The Doctrine of Right, Duties and Religion for the Lower Class

[p. 206]

|206| satisfaction of the drive, or he halts it and renounces it.

§ 6

The will proper or the higher faculty of desire is 1. pure indeterminacy of the I, which as such has no limitation, nor a content immediately present through nature, and is in itself indifferent to every determinateness; 2. I can at the same time pass over to a determinateness and make the one or the other my own, which I then translate into actuality.

§ 7

The abstract freedom of the will consists, then, in that indeterminacy or equality of the I with itself, in which a determination is only insofar as it makes it its own or posits it in itself, but at the same time remains therein equal to itself and can abstract again from every determination. – Manifold stimuli, motives, laws can indeed be put before the will from outside, but if the human being follows them, this happens only insofar as the will itself makes them its own and has resolved upon them. – This is also the case with the determinations of the lower faculty of desire, or with what comes from the natural drives and inclinations.

§ 8

The will bears guilt 1. insofar as its determination is made its own only by itself or belongs to its resolution: I have willed; 2. insofar as a will knows the determinations which are produced by its action, as it lies in its resolution, or which are necessarily and immediately connected with it.

§ 9

The deed is in general the produced alteration and determination of existence. To the action, however, there belongs only

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