The Doctrine of Right, Duties and Religion for the Lower Class

[p. 215]

|215| activity of abstracting pertains to it and with it the form of universality, as e.g. in the universal object “human being”. But the content of the universal object does not pertain to it, as abstracting, but is given to thinking and is present for itself independently of it.

To thinking there belong still manifold determinations which express a connection between the manifold appearances that is universal and necessary. The connection as it is in sensuous intuition is only an external or contingent one, which can be so or also not so. A stone, e.g., by its falling makes an impression in a soft mass. In sensuous intuition lies the falling of the stone and that thereupon, in time, there is a hollow in the mass where the stone touched it. These two appearances, the falling of the stone and the hollowing of the mass, have succeeded one another in time. But this connection contains as yet no necessity, but, according to the expression, under the same conditions the one could happen and the other not follow upon it. If, on the other hand, the relation of these two appearances to one another determines itself as a connection of cause and effect or as causality, then this connection is necessary or a connection of the understanding. It lies therein that, if under the same conditions the one happens, the other is contained therein.

These determinations are forms of thinking. Spirit posits them only out of itself, but they are at the same time determinations of what is. Only through reflection do we come to what ground and consequence, inner and outer, what is essential or inessential are. Spirit is not conscious thereby that it posits these determinations arbitrarily, but it expresses therein something that is present for itself without its contribution.

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