[p. 226]
|226| equality with myself, or freely, because, in that I am thus determined, I at the same time look upon myself as something foreign, or distinguish this being determined from myself, the I, because walking or seeing thus is not in me by nature, but because I have myself posited it in my will. To this extent it is manifestly at the same time also no foreign thing, because I have made it my own and have my will for myself therein.
This freedom is now a formal freedom, because with the equality with myself there is at the same time also inequality with myself present, or something limited is in me. When we speak of freedom in common life, we usually understand by it the arbitrary will or relative freedom, that I can do something or also refrain from it. – With a limited will we can have formal freedom in so far as we distinguish this determinate from ourselves or reflect upon it, i.e. that we are also beyond it. – When we are in passion or act driven by nature, we have no formal freedom. Because our I is wholly absorbed in this feeling, it does not seem to us to be something limited. Our I is not also at the same time out of it, does not distinguish itself from it.
§ 20
The absolutely free will distinguishes itself from the relatively free will or the arbitrary will in this, that the absolute has only itself as its object, the relative, however, something limited. The relative will, e.g. desire, is concerned merely with the object. The absolute, however, also distinguishes itself from obstinacy. This has in common with the absolute will that it is concerned not so much with the matter as rather with the will as will, that precisely its will be respected. The two are well to be distinguished. The obstinate person holds to his will merely because it is his will, without having a rational ground for it, i.e. without his will being something universally valid.
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