they are not judgements at all and can occur only in a subjective thinking which can also hold fast to an untrue abstraction. – Considered objectively, they express the nature of what is, or of sensuous things, namely that they are a falling apart into an empty identity and into a fulfilled relation, which, however, is the qualitative otherness of the related terms, their complete inadequacy.

Addition. The negative-infinite judgement, in which there is no longer any relation at all between subject and predicate, is usually cited in formal logic merely as a senseless curiosity. In fact, however, this infinite judgement is not to be regarded merely as a contingent form of subjective thinking; rather it results as the next dialectical result of the preceding immediate judgements (the positive and the simply negative), whose finitude and untruth come expressly to light in it. Crime can be regarded as an objective example of the negative-infinite judgement. Whoever commits a crime, say more precisely a theft, negates not merely, as in a civil lawsuit, the particular right of another to this determinate thing, but his right in general, and is therefore not merely required to return the thing he has stolen but is punished in addition, because he has violated right as such, that is, right in general. The civil lawsuit, by contrast, is an example of the simply negative judgement, since in it only this particular right is negated and right in general is thus recognized. It is the same as with the negative judgement “this flower is not red”, by which only this particular colour, but not colour in general, is negated of the flower, for it can still be blue, yellow and so on. Likewise death too is a negative-infinite judgement, as distinct from illness, which is a simply negative judgement. In illness only this or that particular function of life is inhibited or negated, whereas in death, as one usually says, body and soul part, that is, subject and predicate fall completely apart.

The Doctrine of the Concept → A. The Subjective Concept → b. Judgement → β. The Judgement of Reflection
§ 174

The singular, posited in judgement as singular (reflected into itself), has a predicate over against which the subject, as relating itself to itself, at the same time remains an other. – In concrete existence the subject is no longer immediately qualitative but in relationship and connection with an other, with an external world. Universality has thereby received the meaning of this relativity. (For example useful, dangerous; gravity, acid – then drive and so on.)

Addition. The judgement of reflection is distinguished from the qualitative judgement in general in that its predicate is no longer an immediate, abstract quality, but of such a kind that the subject proves through it to be related to something else. If we say, for example: “this rose is red”, we consider the subject in its immediate singularity without relation to something else; if, on the other hand, we make the judgement: “this plant is curative”, we consider the subject, the plant, as standing, through its predicate, curativeness, in relation to something else (the illness to be cured by it). It is the same with the judgements “this body is elastic”, “this instrument is useful”, “this punishment has a deterrent effect” and so on. The predicates of such judgements are in general determinations of reflection, by which the immediate singularity of the subject is indeed gone beyond, but its concept is not yet stated. – Ordinary argumentation usually proceeds chiefly in this mode of judging. The more concrete the object at issue is, the more points of view it offers to reflection, by which, however, its peculiar nature, that is, its concept, is not exhausted.

§ 175

1. The subject, the singular as singular (in the singular judgement), is a universal. 2. In this relation it is raised above its singularity. This extension is an external one, subjective reflection, at first indeterminate particularity (in the particular judgement, which is immediately just as much negative as positive; – the singular is divided within itself, partly it relates itself to itself, partly to something else). 3. Some are the universal; thus particularity is extended to universality; or this, determined by the singularity of the subject, is allness (commonality, the usual universality of reflection).

Addition. The subject, being determined as universal in the singular judgement, thereby goes beyond itself as this merely singular. When we say: “this plant is curative”, this implies that not merely this single plant is curative, but several or some, and this then gives the particular judgement (“some plants are curative”, “some people are inventive” and so on). Through particularity the immediately singular loses its independence and enters into connection with something else. The human being, as this human being, is no longer merely this single human being; he stands beside other human beings and is thus one in the multitude. But precisely thereby he also belongs to his universal and is thereby raised. The particular judgement is just as much positive as negative. If only some bodies are elastic, the rest are not elastic. – This again contains the advance to the third form of the judgement of reflection, that is, to the judgement of allness (“all human beings are mortal”; “all metals are conductors of electricity”). Allness is that form of universality on which reflection usually falls first. The singular things form the foundation here, and it is our subjective doing by which they are combined and determined as all. The universal appears here only as an external bond embracing the singular things, which subsist for themselves and are indifferent to it. In fact, however, the universal is the ground and soil, the root and the substance of the singular. If we consider, for example, Gaius, Titus, Sempronius and the other inhabitants of a city or a country, the fact that they are all human beings is not merely something common to them but their universal, their genus, and all these singular individuals would not be at all without this their genus. It is different, on the other hand, with that superficial, merely so-called universality which is in fact merely what belongs to all the individuals and is common to them. It has been remarked that human beings, as distinct from animals, have this in common, that they are provided with earlobes. It is evident, however, that if one or another should perhaps have no earlobes, his other being, his character, his capacities and so on would not be affected by this, whereas it would make no sense to assume that Gaius could perhaps also not be a human being and yet be brave, learned and so on. What the single human being is in particular, he is only insofar as he is above all a human being as such and in the universal, and this universal is not merely something outside and beside other abstract qualities or mere determinations of reflection, but rather what permeates all the particular and encloses it within itself.

§ 176

Through the subject’s being likewise determined as universal, its identity with the predicate, and thereby the determination of judgement itself, is posited as indifferent. This unity of the content, as universality identical with the negative reflection-into-itself of the subject, makes the relation of judgement a necessary one.

Addition. The advance from the judgement of reflection of allness to the judgement of necessity is already found in our ordinary consciousness insofar as we say: what belongs to all belongs to the genus and is therefore necessary. When we say: all plants, all human beings and so on, this is the same as if we said: the plant, the human being and so on.

The Doctrine of the Concept → A. The Subjective Concept → b. Judgement → γ. Judgement of Necessity
§ 177

The judgement of necessity, as the identity of the content in its distinction, 1. contains in the predicate partly the substance or nature of the subject, the concrete universal – the genus; partly, since this universal likewise contains determinacy within itself as negative, the excluding essential determinacy – the species; – categorical judgement. 2. According to their substantiality the two sides receive the shape of independent actuality, whose identity is only an inner one, so that the actuality of the one is at the same time not its own but the being of the other; – hypothetical judgement. 3. If in this externalization of the concept the inner identity is at the same time posited, the universal is the genus that is identical with itself in its excluding singularity; the judgement which has this universal as both its sides, at one time as such, at another as the circle of its self-excluding particularization, whose either-or is just as much the genus as its both-and – is the disjunctive judgement. Universality, first as genus and now also as the circle of its species, is thereby determined and posited as totality.

Addition. The categorical judgement (“gold is metal”, “the rose is a plant”) is the immediate judgement of necessity and corresponds in the sphere of essence to the relationship of substantiality. All things are a categorical judgement, that is, they have their substantial nature, which forms their fixed and unchangeable foundation. Only when we consider things from the point of view of their genus and as determined by it with necessity does judgement begin to be a true one. It must be called a lack of logical education when judgements such as these: “gold is expensive” and “gold is metal” are regarded as standing at the same level. That gold is expensive concerns an external relation of it to our inclinations and needs, to the costs of obtaining it and so on, and gold remains what it is even if that external relation changes or falls away. Metallicity, by contrast, constitutes the substantial nature of gold, without which it, with everything else that is in it or may be stated of it, cannot subsist. It is likewise when we say: “Gaius is a human being”; we thereby express that everything else he may be has value and significance only insofar as it corresponds to this his substantial nature of being a human being. – But further the categorical judgement too is still defective insofar as in it the moment of particularity does not yet come into its right. Thus, for example, gold is indeed metal; but silver, copper, iron and so on are likewise metals, and metallicity as such behaves indifferently towards the particular of its species. This contains the advance from the categorical to the hypothetical judgement, which can be expressed by the formula: if A is, then B is. We have here the same advance as earlier from the relationship of substantiality to the relationship of causality. In the hypothetical judgement the determinacy of the content appears as mediated, as dependent on something else, and this is precisely the relationship of cause and effect. The meaning of the hypothetical judgement is in general that through it the universal is posited in its particularization, and we thereby obtain, as the third form of the judgement of necessity, the disjunctive judgement. A is either B or C or D; the poetic work of art is either epic or lyric or dramatic; colour is either yellow or blue or red and so on. The two sides of the disjunctive judgement are identical; the genus is the totality of its species, and the totality of the species is the genus. This unity of the universal and the particular is the concept, and it is this which now forms the content of judgement.

The Doctrine of the Concept → A. The Subjective Concept → b. Judgement → δ. The Judgement of the Concept
§ 178

The judgement of the concept has the concept, the totality in simple form, as its content, the universal with its complete determinacy. The subject is 1. at first a singular which has as its predicate the reflection of the particular existence onto its universal – the agreement or non-agreement of these two determinations; good, true, correct and so on – assertoric judgement.

Only such judging, whether an object, action and so on is good or bad, true, beautiful and so on, is also called judging in common life; one will not ascribe power of judgement to anyone who knows how to make, for example, the positive or negative judgements: “this rose is red”, “this painting is red, green, dusty” and so on. Through the principle of immediate knowing and faith, even in philosophy assertoric judging, which in society, when it lays claim for itself to being supposed to count, rather counts as improper, has been made the sole and essential form of doctrine. In the so-called philosophical works that assert that principle one can read hundreds upon hundreds of assurances about reason, knowing, thinking and so on, which, since external authority after all no longer counts for much, seek to gain credence through the infinite repetitions of one and the same thing.

§ 179

The assertoric judgement does not contain, in its at first immediate subject, the relation of particular and universal that is expressed in the predicate. This judgement is therefore only a subjective particularity, and the opposite assurance stands over against it with equal right, or rather wrong; it is therefore 2. at once only a problematic judgement. But 3. if the objective particularity is posited in the subject, its particularity as the constitution of its existence, the subject now expresses the relation of this particularity to its constitution, that is, to its genus, and thereby what (preceding §) constitutes the content of the predicate (this – immediate singularity – house – genus -, constituted thus and thus – particularity -, is good or bad) – apodictic judgement. – All things are a genus (their determination and purpose) in a single actuality of a particular constitution; and their finitude is that their particular may or may not be in conformity with the universal.

§ 180

Subject and predicate are in this way each itself the whole judgement. The immediate constitution of the subject shows itself at first as the mediating ground between the singularity of the actual and its universality, as the ground of judgement. What has in fact been posited is the unity of subject and predicate as the concept itself; it is the fulfilment of the empty “is“, the copula, and since its moments are at the same time distinguished as subject and predicate, it is posited as their unity, as the relation mediating them – the syllogism.

The Doctrine of the Concept → A. The Subjective Concept → c. The Syllogism
§ 181

→ Groundlines § 302

The syllogism is the unity of concept and judgement; – it is the concept as the simple identity into which the distinctions of form of judgement have gone back, and judgement insofar as it is at the same time posited in reality, namely in the distinction of its determinations. The syllogism is the rational and everything rational.

The syllogism is indeed usually stated to be the form of the rational, but as a subjective one and without any connection being shown between it and any other rational content, for example a rational principle, a rational action, idea and so on. In general reason is spoken of and appealed to much and often without stating what its determinacy is, what it is, and least of all is syllogizing thought of in this connection. In fact formal syllogizing is the rational in such an irrational way that it has nothing to do with a rational content. But since such a content can be rational only through the determinacy by which thinking is reason, it can be so solely through the form which the syllogism is. – But this is nothing other than the posited (at first formally) real concept, as the § expresses. The syllogism is therefore the essential ground of everything true; and the definition of the absolute is now that it is the syllogism, or, this determination expressed as a proposition: “Everything is a syllogism“. Everything is concept, and its existence is the distinction of its moments, so that its universal nature gives itself external reality through particularity and thereby, and as negative reflection-into-itself, makes itself singular. – Or conversely, the actual is a singular which raises itself through particularity into universality and makes itself identical with itself. – The actual is one, but likewise the stepping apart of the moments of the concept, and the syllogism is the circuit of the mediation of its moments, through which it posits itself as one.

Addition. Like the concept and judgement, the syllogism too is usually regarded merely as a form of our subjective thinking, and accordingly it is said that the syllogism is the grounding of judgement. Now judgement does indeed point to the syllogism, but it is not merely our subjective doing by which this advance comes about; rather it is judgement itself that posits itself as syllogism and returns in it to the unity of the concept. More precisely, it is the apodictic judgement that forms the transition to the syllogism. In the apodictic judgement we have a singular which, through its constitution, relates itself to its universal, that is, to its concept. The particular appears here as the mediating middle between the singular and the universal, and this is the basic form of the syllogism, whose further development, grasped formally, consists in the singular and the universal also taking this place, whereby the transition from subjectivity to objectivity is then formed.

§ 182

The immediate syllogism is that in which the determinations of the concept, as abstract, stand to one another only in external relationship, so that the two extremes are singularity and universality, while the concept, as the middle joining both together, is likewise only abstract particularity. The extremes are thereby posited as subsisting indifferently for themselves, just as much with respect to each other as with respect to their middle. This syllogism is thus the rational as conceptless – the formal syllogism of the understanding. – In it the subject is joined together with another determinacy; or the universal, through this mediation, subsumes a subject external to it. The rational syllogism, by contrast, is that in which the subject, through the mediation, joins itself together with itself. Only thus is it subject, or the subject is only in itself the syllogism of reason.

In the following consideration the syllogism of the understanding is expressed, according to its ordinary, familiar meaning, in its subjective manner, which belongs to it in the sense that we make such syllogisms. In fact it is only a subjective syllogizing; but this likewise has the objective meaning that it expresses only the finitude of things, but in the determinate way which form has reached here. In finite things subjectivity, as thinghood, is separable from their properties, their particularity, and likewise separable from their universality, both insofar as this is the mere quality of the thing and its external connection with other things, and insofar as it is its genus and concept.

Addition. In accordance with the conception mentioned above of the syllogism as the form of the rational, reason itself has also been defined as the faculty of drawing inferences, and the understanding, by contrast, as the faculty of forming concepts. Apart from the superficial representation of spirit underlying this, as a mere sum of forces or faculties subsisting side by side, it must be noted about this association of the understanding with the concept and of reason with the syllogism that, just as little as the concept is to be regarded merely as a determination of the understanding, so little is the syllogism to be regarded straightforwardly as rational. For on the one hand what is usually treated in formal logic in the doctrine of the syllogism is in fact nothing other than the mere syllogism of the understanding, to which the honour of counting as the form of the rational, indeed as the rational pure and simple, by no means belongs; and on the other hand the concept as such is so little a mere form of the understanding that it is rather only the abstracting understanding by which it is reduced to that. Accordingly one also usually distinguishes mere concepts of the understanding and concepts of reason, which, however, is not to be understood as though there were two kinds of concepts, but rather in such a way that it is our doing either merely to stop at the negative and abstract form of the concept or to grasp it, according to its true nature, as what is at the same time positive and concrete. Thus it is, for example, the mere concept of freedom of the understanding when freedom is regarded as the abstract opposite of necessity, whereas the true and rational concept of freedom contains necessity within itself as sublated. Likewise the definition of God set up by so-called deism is the mere concept of God of the understanding, whereas the Christian religion, which knows God as the triune, contains the concept of God of reason.

The Doctrine of the Concept → A. The Subjective Concept → c. The Syllogism → α. Qualitative Syllogism
§ 183

The first syllogism is the syllogism of existence, or the qualitative one, as stated in the preceding §, 1. S—P—U [singular—particular—universal], in which a subject, as singular, is joined through a quality together with a universal determinacy.

That the subject (the terminus minor) has further determinations than those of singularity, and likewise that the other extreme (the predicate of the conclusion, the terminus maior) is further determined than merely as a universal, does not come into consideration here; only the forms through which they make the syllogism.

Addition. The syllogism of existence is a mere syllogism of the understanding, and indeed insofar as here singularity, particularity and universality stand over against one another quite abstractly. So this syllogism is the concept’s highest coming out of itself. We have here something immediately singular as subject; in this subject some particular side, a property, is then singled out, and by means of it the singular proves itself to be a universal. So, for example, when we say: “this rose is red; red is a colour; therefore this rose is something coloured”. It is chiefly this shape of the syllogism that is usually discussed in ordinary logic. Formerly the syllogism was regarded as the absolute rule of all cognition, and a scientific assertion counted as justified only if it was shown to be mediated by a syllogism. Nowadays one meets the various forms of the syllogism almost only in compendia of logic, and knowledge of them counts as empty school wisdom of which no further use is to be made either in practical life or in science. About this it must first be noted that, although it would be superfluous and pedantic to come forward on every occasion with the whole detail of formal syllogizing, the various forms of the syllogism nevertheless constantly assert themselves in our cognition. If, for example, someone in winter, on waking in the morning, hears the carriages creaking in the street and is thereby prompted to the reflection that it must have frozen hard, he thereby performs an operation of syllogizing, and we repeat this operation daily under the most manifold complications. It might therefore be at least of no lesser interest to become expressly conscious of this daily doing of ours as thinking human beings than it is, admittedly, of interest to take note not only of the functions of our organic life, such as the functions of digestion, blood formation, breathing and so on, but also of the processes and formations of the nature surrounding us. In this connection it will readily be granted that, just as little as one needs a prior study of anatomy and physiology in order to digest, breathe and so on properly, so little does one need to have studied logic beforehand in order to draw correct inferences. – It is Aristotle who first observed and described the various forms and so-called figures of the syllogism in their subjective meaning, and indeed with such certainty and determinacy that essentially nothing further has had to be added. Now although this achievement does Aristotle great honour, it is by no means the forms of the syllogism of the understanding, or of finite thinking in general, that he used in his properly philosophical investigations. (See Remark to § 189.)

§ 184

This syllogism is α) wholly contingent according to its determinations, since the middle, as abstract particularity, is only some determinacy of the subject, of which the subject, as immediate and thus empirically concrete, has several, and can therefore be joined together with just as many other universalities, just as a single particularity can in turn have different determinacies within itself, so that the subject can be related through the same medius terminus to different universals.

Formal syllogizing has rather gone out of fashion than that its incorrectness has been seen and its non-use thereby justified. This and the following § state the nullity of such syllogizing for truth. According to the side stated in the §, the most diverse things can be, as it is called, proved by such syllogisms. One need only take the medius terminus from which the transition to the required determination can be made. But with another medius terminus something else can be proved, even its opposite. – The more concrete an object is, the more sides it has that belong to it and can serve as medii termini. Which of these sides is more essential than the other must again rest on such a syllogizing, which holds to the single determinacy and can likewise easily find for it a side and respect according to which it can be made to count as important and necessary.

Addition. However little one usually thinks of the syllogism of the understanding in the daily intercourse of life, it nevertheless constantly plays its role there. Thus, for example, in a civil lawsuit it is the business of the advocates to assert the legal titles favourable to their parties. But such a legal title is, in logical respects, nothing other than a medius terminus. The same then also takes place in diplomatic negotiations, when, for example, various powers lay claim to one and the same country. Here the right of inheritance, the geographical situation of the country, the descent and language of its inhabitants or some other ground can be singled out as medius terminus.

§ 185

β) This syllogism is likewise contingent through the form of relation that is in it. According to the concept of the syllogism, the true is the relation of distinct terms through a middle that is their unity. But the relations of the extremes to the middle (the so-called premisses, the major premiss and minor premiss) are rather immediate relations.

This contradiction of the syllogism again expresses itself through an infinite progress, as the demand that the premisses likewise each be proved by a syllogism; but since this has two equally immediate premisses, this demand, which always doubles itself, repeats itself to infinity.

§ 186

What has been noted here (for the sake of its empirical importance) as a defect of the syllogism, to which absolute correctness is ascribed in this form, must sublate itself of its own accord in the further determination of the syllogism. Here, within the sphere of the concept, as in judgement, the opposite determinacy is not merely present in itself but is posited, and so for the further determination of the syllogism too only what is posited by it itself in each case need be taken up. Through the immediate syllogism S—P—U the singular is mediated with the universal and posited in this conclusion as universal. The singular as subject, thus itself as universal, is thereby now the unity of the two extremes and the mediating term; which gives the second figure of the syllogism, 2. U—S—P. This expresses the truth of the first, that the mediation has taken place in singularity and is thereby something contingent.

§ 187

The second figure joins the universal (which passes over from the preceding conclusion, determined by singularity, and thus now takes the place of the immediate subject) together with the particular. The universal is thereby posited through this conclusion as particular, thus as the mediating term of the extremes, whose places the others now take; the third figure of the syllogism: 3. P—U—S.

The so-called figures of the syllogism (Aristotle rightly knows only three of them; the fourth is a superfluous, indeed even absurd addition of the moderns) are placed side by side in the usual treatment of them, without the least thought being given to showing their necessity, still less their meaning and value. It is therefore no wonder that the figures have later been treated as an empty formalism. But they have a very thorough sense, resting on the necessity that each moment, as determination of the concept, itself becomes the whole and the mediating ground. – But what other determinations the propositions [have], whether they may be universal and so on, or negative, in order to bring out a correct syllogism in the various figures, is a mechanical investigation which, because of its conceptless mechanism and its inner meaninglessness, has rightly fallen into oblivion. – Least of all can one appeal for the importance of such investigation, and of the syllogism of the understanding in general, to Aristotle, who did indeed describe these as well as countless other forms of spirit and nature and sought out and stated their determinacy. In his metaphysical concepts, as well as in the concepts of the natural and the spiritual, he was so far from wanting to make the form of the syllogism of the understanding the foundation and criterion that one could say that not a single one of these concepts could have arisen or been allowed to stand if it were to be subjected to the laws of the understanding. With all the descriptive and understanding material that Aristotle essentially brings forward in his way, what always prevails in him is the speculative concept, and that understanding syllogizing which he first stated so determinately he does not let pass over into this sphere.

Addition. The objective sense of the figures of the syllogism is in general this, that everything rational proves itself to be a threefold syllogism, and indeed in such a way that each of its members takes the place of an extreme just as much as that of the mediating middle. This is notably the case with the three members of philosophical science, i.e. the logical Idea, nature and spirit. Here, first, nature is the middle, joining member. Nature, this immediate totality, unfolds itself into the two extremes of the logical Idea and of spirit. But spirit is spirit only by being mediated through nature. Secondly, spirit, which we know as the individual, the active, is likewise the middle, and nature and the logical Idea are the extremes. It is spirit that cognizes the logical Idea in nature and so raises nature to its essence. Likewise, thirdly, the logical Idea itself is the middle; it is the absolute substance of spirit as of nature, the universal, the all-pervading. These are the members of the absolute syllogism.

§ 188

Since each moment has run through the place of the middle and of the extremes, their determinate difference from one another has sublated itself, and the syllogism, in this form of the indifference of its moments, has first the external identity of the understanding, equality, as its relation; – the quantitative or mathematical syllogism. If two things are equal to a third, they are equal to each other.

Addition. The quantitative syllogism mentioned here occurs, as is well known, in mathematics as an axiom, of which, as of the other axioms, it is usually said that their content cannot be proved, but also does not need this proof, since it is immediately evident. In fact, however, these mathematical axioms are nothing other than logical propositions which, insofar as particular and determinate thoughts are expressed in them, are to be derived from universal and self-determining thinking, which is then precisely to be regarded as their proof. This is the case here with the quantitative syllogism set up in mathematics as an axiom, which proves to be the next result of the qualitative or immediate syllogism. – The quantitative syllogism is, moreover, the wholly formless syllogism, since in it the difference of the members determined by the concept is sublated. Which propositions are to be premisses here depends on external circumstances, and so in applying this syllogism one makes into a presupposition what is already established and proved elsewhere.

§ 189

Through this, first, it has come about in respect of form, 1. that each moment has received the determination and place of the middle, thus of the whole in general, and has thereby lost in itself the one-sidedness of its abstraction (§§ 182 and 184); that 2. the mediation (§ 185) has been completed, likewise only in itself, namely only as a circle of mediations mutually presupposing one another. In the first figure S—P—U the two premisses, S—P and P—U, are still unmediated; the former is mediated in the third, the latter in the second figure. But each of these two figures likewise presupposes its two other figures for the mediation of its premisses. Accordingly the mediating unity of the concept is to be posited no longer merely as abstract particularity but as the developed unity of singularity and universality, and indeed first as the reflected unity of these determinations; singularity at the same time determined as universality. Such a middle gives the syllogism of reflection.

42)E (Einzelnes, singular), B (Besonderes, particular), A (Allgemeines, universal) are the abbreviations Hegel uses in what follows; this translation renders them as S, P, U.

The Doctrine of the Concept → A. The Subjective Concept → c. The Syllogism → β. Syllogism of Reflection
§ 190

The middle thus, first, 1. not only as abstract, particular determinacy of the subject, but at the same time as all singular concrete subjects, to which that determinacy belongs only among others, gives the syllogism of allness. But the major premiss, which has the particular determinacy, the terminus medius, as allness for its subject, rather itself presupposes the conclusion, which ought to have it as its presupposition. It therefore rests 2. on induction, whose middle is the complete singulars as such, a, b, c, d and so on. But since immediate empirical singularity is different from universality and therefore cannot afford completeness, induction rests 3. on analogy, whose middle is a singular, but in the sense of its essential universality, its genus or essential determinacy. – The first syllogism refers for its mediation to the second, and the second to the third; but this likewise demands a universality determined within itself, or singularity as genus, after the forms of external relation of singularity and universality have been run through in the figures of the syllogism of reflection.

Through the syllogism of allness the defect of the basic form of the syllogism of the understanding shown in § 184 is remedied, but only in such a way that the new defect arises, namely that the major premiss itself presupposes what ought to be the conclusion, as a proposition that is thus immediate. – “All men are mortal, therefore Gaius is mortal”, “all metals are conductors of electricity, therefore so is, e.g., copper”. In order to be able to state those major premisses, which as All express the immediate singulars and are supposed to be essentially empirical propositions, it is required that the propositions about the single Gaius, the single copper, have already beforehand been established for themselves as correct. – Rightly everyone is struck not only by the pedantry but by the empty formalism of such syllogisms [as] “All men are mortal, now Gaius is etc.”

The Doctrine of the Concept → A. The Subjective Concept → c. The Syllogism → γ. Syllogism of Necessity
§ 191

This syllogism, taken according to its merely abstract determinations, has the universal as its middle, as the syllogism of reflection has singularity – the latter according to the second, the former according to the third figure (§ 187); the universal posited as essentially determined within itself. First, 1. the particular, in the meaning of the determinate genus or species, is the mediating determination – in the categorical syllogism; 2. the singular, in the meaning of immediate being, so that it is as much mediating as mediated – in the hypothetical syllogism; 3. the mediating universal is also posited as the totality of its particularizations and as a single particular, excluding singularity – in the disjunctive syllogism; – so that one and the same universal is in these determinations only as in forms of difference.

§ 192

The syllogism has been taken according to the differences it contains, and the general result of their course is that in it the self-sublating of these differences and of the concept’s being-outside-itself comes about. And indeed, 1. each of the moments has proved itself to be the totality of the moments, thus the whole syllogism; they are thus in themselves identical; and 2. the negation of their differences and of their mediation constitutes being-for-itself; so that it is one and the same universal that is in these forms and that is thereby also posited as their identity. In this ideality of the moments syllogizing receives the determination of essentially containing the negation of the determinacies through which it is the course, and thereby of being a mediation through sublating mediation and a joining together of the subject not with another but with the sublated other, with itself.

Addition. In ordinary logic the treatment of the doctrine of the syllogism usually concludes the first part, which forms the so-called doctrine of elements. Then follows as the second part the so-called doctrine of method, in which it is supposed to be shown how, by applying the forms of thinking treated in the doctrine of elements to the objects at hand, a whole of scientific cognition is to be brought about. Where these objects come from, and what the thought of objectivity in general amounts to, the logic of the understanding gives no further information. Thinking counts here as a merely subjective and formal activity, and the objective, over against thinking, as something fixed and present for itself. But this dualism is not the true, and it is a thoughtless procedure to take up the determinations of subjectivity and objectivity just like that and not to ask about their origin. Both, subjectivity as well as objectivity, are in any case thoughts, and indeed determinate thoughts, which have to prove themselves grounded in universal and self-determining thinking. This has been done here, first, with respect to subjectivity. This, or the subjective concept, which contains within itself the concept as such, judgement and syllogism, we have recognized as the dialectical result of the first two main stages of the logical Idea, namely of being and of essence. When it is said of the concept that it is subjective and only subjective, this is quite correct insofar as it is indeed subjectivity itself. Just as subjective as the concept as such are then also judgement and syllogism, which determinations, next to the so-called laws of thought (of identity, difference and ground), form the content of the so-called doctrine of elements in ordinary logic. But further, this subjectivity with its determinations named here, concept, judgement and syllogism, is not to be regarded as an empty framework which has first to receive its filling from outside, through objects present for themselves; rather it is subjectivity itself which, as dialectical, breaks through its limit and opens itself up through the syllogism to objectivity.

§ 193

→ Groundlines § 280

This realization of the concept, in which the universal is this one totality gone back into itself, whose differences are likewise this totality, and which through sublating mediation has determined itself as immediate unity, is the object.

However strange at first sight this transition from the subject, from the concept in general and more precisely from the syllogism – especially if one has before one only the syllogism of the understanding and syllogizing as a doing of consciousness – into the object may seem, it cannot at the same time be our concern to want to make this transition plausible to representation. One can only call to mind whether our ordinary representation of what is called object roughly corresponds to what makes up the determination of the object here. But by object one usually understands not merely an abstract being or existing thing or something actual in general, but something concrete, complete within itself, self-standing; this completeness is the totality of the concept. That the object is also ob-ject [Gegenstand] and external to another will be determined later, insofar as it places itself in opposition to the subjective; here, first, as that into which the concept has passed over from its mediation, it is only immediate, unprejudiced object, just as the concept too is determined as the subjective only in the later opposition. Further, the object in general is the one whole, still undetermined within itself, the objective world in general, God, the absolute object. But the object likewise has difference in it, falls apart within itself into undetermined manifoldness (as objective world), and each of these singularized things is also an object, an existence concrete, complete and self-standing within itself. As objectivity has been compared with being, concrete existence and actuality, so too the transition to concrete existence and actuality (for being is the first, wholly abstract immediate) is to be compared with the transition to objectivity. The ground from which concrete existence emerges, the reflective relationship that sublates itself into actuality, are nothing other than the still imperfectly posited concept, or they are only abstract sides of it – the ground is only its essential unity, the relationship only the relation of real sides that are supposed to be only reflected into themselves; – the concept is the unity of both, and the object not only essential but universal unity within itself, containing not only real differences but these as totalities within itself. It is evident, moreover, that in all these transitions what matters is more than merely showing in general the inseparability of the concept or of thinking from being. It has often been remarked that being is nothing more than simple relation to itself and that this poor determination is in any case contained in the concept or also in thinking. The sense of these transitions is not to take up determinations as they are merely contained (as also happens in the ontological argument for God’s existence through the proposition that being is one of the realities), but to take the concept as it is supposed at first to be determined for itself as concept, with which this remote abstraction of being, or also of objectivity, is as yet supposed to have nothing to do, and to see from its determinacy as conceptual determinacy alone whether and that it passes over into a form different from the determinacy as it belongs to the concept and appears in it. If the product of this transition, the object, is placed in relation to the concept, which has disappeared in it as regards its peculiar form, the result can correctly be expressed by saying that in themselves concept, or also, if one likes, subjectivity, and object are the same. But it is just as correct that they are different. Since the one is as correct as the other, each is for that very reason as incorrect as the other; such a way of expressing it is incapable of presenting the true relation. That in-itself is an abstraction and still more one-sided than the concept itself, whose one-sidedness in general sublates itself in that it sublates itself into the object, the opposite one-sidedness. So that in-itself too must determine itself to being-for-itself through its negation. As everywhere, speculative identity is not that trivial one, that concept and object are in themselves identical; – a remark that has been repeated often enough, but could not be repeated often enough if the intention were to put an end to the stale and downright malicious misunderstandings about this identity; which, however, sensibly speaking, is again not to be hoped for. Moreover, taking that unity quite generally, without recalling the one-sided form of its being-in-itself, it is, as is well known, what is presupposed in the ontological proof of God’s existence, and indeed as the most perfect. In Anselm, in whom the highly remarkable thought of this proof first occurs, the question is, admittedly, at first merely whether a content is only in our thinking. His words are briefly these: “Certe id, quo maius cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re: quod maius est. Si ergo id, quo maius cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu: id ipsum, quo maius cogitari non potest, est, quo malus cogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse non potest.” [Certainly that than which nothing greater can be thought cannot be in the intellect alone. For if it is even in the intellect alone, it can be thought to be in reality as well: which is greater. If therefore that than which nothing greater can be thought is in the intellect alone, then that very thing than which nothing greater can be thought is something than which something greater can be thought. But certainly this cannot be.] – Finite things, according to the determinations in which we stand here, are this: that their objectivity is not in agreement with the thought of them, i.e. with their universal determination, their genus and their end. Descartes and Spinoza and others expressed this unity more objectively; but the principle of immediate certainty or of faith takes it more in Anselm’s more subjective manner, namely that the determination of God’s being is inseparably bound up with the representation of God in our consciousness. If the principle of this faith also includes the representations of external finite things in the inseparability of the consciousness of them and their being, because they are bound up in intuition with the determination of concrete existence, this is no doubt correct. But it would be the greatest thoughtlessness if it were meant that in our consciousness concrete existence is bound up with the representation of finite things in the same way as with the representation of God; it would be forgotten that finite things are changeable and transient, i.e. that concrete existence is bound up with them only transitorily, that this bond is not eternal but separable. Anselm therefore, setting aside such connection as occurs with finite things, rightly declared that alone to be the perfect which is not merely in a subjective way but at the same time in an objective way. All airs of superiority against the so-called ontological proof and against this Anselmian determination of the perfect are of no avail, since it lies in every unprejudiced human mind just as much as [it] returns in every philosophy, even against its knowledge and will, as in the principle of immediate faith. But the defect in Anselm’s argumentation, which Descartes and Spinoza, as well as the principle of immediate knowing, share with it, is that this unity, which is pronounced as the most perfect or also subjectively as true knowing, is presupposed, i.e. assumed only as in itself. To this thereby abstract identity the diversity of the two determinations is at once opposed, as was also done against Anselm long ago; that is, in fact, the representation and concrete existence of the finite is opposed to the infinite, for, as remarked above, the finite is an objectivity of such a kind that it is at the same time not adequate to its end, its essence and concept, and is different from it, – or such a representation, such a subjective thing, as does not involve concrete existence. This objection and opposition is sublated only by showing the finite to be something untrue, these determinations to be one-sided and null for themselves, and the identity thus to be one into which they themselves pass over and in which they are reconciled.

43)Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion 2. (The German edition gives F. S. Schmitt’s German translation here; the English rendering in square brackets in the text is the translator’s own.)

The Doctrine of the Concept → B. The Object
§ 194

The object is immediate being through its indifference towards difference, as which has sublated itself in it, and it is within itself totality; and at the same time, since this identity is only the implicit identity of the moments, it is likewise indifferent towards its immediate unity; it is a falling apart into distinct terms, each of which is itself the totality. The object is therefore the absolute contradiction of the complete self-standingness of the manifold and the equally complete non-self-standingness of the distinct terms.

The definition “the absolute is the object” is contained most determinately in the Leibnizian monad, which is supposed to be an object, but one that is in itself representing, and indeed the totality of the representation of the world; in its simple unity all difference is only as an ideal, non-self-standing one. Nothing comes into the monad from outside; it is within itself the whole concept, distinguished only by the concept’s own greater or lesser development. Likewise this simple totality falls apart into the absolute plurality of differences in such a way that they are self-standing monads. In the monad of monads and the pre-established harmony of their inner developments these substances are likewise reduced again to non-self-standingness and ideality. The Leibnizian philosophy is thus the completely developed contradiction.

Addition 1. If the absolute (God) is grasped as the object and one stops there, this is, as Fichte above all has rightly emphasized in modern times, in general the standpoint of superstition and slavish fear. God is indeed the object, and indeed the object pure and simple, over against which our particular (subjective) opining and willing has no truth and no validity. But precisely as the absolute object God does not stand over against subjectivity as a dark and hostile power, but rather contains it within himself as an essential moment. This is expressed in the Christian doctrine of religion, where it is said that God wills that all men be helped, and that he wills that all men be saved. That men are helped, that they are saved, comes about through their attaining consciousness of their unity with God and through God’s ceasing to be a mere object for them, and thereby an object of fear and terror, as was notably the case for the religious consciousness of the Romans. When, further, in the Christian religion God is known as love, and indeed insofar as he has revealed himself to men in his Son, who is one with him, as this single human being, and has thereby redeemed them, it is likewise expressed that the opposition of objectivity and subjectivity is overcome in itself, and it is our concern to make ourselves partakers of this redemption by letting go of our immediate subjectivity (putting off the old Adam) and becoming conscious of God as our true and essential self. – Now just as religion and religious worship consist in overcoming the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity, so science, and more precisely philosophy, has no other task than to overcome this opposition through thinking. In cognition what matters in general is to strip the objective world standing over against us of its strangeness, to find ourselves at home in it, as one usually says, which means as much as to lead the objective back to the concept, which is our innermost self. From the discussion so far it can be gathered how wrong it is to regard subjectivity and objectivity as a fixed and abstract opposition. Both are dialectical through and through. The concept, which is at first only subjective, advances in accordance with its own activity, without needing any external material or stuff for this, to objectify itself, and likewise the object is not something rigid and processless; rather its process is to prove itself to be at the same time the subjective, which forms the advance to the Idea. Whoever is not familiar with the determinations of subjectivity and objectivity and wants to hold fast to them in their abstraction finds that these abstract determinations run through his fingers before he knows it, and that he says precisely the opposite of what he meant to say.

Addition 2. Objectivity contains the three forms of mechanism, chemism and the relation of purpose. The mechanically determined object is the immediate, indifferent one. It does contain difference, but the diverse terms behave as indifferent towards one another, and their connection is merely external to them. In chemism, by contrast, the object proves to be essentially differentiated, in such a way that the objects are what they are only through their relation to one another, and the difference constitutes their quality. The third form of objectivity, the teleological relationship, is the unity of mechanism and chemism. Purpose is again, like the mechanical object, totality closed within itself, but enriched by the principle of difference that emerged in chemism, and so it relates itself to the object standing over against it. It is then the realization of purpose that forms the transition to the Idea.

The Doctrine of the Concept → B. The Object → a. Mechanism
§ 195

The object 1. in its immediacy is the concept only in itself; it has the concept as subjective at first outside it, and all determinacy is as an externally posited one. As a unity of distinct terms it is therefore something composite, an aggregate, and its efficacy on another remains an external relation – formal mechanism. – In this relation and non-self-standingness the objects remain just as self-standing, offering resistance, external to one another.

As pressure and impact are mechanical relationships, so we also know mechanically, by rote, insofar as the words are without sense for us and remain external to sense, representation and thinking; they are likewise external to themselves, a senseless succession. Action, piety and so on are likewise mechanical insofar as what a person does is determined for him by ceremonial laws, a spiritual adviser and so on, and his own spirit and will are not in his actions, which are thus external to him.

Addition. Mechanism, as the first form of objectivity, is also the category that first presents itself to reflection when considering the objective world, and at which reflection very often stops. This, however, is a superficial way of considering things, poor in thought, which does not suffice either with respect to nature or, still less, with respect to the spiritual world. In nature it is only the wholly abstract relationships of matter still undisclosed within itself that are subject to mechanism; by contrast, even the appearances and processes of the domain called physical in the narrower sense of the word (such as the phenomena of light, heat, magnetism, electricity etc.) are no longer to be explained in a merely mechanical way (i.e. through pressure, impact, displacement of parts and the like), and still far more inadequate is the application and transfer of this category to the domain of organic nature, insofar as it is a matter of comprehending what is specific to it, notably the nourishment and growth of plants, or even animal sensation. It must in any case be regarded as a very essential, indeed as the chief defect of modern natural science that, even where quite different and higher categories than that of mere mechanism are at issue, it nevertheless holds so stubbornly to the latter, in contradiction with what presents itself to unprejudiced intuition, and thereby blocks its own way to an adequate cognition of nature. – As for the shapes of the spiritual world next, the mechanical view is also often asserted unduly in considering them. This is the case, for example, when it is said that man consists of body and soul. These two are here taken as each having its subsistence for itself and as only externally bound together. Likewise it then also happens that the soul is regarded as a mere complex of forces and faculties subsisting self-standingly side by side. – But however decisively, on the one hand, the mechanical way of considering things must be rejected where it comes forward with the pretension of taking the place of comprehending cognition in general and of asserting mechanism as an absolute category, so, on the other hand, the right and significance of a universal logical category must expressly be vindicated for mechanism, and it is accordingly by no means to be restricted merely to that domain of nature from which the name of this category is taken. There is thus nothing to object to if, even outside the realm of mechanics proper, notably in physics and in physiology, attention is directed to mechanical actions (such as those of gravity, the lever and the like); only it must not be overlooked that within these domains the laws of mechanism are no longer what is decisive but appear only, as it were, in a serving position. Directly connected with this is the further remark that where in nature the higher, notably the organic functions suffer a disturbance or inhibition of their normal efficacy in one way or another, the otherwise subordinate mechanism at once comes forward as dominant. Thus, for example, someone who suffers from a weak stomach feels pressure in the stomach after eating certain foods in small quantity, while others whose digestive organs are healthy remain free of this sensation although they have eaten the same. It is the same with the general feeling of heaviness in the limbs when the body is in a sickly state. – In the domain of the spiritual world, too, mechanism has its place, though likewise only a subordinate one. One rightly speaks of mechanical memory and of all sorts of mechanical activities such as reading, writing, playing music etc. As for memory more precisely, the mechanical mode of conduct even belongs to its essence; a circumstance that has not seldom been overlooked by modern pedagogy, to the great harm of the education of the young, in misunderstood zeal for the freedom of intelligence. Nevertheless, he would prove a poor psychologist who, in order to fathom the nature of memory, wanted to take refuge in mechanics and apply its laws to the soul without further ado. What is mechanical about memory consists precisely only in this, that certain signs, tones etc. are apprehended in their merely external connection and then reproduced in this connection, without attention needing to be directed expressly to their meaning and inner connection. To recognize this state of affairs with mechanical memory no further study of mechanics is needed, and no advancement for psychology as such could grow out of this study.

§ 196

The non-self-standingness according to which the object suffers violence it has only (preceding §) insofar as it is self-standing, and as posited concept in itself the one of these determinations does not sublate itself in its other; rather the object joins itself together with itself through the negation of itself, its non-self-standingness, and only so is it self-standing. Thus at the same time in distinction from externality and negating this in its self-standingness, it is negative unity with itself, centrality, subjectivity – in which it is itself directed to and related to what is external. This is likewise central within itself and therein likewise only related to the other centre, likewise has its centrality in the other; – 2. differentiated mechanism (falling, desire, the social drive and the like).

§ 197

The development of this relationship forms the syllogism that the immanent negativity, as central singularity of an object (abstract centre), relates itself to non-self-standing objects as the other extreme through a middle that unites within itself the centrality and non-self-standingness of the objects, the relative centre; – 3. absolute mechanism.

§ 198

The syllogism stated (S—P—U) is a threefold of syllogisms. The bad singularity of the non-self-standing objects, in which formal mechanism is at home, is, as non-self-standingness, just as much external universality. These objects are therefore the middle also between the absolute and the relative centre (the form of the syllogism U—S—P); for it is through this non-self-standingness that those two are sundered and are extremes, as well as related to each other. Likewise absolute centrality, as the substantially universal (gravity remaining identical), which as pure negativity likewise includes singularity within itself, is the mediating term between the relative centre and the non-self-standing objects, the form of the syllogism P—U—S, and indeed just as essentially according to immanent singularity as sundering, as according to universality as identical cohesion and undisturbed being-within-itself.

Like the solar system, so in the practical sphere, for example, the state is a system of three syllogisms. 1. The singular (the person) joins himself together through his particularity (the physical and spiritual needs, which, further developed for themselves, give civil society) with the universal (society, right, law, government); 2. the will, the activity of individuals, is the mediating term, which gives satisfaction to needs in society, in right and so on, as well as fulfilment and actualization to society, right and so on; 3. but the universal (state, government, right) is the substantial middle in which individuals and their satisfaction have and receive their fulfilled reality, mediation and subsistence. Each of the determinations, in that mediation joins it together with the other extreme, precisely therein joins itself together with itself, produces itself, and this production is self-preservation. – It is only through the nature of this joining together, through this threefold of syllogisms of the same terminorum, that a whole is truly understood in its organization.

§ 199

The immediacy of concrete existence which the objects have in absolute mechanism is in itself negated in that their self-standingness is mediated through their relations to one another, thus through their non-self-standingness. So the object is to be posited as differentiated in its concrete existence against its other.

The Doctrine of the Concept → B. The Object → b. Chemism
§ 200

The differentiated object has an immanent determinacy which constitutes its nature and in which it has concrete existence. But as the posited totality of the concept it is the contradiction of this its totality and of the determinacy of its concrete existence; it is therefore the striving to sublate this contradiction and to make its existence equal to the concept.

Addition. Chemism is a category of objectivity which as a rule is not specially singled out but is lumped together with mechanism and, in this combination, under the common name of the mechanical relationship, is usually set over against the relationship of purposiveness. The occasion for this is to be sought in the fact that mechanism and chemism indeed have this in common, that they are the existing concept only in itself, whereas purpose is to be regarded as the concept existing for itself. But further, mechanism and chemism are also very determinately distinguished from each other, and indeed in such a way that the object, in the form of mechanism, is at first only indifferent relation to itself, whereas the chemical object proves to be related to another through and through. Now in mechanism too, as it develops, relations to another already emerge; but the relation of mechanical objects to one another is as yet only an external relation, in such a way that the semblance of self-standingness remains with the objects related to one another. Thus, for example, in nature the various heavenly bodies that form our solar system stand to one another in the relationship of motion and prove through it to be related to one another. Motion, as the unity of space and time, is however only the wholly external and abstract relation, and so it seems as though the heavenly bodies, thus externally related to one another, would be and remain what they are even without this relation of theirs to one another. – With chemism, by contrast, it is otherwise. Chemically differentiated objects are what they are expressly only through their difference, and are thus the absolute drive to integrate themselves through and in one another.

§ 201

The chemical process therefore has as its product the neutral of its tensed extremes, which these are in themselves; the concept, the concrete universal, joins itself together through the difference of the objects, the particularization, with singularity, the product, and therein only with itself. The other syllogisms are equally contained in this process; singularity, as activity, is likewise the mediating term, as is the concrete universal, the essence of the tensed extremes, which comes to existence in the product.

§ 202

Chemism, as the reflective relationship of objectivity, still has as its presupposition, together with the differentiated nature of the objects, at the same time their immediate self-standingness. The process is the passing to and fro from one form to the other, which at the same time still remain external to each other. – In the neutral product the determinate properties which the extremes had towards each other are sublated. It is indeed in accordance with the concept, but the animating principle of differentiation does not exist in it, since it has sunk back into immediacy; the neutral is therefore something separable. But the judging principle, which sunders the neutral into differentiated extremes and gives the indifferent object in general its difference and animation towards another, and the process as tensing separation, falls outside that first process.

Addition. The chemical process is still a finite, conditioned process. The concept as such is as yet only the inner of this process and does not yet come to concrete existence here in its being-for-itself. In the neutral product the process is extinguished, and what excites it falls outside it.

§ 203

But the externality of these two processes, the reduction of the differentiated to the neutral and the differentiation of the indifferent or neutral, which lets them appear as self-standing towards each other, shows their finitude in the passing over into products in which they are sublated. Conversely, the process presents the presupposed immediacy of the differentiated objects as a null one. – Through this negation of the externality and immediacy in which the concept as object was sunk, it is posited as free and for itself over against that externality and immediacy – as purpose.

Addition. The transition from chemism to the teleological relationship is contained in the two forms of the chemical process mutually sublating each other. What thereby comes about is the becoming free of the concept, which in chemism and in mechanism is present only in itself, and the concept thus existing for itself is purpose.

The Doctrine of the Concept → B. The Object → c. Teleology
§ 204

Purpose is the concept being for itself that has stepped into free concrete existence by means of the negation of immediate objectivity. It is determined as subjective, since this negation is at first abstract and therefore for the time being merely stands over against objectivity. But this determinacy of subjectivity is one-sided with respect to the totality of the concept, and indeed for the concept itself, since all determinacy has posited itself in it as sublated. So for it too the presupposed object is only an ideal reality, null in itself. As this contradiction of its identity with itself against the negation and opposition posited in it, it is itself the sublating, the activity of negating the opposition in such a way that it posits it as identical with itself. This is the realizing of purpose, in which, by making itself into the other of its subjectivity and objectifying itself, it has sublated the difference of the two, has joined itself together only with itself and preserved itself.

The concept of purpose, held on the one hand to be superfluous, has otherwise rightly been called a concept of reason and set over against the abstract universal of the understanding, which relates itself only subsumingly to the particular, which it does not have in itself. – Further, the difference of purpose as final cause from the merely efficient cause, i.e. the cause usually so called, is of the highest importance. The cause belongs to necessity not yet unveiled, blind necessity; it therefore appears as passing over into its other and losing its originality therein in being posited; only in itself or for us is the cause first cause in the effect and going back into itself. Purpose, by contrast, is posited as containing in itself the determinacy, or what there still appears as otherness, the effect, so that in its efficacy it does not pass over but preserves itself, i.e. it effects only itself and is at the end what it was in the beginning, in its originality; only through this self-preservation is there what is truly original. – Purpose requires a speculative grasp, as the concept which itself, in the proper unity and ideality of its determinations, contains judgement or negation, the opposition of subjective and objective, and is just as much the sublating of it. With purpose one must not immediately, or not merely, think of the form in which it is in consciousness as a determination present in representation. With the concept of inner purposiveness Kant reawakened the Idea in general and in particular that of life. Aristotle‘s determination of life already contains inner purposiveness and therefore stands infinitely far above the concept of modern teleology, which had before it only finite, external purposiveness. Need and drive are the nearest examples of purpose. They are the felt contradiction that takes place within the living subject itself, and they pass into the activity of negating this negation, which is still mere subjectivity. Satisfaction establishes peace between subject and object, in that the objective, which in the still present contradiction (the need) stands over there, is likewise sublated as regards this its one-sidedness through union with the subjective. – Those who speak so much of the fixity and insuperability of the finite, both of the subjective and of the objective, have in every drive the example of the opposite. Drive is, so to speak, the certainty that the subjective is only one-sided and has no truth, any more than the objective. Drive is further the carrying out of this its certainty; it brings it about that this opposition – the subjective that is supposed to be and remain only something subjective, as well as the objective that is likewise supposed to be and remain only something objective – and this their finitude are sublated. With regard to the activity of purpose it may further be pointed out that in the syllogism that it is, joining purpose together with itself through the means of realization, the negation of the terminorum essentially occurs; – the negation just mentioned of the immediate subjectivity occurring in purpose as such, as well as of the immediate objectivity (of the means and of the presupposed objects). This is the same negation that is exercised in the elevation of spirit to God against the contingent things of the world as well as against one’s own subjectivity; it is the moment which, as mentioned in the Introduction and § 192, is overlooked and left out in the form of syllogisms of the understanding given to this elevation in the so-called proofs of God’s existence.

§ 205

The teleological relation, as immediate, is at first external purposiveness, and the concept stands over against the object as a presupposed one. Purpose is therefore finite, partly as regards its content, partly in that it has an external condition in an object to be found as the material of its realization; its self-determination is to that extent only formal. More precisely, it lies in immediacy that particularity (as form-determination, the subjectivity of purpose), as reflected into itself, the content, appears as distinct from the totality of form, from subjectivity in itself, the concept. This diversity constitutes the finitude of purpose within itself. The content is thereby something just as limited, contingent and given as the object is something particular and found.

Addition. When purpose is spoken of, one usually has in view only external purposiveness. In this way of considering things, things do not count as bearing their determination within themselves but merely as means, which are used and used up for the realization of a purpose lying outside them. This is in general the point of view of utility, which formerly played a great role in the sciences too, but has since fallen into deserved discredit and been recognized as insufficient for true insight into the nature of things. Finite things as such must indeed be given their due by regarding them as something not final and as pointing beyond themselves. This negativity of finite things is, however, their own dialectic, and in order to cognize it one must first engage with their positive content. Insofar, moreover, as the teleological way of considering things is concerned with the well-meant interest of pointing out the wisdom of God manifesting itself notably in nature, it must be remarked that with this searching out of purposes which things serve as means one does not get beyond the finite and easily falls into meagre reflections, as, for example, when not only the vine is considered from the point of view of the familiar use it affords man, but also the cork tree in relation to the corks that are cut from its bark to stop wine bottles. Whole books were formerly written in this sense, and it is easy to gauge that neither the true interest of religion nor that of science can be furthered in this way. External purposiveness stands immediately before the Idea, but what thus stands on the threshold is often precisely the most inadequate.

§ 206

The teleological relation is the syllogism in which the subjective purpose joins itself together with the objectivity external to it through a middle which is the unity of both, as purposive activity and as the objectivity posited immediately under the purpose, the means.

Addition. The development of purpose into the Idea proceeds through the three stages: first, of subjective purpose, second, of purpose accomplishing itself, and third, of accomplished purpose. – First we have subjective purpose, and this, as the concept being for itself, is itself the totality of the moments of the concept. The first of these moments is that of universality identical with itself, as it were the neutral first water in which everything is contained but nothing is yet separated. The second is then the particularization of this universal, whereby it receives a determinate content. Since this determinate content is then posited through the activity of the universal, the universal returns through it to itself and joins itself together with itself [schließt sich zusammen]. Accordingly we also say, when we set ourselves a purpose, that we resolve [beschließen] on something, and so regard ourselves at first as it were as open and accessible to this or that determination. But likewise it is then also said that one has made up one’s mind [sich entschlossen, literally: unlocked oneself] to something, which expresses that the subject steps out of its inwardness that is only for itself and engages with the objectivity standing over against it. This then gives the advance from merely subjective purpose to purposive activity turned outward.

§ 207

1. Subjective purpose is the syllogism in which the universal concept joins itself together through particularity with singularity in such a way that singularity, as self-determination, judges, i.e. both particularizes that still undetermined universal and makes it into a determinate content, and posits the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity – and is in itself at the same time the return into itself, in that it determines the subjectivity of the concept, presupposed over against objectivity, as something deficient in comparison with the totality joined together within itself, and thereby at the same time turns outward.

§ 208

2. This activity turned outward, as the singularity that is identical in subjective purpose with particularity – in which, besides the content, external objectivity is also included – relates itself, first, immediately to the object and takes possession of it as a means. The concept is this immediate power because it is negativity identical with itself, in which the being of the object is determined throughout only as an ideal one. – The whole middle is now this inner power of the concept as activity, with which the object as means is immediately united and under which it stands.

In finite purposiveness the middle is this, broken into the two moments external to each other, the activity and the object that serves as means. The relation of purpose as power to this object, and the subjugation of it to itself, is immediate – it is the first premiss of the syllogism – insofar as in the concept, as ideality being for itself, the object is posited as null in itself. This relation or first premiss itself becomes the middle, which is at the same time the syllogism within itself, in that purpose joins itself together with objectivity through this relation, its activity, in which it remains contained and dominant.

Addition. The carrying out of purpose is the mediated way of realizing purpose; but immediate realization is just as necessary. Purpose seizes the object immediately because it is the power over the object, because particularity is contained in it, and in particularity objectivity too. – The living being has a body; the soul takes possession of it and has immediately objectified itself in it. The human soul has much to do in making its corporeality into its means. Man must, as it were, first take possession of his body so that it may be the instrument of his soul.

§ 209

3. Purposive activity with its means is still directed outward, because purpose is also not identical with the object; therefore it too must first be mediated with it. The means, as object, stands in this second premiss in immediate relation with the other extreme of the syllogism, objectivity as presupposed, the material. This relation is the sphere of mechanism and chemism, now serving purpose, whose truth and free concept purpose is. That subjective purpose, as the power over these processes in which the objective wears itself out on itself and sublates itself, keeps itself outside them and is what preserves itself in them, is the cunning of reason.

Addition. Reason is as cunning as it is powerful. Cunning consists in general in the mediating activity which, by letting objects act on one another in accordance with their own nature and wear themselves out on one another, without itself interfering immediately in this process, nevertheless brings only its purpose to fulfilment. In this sense one can say that divine providence behaves towards the world and its process as absolute cunning. God lets men go their way with their particular passions and interests, and what comes about thereby is the accomplishment of his intentions, which are something other than what those he makes use of were at first concerned with.

§ 210

Realized purpose is thus the posited unity of subjective and objective. But this unity is essentially determined in such a way that subjective and objective are neutralized and sublated only as regards their one-sidedness, while the objective is subjected and made adequate to purpose as the free concept, and thereby as the power over it. Purpose preserves itself against and in the objective because, besides being the one-sided subjective, the particular, it is also the concrete universal, the identity of both that is in itself. This universal, as simply reflected into itself, is the content, which remains the same through all three terminos of the syllogism and their movement.

§ 211

In finite purposiveness, however, the carried-out purpose too is something just as broken within itself as the middle and the initial purpose were. What has come about is therefore only a form posited externally on the material found at hand, which, because of the limited content of the purpose, is likewise a contingent determination. The purpose attained is therefore only an object which is in turn means or material for other purposes, and so on to infinity.

§ 212

But what happens in itself in the realizing of purpose is that one-sided subjectivity and the semblance of the objective self-standingness present over against it are sublated. In seizing the means the concept posits itself as the essence of the object that is in itself; in the mechanical and chemical processes the self-standingness of the object has already evaporated in itself, and in their course under the dominion of purpose the semblance of that self-standingness, the negative over against the concept, sublates itself. But in that the carried-out purpose is determined only as means and material, this object is at once already posited as something null in itself, merely ideal. With this the opposition of content and form has also disappeared. Since purpose, through the sublation of the form-determinations, joins itself together with itself, form is posited as identical with itself, thereby as content, so that the concept, as form-activity, has only itself as its content. Through this process, then, what the concept of purpose was is in general posited: the unity of subjective and objective that is in itself, now as being for itself – the Idea.

Addition. The finitude of purpose consists in the fact that, in its realization, the material used as means for it is only externally subsumed under it and made adequate to it. But in fact the object is in itself the concept, and when the concept, as purpose, is realized in it, this is only the manifestation of its own inner. Objectivity is thus, as it were, only a husk under which the concept lies hidden. In the finite we cannot experience or see that purpose is truly attained. The accomplishment of the infinite purpose thus consists only in sublating the illusion that it is not yet accomplished. The good, the absolutely good, accomplishes itself eternally in the world, and the result is that it is already accomplished in and for itself and does not first need to wait for us. It is this illusion in which we live, and at the same time it alone is what activates, on which interest in the world rests. The Idea in its process makes that illusion for itself, posits an other over against itself, and its doing consists in sublating this illusion. Only out of this error does truth emerge, and herein lies reconciliation with error and with finitude. Otherness or error, as sublated, is itself a necessary moment of truth, which is only by making itself its own result.

The Doctrine of the Concept → C. The Idea
§ 213

The Idea is the true in and for itself, the absolute unity of concept and objectivity. Its ideal content is none other than the concept in its determinations; its real content is only its presentation, which it gives itself in the form of external existence and [which], with this shape enclosed in its ideality, in its power, it thus preserves itself in.

The definition of the absolute, that it is the Idea, is now itself absolute. All previous definitions go back into this one. – The Idea is truth; for truth is this, that objectivity corresponds to the concept – not that external things correspond to my representations; these are only correct representations which I, this one, have. In the Idea it is not a matter of this one, nor of representations, nor of external things. – But everything actual too, insofar as it is something true, is the Idea and has its truth solely through and by virtue of the Idea. Singular being is some side of the Idea; for it, therefore, still other actualities are needed, which likewise appear as particular and subsisting for themselves; in them together and in their relation alone is the concept realized. The singular for itself does not correspond to its concept; this limitedness of its existence constitutes its finitude and its perishing. The Idea itself is not to be taken as an idea of something or other, any more than the concept merely as determinate concept. The absolute is the universal and one Idea, which, as judging, particularizes itself into the system of determinate ideas, which however are only this: to go back into the one Idea, into their truth. It is out of this judgement that the Idea is at first only the one universal substance, but its developed, true actuality is that it is as subject and so as spirit. The Idea is frequently taken for something merely formal and logical, insofar as it supposedly does not have a concrete existence as its starting point and support. One must leave such a view to the standpoints for which the existing thing and all further determinations not yet penetrated to the Idea still count as so-called realities and true actualities. – Equally false is the representation that the Idea is only the abstract. It is so indeed insofar as everything untrue is consumed in it; but in itself it is essentially concrete, because it is the free concept determining itself and thereby itself to reality. It would only be the formally abstract if the concept, which is its principle, were taken as abstract unity and not, as it is, as the negative return of itself into itself and as subjectivity.

Addition. By truth one understands, first, that I know how something is. This, however, is truth only in relation to consciousness, or formal truth, mere correctness. By contrast, truth in the deeper sense consists in objectivity being identical with the concept. It is this deeper sense of truth that is at issue when, for example, a true state or a true work of art is spoken of. These objects are true when they are what they ought to be, i.e. when their reality corresponds to their concept. So understood, the untrue is the same as what is otherwise also called the bad. A bad man is an untrue man, i.e. a man who does not behave in accordance with his concept or his vocation. Nothing at all, however, can subsist entirely without identity of concept and reality. Even the bad and untrue is only insofar as its reality still somehow behaves in accordance with its concept. What is thoroughly bad or contrary to the concept is precisely for that reason something falling apart within itself. It is the concept alone through which the things in the world have their subsistence, i.e. in the language of religious representation: things are what they are only through the divine and therefore creative thought indwelling in them. – When the Idea is spoken of, one must not represent by it something distant and beyond. The Idea is rather what is thoroughly present, and it is likewise found in every consciousness, even if clouded and stunted. – We represent the world as a great whole created by God, and indeed in such a way that God has made himself known to us in it. Likewise we regard the world as governed by divine providence, and this implies that the asunderness of the world is eternally led back to the unity from which it emerged and preserved in accordance with it. – In philosophy nothing else has ever been at issue than the thinking cognition of the Idea, and everything that deserves the name of philosophy has always had as its basis the consciousness of an absolute unity of what counts for the understanding only in its separation. – That the Idea is the truth, the proof for this is not first to be demanded now; the whole previous exposition and development of thinking contains this proof. The Idea is the result of this course, which however is not to be understood as though it were only something mediated, i.e. mediated by something other than itself. Rather the Idea is its own result and as such is just as much immediate as mediated. The stages of being and essence considered so far, and likewise of the concept and of objectivity, are in this their difference not something fixed and resting on itself; rather they have proved to be dialectical, and their truth is only this, to be moments of the Idea.

§ 214

The Idea can be grasped as reason (this is the proper philosophical meaning of reason), further as subject-object, as the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and the infinite, of soul and body, as the possibility that has its actuality in itself, as that whose nature can be comprehended only as existing and so on, because all the relationships of the understanding are contained in it, but in their infinite return and identity within themselves.

The understanding has an easy job showing everything that is said of the Idea to be self-contradictory. This can just as well be paid back to it, or rather it is already accomplished in the Idea; – a work which is the work of reason and certainly not as easy as its own. – When the understanding shows that the Idea contradicts itself because, for example, the subjective is only subjective and the objective rather opposed to it, being is something quite other than the concept and therefore cannot be picked out of it, likewise the finite is only finite and precisely the opposite of the infinite, thus not identical with it, and so on through all determinations, logic rather shows the opposite, namely that the subjective that is supposed to be only subjective, the finite that is supposed to be only finite, the infinite that is supposed to be only infinite and so forth, has no truth, contradicts itself and passes over into its opposite, whereby this passing over and the unity in which the extremes are as sublated, as a shining or moments, reveals itself as their truth. The understanding that sets about the Idea is the double misunderstanding, first, that it takes the extremes of the Idea, however they may be expressed, insofar as they are in their unity, still in the sense and determination in which they are not in their concrete unity but are still abstractions outside it. No less does it misconstrue the relation, even when it is already expressly posited; thus, for example, it overlooks even the nature of the copula in judgement, which says of the singular, the subject, that the singular is just as much not singular but universal. – Secondly, the understanding takes its reflection, that the Idea identical with itself contains the negative of itself, contradiction, for an external reflection that does not fall within the Idea itself. In fact, however, this is not a wisdom peculiar to the understanding; rather the Idea is itself the dialectic which eternally separates and distinguishes what is identical with itself from what is differentiated, the subjective from the objective, the finite from the infinite, the soul from the body, and only to that extent is eternal creation, eternal vitality and eternal spirit. Since it is thus itself the passing over, or rather the translating of itself, into the abstract understanding, it is just as eternally reason; it is the dialectic which brings this understanding, diverse being back to an understanding about its finite nature and the false semblance of the self-standingness of its productions, and leads it back into unity. Since this double movement is not temporal, nor in any way separated and distinguished – otherwise it would again be only abstract understanding – it is the eternal intuiting of itself in the other; the concept that has carried itself out in its objectivity, the object that is inner purposiveness, essential subjectivity. The various ways of grasping the Idea, as unity of the ideal and real, of the finite and infinite, of identity and difference and so forth, are more or less formal, since they designate some stage of the determinate concept. Only the concept itself is free and the truly universal; in the Idea, therefore, its determinacy is likewise only itself – an objectivity into which it continues itself as the universal and in which it has only its own, the total determinacy. The Idea is the infinite judgement, each of whose sides is the self-standing totality and, precisely by each completing itself into that, has just as much passed over into the other. None of the otherwise determinate concepts is this totality completed in both its sides other than the concept itself and objectivity.

§ 215

The Idea is essentially process, because its identity is the absolute and free identity of the concept only insofar as it is absolute negativity and therefore dialectical. It is the course whereby the concept, as the universality that is singularity, determines itself to objectivity and to the opposition against it, and this externality, which has the concept as its substance, leads itself back through its immanent dialectic into subjectivity.

Because the Idea is a) process, the expression for the absolute “the unity of the finite and infinite, of thinking and being etc.” is, as has often been remarked, false; for unity expresses abstract, calmly persisting identity. Because it is b) subjectivity, that expression is likewise false, for that unity expresses the in-itself, the substantial of true unity. The infinite thus appears as merely neutralized with the finite, the subjective likewise with the objective, thinking with being. But in the negative unity of the Idea the infinite overreaches the finite, thinking overreaches being, subjectivity overreaches objectivity. The unity of the Idea is subjectivity, thinking, infinity, and is thereby essentially to be distinguished from the Idea as substance, just as this overreaching subjectivity, thinking, infinity is to be distinguished from one-sided subjectivity, one-sided thinking, one-sided infinity, to which it lowers itself in judging and determining.

Addition. The Idea, as process, runs through three stages in its development. The first form of the Idea is life, i.e. the Idea in the form of immediacy. The second form is then that of mediation or difference, and this is the Idea as cognition, which appears in the double shape of the theoretical and the practical Idea. The process of cognition has as its result the restoration of the unity enriched by difference, and this gives the third form of the Idea, now absolute, which last stage of the logical process at the same time proves itself to be the truly first and that which is only through itself.

The Doctrine of the Concept → C. The Idea → a. Life
§ 216

→ Groundlines § 161

The immediate Idea is life. The concept is realized as soul in a body; of the body’s externality the soul is the immediate self-relating universality, likewise its particularization, so that the body expresses in it no differences other than the determination of the concept, and finally singularity as infinite negativity – the dialectic of its objectivity existing asunder, which is led back out of the semblance of self-standing subsistence into subjectivity, so that all members are mutually momentary means as well as momentary purposes, and life, as it is the initial particularization, results as the negative unity being for itself and in corporeality, as dialectical, joins itself together only with itself. – So life is essentially a living being and, according to its immediacy, this singular living being. Finitude has in this sphere the determination that, on account of the immediacy of the Idea, soul and body are separable; this constitutes the mortality of the living. But only insofar as it is dead are those two sides of the Idea different component parts.

Addition. The single members of the body are what they are only through their unity and in relation to it. Thus, for example, a hand that is cut off from the body is a hand only in name, but not in substance, as Aristotle already remarks. – From the standpoint of the understanding life is usually regarded as a mystery and in general as incomprehensible. But the understanding thereby only confesses its finitude and nullity. Life is in fact so little something incomprehensible that in it we have rather the concept itself before us, and more precisely the immediate Idea existing as concept. With this the defect of life is also at once expressed. This defect consists in the fact that here concept and reality do not yet truly correspond to each other. The concept of life is the soul, and this concept has the body as its reality. The soul is, as it were, poured out into its corporeality, and so it is as yet only sentient, but not yet free being-for-itself. The process of life then consists in overcoming the immediacy in which it is still caught, and this process, which is itself again threefold, has as its result the Idea in the form of judgement, i.e. the Idea as cognition.

§ 217

The living being is the syllogism whose moments are themselves systems and syllogisms within themselves (§§ 198, 201, 207), which however are active syllogisms, processes, and in the subjective unity of the living being are only one process. The living being is thus the process of its joining together with itself, which runs its course through three processes.

§ 218

1. The first is the process of the living being within itself, in which it sunders itself in itself and makes its corporeality into its object, its inorganic nature. This, as the relatively external, enters in itself into the difference and opposition of its moments, which give themselves up to one another, assimilate one another and preserve themselves by producing themselves. But this activity of the members is only the one activity of the subject, into which their productions go back, so that in it only the subject is produced, i.e. it only reproduces itself.

Addition. The process of the living being within itself has in nature the threefold form of sensibility, irritability and reproduction. As sensibility the living being is immediately simple relation to itself, the soul, which is everywhere present in its body, whose asunderness has no truth for it. As irritability the living being appears sundered within itself, and as reproduction it is constantly restoring itself out of the inner difference of its members and organs. The living being is only as this process within itself, continually renewing itself.

§ 219

2. But the judgement of the concept, as free, proceeds to release the objective from itself as a self-standing totality, and the negative relation of the living being to itself, as immediate singularity, makes the presupposition of an inorganic nature standing over against it. Since this negative of itself is just as much a moment of the concept of the living being itself, it is in the latter, which is at the same time the concrete universal, as a lack. The dialectic through which the object, as null in itself, sublates itself is the activity of the living being certain of itself, which in this process against an inorganic nature thereby preserves itself, develops and objectifies itself.

Addition. The living being stands over against an inorganic nature, to which it relates as its power and which it assimilates. The result of this process is not, as in the chemical process, a neutral product in which the self-standingness of the two sides that stood over against each other is sublated; rather the living being proves to overreach its other, which cannot withstand its power. Inorganic nature, which is subjugated by the living being, suffers this because it is in itself the same as what life is for itself. The living being thus only comes together with itself in the other. When the soul has fled from the body, the elemental powers of objectivity begin their play. These powers are, so to speak, constantly on the point of beginning their process in the organic body, and life is the constant struggle against this.

§ 220

3. Since the living individual, which in its first process behaves within itself as subject and concept, assimilates its external objectivity through its second and so posits real determinacy within itself, it is now in itself genus, substantial universality. The particularization of this is the relation of the subject to another subject of its genus, and the judgement is the relationship of the genus to these individuals so determined against each other; – sexual difference.

§ 221

The process of the genus brings it to being-for-itself. Its product, because life is still the immediate Idea, falls apart into two sides: according to the one, the living individual in general, which was at first presupposed as immediate, now emerges as something mediated and generated; according to the other, however, living singularity, which on account of its first immediacy relates negatively to universality, perishes in this as the power.

Addition. The living being dies because it is the contradiction of being in itself the universal, the genus, and yet existing immediately only as a singular. In death the genus proves itself to be the power over the immediately singular. – For the animal the process of the genus is the highest point of its vitality. But it does not attain to being for itself in its genus; rather it succumbs to the genus’s power. The immediately living being mediates itself with itself in the process of the genus and so raises itself above its immediacy, but only to sink back into it again and again. Life thereby at first runs its course only into the bad infinity of the progress to infinity. What, however, comes about according to the concept through the process of life is the sublation and overcoming of the immediacy in which the Idea, as life, is still caught.

§ 222

But the Idea of life has thereby freed itself not only from some one (particular) immediate this, but from this first immediacy in general; it thereby comes to itself, to its truth; it thereby enters concrete existence for itself as free genus. The death of merely immediate singular vitality is the emergence of spirit.

The Doctrine of the Concept → C. The Idea → b. Cognition
§ 223

The Idea exists freely for itself insofar as it has universality as the element of its concrete existence, or objectivity is itself as the concept, the Idea has itself as its object. Its subjectivity, determined to universality, is pure distinguishing within itself – intuiting that keeps itself in this identical universality. But as determinate distinguishing it is the further judgement of repelling itself from itself as totality, and indeed first of presupposing itself as an external universe. These are two judgements which are identical in themselves but not yet posited as identical.

§ 224

The relation of these two Ideas, which are identical in themselves or as life, is thus the relative one, which constitutes the determination of finitude in this sphere. It is the relationship of reflection, since the distinguishing of the Idea within itself is only the first judgement, the presupposing not yet as a positing, and for the subjective Idea, therefore, the objective is the immediate world found at hand, or the Idea as life in the appearance of singular concrete existence. At the same time, insofar as this judgement is pure distinguishing within itself (preceding §), it is for itself itself and its other; thus it is the certainty of the identity of this objective world with it that is in itself. – Reason comes to the world with the absolute faith that it can posit the identity and raise its certainty to truth, and with the drive to posit as null also the opposition that is null for it in itself.

§ 225

This process is in general cognition. In itself, in it, in one activity, the opposition – the one-sidedness of subjectivity together with the one-sidedness of objectivity – is sublated. But this sublating happens at first only in itself; the process as such is therefore immediately itself afflicted with the finitude of this sphere and falls apart into the double movement of the drive, posited as diverse: to sublate the one-sidedness of the subjectivity of the Idea by taking the world that is into itself, into subjective representing and thinking, and to fill the abstract certainty of itself with this objectivity, thus counting as true, as content; – and conversely to sublate the one-sidedness of the objective world, which here, on the contrary, counts only as a semblance, a collection of contingencies and shapes null in themselves, to determine it through the inner of the subjective, which here counts as the truly existing objective, and to build this into it. The former is the drive of knowing towards truth, cognition as such, the theoretical activity of the Idea; the latter the drive of the good towards accomplishing it, willing, the practical activity of the Idea.

The Doctrine of the Concept → C. The Idea → b. Cognition → α. Cognition
§ 226

The general finitude of cognition, which lies in the one judgement, the presupposition of the opposition (§ 224), against which its doing is itself the implanted contradiction, determines itself more precisely in its own Idea in such a way that the Idea’s moments receive the form of diversity from one another and, while they are indeed complete, come to stand to one another in the relationship of reflection, not of the concept. The assimilation of the material as something given therefore appears as its reception into conceptual determinations that at the same time remain external to it and likewise appear in diversity against one another. It is reason active as understanding. The truth to which this cognition comes is therefore likewise only finite truth; the infinite truth of the concept is fixed for it as a goal that is only in itself, a beyond. But in its external doing it stands under the guidance of the concept, and the concept’s determinations make up the inner thread of the advance.

Addition. The finitude of cognition lies in the presupposition of a world found at hand, and the cognizing subject appears here as a tabula rasa. This representation has been ascribed to Aristotle, although no one is further from this external conception of cognition than precisely Aristotle. This cognition does not yet know itself as the activity of the concept, which it is only in itself but not for itself. Its conduct appears to itself as passive; in fact, however, it is active.

§ 227

Finite cognition, since it presupposes the distinct as something existing found at hand and standing over against it – the manifold facts of external nature or of consciousness – has, 1., first, as the form of its activity formal identity or the abstraction of universality. This activity therefore consists in dissolving the given concrete, singularizing its differences and giving them the form of abstract universality; or in leaving the concrete as ground and, by abstracting from particularities that seem inessential, singling out a concrete universal, the genus or force and law; – analytic method.

Addition. One usually speaks of analytic and synthetic method as though it were merely a matter of our choice to follow the one or the other. This, however, is by no means the case; rather it is the form of the objects to be cognized themselves on which it depends which of the two methods named, resulting from the concept of finite cognition, is to be applied. Cognition is at first analytic; the object has for it the shape of singularization, and the activity of analytic cognition is directed to leading the singular lying before it back to a universal. Thinking has here only the meaning of abstraction or formal identity. This is the standpoint on which Locke and all empiricists stand. Many say that cognition can do nothing more at all than break the given concrete objects down into their abstract elements and then consider these in their isolation. It is at once evident, however, that this is a perversion of things and that cognition, which wants to take things as they are, thereby falls into contradiction with itself. Thus, for example, the chemist puts a piece of meat in his retort, tortures it in many ways and then says he has found that it consists of nitrogen, carbon, hydrogen etc. But these abstract substances are then no longer meat. It is the same when the empirical psychologist breaks an action down into the various sides it presents to consideration and then holds these fast in their separation. The object treated analytically is here regarded, as it were, as an onion from which one peels off one skin after another.

§ 228

This universality is, 2., also a determinate one; the activity here proceeds along the moments of the concept, which in finite cognition is not in its infinity but is the determinate concept of the understanding. The reception of the object into its forms is the synthetic method.

Addition. The movement of the synthetic method is the reverse of the analytic method. Whereas the latter, starting from the singular, advances to the universal, in the former, by contrast, the universal (as definition) forms the starting point, from which one advances through particularization (in division) to the singular (the theorem). The synthetic method thus proves to be the development of the moments of the concept in the object.

§ 229

aa) The object, brought by cognition first into the form of the determinate concept in general, so that its genus and its universal determinacy are thereby posited, is the definition. Its material and grounding are supplied by the analytic method (§ 227). The determinacy, however, is supposed to be only a mark, i.e. for the purpose of cognition external to the object, merely subjective.

Addition. Definition itself contains the three moments of the concept: the universal, as the proximate genus (genus proximum), the particular, as the determinacy of the genus (qualitas specifica), and the singular, as the defined object itself. – With definition the question first arises where it comes from, and this question is in general to be answered by saying that definitions arise analytically. But with this the occasion for dispute about the correctness of the definition set up is also at once given, for it depends on which perceptions one started from and which points of view one had in mind. The richer the object to be defined, i.e. the more different sides it presents to consideration, the more different the definitions set up of it usually turn out. Thus, for example, there is a whole host of definitions of life, of the state etc. Geometry, by contrast, has an easy time making definitions, since its object, space, is so abstract. – Further, there is in general no necessity with regard to the content of the defined objects. One has to accept that there is a space, that there are plants, animals etc., and it is not the business of geometry, botany etc. to show the necessity of these objects. For this very reason the synthetic method is as little suited to philosophy as the analytic, for philosophy has above all to justify itself regarding the necessity of its objects. Nevertheless, attempts have repeatedly been made in philosophy too to use the synthetic method. Thus notably Spinoza begins with definitions and says, for example: substance is causa sui. In his definitions the most speculative is laid down, but in the form of assurances. The same then also holds of Schelling.

§ 230

bb) The statement of the second moment of the concept, the determinacy of the universal as particularization, is division, according to some external consideration.

Addition. Of division it is required that it be complete, and this requires a principle or ground of division so constituted that the division based on it comprises the whole extent of the domain designated in general by the definition. More precisely, what matters in division is that its principle be taken from the nature of the object to be divided itself, and the division thus be made natural and not merely artificial, i.e. arbitrary. Thus, for example, in zoology, in the division of mammals, the teeth and claws are chiefly used as ground of division, and this is sensible insofar as the mammals themselves are distinguished from one another by these parts of their body, and the general type of their various classes is to be traced back to them. – In general, true division is to be regarded as determined by the concept. It is to that extent at first threefold; but since particularity presents itself as something double, division thereby also advances to fourfoldness. In the sphere of spirit the trichotomous predominates, and it is among Kant’s merits to have drawn attention to this circumstance.

§ 231

cc) In concrete singularity, such that the determinacy that is simple in the definition is grasped as a relationship, the object is a synthetic relation of distinct determinations; – a theorem. Their identity, because they are diverse, is a mediated one. Bringing up the material that makes up the middle terms is construction, and the mediation itself, from which the necessity of that relation emerges for cognition, is proof.

According to the usual accounts of the difference between the synthetic and analytic method, it appears on the whole a matter of choice which one wants to use. If the concrete, which according to the synthetic method is presented as result, is presupposed, then the abstract determinations which made up the presuppositions and the material for the proof can be analysed out of it as consequences. The algebraic definitions of curved lines are theorems in the geometrical procedure; so too the Pythagorean theorem, if taken as the definition of the right-angled triangle, would yield by analysis the theorems previously proved in geometry for its sake. The arbitrariness of the choice rests on the fact that the one method as well as the other starts from something externally presupposed. According to the nature of the concept, analysing is the first, since it must first raise the given empirical-concrete material into the form of universal abstractions, which can only then be placed at the head as definitions in the synthetic method. That these methods, so essential and of such brilliant success in their own field, are useless for philosophical cognition is self-evident, since they have presuppositions and cognition behaves in them as understanding and as advancing by formal identity. In Spinoza, who used the geometrical method above all, and indeed for speculative concepts, its formalism at once becomes striking. The Wolffian philosophy, which developed it into the most extensive pedantry, is also, as regards its content, metaphysics of the understanding. – In place of the abuse that was practised with the formalism of these methods in philosophy and in the sciences, the abuse with so-called construction has stepped in in more recent times. Through Kant the notion had been put into circulation that mathematics constructs its concepts; this said nothing other than that it deals not with concepts but with abstract determinations of sensible intuitions. And so the statement of sensible determinations picked up from perception, bypassing the concept, and the further formalism of classifying philosophical and scientific objects in tables according to a presupposed schema, otherwise at will and discretion, has been called a construction of concepts. There lies in the background, no doubt, an obscure representation of the Idea, of the unity of concept and objectivity, and also that the Idea is concrete. But that game of so-called constructing is far from presenting this unity, which only the concept as such is, and just as little is the sensibly concrete of intuition a concrete of reason and of the Idea. Because, moreover, geometry deals with the sensible but abstract intuition of space, it can fix simple determinations of the understanding in it unhindered; it alone therefore has the synthetic method of finite cognition in its perfection. In its course, however, it finally comes up against – what is very remarkable – incommensurabilities and irrationalities, where, if it wants to go further in determining, it is driven beyond the principle of the understanding. Here too, as often elsewhere, the inversion occurs in terminology that what is called rational is the understandable, while what is called irrational is rather a beginning and trace of rationality. Other sciences, when they come to the limit of their understanding advance – which necessarily and often happens to them, since they are not situated in the simplicity of space or number – help themselves out in an easy way. They break off its consistency and take up what they need, often the opposite of what preceded, from outside, from representation, opinion, perception or wherever else. The unconsciousness of this finite cognition about the nature of its method and its relationship to the content lets it recognize neither that in its advance through definitions, divisions and so on it is led on by the necessity of the determinations of the concept, nor where it is at its limit, nor, when it has crossed it, that it finds itself in a field where the determinations of the understanding no longer hold, which it nevertheless crudely still uses there.

§ 232

The necessity that finite cognition produces in proof is at first an external one, determined only for subjective insight. But in necessity as such it has itself left behind its presupposition and starting point, the finding at hand and being given of its content. Necessity as such is in itself the self-relating concept. The subjective Idea has thus come in itself to what is determined in and for itself, the non-given, and therefore to that as immanent in the subject, and passes over into the Idea of willing.

Addition. The necessity at which cognition arrives through proof is the opposite of what forms its starting point. At its starting point cognition had a given and contingent content; but now, at the close of its movement, it knows the content as a necessary one, and this necessity is mediated by subjective activity. Likewise subjectivity was at first quite abstractly a mere tabula rasa, whereas it now proves to be determining. Herein, however, lies the transition from the Idea of cognition to the Idea of willing. This transition consists more precisely in the fact that the universal is to be grasped in its truth as subjectivity, as the concept that moves, is active and posits determinations.

The Doctrine of the Concept → C. The Idea → b. Cognition → β. Willing
§ 233

→ Groundlines § 141

The subjective Idea, as what is determined in and for itself and as simple content equal to itself, is the good. Its drive to realize itself has the reverse relationship to the Idea of the true and aims rather at determining the world found at hand according to its purpose. – This willing has on the one hand the certainty of the nullity of the presupposed object, but on the other hand, as finite, it at the same time presupposes the purpose of the good as merely subjective Idea and the self-standingness of the object.

§ 234

→ Groundlines § 141

The finitude of this activity is therefore the contradiction that in the self-contradictory determinations of the objective world the purpose of the good is just as much carried out as not, that it is posited as inessential as much as essential, as actual and at the same time as merely possible. This contradiction represents itself as the infinite progress of the actualization of the good, which is fixed in it only as an ought. Formally, however, the disappearance of this contradiction lies in the activity’s sublating the subjectivity of purpose and thereby objectivity, the opposition through which both are finite, and not only the one-sidedness of this subjectivity but subjectivity in general; another such subjectivity, i.e. a new generation of the opposition, is not distinct from that which was supposed to be a previous one. This return into itself is at the same time the inward recollection of the content, which is the good and the identity of both sides that is in itself – the recollection of the presupposition of theoretical conduct (§ 224), that the object is what is substantial and true in it.

Addition. Whereas intelligence is concerned only with taking the world as it is, the will by contrast aims at first making the world into what it ought to be. The immediate, what is found at hand, counts for the will not as a fixed being but only as a semblance, as something null in itself. Here occur the contradictions in which one drifts about on the standpoint of morality. This is in general, in practical respects, the standpoint of the Kantian and also still of the Fichtean philosophy. The good is to be realized; one has to work at bringing it forth, and the will is only the good activating itself. But if the world then were as it ought to be, the activity of the will would thereby fall away. The will therefore itself demands that its purpose also not be realized. The finitude of the will is thereby correctly expressed. But one must not stop at this finitude, and it is the process of the will itself through which it and the contradiction contained in it are sublated. Reconciliation consists in the will returning in its result to the presupposition of cognition, thus in the unity of the theoretical and practical Idea. The will knows the purpose as its own, and intelligence grasps the world as the actual concept. This is the true position of rational cognition. What is null and vanishing makes up only the surface, not the true essence of the world. This is the concept being in and for itself, and the world is thus itself the Idea. Unsatisfied striving disappears when we cognize that the final purpose of the world is just as much accomplished as it eternally accomplishes itself. This is in general the position of the mature man, while youth thinks the world lies wholly in wickedness and something quite different must first be made of it. The religious consciousness, by contrast, regards the world as governed by divine providence and thus as corresponding to what it ought to be. This agreement of is and ought is, however, not a rigid and processless one; for the good, the final purpose of the world, is only by constantly bringing itself forth, and between the spiritual and the natural world there then still remains the difference that, while the latter only constantly returns into itself, in the former there is indeed also progress.

§ 235

→ Groundlines § 141

The truth of the good is thereby posited as the unity of the theoretical and practical Idea: that the good is attained in and for itself – that the objective world is thus in and for itself the Idea, just as it at the same time eternally posits itself as purpose and through activity brings forth its actuality. – This life, which has come back to itself from the difference and finitude of cognition and has become identical with the concept through the concept’s activity, is the speculative or absolute Idea.

The Doctrine of the Concept → C. The Idea → c. The Absolute Idea
§ 236

→ Groundlines § 141

The Idea as unity of the subjective and the objective Idea is the concept of the Idea, for which the Idea as such is the ob-ject, for which the object is the Idea; – an object in which all determinations have come together. This unity is thus absolute truth and all truth, the Idea thinking itself, and indeed here as thinking, as logical Idea.

Addition. The absolute Idea is first the unity of the theoretical and the practical Idea and thereby at the same time the unity of the Idea of life and the Idea of cognition. In cognition we had the Idea in the shape of difference, and the process of cognition has shown itself to us as the overcoming of this difference and as the restoration of that unity which, as such and in its immediacy, is at first the Idea of life. The defect of life consists in its being as yet only the Idea in itself; cognition, by contrast, is just as one-sidedly the Idea only for itself. The unity and truth of these two is the Idea in and for itself, and thereby absolute Idea. – Up to now we have had the Idea in its development through its various stages as our object; but now the Idea is objective to itself. This is the νόησις νοήσεως [thinking of thinking], which Aristotle already designated as the highest form of the Idea.

§ 237

The absolute Idea is for itself, because there is no passing over or presupposing in it, and in general no determinacy that would not be fluid and transparent, the pure form of the concept, which intuits its content as itself. It is content to itself insofar as it is the ideal distinguishing of itself from itself, and the one of the terms distinguished is identity with itself, in which, however, the totality of form is contained as the system of the determinations of content. This content is the system of the logical. As form nothing remains to the Idea here but the method of this content – the determinate knowing of the currency of its moments.

Addition. When the absolute Idea is spoken of, one may think that here at last the real thing will come, that here everything must come out. One can certainly declaim at length and without substance about the absolute Idea; the true content, however, is none other than the whole system whose development we have considered so far. Accordingly it can also be said that the absolute Idea is the universal, but the universal not merely as abstract form, over against which the particular content stands as an other, but as the absolute form into which all determinations, the whole fullness of the content posited by it, have gone back. The absolute Idea is in this respect to be compared with the old man who utters the same religious propositions as the child, but for whom they have the meaning of his whole life. Even if the child understands the religious content, it counts for him only as something outside which the whole of life and the whole world still lie. – It is the same, then, with human life in general and the events that make up its content. All work is directed only towards the goal, and when this is reached one is astonished to find nothing other than just what one wanted. The interest lies in the whole movement. When a man pursues his life, the end may appear to him very limited, but it is the whole decursus vitae that is gathered together in it. – So too the content of the absolute Idea is the whole expanse that we have had before us so far. The last thing is the insight that the whole unfolding makes up the content and the interest. – Further, this is the philosophical view, that everything which, taken for itself, appears as something limited receives its value from belonging to the whole and being a moment of the Idea. Thus it is that we have had the content, and what we still have is the knowledge that the content is the living development of the Idea, and this simple retrospect is contained in the form. Each of the stages considered so far is an image of the absolute, but at first in a limited way, and so it drives itself on to the whole, whose unfolding is what we have designated as method.

§ 238

→ Groundlines § 2 · Groundlines § 31

The moments of the speculative method are α) the beginning, which is being or the immediate; for itself, for the simple reason that it is the beginning. But from the standpoint of the speculative Idea it is its self-determining, which, as the absolute negativity or movement of the concept, judges and posits itself as the negative of itself. Being, which for the beginning as such appears as abstract affirmation, is thus rather negation, positedness, mediatedness in general and presupposedness. But as the negation of the concept, which in its otherness is absolutely identical with itself and the certainty of itself, it is the concept not yet posited as concept, or the concept in itself. – This being is therefore, as the still undetermined concept, i.e. the concept determined only in itself or immediately, just as much the universal.

The beginning, in the sense of immediate being, is taken from intuition and perception – the beginning of the analytic method of finite cognition; in the sense of universality it is the beginning of its synthetic method. But since the logical is immediately just as much universal as existing, just as much presupposed by the concept to itself as immediately the concept itself, its beginning is just as much a synthetic as an analytic beginning.

Addition. The philosophical method is both analytic and synthetic, but not in the sense of a mere juxtaposition or a mere alternation of these two methods of finite cognition, but rather in such a way that it contains them within itself as sublated and accordingly behaves in each of its movements as analytic and synthetic at once. Philosophical thinking proceeds analytically insofar as it merely takes up its object, the Idea, lets it have its way and, as it were, merely watches its movement and development. Philosophizing is to that extent wholly passive. But just as much philosophical thinking is synthetic and proves to be the activity of the concept itself. This, however, requires the effort of keeping away from oneself one’s own fancies and particular opinions, which always want to push themselves forward.

§ 239

→ Groundlines § 2 · Groundlines § 31

β) The advance is the posited judgement of the Idea. The immediate universal, as the concept in itself, is the dialectic of lowering in itself its immediacy and universality to a moment. With this the negative of the beginning, or the first in its determinacy, is posited; it is for one, the relation of distinct terms – moment of reflection.

This advance is just as much analytic, since through the immanent dialectic only what is contained in the immediate concept is posited, – as synthetic, because in this concept this difference was not yet posited.

Addition. In the advance of the Idea the beginning proves to be what it is in itself, namely the posited and mediated and not the existing and immediate. Only for consciousness that is itself immediate is nature the initial and immediate and spirit what is mediated by it. In fact, however, nature is what is posited by spirit, and it is spirit itself that makes nature its presupposition.

§ 240

→ Groundlines § 2 · Groundlines § 31

The abstract form of the advance is, in being, an other and passing over into an other; in essence, shining in the opposite; in the concept, the distinctness of the singular from universality, which as such continues itself into what is distinct from it and is as identity with it.

§ 241

→ Groundlines § 2 · Groundlines § 31

In the second sphere the concept, at first being in itself, has come to shining and is thus in itself already the Idea. – The development of this sphere becomes a going back into the first, just as that of the first is a passing over into the second; only through this double movement does difference receive its due, in that each of the two distinct terms, considered in itself, completes itself into totality and therein activates itself into unity with the other. Only the self-sublating of the one-sidedness of both in themselves keeps the unity from becoming one-sided.

§ 242

→ Groundlines § 2 · Groundlines § 31

The second sphere develops the relation of the distinct terms into what it at first is, into contradiction in itself – in the infinite progress – which resolves itself γ) into the end, that the differentiated is posited as what it is in the concept. It is the negative of the first and, as identity with it, the negativity of itself; thereby the unity in which these two firsts are as ideal and as moments, as sublated, i.e. at the same time as preserved. The concept, thus joining itself together with itself from its being-in-itself by means of its difference and the sublation of this, is the realized concept, i.e. the concept containing the positedness of its determinations in its being-for-itself – the Idea, for which at the same time, as the absolutely first (in the method), this end is only the disappearance of the semblance that the beginning was something immediate and it a result; – the cognition that the Idea is the one totality.

§ 243

The method is in this way not external form but the soul and the concept of the content, from which it is distinguished only insofar as the moments of the concept also come, in themselves, in their determinacy, to appear as the totality of the concept. Since this determinacy, or the content, leads itself back together with the form to the Idea, the Idea presents itself as systematic totality, which is only one Idea, whose particular moments are just as much the same in themselves as they bring forth, through the dialectic of the concept, the simple being-for-itself of the Idea. – In this way science concludes by grasping the concept of itself, as of the pure Idea for which the Idea is.

§ 244

The Idea that is for itself, considered according to this its unity with itself, is intuiting; and the intuiting Idea is nature. But as intuiting the Idea is posited in the one-sided determination of immediacy or negation through external reflection. The absolute freedom of the Idea, however, is that it does not merely pass over into life, nor let life shine within it as finite cognition, but in the absolute truth of itself resolves to release freely from itself the moment of its particularity or of first determining and otherness, the immediate Idea as its reflection, as nature.

Addition. We have now returned to the concept of the Idea with which we began. At the same time this return to the beginning is an advance. What we began with was being, abstract being, and now we have the Idea as being; but this existing Idea is nature.

DE