[p. 347]
|347| potency, is the object of universal government; it provides for the need which is a universal one, and for it in general.
The movement of the whole is a constant separation of the universal and particular and a subsumption of the latter under the former; this particular, however, is the subsisting separation, and therefore in it the moments of the absolute, or the form, are imprinted as outside and alongside one another, and the movement is just as manifoldly determined.
The particular against which the universal moves, in the potency of difference turned outwards and of hidden identity, determines the movement as directed towards annihilation; for that which is posited absolutely as particular and cannot bring forth identity, thus is not absolute concept, intelligence, can become one with the universal only through annihilation.
But the particular itself as absolute concept, and as organic totality, as a people, is a particular, and herewith both are against one another; insofar as they posit themselves as ideally negated, the side of the negation of the absolute concept, and not ideally as subsisting, they do not recognise one another. The people which finds itself not recognised must produce this being-recognised, through war, or colonies.
But the self-constituting individuality is in the second potency not itself potency which takes its inorganic, the absolute concept which stands over against it, into itself, and makes it really, absolutely one with itself; through war there is only a recognising; an ideal equating; a true, living one.
Since government is a subsuming of the particular under the universal, in this concept the moments of the universality opposed to the particular, and then the subsumption, can be distinguished, and this subsumption is in turn a twofold one, namely the ideal and the real; the former in which it is the formal universality under which the particular is placed, the latter the
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