Tag: Actualization

Inalienable, therefore, are those goods, or rather substantial determinations, and the right to them likewise imprescriptible, which constitute my own most personal being and the universal essence of my self-consciousness — such as my personality as such, my universal freedom of will, ethical life, and religion. That what spirit is according to its concept, or…

Of my particular, bodily and mental skills and my possibilities of activity, I can alienate individual products and a use limited in time from another,* because, by this limitation, they acquire an external relation to my totality and universality. Through the alienation of the whole of my time, as made concrete through work, and of…

What is peculiar to spiritual production can, through the manner of its expression, turn directly into such an externality of a thing that it can now equally be produced by others; so that, with its acquisition, the new owner — apart from thereby being able to make his own the communicated thoughts or the technical…

Since the acquirer of such a product possesses, in the copy as a single thing, its full use and value, he is a complete and free owner of it as a single thing, although the author of the writing or the inventor of the technical device remains the owner of the universal manner of multiplying…

The comprehensive totality of external activity — life — is, as against personality, which is itself this same and immediate totality, not something external. The alienation or sacrifice of life is, rather, the opposite of the existence of this personality. I therefore have, in general, no right to such alienation, and only an ethical Idea…

Contract is formal insofar as the two acts of consent, through which the common will comes about — the negative moment of alienating a thing and the positive moment of accepting it — are distributed between the two contracting parties; — a contract of gift. It can, however, be called real insofar as each of…

Since, in the real contract, each party retains the same property with which he enters and which he at the same time gives up, that which remains identical distinguishes itself, as the property that is in itself present in the contract, from the external things which, in exchange, change their owner. That identical element is…

The distinction between ownership and possession, between the substantial and the external side (§ 45), becomes, in contract, the distinction between the common will as agreement and the actualization of that will through performance. That agreement, once arrived at, is, taken by itself in distinction from performance, something represented, to which, therefore, in accordance with…

The stipulation contains the side of the will, and hence the substantial element of what is rightful in the contract, as against which the possession still subsisting — insofar as the contract is not yet fulfilled — is, by itself, only the external element, which has its determination solely in that other side. Through the…

The classification of contracts, and an intelligent treatment of their kinds grounded upon it, is to be drawn not from external circumstances but from distinctions lying in the nature of contract itself. — These distinctions are those between formal and real contract, and then between ownership, and possession and use, value, and specific thing. There…

In the relation of immediate persons to one another in general, their will is, just as much as it is in itself identical and posited by them in the contract as common, likewise a particular will. Because they are immediate persons, it is contingent whether their particular will accords with the will that is in…

This collision, in which the thing is claimed on the basis of a ground of right, and which constitutes the sphere of civil litigation, contains the recognition of right as the universal and decisive factor, such that the thing shall belong to whoever has the right to it. The dispute concerns only the subsumption of…

In the parties, the recognition of right is bound up with an opposed particular interest, and with an opinion answering to it. Against this semblance, right in itself likewise emerges, within that very semblance (previous §), as represented and demanded. But it is, at first, only as an ought, since the will is not yet…

In the contract, I acquire a property on account of the particular character of the thing, and at the same time, in accordance with its inner universality, in part as to its value, in part as arising from the property of the other party. Through the arbitrary will of the other party, a false semblance…

That, as against this taking of the thing merely as this particular thing, and as against the merely opining as well as the arbitrary will, the objective or universal element should be recognizable in part as value, should in part hold good as right, and that the subjective arbitrariness opposed to right should in part…

Insofar as it is the existent will which alone can be violated, but this will, in its existence, has entered the sphere of a quantitative extent as well as qualitative determinations, and is accordingly variable, it likewise makes a difference for the objective side of crimes whether such existence and its determinacy is violated in…

The violation, as affecting only external existence or possession, is an evil, a damage to some mode of property or estate; the sublation of the violation, as of a damaging, is civil satisfaction as compensation, insofar as such can take place at all. In this aspect of satisfaction, the universal character of the damage, as…

It is, it is true, not my own deed if things of which I am the owner, and which, as external, stand in manifold connection and operation (as may also be the case with me myself, as a mechanical body or as a living thing), cause harm to others thereby. This falls to my charge,…

The particularity of the interests of the natural will, gathered into its simple totality, is personal existence as life. Life, in extreme danger and in collision with the rightful property of another, has a claim to a right of necessity (not as a matter of equity, but as a right), since, on the one side,…

The right that accrues to the individual on the basis of the unity of the family, and which is at first simply his life within this unity itself, comes forward in the form of right — as the abstract moment of determinate singularity — only to the extent that the family passes over into dissolution,…