[p. 218]
|218| concluded with its immediate expression but has a further consequence, likewise necessary for the animal. It is a doing in which there lies a relation also to something else; e.g. the hauling together of grains by many animals. This is not yet the whole action, but there lies further beyond it a purpose, namely their nourishment for the future.
The drive is, in the first place, something inward, something that begins a movement from itself or brings forth an alteration out of itself. The drive proceeds from itself. It is indeed awakened by external circumstances, but notwithstanding was already present. It is not produced thereby. Mechanical causes produce merely external or mechanical effects, which are completely determined by their causes, in which therefore nothing is contained that is not already present in the cause; e.g. if I give a body motion, there is in it nothing but the communicated motion; or if I colour a body, it has nothing more than the communicated colour. On the other hand, if I act upon a living being, this action makes of it something quite other than it is immediately. The activity of the living being is thereby aroused to show itself out of itself in its peculiarity.
In the second place the drive is 1. restricted as to content, 2. contingent on the side of its satisfaction, as dependent on external circumstances. The drive does not go beyond its purpose and is insofar called blind. It satisfies itself, whatever the consequences may be.
To this extent the human being does not posit his drives himself, but has them immediately, or they belong to his nature. Nature, however, is subject to necessity, because everything in it is limited, relative, or is absolutely only in relation to something else. But what is in relation to something else is not for itself, but dependent on the other. It has its ground therein and is something
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