[p. 222]
§ 14
The freedom of the will is freedom in general, and all other freedoms are merely species of it. When one says “freedom of the will”, it is not meant as if there were, apart from the will, a further force, property or faculty that also had freedom. Just as, when one speaks of the omnipotence of God, one does not understand thereby that there were other beings besides him who had omnipotence. There is thus civil freedom, freedom of the press, political and religious freedom. These species of freedom are the universal concept of freedom, in so far as it is applied to particular relations or objects. Freedom of religion consists in this, that religious representations and religious actions are not forced upon me, i.e. that there are in it only such determinations as I acknowledge as my own and make my own. A religion that is forced upon me, or in regard to which I do not behave as a free being, is not mine, but always remains foreign to me. – The political freedom of a people consists in constituting a state of its own and in deciding what counts as the universal national will either through the whole people itself or through those who belong to the people and whom it can acknowledge as its own, inasmuch as every other citizen has equal rights with them.
§ 15
One expresses oneself thus: my will has been determined by these motives, circumstances, stimulations and impulses. This expression contains, in the first place, that I have behaved passively therein. In truth, however, I have behaved not only passively but also essentially actively therein, namely in this, that my will has taken up these circumstances as motives and lets them count as motives. The relation of causality does not take place here. The circumstances do not behave as causes, nor my will as their effect. According to this relation
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