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112

c) Since I preserve my subjectivity in carrying out my purposes (§ 110), I thereby sublate, in this objectification, this subjectivity at the same time as immediate, that is, as this single subjectivity of mine. But this external subjectivity, thus identical with me, is the will of others (§ 73). — The ground of the existence of the will is now subjectivity (§ 106), and the will of others is at the same time another existence that I give to my purpose. — The carrying out of my purpose therefore has within it this identity of my will and the will of others — it has a positive relation to the will of others.

The objectivity of the purpose that has been carried out thus contains within it three meanings, or rather contains in one the three moments: α) to be an external, immediate existence (§ 109); β) to be appropriate to the concept (§ 112); γ) to be a universal subjectivity. The subjectivity that preserves itself in this objectivity consists, α) in that the objective purpose is mine, so that I preserve myself as this particular self within it (§ 110); β) and γ) of subjectivity have already coincided with moments β) and γ) of objectivity. — That these determinations, thus distinguishing themselves on the moral standpoint, are united only in contradiction, constitutes, more precisely, the appearance, or the finitude, of this sphere (§ 108), and the development of this standpoint is the development of these contradictions and their resolutions, which, however, within this standpoint, can only be relative.

DE

Comments

2 responses to “112”

  1. Hegel (Notes) Avatar
    Hegel (Notes)

    Objectivity – here is universal subjectivity –
    The external existence of the subject is essentially at once the will of others
    – being for another – i.e. subjective will
    Presupposition, material – other subjectivity
    conditioned doing – bringing-forth of an alteration of existence, i.e. a determinacy that has a relation to the will of others –

  2. Eduard Gans (Additions) Avatar
    Eduard Gans (Additions)

    In connection with abstract right it had been said that it contains only prohibitions, so that the strictly rightful action has, with regard to the will of others, only a negative determination. In morality, by contrast, the determination of my will in relation to the will of others is positive, that is, the subjective will has, in what it realizes, the will that is in itself as something inward. Here there is present a bringing-forth or an alteration of existence, and this stands in relation to the will of others. The concept of morality is the inward relation of the will to itself. But here there is not merely one will; rather, the objectification carries within it at the same time the determination that the single will sublates itself therein, and thus, precisely because the determination of one-sidedness falls away, two wills and a positive relation of these to one another are posited. In right it does not matter whether the will of others wants something in relation to my will, which gives itself existence in property. In morality, by contrast, it is a matter of the welfare of others as well, and this positive relation can first occur here.

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