[p. 224]
|224| side of the deed but not the others. He is here represented as an absolute knowing in general, not merely as a relative and contingent one; or what he does is regarded in general as his deed. A part of him is not detached and rolled onto another being; e.g. Ajax, when he killed the cattle and sheep of the Greeks in the madness of rage that he had not received the arms of Achilles, did not put the guilt on his madness, as if he had been another being therein, but took the whole action upon himself as the doer and slew himself out of shame.
§ 18
If the will were not a universal one, there would be no proper laws, nothing that could truly oblige all. Everyone could act according to his pleasure and would not respect the arbitrary will of another. That the will is a universal one flows from the concept of its freedom. Human beings, considered according to their appearance, show themselves as very different in regard to the will in general, in character, custom, inclination, particular talents. To this extent they are particular individuals and differ from one another by nature. Each has talents and determinations in itself that the other lacks. These differences of individuals are no concern of the will in itself, because it is free. Freedom consists precisely in the indeterminacy of the will or [in this,] that it has no natural determinacy in itself. The will in itself is thus a universal will. The particularity or individuality of the human being does not stand in the way of the universality of the will, but is subordinate to it. An action that is rightful or moral or otherwise excellent is indeed done by an individual, but all assent to it. They thus recognise themselves or their own will therein. – It is the same case here as with works of art. Even those who could not have brought about such a work find
Leave a Reply
You must be logged in to post a comment.