Category: Paragraph

81

In the relation of immediate persons to one another in general, their will is, just as much as it is in itself identical and posited by them in the contract as common, likewise a particular will. Because they are immediate persons, it is contingent whether their particular will accords with the will that is in…
82

Third Section. Wrong In the contract, right in itself is present as something posited, its inner universality as something common to arbitrary will and particular will. This appearance of right, in which right itself and its essential determinate being, the particular will, coincide immediately — that is, contingently — proceeds, in wrong, into semblance —…
83

Right, which, as something particular and hence manifold, as against its universality and simplicity existing in itself, acquires the form of a semblance, is such a semblance, in part, in itself or immediately; in part, it is posited, through the subject, as semblance; and in part, it is posited simply as null — unwitting or…
84

A. Non-Malicious Wrong Taking possession (§ 54) and contract, taken by themselves and according to their particular kinds — at first merely different manifestations and consequences of my will in general — are, since the will is the universal within itself, in relation to the recognition of others, grounds of right. It lies in their…
85

This collision, in which the thing is claimed on the basis of a ground of right, and which constitutes the sphere of civil litigation, contains the recognition of right as the universal and decisive factor, such that the thing shall belong to whoever has the right to it. The dispute concerns only the subsumption of…
86

In the parties, the recognition of right is bound up with an opposed particular interest, and with an opinion answering to it. Against this semblance, right in itself likewise emerges, within that very semblance (previous §), as represented and demanded. But it is, at first, only as an ought, since the will is not yet…
87

B. Fraud Right in itself, in its distinction from right as particular and existent, is indeed determined, as something demanded, to be the essential factor, but is thereby at the same time only something demanded — on this side, something merely subjective, and hence inessential and merely apparent. Right, the universal, thus reduced by the…
88

In the contract, I acquire a property on account of the particular character of the thing, and at the same time, in accordance with its inner universality, in part as to its value, in part as arising from the property of the other party. Through the arbitrary will of the other party, a false semblance…
89

That, as against this taking of the thing merely as this particular thing, and as against the merely opining as well as the arbitrary will, the objective or universal element should be recognizable in part as value, should in part hold good as right, and that the subjective arbitrariness opposed to right should in part…
90

C. Coercion and Crime That my will, in property, places itself into an external thing entails that it is, just as much as it is reflected into that thing, seized hold of within it and placed under necessity. In this it can, in part, suffer violence in general; in part, through violence, some sacrifice or…
91

As a living being, a human being can indeed be subdued — that is, his physical and otherwise external side can be brought under the power of others — but the free will as such cannot be coerced (§ 5), except insofar as he himself does not withdraw from the externality in which he is…
92

Because the will is Idea, or actually free, only insofar as it has determinate being, and the determinate being into which it has placed itself is the being of freedom, violence or coercion destroys itself immediately in its own concept, as a manifestation of a will that supersedes the manifestation or determinate being of a…
93

Coercion has, of this — that it destroys itself in its own concept — the real display in this: that coercion is superseded by coercion; it is, therefore, not merely conditionally rightful but necessary — namely, as a second coercion, which is the superseding of a first coercion. The violation of a contract through non-performance…
94

Abstract right is a right of coercion, because the wrong done against it is a violence against the existence of my freedom in an external thing, so that the preservation of this existence against the violence is itself likewise an external act and a violence superseding that first violence. To define abstract or strict right…
95

The first coercion, as violence exercised by one who is free, which violates the existence of freedom in its concrete sense — right as right — is crime, — a negatively infinite judgment in its complete sense (see my Logic, vol. II, p. 99), through which not only the particular, the subsumption of a thing…
96

Insofar as it is the existent will which alone can be violated, but this will, in its existence, has entered the sphere of a quantitative extent as well as qualitative determinations, and is accordingly variable, it likewise makes a difference for the objective side of crimes whether such existence and its determinacy is violated in…
97

The violation of right as right that has occurred is indeed a positive, external existence, but one that is in itself null. The manifestation of this nullity of theirs is the annihilation of that violation, entering into existence just as much — the actuality of right, as its necessity mediating itself with itself through the…
98

The violation, as affecting only external existence or possession, is an evil, a damage to some mode of property or estate; the sublation of the violation, as of a damaging, is civil satisfaction as compensation, insofar as such can take place at all. In this aspect of satisfaction, the universal character of the damage, as…
99

But the violation which befalls the will that exists in itself (and thus equally this will of the violator as much as of the violated and of all) has, in this will existing in itself as such, no positive existence, any more than in the mere product. For itself, this will existing in itself (right,…
100

The violation that befalls the criminal is not only just in itself — as just, it is at the same time his will existing in itself, an existence of his freedom, his right — but it is also a right done to the criminal himself, that is, it is posited in his existent will, in…