Category: Paragraph

61

Since the substance of the thing, in itself, which is my property, is its externality, i.e. its lack of substantiality — it is not, as against me, an end in itself (§ 42) — and since this realized externality is the use or utilization I make of it, the entire use or utilization is the…
62

Only a partial or temporary use, and likewise a partial or temporary possession (as itself the partial or temporary possibility of using the thing), belonging to me, is therefore distinct from the ownership of the thing itself. If the entire compass of use were mine, while the abstract ownership were to belong to another, then…
63

The thing, in use, is a single thing, determinate in quality and quantity, and related to a specific need. But its specific usefulness is, at the same time, quantitatively determinate and comparable with other things of the same usefulness, just as the specific need which it serves is at once need in general, and, according…
64

The form given to possession, and the sign, are themselves external circumstances, without the subjective presence of the will, which alone constitutes their meaning and value. But this presence — which is the use, utilization, or other manifestation of the will — falls within time, with respect to which objectivity consists in the continuance of…
65

C. Alienation of Property I can alienate my property, since it is mine only insofar as I place my will in it — so that I may release my thing altogether from myself as ownerless (derelict) or surrender it to another’s will to be possessed — but only insofar as the thing is, by its…
66

Inalienable, therefore, are those goods, or rather substantial determinations, and the right to them likewise imprescriptible, which constitute my own most personal being and the universal essence of my self-consciousness — such as my personality as such, my universal freedom of will, ethical life, and religion. That what spirit is according to its concept, or…
67

Of my particular, bodily and mental skills and my possibilities of activity, I can alienate individual products and a use limited in time from another,* because, by this limitation, they acquire an external relation to my totality and universality. Through the alienation of the whole of my time, as made concrete through work, and of…
68

What is peculiar to spiritual production can, through the manner of its expression, turn directly into such an externality of a thing that it can now equally be produced by others; so that, with its acquisition, the new owner — apart from thereby being able to make his own the communicated thoughts or the technical…
69

Since the acquirer of such a product possesses, in the copy as a single thing, its full use and value, he is a complete and free owner of it as a single thing, although the author of the writing or the inventor of the technical device remains the owner of the universal manner of multiplying…
70

The comprehensive totality of external activity — life — is, as against personality, which is itself this same and immediate totality, not something external. The alienation or sacrifice of life is, rather, the opposite of the existence of this personality. I therefore have, in general, no right to such alienation, and only an ethical Idea…
71

Transition from Property to Contract Determinate being [Dasein], as determinate being, is essentially being for another (see above, Rem. to § 48); property, on the side on which it is a determinate being as an external thing, is for other external things and stands within the connection of this necessity and contingency. But as the…
72

Second Section. Contract Property, of which the side of determinate being, or of externality, is no longer merely a thing but contains within itself the moment of a will (and hence of another will), comes about through contract — as the process in which the contradiction is displayed and mediated: that I am and remain…
73

I can alienate my property not merely (§ 65) as an external thing; rather, through the concept, I must alienate it as property, so that my will may be objective to me as existing. But according to this moment, my will, as alienated, is at the same time an other will. That, then, in which…
74

This relation is thus the mediation of a will identical in owners existing for themselves in absolute distinction, and it contains this: that each, through his own will and that of the other, ceases to be an owner, remains an owner, and becomes an owner; — the mediation of the will to give up one…
75

Since the two contracting parties relate to one another as immediate, self-subsistent persons, contract proceeds: α) from arbitrary will; β) the identical will that comes into determinate being through the contract is only one posited by them, and hence only common, not universal in and for itself; γ) the object of the contract is a…
76

Contract is formal insofar as the two acts of consent, through which the common will comes about — the negative moment of alienating a thing and the positive moment of accepting it — are distributed between the two contracting parties; — a contract of gift. It can, however, be called real insofar as each of…
77

Since, in the real contract, each party retains the same property with which he enters and which he at the same time gives up, that which remains identical distinguishes itself, as the property that is in itself present in the contract, from the external things which, in exchange, change their owner. That identical element is…
78

The distinction between ownership and possession, between the substantial and the external side (§ 45), becomes, in contract, the distinction between the common will as agreement and the actualization of that will through performance. That agreement, once arrived at, is, taken by itself in distinction from performance, something represented, to which, therefore, in accordance with…
79

The stipulation contains the side of the will, and hence the substantial element of what is rightful in the contract, as against which the possession still subsisting — insofar as the contract is not yet fulfilled — is, by itself, only the external element, which has its determination solely in that other side. Through the…
80

The classification of contracts, and an intelligent treatment of their kinds grounded upon it, is to be drawn not from external circumstances but from distinctions lying in the nature of contract itself. — These distinctions are those between formal and real contract, and then between ownership, and possession and use, value, and specific thing. There…