[p. 230]
|230| As a natural being he stands, on the one hand, under the dominion of external things, but on the other hand these inclinations and desires are something immediate, limited, unfree, or an other than his true will. Obedience to the law of reason is obedience in relation to my inessential nature, which stands under the dominion of something other for it. Yet on the other side it is independent determination out of himself, for precisely this law has its root in my essence.
The disposition is thus in morality an essential moment. It consists in this, that one does one’s duty because it is fitting so. It is thus an immoral disposition to do something from fear of punishment or in order to obtain a good opinion of oneself among others. This is a heterogeneous, i.e. alien motive, for it is not the ground of the matter itself, or one then regards right not as something that is in and for itself, but as something that is dependent on external determinations.
Nevertheless the consideration whether punishments or rewards are attached to an action is of importance, although the consequences do not constitute the worth of the action. The consequences of a good action can often draw much evil after them, an evil action, on the other hand, can also have good among its consequences. – In general, however, to think of the consequences of the action is important for this reason, that one thereby does not remain at the immediate point of view, but goes beyond it. Through its many-sided consideration one is also led to the nature of actions.
According to right, the human being is an object for the human being as an absolutely free being, according to morality, on the other hand, as an individual according to his particular existence as member of a family, as friend, as a character of such and such a kind, and so on. If the external circumstances in which the human being stands with others are so constituted that he fulfils his vocation, this is his
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