Tag: Concept

The violation that befalls the criminal is not only just in itself — as just, it is at the same time his will existing in itself, an existence of his freedom, his right — but it is also a right done to the criminal himself, that is, it is posited in his existent will, in…

The sublation of crime is, to this extent, retribution, insofar as it is, according to the concept, a violation of the violation, and, according to existence, the crime has a determinate, qualitative and quantitative extent, and thus so too does its negation, as existence. This identity, resting on the concept, is however not the equality…

The sublation of crime, in this sphere of the immediacy of right, is at first revenge, just according to its content, insofar as it is retribution. But according to its form, it is the act of a subjective will, which can put its infinity into every violation that has occurred, and whose justice is therefore…

The demand that this contradiction (like the contradiction present in the other kind of wrong; § 86, § 89), which is present here in the manner in which the wrong is annulled, should be resolved, is the demand for a justice freed from subjective interest and shape as well as from the contingency of power…

Part Two. Morality The moral standpoint is the standpoint of the will insofar as the will is not merely in itself but is infinite for itself (previous §). This reflection of the will into itself, and its identity for itself as against being-in-itself and immediacy and the determinacies that develop therein, determines the person into…

Since subjectivity now constitutes the determinacy of the concept, and is distinguished from the concept as such — the will existing in itself — and since, indeed, the will of the subject, as the individual existing for itself, at the same time is (still having immediacy attached to it as well), subjectivity constitutes the existence…

The self-determination of the will is at the same time a moment of its concept, and subjectivity is not only the side of its existence but its own determination (§ 104). The will determined as subjective, free for itself, at first as concept, must itself have existence in order to be as Idea. The moral…

The subjective will, as immediately for itself and distinguished from the will existing in itself (§ 106 Remark), is therefore abstract, restricted, and formal. Subjectivity, however, is not merely formal but, as the infinite self-determining of the will, constitutes its formal element. Because, in this its first emergence in the individual will, it is not…

This formal element contains, according to its general determination, in the first place the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity and the activity relating itself thereto (§ 8) — whose moments, more closely considered, are these: existence and determinacy are identical in the concept (compare § 104), and the will as subjective is itself this concept…

This identity of content, however, receives, on the moral standpoint — where freedom, this identity of the will with itself, is for the will (§ 105) — its closer, distinctive determination. a) The content is, for me, determined as mine in such a way that, in its identity, it is not only my inner purpose…

b) The content, even though it contains something particular (this may be taken from wherever it will), has, as the content of the will that is reflected into itself in its determinacy, and hence identical with itself and universal, α) the determination of being appropriate, in itself, to the will existing in itself, or of…

c) Since I preserve my subjectivity in carrying out my purposes (§ 110), I thereby sublate, in this objectification, this subjectivity at the same time as immediate, that is, as this single subjectivity of mine. But this external subjectivity, thus identical with me, is the will of others (§ 73). — The ground of the…

The utterance of the will as subjective, or moral, is action. Action contains the determinations set forth: α) to be known by me, in its externality, as mine; β) the essential relation to the concept, as an ought; and γ) the relation to the will of others. Only the utterance of the moral will is…

The right of the moral will contains three sides: a) The abstract or formal right of the action — that, as it is carried out in immediate existence, its content in general is mine, so that it is the purpose of the subjective will. b) The particular aspect of the action is its inner content:…

First Section. Purpose and Responsibility The finitude of the subjective will in the immediacy of acting consists, immediately, in this: that for its acting it has a presupposed external object with manifold circumstances. The deed posits a change in this existence that lies before it, and the will has responsibility for this in general, insofar…

The will that itself acts has, in its purpose directed at the existence that lies before it, a representation of its circumstances. But because it is, on account of this presupposition, finite, the objective appearance is contingent for it and may contain in itself something other than what is in its representation. The right of…

The action, furthermore, as translated into external existence, which develops in every direction according to its connection within external necessity, has manifold consequences. The consequences, as the shape that has the purpose of the action for its soul, belong to the action (are what pertains to it) — but at the same time, as the…

Second Section. Intention and Welfare The external existence of the action is a manifold connection that can be regarded as infinitely divided into singularities, and the action may be regarded as touching, in the first instance, only such a single point. But the truth of the single is the universal, and the determinacy of the…

The right of intention is that the universal quality of the action should not merely be in itself, but should be known by the agent, and thus should already have lain in his subjective will; just as, conversely, the right of the objectivity of the action, as it may be called, is to assert itself,…

The universal quality of the action is the manifold content of the action in general, reduced to the simple form of universality. But the subject, as reflected into itself, and hence particular as against the objective particularity, has, in its purpose, its own particular content, which is the determining soul of the action. That this…