Tag: Actualization

The subjective point of departure for marriage can appear, more, as the particular inclination of the two persons who enter into this relationship, or as the provision and arrangement made by parents and so on; but its objective point of departure is the free consent of the persons — and specifically, their consent to constitute…

The ethical [aspect] of marriage consists in the consciousness of this unity as a substantial purpose, and thus in love, trust, and the sharing of the whole of individual existence — a disposition and actuality in which the natural drive is reduced to the modality of a natural moment, one destined to be extinguished precisely…

Just as the stipulation of the contract already contains, for itself, the true transfer of property (§ 79), so the solemn declaration of consent to the ethical bond of marriage, and the corresponding recognition and confirmation of it by the family and the community (that the church enters in, in this respect, is a further…

The one is, accordingly, the spiritual [element] as that which divides itself into personal self-subsistence that is for itself, and into the knowing and willing of free universality — the self-consciousness of comprehending thought and the willing of the objective final purpose; the other is the spiritual [element] preserving itself in unity, as the knowing…

Marriage is essentially monogamy, because it is personality — immediate, exclusive singularity — that enters into and gives itself over to this relationship; its truth and inwardness (the subjective form of substantiality) therefore arise only from the reciprocal, undivided devotion of this personality. This [personality] comes into its right, of being conscious of itself in…

Further, because it is this infinitely self-proper personality of the two sexes from whose free devotion marriage proceeds, it must not be concluded within a circle already naturally identical, already acquainted, and, in all its particulars, familiar to itself — a circle in which the individuals do not have, over against one another, a personality…

The family, as a person, has its external reality in a property, in which it has the existence of its substantial personality only in the form of resources.

The family, as a legal person against others, is to be represented by the man as its head. Further, it is he to whom acquisition from without, care for its needs, and the disposition and administration of the family’s resources chiefly belong. These resources are common property, so that no member of the family has…

Through a marriage a new family constitutes itself, which is something self-subsistent for itself over against the stocks or houses from which it proceeded; the connection with these has natural blood relationship as its basis, but the new family has ethical love [as its basis]. The property of an individual therefore also stands in essential…

Children have the right to be nourished and brought up out of the family’s common resources. The parents’ right to the services of the children, as services, is grounded in, and limited by, the common concern of the family in general. Likewise, the parents’ right over the arbitrary will of the children is determined by…

Children are in themselves free, and their life is the immediate existence solely of this freedom; they do not, therefore, belong to others, nor to their parents, as things. Their upbringing has, with respect to the family relationship, the positive determination that the ethical be brought, within them, to an immediate feeling still free of…

Because marriage is, at first, only the immediate ethical Idea, and thus has its objective actuality in the inwardness of subjective disposition and feeling, there lies in this the first contingency of its existence. Just as little as compulsion can take place to enter into marriage, just as little is there otherwise a merely legal,…

The ethical dissolution of the family consists in this: that the children, brought up to free personality, are, upon reaching their majority, recognized as legal persons, capable, in part, of having free property of their own, and, in part, of founding families of their own — the sons as heads, the daughters as wives —…

The natural dissolution of the family through the death of the parents, in particular of the man, has as its consequence inheritance with respect to the resources — an entry, by its essence, into the peculiar possession of resources that were, in themselves, held in common; an entry that becomes the more indeterminate, with the…

Through this falling apart there arises the freedom for the arbitrary will of individuals, in part, in general, to employ their resources more according to the liking, opinions, and purposes of their own particularity, and, in part, to regard, as it were, a circle of friends, acquaintances, and so on, in place of a family,…

The principle that the members of the family become self-subsistent legal persons (§ 177) allows something of this arbitrariness and distinction, among the natural heirs, to enter within the circle of the family — but it can take place only within the strictest limits, so as not to violate the fundamental relationship. The merely direct…

Particularity, for itself, on the one hand, as the satisfaction of its needs, of contingent arbitrary will, and of subjective liking, indulging itself in every direction, destroys itself and its substantial concept in its enjoyments; on the other hand, as infinitely excited, and, in its thoroughgoing dependence on external contingency and arbitrary will as well…

Likewise, the means for particularized needs, and, in general, the ways of their satisfaction, divide and multiply themselves — these means becoming, in turn, relative purposes and abstract needs — a multiplication proceeding into the infinite, which is, in just the same measure, a differentiation of these determinations and a judging of the suitability of…

Needs and means become, as real existence, a being for others, through whose needs and labour satisfaction is mutually conditioned. The abstraction that becomes a quality of needs and means (see the preceding §) also becomes a determination of the mutual relation of individuals to one another; this universality, as being recognized, is the moment…

This moment thus becomes a particular determination of purpose for the means themselves, and for their possession, as well as for the manner and way of satisfying needs. It further contains, immediately, the demand for equality with others in this respect; the need for this equality, on the one hand, and the making of oneself…