[p. 228]
|228| as its object according to these particular determinations. It has not the purpose of furthering him according to them or of rendering him any particular help in regard to them.
Second. Right does not depend on the intention one has therein. One can do something with a very good intention, but the action does not thereby become rightful, but can nevertheless be contrary to right. On the other side, an action, e.g. the assertion of my property, can be perfectly rightful and yet an evil intention be present therein, in that I am concerned not merely with right but rather with harming the other. This intention has no influence upon right as such.
Third. It does not depend on the conviction whether what I have to render is right or wrong. This is especially the case with punishment. One does indeed seek to convince the criminal that right is done to him. Yet this conviction or non-conviction has no influence on the right that is done to him.
Finally, right is also not concerned with the disposition with which something is accomplished. It is very often the case that one does what is right merely from fear of punishment or from fear of other unpleasant consequences in general, e.g. of losing one’s good name, one’s credit; or one can also, in fulfilling one’s right, have the disposition to be rewarded for it in the other life. Right as such, however, is independent of these dispositions.
§ 23
Right and morality are distinguished from one another. Something can very well be permitted according to right which morality forbids. Right, e.g., permits me the disposal of my property in an entirely indeterminate manner, but morality contains determinations which restrict the same. It can seem as if morality permits much that right does not permit, but morality demands not only the observance of right towards others, but rather adds to
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