[p. 268]
|268| for others, thus of one’s inner and one’s actuality, and thereby nullity in itself.
§ 62
It also belongs especially to untruthfulness when what one means is supposed to be a good intention or disposition, whereas what one does is something evil. (This inequality between the disposition and what the action is in itself would at least be a clumsiness, but insofar as the agent is at all culpable, one who does evil is to be regarded as also meaning it evilly.)
§ 63
It presupposes a particular relation to have the right to tell someone the truth about his conduct. If one does this without having the right to it, one is untrue insofar as one sets up a relation to the other which does not obtain.
Explanation. On the one hand it is the first thing to tell the truth, insofar as one knows that it is true. It is ignoble not to tell the truth when it is in its right place to tell it, because one thereby debases oneself before oneself and the other. But one should also not tell the truth when one has no calling to it or not even a right. If one tells the truth merely in order to have done one’s part, without further result, then it is at least something superfluous, for what matters is not that I have said the thing, but that it comes about. Speaking is not yet the deed or action, which is higher. – The truth is told in the right place and at the right time when it serves to bring the matter about. Speech is an astonishingly great means, but great understanding belongs to using it correctly.
§ 64
Akin to slander, which is an actual lie, is
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