In the Introduction to the Groundlines Hegel presupposes the derivation of the free will and refers for it in § 4 Remark to his Encyclopaedia (Heidelberg 1817) §§ 363–399, in the numbering of the third edition §§ 443–482. This page gives the whole stretch: spirit as intelligence, the path from intuiting through representing to thinking, the transition into the will, and practical and free spirit up to the threshold of objective spirit. The §§ of practical and free spirit also appear as parallel-passage comments under the corresponding paragraphs of the Groundlines, there, however, without the Additions.
All three versions published in Hegel’s lifetime are reproduced: the third edition of 1830 with the Additions, the second of 1827 and the first of 1817. In the second and third editions the numbering runs the same; the first edition has its own numbering. Where Hegel expressly cites a passage in the Groundlines, or where a passage corresponds to a paragraph of the Introduction, the reference stands under the § heading.
Contents
| Topic | 1830 | 1827 | 1817 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spirit: concept and division | §§ 440–444 | §§ 440–444 | §§ 363–367 |
| Intuition | §§ 445–450 | §§ 445–450 | §§ 368–372 |
| Representation | §§ 451–464 | §§ 451–464 | §§ 373–383 |
| Thinking | §§ 465–468 | §§ 465–468 | §§ 384–387 |
| Practical spirit | §§ 469–480 | §§ 469–481 | §§ 388–399 |
| Free spirit | §§ 481–482 | (§§ 482–483) | (§§ 400–401) |
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1830), §§ 440–482
- Spirit: concept and division: § 440 · § 441 · § 442 · § 443 · § 444
- Intuition: § 445 · § 446 · § 447 · § 448 · § 449 · § 450
- Representation: § 451 · § 452 · § 453 · § 454 · § 455 · § 456 · § 457 · § 458 · § 459 · § 460 · § 461 · § 462 · § 463 · § 464
- Thinking: § 465 · § 466 · § 467 · § 468
- Practical spirit: § 469 · § 470 · § 471 · § 472 · § 473 · § 474 · § 475 · § 476 · § 477 · § 478 · § 479 · § 480
- Free spirit: § 481 · § 482
§ 440
Spirit has determined itself as the truth of the soul and of consciousness – of the former, that simple immediate totality, and of the latter, that knowing which now, as infinite form, is not restricted by that content, does not stand in relationship to it as object, but is knowing of the substantial totality, neither subjective nor objective. Spirit therefore begins only from its own being and relates only to its own determinations.
Psychology therefore considers the faculties or universal modes of activity of spirit as such, intuiting, representing, recollecting etc., desires etc., partly without the content which, according to appearance, is found in empirical representing, also in thinking as in desire and will, partly without the forms of being in the soul as natural determination, in consciousness itself as an object of it present for itself. This, however, is not an arbitrary abstraction; spirit is itself this: to be raised above nature and natural determinacy, as above entanglement with an external object, i.e. above the material in general; as its concept has resulted. It now has only this to do: to realize this concept of its freedom, i.e. only to sublate the form of immediacy with which it begins again. The content that is raised to intuitions is its sensations, just as [it is] its intuitions that are transformed into representations, and so forth representations that are transformed into thoughts etc.
Addition. Free spirit, or spirit as such, is reason as it separates itself on the one hand into pure, infinite form, into limitless knowing, and on the other hand into the object identical with this. This knowing has here as yet no further content than itself – with the determination that it comprehends all objectivity within itself, that consequently the object is not something coming to spirit from outside and ungraspable by it. So spirit is the absolutely universal certainty of itself, thoroughly without opposition. It therefore possesses the confidence that it will find itself in the world, that the world must be friendly to it, that, as Adam says of Eve that she is flesh of his flesh, so it has to seek in the world reason of its own reason. Reason has resulted for us as the unity of the subjective and objective, of the concept existing for itself and of reality. Since, therefore, spirit is absolute certainty of itself, knowing of reason, it is knowing of the unity of the subjective and objective – knowing that its object is the concept and the concept objective. Thereby free spirit shows itself as the unity of the two universal stages of development considered in the first and the second main part of the doctrine of subjective spirit – namely of the soul, this simple spiritual substance or immediate spirit, and of consciousness or appearing spirit, the self-separating of that substance. For the determinations of free spirit have the subjective in common with those of the soul, the objective, by contrast, with those of consciousness. The principle of free spirit is to posit what exists for consciousness as something of the soul and conversely to make what is of the soul into something objective. Like consciousness, it stands as one side over against the object and is at the same time both sides, thus totality, like the soul. Whereas, then, the soul was the truth only as immediate, unconscious totality, and whereas in consciousness, by contrast, this totality was separated into the I and the object external to it, so that knowing there still had no truth, free spirit is to be cognized as truth knowing itself. The knowing of truth, however, at first itself does not have the form of truth, for at the stage of development now reached it is still something abstract – the formal identity of the subjective and objective. Only when this identity has been developed further into actual difference and has made itself into the identity of itself and its difference, when spirit thus comes forth as totality determinately differentiated within itself, only then has that certainty come to its verification.
§ 441
The soul is finite insofar as it is immediately or naturally determined; consciousness, insofar as it has an object; spirit, insofar as it has, though no longer an object, a determinacy in its knowing, namely through its immediacy and, what is the same, through being subjective or as the concept. And it is indifferent what is determined as its concept and what as its reality. If absolutely infinite, objective reason is posited as its concept, then reality is knowing or intelligence; or if knowing is taken as the concept, then its reality is this reason, and the realization of knowing is to appropriate it. The finitude of spirit therefore consists in knowing not grasping the being-in-and-for-itself of its reason, or equally in reason not having brought itself to full manifestation in knowing. Reason is at the same time infinite only insofar as it is absolute freedom, and therefore presupposes itself to its knowing and thereby makes itself finite, and is the eternal movement of sublating this immediacy, comprehending itself and being knowing of reason.
Addition. Free spirit, as we have seen, is according to its concept complete unity of the subjective and objective, of form and content, consequently absolute totality and thus infinite, eternal. We have cognized it as knowing of reason. Because it is this, because it has the rational as its object, it must be designated as the infinite being-for-itself of subjectivity. It therefore belongs to the concept of spirit that in it the absolute unity of subjective and objective is not merely in itself but also for itself, thus an object of knowing. Because of this conscious harmony prevailing between knowing and its object, between form and content, excluding all separation and thereby all alteration, one can call spirit, according to its truth, the eternal as well as the completely blessed and holy. For only that may be called holy which is rational and knows of the rational. Therefore neither external nature nor mere sensation has a right to that name. Immediate sensation, not purified by rational knowing, is burdened with the determinacy of the natural, the contingent, of being-external-to-itself, of falling apart. In the content of sensation and of natural things, therefore, infinity consists only in something formal, abstract. Spirit, by contrast, is, according to its concept or its truth, infinite or eternal in this concrete and real sense, that in its difference it remains absolutely identical with itself. Therefore spirit must be declared to be the image of God, the divinity of man. But in its immediacy – for spirit as such too gives itself at first the form of immediacy – spirit is not yet truly spirit: there, rather, its concrete existence does not stand in absolute agreement with its concept, with the divine archetype; there the divine in it is only the essence that is still to be developed into complete appearance. Immediately, consequently, spirit has not yet grasped its concept; it is only rational knowing but does not yet know itself as such. Thus spirit, as was already said in the Addition to the preceding paragraph, is at first only the indeterminate certainty of reason, of the unity of the subjective and objective. Therefore it here still lacks the determinate cognition of the rationality of the object. To attain this, spirit must free the object, rational in itself, from the form of contingency, singularity and externality that at first clings to it, and thereby make itself free from relation to something other than itself. On the path of this liberation falls the finitude of spirit. For as long as it has not yet reached its goal, it does not yet know itself as absolutely identical with its object but finds itself limited by it. But the finitude of spirit must not be held to be something absolutely fixed; it must be cognized as a mode of appearance of spirit, which is nonetheless infinite according to its essence. This implies that finite spirit is immediately a contradiction, something untrue, and at the same time the process of sublating this untruth. This wrestling with the finite, the overcoming of the limit, makes up the stamp of the divine in the human spirit and forms a necessary stage of eternal spirit. If, therefore, one speaks of the limits of reason, this is even worse than talking of wooden iron would be. It is infinite spirit itself that presupposes itself as soul as well as consciousness and thereby makes itself finite, but equally posits this self-made presupposition, this finitude, the opposition of consciousness, sublated in itself, against the soul on the one hand and against an external object on the other, as sublated. This sublation has in free spirit a different form from that in consciousness. Whereas for consciousness the further determination of the I takes on the semblance of an alteration of the object independent of its activity, so that in consciousness the logical consideration of this alteration still fell to us alone, it is for free spirit that it itself brings forth from itself the developing and changing determinations of the object, that it itself makes objectivity subjective and subjectivity objective. The determinations known by it are indeed indwelling in the object, but at the same time posited by it. Nothing in it is something merely immediate. If, therefore, one speaks of “facts of consciousness” that are supposed to be the first for spirit and to have to remain something unmediated, merely given for it, it must be remarked that on the standpoint of consciousness much that is so given is indeed found, but that free spirit has not to leave these facts [Tatsachen] as self-standing things [Sachen] given to it, but to prove and thus explain them as deeds [Taten] of spirit, as a content posited by it.
§ 442
The advance of spirit is development insofar as its concrete existence, knowing, has within itself being determined in and for itself, i.e. the rational, as its import and purpose, so that the activity of translating is purely the formal transition into manifestation and therein return into itself. Insofar as knowing, burdened with its first determinacy, is as yet only abstract or formal, the goal of spirit is to bring forth objective fulfilment and thereby at the same time the freedom of its knowing.
Here one is not to think of the development of the individual connected with the anthropological, according to which the faculties and forces are regarded as coming forth one after another and expressing themselves in concrete existence – an advance on whose cognition great value was for a time laid (by the Condillacian philosophy), as though such supposed natural emergence were to set out the origin of these faculties and explain them. The tendency cannot be overlooked here to make the manifold modes of activity of spirit comprehensible in its unity and to show a connection of necessity. But the categories used for this are in general of a meagre kind. Above all the prevailing determination is that the sensuous is indeed rightly taken as the first, as the initial foundation, but that from this starting point the further determinations appear to emerge only in an affirmative way, and the negative of the activity of spirit, through which that material is spiritualized and sublated as sensuous, is misconstrued and overlooked. In that position the sensuous is not merely the empirical first but remains in such a way that it is supposed to be the truly substantial foundation. Likewise, if the activities of spirit are regarded only as expressions, forces in general, perhaps with the determination of utility, i.e. as purposive for some other interest of intelligence or of the heart, then no final purpose is present. This can only be the concept itself, and the activity of the concept can only have itself as its purpose: to sublate the form of immediacy or of subjectivity, to reach and grasp itself, to free itself to itself. In this way the so-called faculties of spirit in their distinctness are to be regarded only as stages of this liberation. And this alone is to be held to be the rational way of considering spirit and its various activities.
Addition. The concrete existence of spirit, knowing, is absolute form, i.e. form that has content within itself, or the concept existing as concept, giving itself its reality. That the content or object is something given to knowing, something coming to it from outside, is therefore only a semblance, through whose sublation spirit proves to be what it is in itself – namely absolute self-determining, the infinite negativity of what is external to it and to itself, the ideal that brings forth all reality out of itself. The advance of spirit consequently has only the sense that that semblance be sublated, that knowing prove itself to be the form developing all content out of itself. So far, then, from the activity of spirit being restricted to a mere reception of the given, it must rather be called a creative one, even though the productions of spirit, insofar as it is only subjective spirit, do not yet receive the form of immediate actuality but remain more or less ideal.
§ 443
Just as consciousness has as its object the preceding stage, the natural soul (§ 413), so spirit has, or rather makes, consciousness its object; i.e. since consciousness is only in itself the identity of the I with its other (§ 415), spirit posits this identity for itself, so that now it knows it, this concrete unity. Its productions are according to the rational determination that the content is both what is in itself and, according to freedom, its own. Thus, since in its beginning it is determined, this determinacy is the double one, that of what exists and that of what is its own; according to the former, to find something within itself as existing; according to the latter, to posit it only as its own. The path of spirit is therefore: a) to be theoretical, to have to do with the rational as its immediate determinacy and now to posit it as its own; or to free knowing from presupposition and thereby from its abstraction, and to make determinacy subjective. Since knowing, as thus determined in and for itself within itself, determinacy posited as its own, is thereby free intelligence, it is b) will, practical spirit, which at first is likewise formal, has a content as only its own, wills immediately, and now frees its determination of will from its subjectivity as the one-sided form of its content, so that c) it becomes objective to itself as free spirit, in which that double one-sidedness is sublated.
Addition. While one cannot well say of consciousness, since it has the object immediately, that it has a drive, spirit by contrast must be grasped as drive, because it is essentially activity, and indeed at first a) that activity through which the seemingly alien object receives, instead of the shape of something given, singularized and contingent, the form of something inwardized, subjective, universal, necessary and rational. By carrying out this alteration on the object, spirit reacts against the one-sidedness of consciousness, which relates to objects as immediately existing and does not know them as subjective, and is thus theoretical spirit. In this the drive of knowing prevails, the urge for knowledge. Of the content of knowledge I know that it is, has objectivity – and at the same time that it is in me, thus subjective. Here, then, the object no longer has, as on the standpoint of consciousness, the determination of something negative against the I. b) Practical spirit takes the reverse starting point; it begins not, like theoretical spirit, from the seemingly self-standing object, but from its purposes and interests, thus from subjective determinations, and only advances to making them into something objective. In doing so it reacts against the one-sided subjectivity of self-consciousness closed up within itself, just as theoretical spirit reacts against consciousness dependent on a given object. Theoretical and practical spirit therefore mutually complement each other, precisely because they are distinguished from each other in the way indicated. This difference, however, is not absolute, for theoretical spirit too deals with its own determinations, with thoughts; and conversely the purposes of the rational will are not something belonging to the particular subject but something being in and for itself. Both modes of spirit are forms of reason, for both in theoretical and in practical spirit, though on different paths, what reason consists in is brought forth: a unity of the subjective and objective. At the same time, however, those double forms of subjective spirit have in common the defect that in both one starts from the seeming separatedness of the subjective and objective, and the unity of these opposed determinations is only to be brought forth – a defect that lies in the nature of spirit, since spirit is not something existing, immediately complete, but rather what brings itself forth, pure activity, the sublating of the presupposition of the opposition of subjective and objective made in itself by itself.
§ 444
Theoretical as well as practical spirit are still in the sphere of subjective spirit in general. They are not to be distinguished as passive and active. Subjective spirit is productive; but its productions are formal. Inwardly, the production of theoretical spirit is only its ideal world and the gaining of abstract self-determination within itself. Practical spirit deals, it is true, only with self-determinations, with its own material, but one that is likewise still formal, and thus with a limited content, for which it gains the form of universality. Outwardly, since subjective spirit is unity of soul and consciousness, and thus also an existing reality, at once anthropological and in accordance with consciousness, its products are in the theoretical the word and in the practical (not yet deed and action) enjoyment.
Psychology, like logic, belongs to those sciences that in recent times have drawn the least benefit from the more general education of spirit and the deeper concept of reason, and it is still in an extremely bad state. It has indeed, through the turn of the Kantian philosophy, been given greater importance, even to the point that it, and indeed in its empirical state, is supposed to make up the foundation of metaphysics, as a science that is supposed to consist in nothing other than apprehending empirically the facts of human consciousness, and indeed as facts, as they are given, and dissecting them. With this position of psychology, in which it is mixed with forms from the standpoint of consciousness and with anthropology, nothing has changed for its state itself; it has only been added that, for metaphysics and philosophy in general, as for spirit as such, the cognition of the necessity of what is in and for itself, the concept and truth, has been renounced.
Addition. Only the soul is passive; free spirit, however, is essentially active, productive. One therefore errs when one sometimes distinguishes theoretical from practical spirit by designating the former as the passive and the latter as the active. In appearance this difference is indeed correct. Theoretical spirit seems only to take up what is present, whereas practical spirit is supposed to bring forth something not yet externally present. In truth, however, as already indicated in the Addition to § 442, theoretical spirit is not a merely passive taking up of an other, of a given object, but shows itself active in raising the content of the object, rational in itself, from the form of externality and singularity into the form of reason. Conversely, however, practical spirit too has a side of passivity, since its content is at first, although not from outside, nevertheless given inwardly, thus an immediate content not posited through the activity of the rational will, and is only to be made into such a posited content by means of thinking knowing, thus by means of theoretical spirit. No less untrue than the distinction of theoretical and practical just discussed must be declared the distinction according to which intelligence is supposed to be the limited and the will, by contrast, the unlimited. Quite the reverse, the will can be declared the more limited, because it engages in struggle with external, resistant matter, with the excluding singularity of the actual, and at the same time has other human wills over against it, whereas intelligence as such, in its expression, goes only as far as the word – this fleeting, vanishing, wholly ideal realization taking place in an unresisting element – thus remains completely with itself in its expression, satisfies itself within itself, proves itself to be an end in itself, the divine, and, in the form of comprehending cognition, brings about the unlimited freedom and reconciliation of spirit with itself. Both modes of subjective spirit, intelligence as well as will, have, however, at first only formal truth. For in both the content does not immediately correspond to the infinite form of knowing, so that this form is not yet truly fulfilled. In the theoretical the object does indeed become subjective on the one hand, but on the other hand a content of the object at first still remains outside unity with subjectivity. Therefore here the subjective forms only a form that does not absolutely penetrate the object, and so the object is not through and through something posited by spirit. – In the practical sphere, by contrast, the subjective immediately has as yet no true objectivity, since in its immediacy it is not something absolutely universal, being in and for itself, but something belonging to the singularity of the individual. When spirit has overcome the defect just presented, when its content is thus no longer at odds with its form, when the certainty of reason, of the unity of subjective and objective, is no longer formal but rather fulfilled, when accordingly the Idea forms the sole content of spirit, then subjective spirit has reached its goal and passes over into objective spirit. This knows its freedom, cognizes that its subjectivity in its truth makes up absolute objectivity itself, and grasps itself not merely within itself as Idea but brings itself forth as an externally present world of freedom.
338)*When, therefore, people assert that the truth cannot be cognized, this is the most extreme blasphemy. People do not know what they are saying here. If they knew it, they would deserve to have the truth taken from them. The modern despair of the cognizability of truth is alien to all speculative philosophy as to all genuine religiousness. A poet as religious as he is thinking, Dante, expresses his faith in the cognizability of truth in so pregnant a way that we take the liberty of communicating his words here. He says in the fourth canto of Paradise, lines 124–130: Io veggio ben che già mai non si sazia nostro intelletto, se ‘l ver non lo illustra di fuor dal qual nessun vero si spazia. Posasi in esso come fera in lustra, tosto che giunto l’ha; e giunger pòllo: se non, ciascun disio sarebbe frustra. [I see well that our intellect is never sated unless the truth illumines it, outside which no truth extends. It rests in it like a wild beast in its lair as soon as it has reached it; and it can reach it: if not, every desire would be in vain. – Translator’s own rendering; the German edition here quotes W. G. Hertz’s verse translation.]
339)Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, Traité des sensations, Paris and London 1754
§ 445
Intelligence finds itself determined; this is its semblance, from which it starts in its immediacy; but as knowing it is this: to posit what is found as its own. Its activity deals with the empty form of finding reason, and its purpose is that its concept be for it, i.e. that it be reason for itself, whereby at the same time the content becomes rational for it. This activity is cognition. The formal knowing of certainty raises itself, since reason is concrete, to determinate knowing in accordance with the concept. The course of this elevation is itself rational and a necessary transition, determined by the concept, of one determination of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of spirit) into another. The refutation of the semblance of finding the rational, which cognition is, starts [from] certainty, i.e. from the faith of intelligence in its capacity to know rationally, in the possibility of being able to appropriate reason, which intelligence and the content are in themselves.
The distinction of intelligence from the will often has the incorrect sense that both are taken as a fixed existence separated from each other, so that willing could be without intelligence or the activity of intelligence without will. The possibility that, as it is called, the understanding can be educated without the heart and the heart without the understanding, that there are also, one-sidedly, hearts without understanding and understandings without heart, shows in any case only this, that bad existences, untrue within themselves, occur; but it is not philosophy that should take such untruths of existence and representation for the truth, the bad for the nature of the matter. – A host of other forms used of intelligence – that it receives impressions from outside, takes them up, that representations arise through the effects of external things as causes etc. – belong to a standpoint of categories that is not the standpoint of spirit and of philosophical consideration. A favourite form of reflection is that of the forces and faculties of the soul, of intelligence or of spirit. – The faculty, like force, is the fixed determinacy of a content, represented as reflection-into-itself. Force (§ 136) is indeed the infinity of form, of inner and outer, but its essential finitude contains the indifference of the content towards the form (ibid., Remark). Herein lies the irrational that is brought into spirit, as also into nature, by this form of reflection and the consideration of spirit as a multitude of forces. What can be distinguished in its activity is held fast as a self-standing determinacy, and spirit is in this way made into an ossified, mechanical collection. It makes no difference whatever here if instead of faculties and forces the expression activities is used. Isolating the activities likewise makes spirit only an aggregate and regards their relationship as an external, contingent relation. The doing of intelligence as theoretical spirit has been called cognition, not in the sense that it cognizes among other things but besides also intuits, represents, recollects, imagines etc.; such a position is connected first with the isolating of the activities of spirit just criticized, but further the great question of recent times is also connected with it, whether true cognition, i.e. the cognition of truth, is possible; so that if we see that it is not possible, we have to give up this endeavour. The many sides, grounds and categories with which an external reflection swells the extent of this question find their settlement in their place; the more externally the understanding behaves here, the more diffuse a simple object becomes for it. Here is the place of the simple concept of cognition, which confronts the wholly general point of view of that question, namely that of calling into question the possibility of true cognition in general and passing it off as a possibility and an arbitrary choice to pursue cognition or else to leave it alone. The concept of cognition has resulted as intelligence itself, as the certainty of reason; the actuality of intelligence is now cognition itself. It follows that it is absurd to speak of intelligence and yet at the same time of the possibility or arbitrariness of cognition. But cognition is true precisely insofar as intelligence actualizes it, i.e. posits its concept for itself. This formal determination has its concrete sense in the same thing in which cognition has it. The moments of its realizing activity are intuiting, representing, recollecting etc.; [these] activities have no other immanent sense; their purpose is solely the concept of cognition (see Remark § 445). Only when they are isolated is it represented, partly, that they are useful for something other than cognition, partly [that they] afford the satisfaction of it for themselves, and the delights of intuiting, of recollection, of imagining etc. are praised. Isolated, i.e. spiritless, intuiting, imagining etc. can certainly afford satisfaction too; what in physical nature is the fundamental determinacy, being-outside-itself, presenting the moments of immanent reason outside one another, is something that in intelligence partly arbitrariness can do, and partly happens to it insofar as it is itself only natural, uneducated. But true satisfaction, it is admitted, is afforded only by an intuiting penetrated by understanding and spirit, by rational representing, by productions of the imagination penetrated by reason and presenting ideas etc., i.e. by cognizing intuiting, representing etc. The true that is ascribed to such satisfaction lies in intuiting, representing etc. being present not in isolation but only as a moment of the totality, of cognition itself.
Addition. As already remarked in the Addition to § 441, spirit too, mediated by the negation of the soul and of consciousness, at first itself still has the form of immediacy, consequently the semblance of being external to itself, of relating, like consciousness, to the rational as to something existing outside it, merely found, not mediated by it. But through the sublation of those two main stages of development preceding it, of these presuppositions made by it itself, spirit has already shown itself to us as what mediates itself with itself, as what takes itself back into itself out of its other, as unity of the subjective and the objective. The activity of spirit that has come to itself, containing the object within itself as already sublated in itself, therefore necessarily aims at also sublating that semblance of the immediacy of itself and its object, the form of merely finding the object. – At first, accordingly, the activity of intelligence does indeed appear as a formal, unfulfilled one, and spirit consequently as ignorant; and the first concern is to remove this ignorance. To this end intelligence fills itself with the object immediately given to it, which, precisely because of its immediacy, is burdened with all the contingency, nullity and untruth of external existence. But intelligence does not stop at this taking up of the immediately presenting content of objects; rather it purifies the object of what shows itself in it as purely external, as contingent and null. Whereas, then, for consciousness, as we have seen, its further development seems to proceed from the alteration of the determinations of its object taking place for itself, intelligence by contrast is posited as that form of spirit in which spirit itself alters the object and, through its development, also develops itself further to truth. In making the object from something external into something inner, intelligence inwardizes itself. Both of these, the inwardizing of the object and the recollection [Erinnerung] of spirit, are one and the same. What spirit has a rational knowing of thus becomes a rational content precisely by being known in a rational way. – Intelligence thus strips the object of the form of contingency, grasps its rational nature, thus posits it subjectively, and thereby at the same time conversely develops subjectivity into the form of objective rationality. So knowing, at first abstract, formal, becomes concrete knowing, filled with true content, thus objective knowing. When intelligence reaches this goal set for it by its concept, it is in truth what at first it only ought to be – namely cognition. This must be well distinguished from mere knowing. For already consciousness is knowing. But free spirit is not content with simple knowing; it wants to cognize, i.e. it wants to know not only that an object is and what it is in general as well as according to its contingent, external determinations, but it wants to know what the determinate substantial nature of the object consists in. This difference of knowing and cognizing is something quite familiar to educated thinking. Thus one says, for example: we know, it is true, that God is, but we are unable to cognize him. The sense of this assertion is that we may well have an indeterminate representation of the abstract essence of God, but are supposedly incapable of comprehending his determinate, concrete nature. Those who speak in this way may – for their own person – be perfectly right. For although even that theology which declares God uncognizable busies itself very much around him exegetically, critically and historically and in this way swells itself into an extensive science, it nevertheless gets only as far as a knowing of what is external, while excreting the substantial content of its object as something indigestible for its weak spirit, and thus renounces the cognition of God, since, as was said, knowing of external determinacies does not suffice for cognition, which rather requires grasping the substantial determinacy of the object. Such a science as the one just named stands on the standpoint of consciousness, not on that of true intelligence, which was otherwise also rightly called the faculty of cognition; only that the expression faculty has the skewed meaning of a mere possibility. For the sake of a clear overview, let us now state in advance, by way of assurance, the formal course of the development of intelligence to cognition. It is as follows: first intelligence has an immediate object, then secondly a material reflected into itself, inwardized, finally thirdly an object just as much subjective as objective. So arise the three stages: α) of material knowing related to an immediately singular object – or of intuition; β) of intelligence taking itself back into itself out of the relationship to the singularity of the object and relating the object to a universal – or of representation; γ) of intelligence comprehending the concretely universal of objects – or of thinking in the determinate sense that what we think also is, also has objectivity. α) The stage of intuition, of immediate cognition or of consciousness posited with the determination of rationality and penetrated by the certainty of spirit, again falls into three subdivisions: 1. intelligence begins here from the sensation of immediate material; 2. then develops into attention, which just as much separates the object from itself as it fixes it, 3. and on this path becomes intuition proper, which posits the object as something external to itself. β) The second main stage of intelligence, representation, comprises the three stages: 1. of recollection, 2. of imagination, 3. of memory. γ) Finally the third main stage in this sphere, thinking, has as its content: 1. the understanding, 2. judgement and 3. reason.
§ 446
Spirit, which as soul is naturally determined, as consciousness is in relationship to this determinacy as to an external object, but as intelligence 1. finds itself so determined, is its dull weaving within itself, in which it is material to itself and has the whole material of its knowing. On account of the immediacy in which it thus at first is, it is in this absolutely only as a singular and commonly subjective spirit and thus appears as feeling.
If feeling already occurred earlier (§ 399 ff.) as a mode of existence of the soul, then finding, or immediacy, has there essentially the determination of natural being or corporeality, here, however, only abstractly that of immediacy in general.
Addition. We have already had to speak of feeling twice, but each time in a different relation. First we had to consider it with the soul, and more precisely where the soul, awakening from its natural life closed up within itself, finds within itself the determinations of content of its sleeping nature and is precisely thereby sensing, but through sublation of the limitedness of sensation attains to the feeling of its self, of its totality, and finally, grasping itself as I, awakens to consciousness. – On the standpoint of consciousness feeling was spoken of a second time. There, however, the determinations of feeling were the material of consciousness, separated from the soul and appearing in the shape of a self-standing object. – Now finally, thirdly, feeling has the meaning of being that form which spirit as such, forming the unity and truth of the soul and of consciousness, first gives itself. In this the content of feeling is freed from the twofold one-sidedness it had on the standpoint of the soul on the one hand and on that of consciousness on the other. For now that content has the determination of being in itself just as much objective as subjective, and the activity of spirit is now directed only to positing it as the unity of the subjective and the objective.
§ 447
The form of feeling is that it is indeed a determinate affection, but this determinacy is simple. Therefore a feeling, even if its content is the most solid and true, has the form of contingent particularity, besides the fact that the content can equally be the meagrest and most untrue.
That spirit has in its feeling the material of its representations is a very general presupposition, but more usually in the sense opposite to the one this proposition has here. Against the simplicity of feeling, judgement in general, the distinction of consciousness into a subject and an object, is rather usually presupposed as the original; so the determinacy of sensation is then derived from a self-standing external or internal object. Here, in the truth of spirit, this standpoint of consciousness, opposed to its idealism, has perished, and the material of feeling is rather already posited as immanent in spirit. As regards content, it is a common prejudice that there is more in feeling than in thinking; this is maintained in particular with regard to moral and religious feelings. The material which spirit is to itself as feeling has resulted here too as the being-determined-in-and-for-itself of reason; therefore all rational, and more precisely also all spiritual, content enters into feeling. But the form of selfish singularity that spirit has in feeling is the lowest and worst, in which it is not as something free, as infinite universality – its import and content are rather as something contingent, subjective, particular. Educated, true sensation is the sensation of an educated spirit that has acquired the consciousness of determinate differences, essential relationships, true determinations etc., and in whom it is this corrected material that enters into its feeling, i.e. receives this form. Feeling is the immediate, so to speak most present, form in which the subject relates to a given content; it reacts against it first with its particular self-feeling, which may well be more solid and comprehensive than a one-sided point of view of the understanding, but can equally be limited and bad; in any case it is the form of the particular and subjective. When a person appeals, about something, not to the nature and concept of the matter or at least to reasons, to the universality of the understanding, but to his feeling, there is nothing to be done but to leave him standing, because he thereby refuses the community of rationality and shuts himself up in his isolated subjectivity, particularity.
Addition. In sensation the whole of reason – the entire material of spirit – is present. All our representations, thoughts and concepts of external nature, of the legal, of the ethical and of the content of religion develop out of our sensing intelligence; just as, conversely, after they have received their complete exposition, they are concentrated into the simple form of sensation. One of the ancients therefore rightly said that human beings formed their gods out of their sensations and passions. But that development of spirit out of sensation is usually understood as though intelligence were originally thoroughly empty and therefore received all content as something entirely alien to it from outside. This is an error. For what intelligence seems to take up from outside is in truth nothing other than the rational, consequently identical with spirit and immanent in it. The activity of spirit therefore has no other purpose than, by sublating the seeming being-external-to-itself of the object rational in itself, also to refute the semblance that the object is something external to spirit.
§ 448
2. In the diremption of this immediate finding, the one moment is the abstract identical direction of spirit in feeling as in all its other further determinations, attention, without which nothing is for it; active recollection, the moment of what is its own, but as the still formal self-determination of intelligence. The other moment is that, against this its inwardness, it posits the determinacy of feeling as something existing, but as something negative, as the abstract otherness of itself. Intelligence thereby determines the content of sensation as existing outside itself, casts it out into space and time, which are the forms in which it is intuiting. According to consciousness the material is only its object, a relative other; but from spirit it receives the rational determination of being the other of itself (cf. §§ 247, 254)
Addition. The immediate, thus undeveloped, unity of spirit with the object present in sensation and in feeling is still spiritless. Intelligence therefore sublates the simplicity of sensation, determines what is sensed as something negative against it, thus separates it from itself and at the same time posits it in its separatedness as nevertheless its own. Only through this double activity of sublating and restoring the unity between me and the other do I come to apprehend the content of sensation. This happens first in attention. Without it, therefore, no apprehension of the object is possible; only through it does spirit become present in the matter, and receive, though not yet cognition – for this requires a further development of spirit – nevertheless acquaintance with the matter. Attention therefore makes up the beginning of education. More precisely, however, attending must be grasped as a filling of oneself with a content that has the determination of being both objective and subjective, or, in other words, of being not only for me but also having self-standing being. In attention, then, a separation and a unity of the subjective and the objective necessarily take place – a reflecting-into-itself of free spirit and at the same time an identical direction of it towards the object. This already implies that attention is something dependent on my arbitrary choice – that I am attentive, then, only when I want to be. But it does not follow from this that attention is something easy. Rather it requires an effort, since a person who wants to apprehend the one object must abstract from everything else, from all the thousand things moving in his head, from his other interests, even from his own person, and, suppressing his vanity, which does not let the matter have its say but passes judgement on it too hastily, must immerse himself steadfastly in the matter, let it hold sway within him without breaking in with his reflections, or fix himself on it. Attention thus contains the negation of one’s own self-assertion and the surrender to the matter – two moments as necessary to the competence of spirit as they are usually regarded as unnecessary for so-called refined education, since this is supposed to include precisely being done with everything, being above everything. This being-above leads, in a certain way, back to the state of savagery. The savage is attentive to almost nothing; he lets everything pass him by without fixing himself on it. Only through the education of spirit does attention receive strength and fulfilment. The botanist, for example, notices incomparably more in a plant in the same time than someone ignorant of botany. The same naturally holds with regard to all other objects of knowing. A person of great sense and great education at once has a complete intuition of what lies before him; with him sensation thoroughly bears the character of recollection. As we have seen above, a separation and a unity of the subjective and the objective take place in attention. Insofar, however, as attention first comes forth with feeling, the unity of the subjective and the objective predominates in it, and the difference of these two sides is therefore still something indeterminate. But intelligence necessarily advances to developing this difference, to distinguishing the object from the subject in a determinate way. The first form in which it does this is intuition. In this the difference of the subjective and the objective predominates just as much as the unity of these opposed determinations does in formal attention. The objectification of what is sensed taking place in intuition we now have to discuss more closely. In this connection both inner and outer sensations are to be discussed. As regards the former, it holds especially of them that in sensation man is subject to the power of his affections – but that he withdraws from this power when he is able to bring his sensations to intuition. Thus we know, for example, that when someone is able to make the overwhelming feelings of joy or pain intuitable to himself, say in a poem, he separates from himself what constricted his spirit and thereby procures relief or complete freedom for himself. For although, by considering the many sides of his sensations, he seems to increase their power, he in fact diminishes this power by making his sensations into something standing over against him, something becoming external to him. Thus notably Goethe, especially through his Werther, relieved himself, while he subjected the readers of this novel to the power of sensation. The educated person feels – since he considers what is sensed from all the points of view that present themselves – more deeply than the uneducated, but is at the same time superior to him in mastery over feeling, because he moves preferably in the element of rational thinking, raised above the limitedness of sensation. Inner sensations, then, as just indicated, are more or less separable from us according to the degree of strength of reflective and rational thinking. With external sensations, by contrast, the difference of their separability depends on whether they relate to the object as something subsisting or as something vanishing. According to this determination the five senses are ordered in such a way that on the one side smell and taste, on the other sight and touch, and in the middle hearing come to stand. Smell has to do with the volatilization or evaporation, taste with the consumption, of the object. To these two senses, then, the object presents itself in its complete non-self-standingness, only in its material vanishing. Here, therefore, intuition falls into time, and the transposition of what is sensed from the subject into the object is less easy than with the sense of touch, which relates chiefly to what is resistant in the object, and with the sense of intuition proper, sight, which occupies itself with the object as something predominantly self-standing, subsisting ideally and materially, has only an ideal relation to it, senses only its ideal side, colour, by means of light, but leaves the material side of the object untouched. For hearing, finally, the object is something materially subsisting but ideally vanishing; in the tone the ear perceives the trembling, i.e. the merely ideal, not real negation of the self-standingness of the object. Therefore with hearing the separability of sensation shows itself to be less than with sight but greater than with taste and smell. We must hear the tone, because, detaching itself from the object, it penetrates into us, and we assign it without great difficulty to this or that object, because the object preserves itself self-standingly in its trembling. The activity of intuition thus brings about first in general a moving away of sensation from us, a reshaping of what is sensed into an object present outside us. Through this change the content of sensation is not changed; rather it is here one and the same in spirit and in the external object, so that spirit here still has no content peculiar to it that it could compare with the content of intuition. What comes about through intuition is thus merely the transformation of the form of inwardness into the form of externality. This forms the first, itself still formal, way in which intelligence becomes determining. – About the meaning of that externality, however, two things must be remarked: first, that what is sensed, in becoming an object external to the inwardness of spirit, receives the form of something external to itself, since the spiritual or rational makes up the proper nature of objects. Secondly, we must remark that, since that reshaping of what is sensed proceeds from spirit as such, what is sensed thereby receives a spiritual, i.e. an abstract, externality and through it that universality which can immediately fall to the share of the external, namely a still wholly formal, contentless universality. But the form of the concept itself falls apart in this abstract externality. The latter therefore has the double form of space and time. (Cf. §§ 254–259) Sensations are thus posited spatially and temporally through intuition. The spatial presents itself as the form of indifferent being-side-by-side and calm subsisting, the temporal, by contrast, as the form of unrest, of what is negative within itself, of being-one-after-another, of arising and vanishing, so that the temporal is in that it is not, and is not in that it is. But both forms of abstract externality are identical with each other in that each is within itself absolutely discrete and at the same time absolutely continuous. Their continuity, which includes absolute discreteness within itself, consists precisely in the abstract universality of the external coming from spirit, not yet developed into any actual singularization. But when we said that what is sensed receives from intuiting spirit the form of the spatial and temporal, this proposition must not be understood as though space and time were only subjective forms. Kant wanted to make space and time into such forms. But things are in truth themselves spatial and temporal; that double form of asunderness is not one-sidedly applied to them by our intuition but has already been originally created into them by the infinite spirit being in itself, by the creative eternal Idea. When, therefore, our intuiting spirit does the determinations of sensation the honour of giving them the abstract form of space and time and thereby making them into proper objects just as much as assimilating them to itself, what happens is by no means what, in the opinion of subjective idealism, happens here, namely that we receive only the subjective mode of our determining and not determinations proper to the object itself. – Moreover, those who are narrow-minded enough to attach a quite peculiar importance to the question of the reality of space and time must be answered that space and time are extremely meagre and superficial determinations, that things therefore have very little in these forms and would thus lose very little through their loss, were this otherwise possible. Cognizing thinking does not dwell on those forms; it grasps things in their concept, which contains space and time within itself as sublated. Just as in external nature space and time sublate themselves, through the dialectic of the concept immanent in them, into matter (§ 261) as their truth, so free intelligence is the dialectic, being for itself, of those forms of immediate asunderness.
§ 449
3. Intelligence as this concrete unity of the two moments, namely to be immediately inwardized within itself in this externally existing material and, in its inwardizing-into-itself, sunk into being-outside-itself, is intuition.
Addition. Intuition must be confused neither with representation proper, to be considered only later, nor with merely phenomenological consciousness, already discussed. As regards first the relationship of intuition to representation, the former has in common with the latter only this, that in both forms of spirit the object is both separated from me and at the same time mine. But that the object has the character of being mine is present in intuition only in itself and is posited only in representation. In intuition the objectivity of the content predominates. Only when I make the reflection that it is I who have the intuition do I step onto the standpoint of representation. But with regard to the relationship of intuition to consciousness, we have to remark the following. In the widest sense of the word one could indeed already give the name of intuition to the immediate or sensuous consciousness considered in § 418. But if this name is to be taken, as it reasonably must, in its proper meaning, one must make the essential distinction between that consciousness and intuition that the former relates, in unmediated, wholly abstract certainty of itself, to the immediate singularity of the object, falling apart into manifold sides, whereas intuition is a consciousness filled with the certainty of reason, whose object has the determination of being something rational, consequently not a singular torn apart into different sides, but a totality, a fullness of determinations held together. In this sense Schelling formerly spoke of intellectual intuition. Spiritless intuition is merely sensuous consciousness remaining external to the object. Spirited, true intuition, by contrast, grasps the solid substance of the object. A talented historian, for example, has before him in living intuition the whole of the conditions and events he is to depict; whoever, by contrast, possesses no talent for presenting history stops at particulars and overlooks the substantial in them. It has therefore rightly been urged in all branches of knowing, notably in philosophy too, that one speak from the intuition of the matter. This requires that a person relate to the matter with spirit, with heart and mind, in short in his wholeness, stand at its centre and let it have its way. Only when the intuition of the substance of the object lies firmly at the basis of thinking can one advance, without stepping out of the true, to the consideration of the particular, which is rooted in that substance but becomes empty straw when separated from it. If, by contrast, the solid intuition of the object is lacking from the outset or disappears again, then reflective thinking loses itself in the consideration of the manifold singularized determinations and relationships occurring in the object – then the separating understanding tears the object apart, even when it is the living, a plant or an animal, through its one-sided, finite categories of cause and effect, external purpose and means etc., and in this way, despite its many clevernesses, does not come to comprehend the concrete nature of the object, to cognize the spiritual bond holding all particulars together. But that one must step out of mere intuition has its necessity in the fact that intelligence, according to its concept, is cognition, whereas intuition is not yet cognizing knowing, because as such it does not attain to the immanent development of the substance of the object but rather restricts itself to apprehending the undeveloped substance, still surrounded by the accessories of the external and contingent. Intuition is therefore only the beginning of cognition. To this its position Aristotle‘s saying relates, that all cognition begins with wonder. For since subjective reason as intuition has the certainty, but also only the indeterminate certainty, of finding itself again in the object, which at first is burdened with the form of unreason, the matter instils wonder and awe in it. But philosophical thinking must raise itself above the standpoint of wonder. It is a complete error to think that one already truly cognizes the matter when one has an immediate intuition of it. Completed cognition belongs only to the pure thinking of comprehending reason, and only someone who has raised himself to this thinking possesses a completely determinate true intuition; with him intuition forms merely the solid form into which his fully developed cognition compresses itself again. In immediate intuition I do have the whole matter before me; but only in cognition unfolded on all sides and returning to the form of simple intuition does the matter stand before my spirit as a totality articulated within itself, systematic. In general only the educated person has an intuition freed from the mass of the contingent and equipped with a fullness of the rational. A thoughtful educated person can, even if he does not philosophize, grasp the essential, the centre of the matter, in simple determinacy. For this, however, reflection is always necessary. One often imagines that the poet, like the artist in general, must proceed merely intuitively. This is by no means the case. A genuine poet must rather ponder and reflect before and during the execution of his work; only in this way can he hope to lift the heart or the soul of the matter out of all the externalities veiling it and precisely thereby develop his intuition organically.
§ 450
Upon and against this its own being-outside-itself intelligence equally essentially directs its attention and is the awakening to itself in this its immediacy, its inwardizing-into-itself in it; thus intuition is this concrete of the material and of itself, its own, so that it no longer needs this immediacy and the finding of the content.
Addition. On the standpoint of mere intuition we are outside ourselves, in spatiality and temporality, these two forms of asunderness. Intelligence is here sunk into the external material, one with it, and has no other content than that of the intuited object. Therefore we can become extremely unfree in intuition. As already remarked in the Addition to § 448, however, intelligence is the dialectic, being for itself, of that immediate asunderness. Accordingly spirit posits intuition as its own, penetrates it, makes it into something inner, inwardizes itself in it, becomes present to itself in it – and thus free. Through this going-into-itself intelligence raises itself to the stage of representation. Representing spirit has the intuition; it is sublated in it, not vanished, not something merely past. When an intuition sublated into representation is spoken of, language therefore says quite correctly: I have seen this. This expresses not mere pastness but at the same time presence; the pastness here is merely relative – it takes place only in the comparison of immediate intuition with what we now have in representation. But the word “have” used in the perfect has quite properly the meaning of presence: what I have seen is something I not merely had but still have – thus something present in me. One can see in this use of the word “have” a universal sign of the inwardness of the modern spirit, which reflects not merely on the fact that what is past is past according to its immediacy, but also on the fact that it is still preserved in spirit.
340)Metaphysics I, 2, 982 b
§ 451
Representation, as inwardized intuition, is the middle between intelligence’s immediately finding itself determined and intelligence in its freedom, thinking. Representation is what is its own for intelligence, still with one-sided subjectivity, since this its own is still conditioned by immediacy and is not in itself being. The path of intelligence in representations is just as much to make immediacy inner, to posit itself intuiting within itself, as to sublate the subjectivity of inwardness and within it to divest itself of itself and to be within itself in its own externality. But since representing begins from intuition and its found material, this activity is still burdened with this difference, and its concrete productions in it are still syntheses, which only in thinking become the concrete immanence of the concept.
Addition. The various forms of spirit standing on the standpoint of representation are usually regarded, even more than happens with the preceding stage of intelligence, as singularized forces or faculties independent of one another. One speaks, alongside the faculty of representation in general, of the power of imagination and the power of memory, and regards the mutual self-standingness of these forms of spirit as something completely settled. But the truly philosophical conception consists precisely in comprehending the rational connection present between those forms, in cognizing the organic development of intelligence taking place in them. To facilitate an overview, let us now designate the stages of this development in advance in a general way. 1. The first of these stages we call recollection in the peculiar sense of the word, according to which it consists in the involuntary calling forth of a content that is already ours. Recollection forms the most abstract stage of intelligence active in representations. Here the represented content is still the same as in intuition; it receives its confirmation in intuition, just as conversely the content of intuition is confirmed in my representation. On this standpoint, consequently, we have a content that is not only intuited as existing but at the same time inwardized, posited as mine. So determined, the content is what we call an image. 2. The second stage in this sphere is imagination. Here the opposition between my subjective or represented content and the intuited content of the matter comes in. Imagination works out for itself a content peculiar to it by relating thinkingly to the intuited object, lifting out what is universal in it and giving it determinations that belong to the I. In this way imagination ceases to be merely formal recollection and becomes recollection that concerns the content, generalizes it and thus creates universal representations. Because on this standpoint the opposition of the subjective and objective prevails, the unity of these determinations here can be not an immediate one, as at the stage of mere recollection, but only a restored one. This restoration happens in such a way that the intuited external content is subjected to the represented content raised to universality, reduced to a sign of the latter, while the latter is precisely thereby made objective, external, imaged. 3. Memory is the third stage of representation. Here, on the one hand, the sign is inwardized, taken up into intelligence; on the other hand, intelligence is precisely thereby given the form of something external, mechanical, and in this way a unity of the subjective and objective is brought forth which forms the transition to thinking as such.
§ 452
As at first inwardizing intuition, intelligence posits the content of feeling in its inwardness, in its own space and its own time. Thus it is αα) an image, freed from its first immediacy and abstract singularity against others, as taken up into the universality of the I in general. The image no longer has the complete determinacy that intuition has, and is arbitrary or contingent, in general isolated from the external place, the time and the immediate connection in which intuition stood.
Addition. Since intelligence, according to its concept, is infinite ideality or universality being for itself, the space and time of intelligence are universal space and universal time. When, therefore, I posit the content of feeling in the inwardness of intelligence and thereby make it a representation, I lift it out of the particularity of time and space to which it is itself bound in its immediacy and on which I too am dependent in sensation and in intuition. From this it follows, first, that while sensation and intuition require the immediate presence of the matter, I can, by contrast, wherever I am, represent something to myself, even what is furthest from me in external space and external time. Secondly, however, it follows from what has been said above that everything that happens receives duration for us only through its reception into representing intelligence – that, by contrast, events which intelligence has not deemed worthy of this reception become something completely past. What is represented, however, gains that imperishability only at the cost of the clarity and freshness of the immediate singularity of what is intuited, firmly determined on all sides; intuition becomes obscured and blurred in becoming an image. As regards time, it may still be remarked here, about the subjective character it receives in representation, that in intuition time becomes short for us when we intuit much, long, by contrast, when the lack of given material drives us to the consideration of our contentless subjectivity, but that conversely in representation those times in which we have been occupied in manifold ways seem long to us, while those in which we have had little occupation seem to be short. Here, in recollection, we look at our subjectivity, our inwardness, and determine the measure of time according to the interest it has had for us. There, in intuition, we are sunk in the consideration of the matter; there time seems short to us when it receives an ever changing filling, long, by contrast, when its uniformity is interrupted by nothing.
§ 453
ββ) The image for itself is transient, and intelligence itself, as attention, is its time and also its space, its when and where. But intelligence is not only consciousness and existence but, as such, the subject and the in-itself of its determinations; inwardized in it, the image, no longer existing, is preserved unconsciously.
To grasp intelligence as this nocturnal pit in which a world of infinitely many images and representations is preserved without their being in consciousness is, on the one hand, the general demand to grasp the concept as concrete, as, for example, to grasp the germ in such a way that it contains affirmatively, in virtual possibility, all the determinacies that come to concrete existence only in the development of the tree. The inability to grasp this universal, concrete within itself and yet remaining simple, is what has occasioned the talk of preserving particular representations in particular fibres and places; the diverse is supposed essentially to have only a singularized spatial existence too. – But the germ comes, out of the existing determinacies, to the return into its simplicity, again to the existence of being-in-itself, only in an other, the germ of the fruit. Intelligence, however, is as such the free concrete existence of being-in-itself inwardizing itself within itself in its development. On the other hand, then, intelligence is to be grasped as this unconscious pit, i.e. as the existing universal in which the diverse is not yet posited as discrete. And indeed this in-itself is the first form of universality that presents itself in representing.
Addition. The image is mine, it belongs to me; but at first it has as yet no further homogeneity with me, for it is not yet thought, not yet raised into the form of rationality; rather there still exists between it and me a relationship, stemming from the standpoint of intuition, that is not truly free, according to which I am only the inner, while the image is what is external to me. Therefore at first I do not yet have full power over the images sleeping in the pit of my inwardness, am not yet able to call them forth again at will. No one knows what infinite multitude of images of the past slumbers in him; contingently they do wake now and then, but one cannot, as one says, call them to mind. So images are ours only in a formal way.
§ 454
γγ) Such an abstractly preserved image needs for its existence an existing intuition; recollection proper, so called, is the relation of the image to an intuition, and indeed as the subsumption of the immediate singular intuition under what is universal as regards form, under the representation, which is the same content; so that intelligence is inward to itself in the determinate sensation and its intuition and recognizes it as already its own, just as at the same time it now knows its image, at first only inner, also as an immediate image of intuition and as confirmed in it. – The image, which in the pit of intelligence was only its property, is now, with the determination of externality, also in its possession. It is thereby at the same time posited as distinguishable from intuition and separable from the simple night in which it is at first sunk. Intelligence is thus the power to be able to express its property and no longer to need external intuition for its existence in it. This synthesis of the inner image with the inwardized existence is representation proper, in that the inner now also has in itself the determination of being able to be placed before intelligence, of having existence in it.
Addition. The images of the past lying hidden in the dark depth of our inner become our actual possession by stepping before intelligence in the luminous, plastic shape of an existing intuition of the same content, and by our recognizing them, with the help of this present intuition, as intuitions we have already had. Thus it happens, for example, that we recognize a person whose image has already become completely obscured in our spirit among hundreds of thousands as soon as he himself comes into our sight again. If, then, I am to retain something in recollection, I must have repeated the intuition of it. At first, admittedly, the image is reawakened not so much by myself as rather by the corresponding immediate intuition. But through frequent such calling forth again the image receives in me so great a vividness and presence that I no longer need the external intuition in order to recollect it. In this way children come from intuition to recollection. The more educated a person is, the more he lives not in immediate intuition but – in all his intuitions – at the same time in recollections, so that he sees little that is thoroughly new; the substantial import of most new things is rather already something familiar to him. Likewise an educated person is content chiefly with his images and seldom feels the need for immediate intuition. The curious populace, by contrast, keeps running again and again to wherever there is something to gape at.
§ 455
αα) Intelligence active in this possession is reproductive imagination, the emergence of images from the I’s own inwardness, which is now their power. The next relation of the images is that of the external immediate space and time preserved along with them. – But the image has in the subject in which it is preserved only the individuality in which the determinations of its content are tied together; its immediate, i.e. at first only spatial and temporal concretion, which it has as one in intuiting, is by contrast dissolved. The reproduced content, as belonging to the self-identical unity of intelligence and brought forth from its universal pit, has a universal representation as the associating relation of the images, of representations more abstract or more concrete according to other circumstances.
The so-called laws of the association of ideas have had great interest, especially in the flowering of empirical psychology contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. In the first place, it is not ideas that are associated. In the second place, these modes of relation are no laws, precisely because there are so many laws about the same matter, whereby arbitrariness and contingency, the opposite of a law, rather take place; it is contingent whether what connects is something imagistic or a category of the understanding, equality and inequality, ground and consequence etc. Advancing along images and representations according to associating imagination is in general the play of a thoughtless representing in which the determination of intelligence is still formal universality in general, while the content is that given in the images. – Image and representation, insofar as the more precise form-determination indicated is disregarded, are distinguished in content by the former’s being the more sensibly concrete representation; representation – whether the content is something imagistic or concept and Idea – has in general the character of being, although something belonging to intelligence, nevertheless given and immediate as regards its content. Being, intelligence’s finding-itself-determined, still clings to representation, and the universality that that material receives through representing is still abstract universality. Representation is the middle in the syllogism of the elevation of intelligence; the linking of the two meanings of relation-to-self, namely of being and of universality, which in consciousness are determined as object and subject. Intelligence complements what is found by the meaning of universality, and what is its own, inner, by that of being, but of being posited by it. – On the difference between representations and thoughts cf. Introd. § 20 Remark. The abstraction taking place in representing activity, through which universal representations are produced – and representations as such already have the form of universality in them – is often expressed as a falling together of many similar images and is supposed to become comprehensible in this way. In order for this falling together not to be entirely chance, the conceptless, a force of attraction of similar images or something of the sort would have to be assumed, which would at the same time be the negative power of rubbing off against one another what is still unequal in them. This force is in fact intelligence itself, the self-identical I, which through its recollection immediately gives them universality and subsumes the singular intuition under the image already made inner (§ 453).
Addition. The second stage of development of representation is, as we already indicated in advance in the Addition to § 451, imagination. The first form of representing, recollection, raises itself to this through intelligence, stepping out of its abstract being-within-itself into determinacy, dispersing the nocturnal darkness veiling the treasure of its images and driving it away through the luminous clarity of presence. But imagination again has within itself three forms in which it unfolds. It is in general what determines images. At first, however, it does nothing more than determine the images to step into existence. So it is merely reproductive imagination. This has the character of a merely formal activity. Secondly, however, imagination not merely calls forth again the images present in it but relates them to one another and in this way raises them to universal representations. At this stage, accordingly, imagination appears as the activity of associating images. The third stage in this sphere is that on which intelligence posits its universal representations as identical with the particular of the image and thus gives them an imagistic existence. This sensible existence has the double form of the symbol and of the sign, so that this third stage comprises symbolizing and sign-making fantasy, the latter of which forms the transition to memory. Reproductive imagination. The first, then, is the formal aspect of reproducing images. Pure thoughts can indeed also be reproduced; imagination, however, has to do not with them but only with images. But the reproduction of images takes place on the part of imagination at will and without the help of an immediate intuition. Thereby this form of representing intelligence is distinguished from mere recollection, which is not thus self-active but needs a present intuition and lets the images come forth involuntarily. Associating imagination. A higher activity than mere reproducing is the relating of images to one another. The content of images has, because of its immediacy or sensuousness, the form of finitude, of relation to an other. Since here I am in general what determines or posits, I also posit this relation. Through it intelligence gives the images, instead of their objective bond, a subjective bond. The latter, however, still has in part the shape of externality towards what is connected by it. I have, for example, the image of an object before me; to this image the image of persons with whom I have spoken about that object, or who possess it etc., attaches itself quite externally. Often only space and time are what string the images together. Ordinary social conversation for the most part spins itself on from one representation to another in a very external and contingent way. Only when one has a determinate purpose in conversation does it receive a firmer coherence. The various moods give all representations a peculiar relation – cheerful moods a cheerful one, sad moods a sad one. This holds still more of the passions. The measure of intelligence too brings about a difference in the relating of images; spirited, witty people therefore differ from ordinary people in this respect too; a spirited person pursues images that contain something solid and deep. Wit connects representations that, although lying far apart, nevertheless in fact have an inner connection. Wordplay too is to be reckoned to this sphere; the deepest passion can give itself up to this play, for a great spirit knows, even in the most unhappy circumstances, how to bring everything that befalls it into relation with its passion.
§ 456
The association of representations, therefore, is also to be grasped as the subsumption of singular representations under a universal one that makes up their connection. Intelligence, however, is in itself not only universal form; its inwardness is subjectivity determined within itself, concrete, with an import of its own stemming from some interest, concept being in itself or Idea, insofar as one can speak of such content by anticipation. Intelligence is the power over the store of images and representations belonging to it and so ββ) free linking and subsuming of this store under the content peculiar to it. So it is inwardized determinately within itself in that store and imagining it into this its content – fantasy, symbolizing, allegorizing or poetic imagination. These more or less concrete, individualized formations are still syntheses, insofar as the material in which the subjective import gives itself an existence of representation comes from what is found in intuition.
Addition. Already images are more universal than intuitions; they still have, however, a sensibly concrete content, whose relation to other such content I am. But when I now direct my attention to this relation, I arrive at universal representations, or at representations in the proper sense of this word. For that through which the single images relate to one another consists precisely in what is common to them. This common element is either some particular side of the object raised into the form of universality, as, for example, the red colour of the rose, or the concretely universal, the genus, for example the plant in the rose – in each case, however, a representation that comes about through the dissolution, proceeding from intelligence, of the empirical connection of the manifold determinations of the object. In generating universal representations intelligence thus behaves self-actively; it is therefore a spiritless error to assume that universal representations arise – without the contribution of spirit – through many similar images falling on top of one another, so that, for example, the red colour of the rose sought out the red of other images in my head and so brought the universal representation of red to me, the mere onlooker. The particular belonging to the image is indeed something given; but the taking apart of the concrete singularity of the image, and the form of universality arising through it, comes, as remarked, from me. Abstract representations, incidentally, are often called concepts. The Friesian philosophy consists essentially of such representations. When it is asserted that one arrives at the cognition of truth through such things, it must be said that precisely the opposite takes place, and that therefore the thoughtful person, holding fast to the concreteness of images, rightly rejects such empty school wisdom. This point, however, we do not have to discuss further here. Just as little does the more precise constitution of the content stemming either from the external or from the rational, the legal, ethical and religious concern us here. Rather what is at issue here is only the universality of representation in general. From this point of view we have to remark the following. In the subjective sphere in which we find ourselves here, the universal representation is the inner, the image, by contrast, the external. These two determinations standing over against each other here at first still fall apart, but in their separation they are something one-sided. The former lacks externality, imagery; the latter lacks being raised to the expression of a determinate universal. The truth of these two sides is therefore their unity. This unity, the imaging of the universal and the universalizing of the image, comes about more precisely through the universal representation uniting with the image not into a neutral, so to speak chemical, product, but activating and proving itself as the substantial power over the image, subjecting it to itself as something accidental, making itself its soul, becoming for itself in it, inwardizing itself, manifesting itself. Since intelligence brings forth this unity of the universal and the particular, of the inner and the outer, of representation and intuition, and in this way restores the totality present in the latter as a confirmed one, representing activity completes itself within itself insofar as it is productive imagination. This forms the formal aspect of art; for art presents the truly universal or the Idea in the form of sensible existence, of the image.
§ 457
In fantasy intelligence is completed to self-intuition within itself insofar as its import, taken from itself, has imagistic existence. This formation of its self-intuiting is subjective; the moment of what exists is still lacking. But in this unity of inner import and material, intelligence has likewise returned in itself to identical relation to itself as immediacy. Just as, as reason, it starts from appropriating the immediate found within itself (§ 445, cf. § 455 Remark), i.e. determining it as universal, so its doing as reason (§ 438) from the present point on is [this:] to determine what has been completed in it to concrete self-intuition as something existing, i.e. to make itself into being, into a matter. Active in this determination, it is expressing itself, producing intuition – γγ) sign-making fantasy.
Fantasy is the centre in which the universal and being, what is one’s own and being-found, the inner and the outer, are completely created into one. The preceding syntheses of intuition, recollection etc. are unifications of the same moments; but they are syntheses; only in fantasy is intelligence not as the indeterminate pit and the universal, but as singularity, i.e. as concrete subjectivity, in which relation-to-self is determined just as much to being as to universality. The formations of fantasy are everywhere recognized as such unifications of what is spirit’s own or inner and of what is intuitable; their further determinate content belongs to other domains. Here this inner workshop is to be grasped only according to those abstract moments. – As the activity of this unification fantasy is reason, but formal reason only, insofar as the import of fantasy as such is indifferent, whereas reason as such also determines the content to truth. It is still to be particularly emphasized that, since fantasy brings the inner import to image and intuition and this is expressed by saying that it determines it as existing, the expression too must not seem strange that intelligence makes itself existing, makes itself into a matter; for its import is itself, and likewise the determination given to it by intelligence. The image produced by fantasy is only subjectively intuitable; in the sign it adds intuitability proper; in mechanical memory it completes this form of being in itself.
Addition. As we saw in the Addition to the preceding paragraph, in fantasy the universal representation makes up the subjective, which gives itself objectivity in the image and thereby proves itself. This proving, however, is immediately itself still a subjective one, insofar as intelligence at first still respects the given content of the images and orients itself by it in imaging its universal representations. This activity of intelligence, still conditioned in this way, only relatively free, we call symbolizing fantasy. This chooses for the expression of its universal representations no sensible material other than that whose self-standing meaning corresponds to the determinate content of the universal to be imaged. Thus, for example, the strength of Jupiter is presented by the eagle, because the eagle counts as strong. – Allegory expresses the subjective more through a whole of particulars. – Poetic fantasy, finally, uses its material more freely than the plastic arts; yet it too may choose only such sensible material as is adequate to the content of the Idea to be presented. But from the subjective proving present in the symbol, mediated by the image, intelligence necessarily advances to the objective proving of the universal representation, being in and for itself. For since the content of the universal representation to be proved only joins itself together with itself in the content of the image serving as symbol, the form of the being-mediated of that proving, of that unity of subjective and objective, turns over into the form of immediacy. Through this dialectical movement the universal representation thus comes to need the content of the image no longer for its proving, but to be proved in and for itself, thus to count immediately. When the universal representation, freed from the content of the image, makes itself something intuitable in an external material chosen by it arbitrarily, it brings forth what must be called, in determinate distinction from the symbol, a sign. The sign must be declared to be something great. When intelligence has designated something, it has finished with the content of intuition and has given the sensible material a meaning alien to it as its soul. Thus, for example, a cockade or a flag or a gravestone means something quite other than what it immediately indicates. The arbitrariness of the connection of the sensible material with a universal representation emerging here has the necessary consequence that one must first learn the meaning of signs. This holds notably of linguistic signs.
§ 458
In this unity, proceeding from intelligence, of a self-standing representation and an intuition, the matter of the latter is at first indeed something taken up, something immediate or given (e.g. the colour of the cockade and the like). But in this identity the intuition counts not as representing positively itself, but something else. It is an image that has received into itself, as its soul, a self-standing representation of intelligence, its meaning. This intuition is the sign.
§ 459
Language comes into consideration here only according to its peculiar determinacy as the product of intelligence, manifesting its representations in an external element. If language were to be treated concretely, then for its material (the lexical) the anthropological, more precisely the psychical-physiological (§ 401), standpoint would have to be recalled, and for its form (grammar) that of the understanding anticipated. For the elementary material of language, on the one hand the representation of mere contingency has been lost, and on the other hand the principle of imitation has been restricted to its small range, sounding objects. Yet one can still hear the German language praised for its richness because of the many particular expressions it possesses for particular sounds (rushing, whistling, creaking etc.; perhaps more than a hundred have been collected; the mood of the moment creates new ones when it pleases); such an abundance in what is sensuous and insignificant is not to be reckoned to what is supposed to make up the richness of an educated language. The peculiarly elementary itself rests not so much on a symbolism relating to external objects as on an inner symbolism, namely anthropological articulation, as it were as a gesture of bodily speech expression. Thus the peculiar meaning has been sought for each vowel and consonant as for their more abstract elements (gesture of the lips, of the palate, of the tongue) and then for their combinations. But these unconscious dull beginnings are modified by further externalities as well as by needs of education into inconspicuousness and insignificance, essentially through their being reduced, as sensuous intuitions, themselves to signs, and their own original meaning thereby stunted and extinguished. The formal side of language, however, is the work of the understanding, which imagines its categories into it; this logical instinct brings forth its grammatical side. The study of languages that have remained original, which have only begun to be thoroughly known in recent times, has shown in this respect that they contain a grammar developed in great detail and express distinctions that are lacking or have been blurred in the languages of more educated peoples; it seems that the language of the most educated peoples has the more imperfect grammar, and the same language has a more perfect grammar in a less educated state of its people than in a more highly educated one. Cf. Mr W. von Humboldt, On the Dual [Berlin 1828] I, 10, 11. In connection with spoken language, as the original one, written language may also be mentioned, though here only in passing; it is merely a further development in the particular domain of language that takes an external practical activity to its aid. Written language advances to the field of immediate spatial intuiting, in which it takes and brings forth the signs (§ 454). More precisely, hieroglyphic script designates representations by spatial figures, alphabetic script, by contrast, sounds, which are themselves already signs. The latter therefore consists of signs of signs, and in such a way that it dissolves the concrete signs of spoken language, words, into their simple elements and designates these elements. – Leibniz let himself be seduced by his understanding into regarding a complete written language, formed in a hieroglyphic way – which no doubt also occurs partially with alphabetic script (as in our signs for numbers, planets, chemical substances and the like) – as very desirable as a universal written language for the intercourse of peoples and especially of scholars. But one may hold that the intercourse of peoples (as was perhaps the case in Phoenicia and happens at present in Canton – see Macartney’s Journey by Staunton) has rather brought about the need for alphabetic script and its origin. In any case one is not to think of a comprehensive finished hieroglyphic language; sensuous objects are indeed capable of signs that remain fixed, but for signs of the spiritual the progress of the formation of thought, advancing logical development, brings about altered views of their inner relationships and thus of their nature, so that a different hieroglyphic determination would thereby also set in. After all, this already happens with sensuous objects, that their signs in spoken language, their names, are frequently changed, as, for example, with chemical and mineralogical ones. Since it has been forgotten what names as such are, namely externalities without sense for themselves, which have a meaning only as signs, since instead of proper names the expression of a kind of definition is demanded, and this is even often formed again according to arbitrariness and chance, the designation, i.e. only the combination of signs of their generic determination or of other properties supposed to be characteristic, changes according to the difference of the view one takes of the genus or of some other property supposed to be specific. – Only to the stationary character of Chinese spiritual culture is the hieroglyphic written language of this people adequate; this kind of written language can in any case be the share only of the smaller part of a people that keeps itself in exclusive possession of spiritual culture. – The development of spoken language is at the same time most closely connected with the habit of alphabetic script, through which alone spoken language gains the determinacy and purity of its articulation. The imperfection of Chinese spoken language is well known; a multitude of its words have several quite different meanings, even up to ten, indeed twenty, so that in speaking the difference is made noticeable merely by the intonation, intensity, speaking softly or shouting. Europeans who begin to speak Chinese before they have made these absurd subtleties of accentuation their own fall into the most ridiculous misunderstandings. Perfection here consists in the opposite of parler sans accent, which is rightly demanded in Europe for educated speech. Because of the hieroglyphic written language, Chinese spoken language lacks the objective determinacy that is gained in articulation through alphabetic script. Alphabetic script is in and for itself the more intelligent; in it the word, the worthiest mode, peculiar to intelligence, of expressing its representations, is brought to consciousness, made an object of reflection. In this occupation of intelligence with it, it is analysed, i.e. this sign-making is reduced to its simple, few elements (the primal gestures of articulating); they are the sensuous side of speech brought to the form of universality, which in this elementary way at the same time attains complete determinacy and purity. Alphabetic script thereby also retains the advantage of spoken language that in it, as in the latter, representations have proper names; the name is the simple sign for the proper, i.e. simple, representation, not dissolved into its determinations and composed of them. Hieroglyphic language arises not from the immediate analysis of sensuous signs, like alphabetic script, but from the preceding analysis of representations, from which the thought is then easily conceived that all representations could be led back to their elements, to simple logical determinations, so that from the elementary signs chosen for this (as with the Chinese Kua, the simple straight line and the line broken into two parts) hieroglyphic language would be generated through their combination. This circumstance of the analytic designation of representations in hieroglyphic script, which seduced Leibniz into regarding it as superior to alphabetic script, is rather what contradicts the fundamental need of language in general, the name: to have, for the immediate representation, which, however rich its content may be grasped within itself, is simple for spirit in the name, also a simple immediate sign, which, as a being for itself, gives nothing to think about and has only the determination of signifying the simple representation as such and representing it sensuously. Not only does representing intelligence do this, both dwelling with the simplicity of representations and gathering them together again from the more abstract moments into which they have been analysed; thinking too resumes the concrete content from the analysis, in which it has become a combination of many determinations, into the form of a simple thought. For both it is a need to have signs that are simple with regard to meaning and that, though consisting of several letters or syllables and also analysable into them, nevertheless do not present a combination of several representations. – What has been cited makes up the fundamental determination for deciding on the value of written languages. It then also follows that in hieroglyphic script the relations of concrete spiritual representations must necessarily become involved and confused, and in any case their analysis, whose next products are in turn to be analysed, appears possible in the most manifold and divergent ways. Every divergence in the analysis would bring forth a different formation of the written name, as in recent times, according to the remark made above, even in the sensuous domain hydrochloric acid has changed its name in several ways. A hieroglyphic written language would require a philosophy as stationary as the culture of the Chinese in general is. It further follows from what has been said that learning to read and write an alphabetic script is to be regarded as an infinite means of education not sufficiently appreciated, since it brings spirit from the sensibly concrete to attention to what is more formal, the sounding word and its abstract elements, and does something essential to ground and purify the ground of inwardness in the subject. – Acquired habit later also effaces the peculiarity of alphabetic script of appearing, in the interest of sight, as a detour through audibility to representations, and makes it a hieroglyphic script for us, so that in using it we do not need to have the mediation of sounds before us in consciousness; people, by contrast, who have little habit of reading speak aloud what they read in order to understand it in its sounding. Besides the fact that with that facility which transforms alphabetic script into hieroglyphs the capacity for abstraction gained through that first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is for itself a deaf reading and a mute writing; the audible or temporal and the visible or spatial each have their own foundation, at first of equal validity with the other; but in alphabetic script there is only one foundation, and indeed in the correct relationship that visible language relates to sounding language only as a sign; intelligence expresses itself immediately and unconditionally through speaking. – The mediation of representations through the less sensuous element of sounds further shows itself in peculiar essentiality for the following transition from representing to thinking – memory.
§ 460
The name, as the linking of the intuition produced by intelligence and its meaning, is at first a singular transient production, and the linking of the representation as something inner with the intuition as something external is itself external. The inwardizing of this externality is memory.
341)Jakob Friedrich Fries, 1773–1843; Neue Kritik der Vernunft, 1807
342)Des Grafen Macartney Gesandtschaftsreise nach China … in den Jahren 1792 bis 1794 … , ed. Sir George Staunton. Translated from the English, 3 vols., Berlin 1797–99
§ 461
Intelligence as memory runs through, with regard to the intuition of the word, the same activities of inwardizing as it does as representation in general with regard to the first immediate intuition (§ 451 ff.). – αα) Making that linking which the sign is into its own, it raises through this inwardizing the singular linking to a universal, i.e. lasting, linking in which name and meaning are objectively connected for it, and makes the intuition, which the name at first is, into a representation, so that the content, the meaning, and the sign are identified, are one representation, and representing is concrete in its inwardness, the content as its existence; – name-retaining memory.
Addition. We consider memory under three forms: first of name-retaining, second of reproductive, third of mechanical memory. The first here, then, is that we retain the meaning of names, that we become capable of recollecting, with linguistic signs, the representations objectively linked with them. Thus on hearing or seeing a word belonging to a foreign language its meaning may well become present to us, but we are not yet able, conversely, to produce the corresponding word-signs of that language for our representations; we learn to speak and write a language later than to understand it.
§ 462
The name is thus the matter as it is present and valid in the realm of representation. ββ) Reproductive memory has and recognizes in the name the matter and with the matter the name, without intuition and image. The name, as the concrete existence of the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligence itself within it, and the inwardizing of the name as the intuition brought forth by it is at the same time the divestment in which it posits itself within itself. The association of particular names lies in the meaning of the determinations of sensing, representing or thinking intelligence, of which it runs through series within itself as sensing etc.
With the name lion we need neither the intuition of such an animal nor even the image; rather the name, in that we understand it, is the imageless simple representation. It is in names that we think. The mnemonics of the ancients, warmed up again some time ago and rightly forgotten again, consists in transforming names into images and thereby reducing memory again to imagination. The place of the power of memory is taken by a lasting tableau of a series of images fixed in the imagination, to which the essay to be learned by heart, the sequence of its representations, is then linked. Given the heterogeneity of the content of these representations and of those permanent images, and also because of the speed with which it is supposed to happen, this linking cannot take place otherwise than through stale, silly, wholly contingent connections. Not only is spirit put on the rack to torment itself with crazy stuff, but what is learned by heart in this way is for that very reason quickly forgotten again, since in any case the same tableau is used for learning by heart every other series of representations, and therefore those previously linked to it are wiped away again. What is impressed mnemonically is not, like what is retained in memory, brought forth by heart [auswendig], i.e. properly from within outwards, from the deep pit of the I, and so recited; rather it is, so to speak, read off from the tableau of the imagination. – Mnemonics is connected with the common prejudices one has about memory in relation to imagination, as though the latter were a higher, more spiritual activity than memory. Rather memory no longer has to do with the image, which is taken from the immediate, unspiritual being-determined of intelligence, from intuition, but with an existence that is the product of intelligence itself – with such an outward [Auswendiges] as remains enclosed in the inward of intelligence and is only within itself its outward, existing side.
Addition. The word as sounding vanishes in time; time thus proves itself in it to be abstract, i.e. merely annihilating, negativity. But the true, concrete negativity of the linguistic sign is intelligence, because through it the sign is changed from something external into something inner and preserved in this transformed form. So words become an existence animated by thought. This existence is absolutely necessary to our thoughts. We know of our thoughts, have determinate, actual thoughts, only when we give them the form of objectivity, of being distinguished from our inwardness, thus the shape of externality, and indeed of such an externality as at the same time bears the stamp of the highest inwardness. Such an inner external is solely the articulated sound, the word. To want to think without words, as Mesmer once tried, therefore appears an unreason which, according to his assurance, almost drove that man to madness. But it is also ridiculous to regard the bondedness of thought to the word as a defect of thought and a misfortune; for although it is usually thought that the inexpressible is precisely the most excellent, this opinion, cherished by vanity, has no ground at all, since the inexpressible is in truth only something murky, fermenting, which gains clarity only when it is able to come to words. The word accordingly gives thoughts their worthiest and truest existence. One can indeed also wrestle with words without grasping the matter. But this is not the fault of the word but of deficient, indeterminate thinking without import. As the true thought is the matter, so too is the word when it is used by true thinking. When intelligence fills itself with the word, it therefore takes into itself the nature of the matter. But this taking-in has at the same time the sense that intelligence thereby makes itself something thing-like, in such a way that subjectivity, in its difference from the matter, becomes something quite empty, the spiritless container of words, thus mechanical memory. In this way the excess of inwardizing of the word turns over, so to speak, into the highest divestment of intelligence. The more familiar I become with the meaning of the word, the more it therefore unites with my inwardness, the more can the objectivity and thus the determinacy of its meaning vanish, and the more, consequently, memory itself, together with the word, becomes something forsaken by spirit.
§ 463
γγ) Insofern as the connection of names lies in meaning, the linking of them with being as names is still a synthesis, and intelligence in this its externality has not simply returned into itself. But intelligence is the universal; the simple truth of its particular divestments and its carried-through appropriation is the sublation of that difference of meaning and name; this highest inwardizing of representing is its highest divestment, in which it posits itself as being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of senseless words. The I, which is this abstract being, is as subjectivity at the same time the power over the various names, the empty bond that fixes series of them within itself and keeps them in fixed order. Insofar as they are only existing and intelligence is here within itself this its being, it is this power as wholly abstract subjectivity – memory, which, because of the complete externality in which the members of such series are towards one another, and because it is itself this externality, though a subjective one, is called mechanical (§ 195).
As is well known, one knows an essay properly by heart only when one attaches no sense to the words; reciting what is known by heart in this way therefore of itself becomes accentless. The correct accent that is brought into it goes to the sense; the meaning, the representation that is called up, by contrast disturbs the mechanical connection and therefore easily confuses the recitation. The capacity to retain by heart series of words in whose connection there is no understanding, or which are already senseless for themselves (a series of proper names), is so extremely wonderful because spirit is essentially this, to be with itself, but here it is divested within itself, its activity is a mechanism. But spirit is with itself only as unity of subjectivity and objectivity; and here in memory, after it is at first in intuition as something external in such a way that it finds the determinations, and in representation inwardizes what is thus found within itself and makes it its own, it makes itself as memory within itself into something external, so that what is its own appears as something to be found. One of the moments of thinking, objectivity, is here posited in intelligence as a quality of intelligence itself. – It is natural to grasp memory as a mechanical activity, an activity of the senseless, whereby it is justified perhaps only by its use, perhaps by its indispensability for other purposes and activities of spirit. But thereby its own meaning, which it has in spirit, is overlooked.
§ 464
What exists as name needs an other, the meaning of representing intelligence, in order to be the matter, true objectivity. Intelligence as mechanical memory is in one both that external objectivity itself and the meaning. It is thus posited as the concrete existence of this identity, i.e. it is active for itself as such identity, which as reason it is in itself. Memory is in this way the transition into the activity of thought, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. from whose objectivity the subjective is no longer something different, just as this inwardness is in itself existing.
Already our language gives memory [Gedächtnis], of which it has become a prejudice to speak contemptuously, the high position of immediate kinship with thought [Gedanke]. – Youth does not have a better memory than the old by chance, and its memory is not practised only for the sake of utility; rather it has a good memory because it does not yet behave reflectively, and memory is practised, intentionally or unintentionally, in order to level the ground of its inwardness into pure being, into pure space, in which the matter, the content being in itself, can have its way and explicate itself without the opposition against a subjective inwardness. A thorough talent is usually combined with a good memory in youth. But such empirical statements do nothing to help cognize what memory is in itself; it is one of the points hitherto quite unregarded, and in fact one of the hardest, in the doctrine of spirit, to grasp the position and meaning of memory in the systematization of intelligence and to comprehend its organic connection with thinking. Memory as such is itself the merely external way, the one-sided moment of the concrete existence of thinking; the transition is for us, or in itself, the identity of reason and of the mode of concrete existence, which identity makes reason now exist in the subject, be as its activity; thus it is thinking.
343)Franz Anton Mesmer, 1734–1815, physician; founded the doctrine of the healing power of “animal magnetism”.
§ 465
Intelligence is recognizing; – it cognizes an intuition insofar as this is already its own (§ 454); further, in the name, the matter (§ 462); but now its universal is for it in the double meaning of the universal as such and of the same as immediate or existing, thus as the true universal, which is the overreaching unity of itself over its other, being. So intelligence is cognizing for itself in itself; – in itself the universal; its product, thought, is the matter; simple identity of the subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought is; and that what is only is insofar as it is thought (cf. §§ 5, 21); – for itself; the thinking of intelligence is having thoughts; they are as its content and object.
Addition. Thinking is the third and last main stage of development of intelligence; for in it the immediate unity of subjective and objective being in itself, present in intuition, is restored out of the opposition of these two sides taking place in representation as a unity enriched by this opposition, thus as being in and for itself, and this end is accordingly bent back into that beginning. Whereas, then, on the standpoint of representation the unity of subjective and objective effected partly by imagination, partly by mechanical memory – although in the latter I do violence to my subjectivity – still remains something subjective, in thinking, by contrast, that unity receives the form of a unity both objective and subjective, since thinking knows itself as the nature of the matter. Those who understand nothing of philosophy do indeed throw up their hands when they hear the proposition: thinking is being. Nevertheless the presupposition of the unity of thinking and being underlies all our doing. We make this presupposition as rational, as thinking beings. But one must indeed distinguish whether we only are thinking beings or whether we also know ourselves as thinking. The former we are under all circumstances; the latter, by contrast, takes place in a complete way only when we have raised ourselves to pure thinking. This cognizes that it alone, and not sensation or representation, is able to grasp the truth of things, and that therefore Epicurus‘ assertion that what is sensed is the true must be declared a complete perversion of the nature of spirit. Of course, however, thinking must not remain abstract, formal thinking – for this tears apart the content of truth – but must develop into concrete thinking, into comprehending cognition.
§ 466
But thinking cognition is likewise at first formal; universality and its being is the simple subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts are thus not determined in and for themselves, and the representations inwardized into thinking are to that extent still the given content.
Addition. At first thinking knows the unity of the subjective and objective as a wholly abstract, indeterminate, merely certain, unfulfilled, unconfirmed one. The determinacy of rational content is therefore still something external to this unity, consequently something given – and cognition is thus formal. But since that determinacy is contained in itself in thinking cognition, that formalism contradicts it and is therefore sublated by thinking.
§ 467
In this content it is 1. formally identical understanding, which works up the inwardized representations into genera, species, laws, forces etc., in general into the categories, in the sense that the material has the truth of its being only in these forms of thought. As infinite negativity within itself thinking is 2. essentially diremption – judgement, which, however, no longer dissolves the concept into the previous opposition of universality and being but distinguishes according to the peculiar connections of the concept; and 3. thinking sublates the form-determination and at the same time posits the identity of the differences; – formal reason, syllogizing understanding. – Intelligence cognizes as thinking; and indeed 1. the understanding explains the singular from its universalities (the categories); so it calls itself comprehending; 2. it declares the singular to be a universal (genus, species), in judgement; in these forms the content appears as given; 3. but in the syllogism it determines content out of itself by sublating that difference of form. In the insight into necessity the last immediacy still clinging to formal thinking has disappeared.
In logic there is thinking as it is at first in itself, and reason develops itself in this element without opposition. In consciousness it likewise occurs as a stage (see § 437 Remark). Here reason is as the truth of the opposition as it had determined itself within spirit itself. – Thinking comes forth again and again in these different parts of science because these parts are distinguished only by the element and the form of opposition, whereas thinking is this one and the same centre into which, as into their truth, the oppositions go back.
Addition. Before Kant no determinate distinction was made among us between understanding and reason. But if one does not want to sink down into vulgar consciousness, which clumsily blurs the different forms of pure thinking, the distinction between understanding and reason must be fixed thus: for the latter the object is what is determined in and for itself, the identity of content and form, of the universal and the particular; for the former, by contrast, it falls apart into form and content, into the universal and the particular, into an empty in-itself and the determinacy coming to it from outside – so that in understanding thinking the content is indifferent to its form, whereas in rational or comprehending cognition it brings forth its form out of itself. But although the understanding has the defect just indicated, it is nevertheless a necessary moment of rational thinking. Its activity consists in general in abstracting. If it separates the contingent from the essential, it is entirely within its right and appears as what it ought to be in truth. Therefore someone who pursues an essential purpose is called a man of understanding. Without understanding no firmness of character is possible either, since this requires that a person hold fast to his individual essentiality. But the understanding can also, conversely, give the form of universality to a one-sided determination and thereby become the opposite of sound common sense, which is gifted with a sense for the essential. The second moment of pure thinking is judging. Intelligence, which as understanding tears apart the various abstract determinations immediately united in the concrete singularity of the object and separates them from the object, necessarily proceeds first to relating the object to these universal determinations of thought, thus to considering it as relationship, as an objective connection, as a totality. This activity of intelligence is often already called comprehending, but wrongly. For on this standpoint the object is still grasped as something given, as something dependent on an other, conditioned by it. The circumstances that condition an appearance still count here as self-standing concrete existences. Thus the identity of the appearances related to one another is still a merely inner one and precisely for that reason a merely external one. The concept therefore shows itself here not yet in its own shape but in the form of conceptless necessity. Only at the third stage of pure thinking is the concept as such cognized. This stage thus presents comprehending proper. Here the universal is cognized as particularizing itself and gathering itself together out of particularization into singularity, or, what is the same, the particular is reduced from its self-standingness to a moment of the concept. Accordingly the universal is here no longer a form external to the content but the true form, bringing forth the content out of itself – the self-developing concept of the matter. On this standpoint, consequently, thinking has no other content than itself, than its own determinations forming the immanent content of form; it seeks and finds in the object only itself. The object is therefore here distinguished from thinking only by having the form of being, of subsisting for itself. Thus thinking here stands in a completely free relationship to the object. In this thinking, identical with its object, intelligence reaches its completion, its goal; for now it is in fact what in its immediacy it only ought to be – truth knowing itself, reason cognizing itself. Knowing now makes up the subjectivity of reason, and objective reason is posited as knowing. This mutual penetration of thinking subjectivity and objective reason is the end result of the development of theoretical spirit through the stages of intuition and representation preceding pure thinking.
§ 468
Intelligence, which as theoretical appropriates immediate determinacy, is now, after completed taking of possession, in its property; through the last negation of immediacy it is posited in itself that for it the content is determined by it. Thinking, as the free concept, is now free as regards content too. Intelligence, knowing itself as what determines the content, which is just as much its own as it is determined as existing, is will.
Addition. Pure thinking is at first an unprejudiced conduct, immersed in the matter. But this doing necessarily also becomes objective to itself. Since comprehending cognition is absolutely with itself in the object, it must cognize that its determinations are determinations of the matter and that conversely the objectively valid, existing determinations are its determinations. Through this inwardizing, through this going-into-itself of intelligence, it becomes will. For ordinary consciousness this transition is indeed not present; for representation, rather, thinking and will fall apart. In truth, however, as we have just seen, thinking is what determines itself to will, and the former remains the substance of the latter, so that without thinking there can be no will, and even the least educated person is will only insofar as he has thought, whereas the animal, because it does not think, is also unable to have a will.
§ 469
Spirit as will knows itself as concluding itself within itself and filling itself out of itself. This filled being-for-itself or singularity makes up the side of concrete existence or reality of the Idea of spirit; as will spirit steps into actuality, as knowing it is on the ground of the universality of the concept. – As giving itself content, the will is with itself, free in general; this is its determinate concept. – Its finitude consists in the formalism of this concept, that its being filled through itself, the abstract determinacy, its own in general, is not identified with developed reason. The vocation of the will being in itself is to bring freedom to concrete existence in the formal will, and thereby the purpose of the latter is to fill itself with its concept, i.e. to make freedom its determinacy, its content and purpose as well as its existence. This concept, freedom, is essentially only as thinking; the path of the will to make itself objective spirit is to raise itself to the thinking will – to give itself the content that it can have only as thinking itself.
True freedom, as ethical life, is this: that the will has as its purposes not subjective, i.e. self-seeking, but universal content; but such content is only in thinking and through thinking; it is nothing less than absurd to want to exclude thinking from ethical life, religiousness, rectitude etc.
Addition. Intelligence has proved to us to be spirit that goes into itself out of the object, inwardizes itself in it and cognizes its inwardness as the objective. Conversely, the will now aims at the objectification of its inwardness, still burdened with the form of subjectivity. We have, however, to follow this externalization here, in the sphere of subjective spirit, only up to the point where willing intelligence becomes objective spirit, i.e. up to where the product of the will ceases to be merely enjoyment and begins to become deed and action. The course of development of practical spirit is now in general as follows. At first the will appears in the form of immediacy; it has not yet posited itself as freely and objectively determining intelligence, but only finds itself as such objective determining. So it is α) practical feeling, has a singular content and is itself immediately singular, subjective will, which does indeed, as just said, feel itself as objectively determining, but still lacks the truly objective content, freed from the form of subjectivity, universal in and for itself. Therefore the will is at first free only in itself or according to its concept. To the Idea of freedom, by contrast, it belongs that the will make its concept, freedom itself, its content or purpose. When it does this it becomes objective spirit, builds up for itself a world of its freedom and thus gives its true content a self-standing existence. But the will reaches this goal only by working off its singularity, by developing its universality, which in this is only in itself, into content universal in and for itself. The will takes the next step on this path when β) as drive it proceeds to make the agreement of its inner determinacy with objectivity, only given in feeling, into one that is first to be posited by it. The further step consists γ) in the particular drives being subordinated to a universal, happiness. But since this universal is only a universality of reflection, it remains something external to the particular of the drives and is related to that particular only by the wholly abstract singular will, by arbitrariness. The indeterminate universal of happiness, the immediate particularity of the drives and the abstract singularity of arbitrariness are, in their mutual externality, something untrue and therefore come together in the will that wills the concretely universal, the concept of freedom, which, as already remarked, forms the goal of the development of practical spirit.
§ 470
Practical spirit, as formal or immediate will, contains at first a double ought: 1. in the opposition of the determinacy posited out of it against the immediate being-determined that thereby enters again, against its existence and condition, which in consciousness at the same time develops into a relationship to external objects. 2. That first self-determination, as itself immediate, is at first not raised into the universality of thinking, which therefore in itself makes up the ought against it as regards form and can make it up as regards content; – an opposition that at first is only for us.
§ 471
Practical spirit has its self-determination in it at first in an immediate way, thus formally, so that it finds itself as singularity determined in its inner nature. It is thus practical feeling. In this, since it is in itself subjectivity simply identical with reason, it does have the content of reason, but as immediately singular content, thus also as natural, contingent and subjective content, which determines itself just as much from the particularity of need, of opinion etc. and from subjectivity setting itself up for itself against the universal, as it can be in itself adequate to reason.
When appeal is made to the feeling of right and morality, as of religion, which man is supposed to have within himself, to his benevolent inclinations etc., to his heart in general, i.e. to the subject insofar as all the various practical feelings are united in it, this has 1. the correct sense that these determinations are his own immanent ones, 2. and then, insofar as feeling is opposed to the understanding, that it can be the totality against the understanding’s one-sided abstractions. But equally feeling can be one-sided, inessential, bad. The rational, which in the shape of rationality is as something thought, is the same content that good practical feeling has, but in its universality and necessity, in its objectivity and truth. Therefore it is, on the one hand, foolish to think that in the transition from feeling to right and duty something is lost in content and excellence; this transition first brings feeling to its truth. It is equally foolish to hold intelligence to be superfluous, indeed harmful, to feeling, heart and will; the truth and, what is the same, the actual rationality of heart and will can take place solely in the universality of intelligence, not in the singularity of feeling as such. If feelings are of a true kind, they are so through their determinacy, i.e. their content, and this is true only insofar as it is universal within itself, i.e. has thinking spirit as its source. The difficulty for the understanding consists in freeing itself from the separation it has once arbitrarily made between the faculties of the soul, feeling, thinking spirit, and in coming to the representation that in man there is only one reason in feeling, willing and thinking. Connected with this, a difficulty is found in the fact that the ideas belonging solely to thinking spirit, God, right, ethical life, can also be felt. But feeling is nothing other than the form of the immediate peculiar singularity of the subject, into which that content, like every other objective content to which consciousness also ascribes objectivity, can be placed. On the other hand it is suspicious, and very well more than that, to hold fast to feeling and heart against thought rationality, right, duty, law, because what is more in the former than in the latter is only particular subjectivity, vanity and arbitrariness. – For the same reason it is clumsy, in the scientific consideration of feelings, to engage with more than their form and to consider their content, since this, as thought, rather makes up the self-determinations of spirit in their universality and necessity, rights and duties. For a peculiar consideration of practical feelings as of inclinations there would remain only the selfish, bad and evil ones; for only they belong to singularity holding itself fast against the universal; their content is the opposite of that of rights and duties, but precisely thereby they receive their more precise determinacy only in opposition to these.
§ 472
Practical feeling contains the ought, its self-determination as being in itself, related to an existing singularity that is supposed to be valid only in its adequacy to that self-determination. Since in this immediacy objective determination is still lacking to both, this relation of need to existence is the wholly subjective and superficial feeling of the agreeable or disagreeable.
Pleasure, joy, pain etc., shame, remorse, contentment etc. are partly only modifications of formal practical feeling in general, but partly distinguished by their content, which makes up the determinacy of the ought. The famous question about the origin of ill in the world arises on this standpoint of the formal practical, at least insofar as by ill is first understood only the disagreeable and pain. Ill is nothing other than the inadequacy of being to the ought. This ought has many meanings and, since contingent purposes likewise have the form of the ought, infinitely many. With regard to them ill is only the right that is exercised against the vanity and nullity of their conceit. They themselves are already ill. – The finitude of life and of spirit falls into their judgement, in which they have the other separated from them at the same time as their negative within them, and are thus the contradiction that is called ill. In the dead there is neither ill nor pain, because in inorganic nature the concept does not step over against its existence and does not at the same time remain its subject in the difference. Already in life, and still more in spirit, this immanent distinguishing is present, and with it an ought enters; and this negativity, subjectivity, the I, freedom, are the principles of ill and of pain. – Jakob Böhme grasped I-hood as pain and torment and as the source of nature and of spirit.
Addition. Although in practical feeling the will has the form of simple identity with itself, difference is already present in this identity; for practical feeling knows itself on the one hand as objectively valid self-determining, as something determined in and for itself, but at the same time on the other hand as determined immediately or from outside, as subject to the determinacy of affections, alien to it. Feeling will is therefore the comparing of its immediate being-determined coming from outside with its being-determined posited by its own nature. Since the latter has the meaning of what ought to be, the will makes the demand on the affection that it agree with it. This agreement is the agreeable, the non-agreement the disagreeable. But because that inner determinacy to which the affection is related is itself still immediate, belonging to my natural singularity, still subjective, only felt, the judgement coming about through that relation can only be a wholly superficial and contingent one. In important matters, therefore, the circumstance that something is agreeable or disagreeable to me appears extremely indifferent. Practical feeling, however, receives still further determinations than the superficial ones just discussed. There are namely, secondly, feelings which, since their content comes from intuition or from representation, surpass the feeling of the agreeable or disagreeable in determinacy. To this class of feelings belong, for example, pleasure, joy, hope, fear, anxiety, pain etc. – Joy consists in the feeling of the singular agreement of my being-determined-in-and-for-itself with a singular event, a thing or person. Contentment, by contrast, is more a lasting, calm agreement without intensity. In cheerfulness a livelier agreement shows itself. Fear is the feeling of my self and at the same time of an ill threatening to destroy my self-feeling. In terror I sense the sudden non-agreement of something external with my positive self-feeling. All these feelings have no content immanent to them, belonging to their peculiar nature; it comes into them from outside. Finally a third kind of feelings arises through the substantial content of the legal, moral, ethical and religious, stemming from thinking, also being taken up into feeling will. When this happens we have to do with feelings that are distinguished from one another by the content peculiar to them and receive their justification through it. To this class belong also shame and remorse; for both as a rule have an ethical foundation. Remorse is the feeling of the non-agreement of my doing with my duty or even only with my advantage, in each case, then, with something determined in and for itself. But when we said that the feelings last discussed have a content peculiar to them, this must not be understood as though the legal, ethical and religious content were necessarily in feeling. That this content is not inseparably grown together with feeling one sees empirically from the fact that remorse can be felt even about a good deed. Nor is it at all absolutely necessary that, in relating my action to duty, I fall into the unrest and heat of feeling; rather I can also settle that relation in representing consciousness and thus let the matter rest with calm consideration. Just as little need the content penetrate into feeling with the second kind of feelings discussed above. A level-headed person, a great character, can find something in accordance with his will without breaking out into the feeling of joy, and conversely suffer a misfortune without giving himself up to the feeling of pain. Whoever falls prey to such feelings is more or less caught in the vanity of attaching a particular importance to the fact that precisely he, this particular I, experiences either good fortune or misfortune.
§ 473
The practical ought is a real judgement. The immediate, merely found adequacy of the existing determinacy to need is a negation for the self-determination of the will and inadequate to it. In order that the will, i.e. the unity of universality and determinacy being in itself, satisfy itself, i.e. be for itself, the adequacy of its inner determination and of existence ought to be posited by it. The will is, as regards the form of its content, at first still natural will, immediately identical with its determinacy, drive and inclination; insofar as the totality of practical spirit places itself into a single one of the many limited determinations posited with opposition in general, [it is] passion.
Addition. In practical feeling it is contingent whether the immediate affection agrees with the inner determinacy of the will or not. This contingency, this being dependent on an external objectivity, contradicts the will that cognizes itself as what is determined in and for itself and knows objectivity to be contained in its subjectivity. This will therefore cannot stop at comparing its immanent determinacy with something external and merely finding the agreement of these two sides; rather it must advance to positing objectivity as a moment of its self-determination, thus to bringing forth that agreement, its satisfaction, itself. Thereby willing intelligence develops into drive. This is a subjective determination of will that gives itself its objectivity. Drive must be distinguished from mere desire. The latter belongs, as we saw in § 426, to self-consciousness and thus stands on the standpoint of the not yet overcome opposition between the subjective and the objective. It is something singular and seeks only the singular for a singular, momentary satisfaction. Drive, by contrast, since it is a form of willing intelligence, starts from the sublated opposition of the subjective and the objective and comprises a series of satisfactions – thus something whole, universal. At the same time, however, drive, as coming from the singularity of practical feeling and forming only the first negation of it, is still something particular. Therefore man, insofar as he is sunk in drives, appears unfree.
§ 474
Inclinations and passions have the same determinations as their content as practical feelings, and likewise have, on the one hand, the rational nature of spirit as their foundation; on the other hand, however, as belonging to the still subjective, singular will, they are burdened with contingency and, as particular, seem to relate externally to the individual and to one another and thus according to unfree necessity.
Passion contains in its determination that it is restricted to a particularity of the determination of will in which the whole subjectivity of the individual sinks itself, whatever the content of that determination may otherwise be. Because of this formal character, however, passion is neither good nor evil; this form expresses only that a subject has laid the whole living interest of his spirit, talent, character, enjoyment into one content. Nothing great has been accomplished without passion, nor can it be accomplished without it. It is only a dead, indeed too often hypocritical morality that inveighs against the form of passion as such. But with the inclinations the question is immediately raised which are good and which evil, likewise up to what degree the good ones remain good and, since they are particular against one another and there are many of them, how they must at least restrict one another, since they are after all found in one subject and, according to experience, cannot well all be satisfied. With these many drives and inclinations it is at first the same as with the powers of the soul, whose collection theoretical spirit is supposed to be – a collection that is now increased by the multitude of drives. The formal rationality of drive and inclination consists only in their universal drive not to be as something subjective, but to sublate subjectivity through the activity of the subject itself, to be realized. Their true rationality cannot result in a consideration of external reflection, which presupposes self-standing natural determinations and immediate drives and therefore lacks the one principle and final end for them. But it is the immanent reflection of spirit itself to go beyond their particularity as well as their natural immediacy and to give their content rationality and objectivity, in which they are as necessary relations, rights and duties. It is this objectification, then, that shows their import as well as their relation to one another, in short their truth; just as Plato showed, with true sense, also insofar as he comprised under the right of spirit its whole nature, that he could present what justice is in and for itself only in the objective shape of justice, namely the construction of the state as ethical life. The question which are the good, rational inclinations and what their subordination is thus turns into the presentation of what relations spirit brings forth in developing itself as objective spirit; – a development in which the content of self-determination loses contingency or arbitrariness. The treatment of drives, inclinations and passions according to their true import is therefore essentially the doctrine of legal, moral and ethical duties.
§ 475
The subject is the activity of satisfying the drives, of formal rationality, namely of translation from the subjectivity of the content, which is in so far purpose, into objectivity, in which it closes together with itself. That, insofar as the content of the drive as matter is distinguished from this its activity, the matter which has come about contains the moment of subjective singularity and its activity, is interest. Therefore nothing comes about without interest.
An action is a purpose of the subject, and equally it is his activity that carries out this purpose; only by the subject being in this way [even] in the most disinterested action, i.e. through his interest, is there acting at all. – Against drives and passions one sets, on the one hand, the stale daydream of a natural happiness through which needs are supposed to find their satisfaction without the activity of the subject in bringing forth the adequacy of immediate existence and its inner determinations. On the other hand, duty for duty’s sake, morality, is opposed to them quite generally. But drive and passion is nothing other than the liveliness of the subject, according to which it is itself in its purpose and its execution. The ethical concerns the content, which as such is the universal, something inactive, and has its activating factor in the subject; that the content is immanent to the subject is interest and, when it claims the whole effective subjectivity, passion.
Addition. Even in the purest legal, ethical and religious will, which has only its concept, freedom, as its content, there lies at the same time singularization into a this, into something natural. This moment of singularity must receive its satisfaction in the execution even of the most objective purposes; I as this individual do not want to, and ought not to, perish in the execution of the purpose. This is my interest. It must not be confused with selfishness, for the latter prefers its particular content to the objective content.
§ 476
The will as thinking and free in itself distinguishes itself from the particularity of the drives and places itself, as simple subjectivity of thinking, above their manifold content; thus it is reflecting will.
§ 477
Such a particularity of drive is in this way no longer immediate, but is its own only through the will closing together with it and thereby giving itself determinate singularity and actuality. It is on the standpoint of choosing between inclinations, and is arbitrariness.
§ 478
The will as arbitrariness is free for itself, in that it is reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate self-determining. However, insofar as the content in which this its formal universality resolves itself into actuality is still no other than that of drives and inclinations, it is actual only as subjective and contingent will. As the contradiction of actualizing itself in a particularity which is at the same time a nullity for it, and of having a satisfaction in it out of which it has at the same time stepped, it is at first the process of dispersion and of sublating one inclination or enjoyment by another, and of satisfaction that equally is not satisfaction, by another, to infinity. But the truth of particular satisfactions is the universal one, which thinking will makes its purpose as happiness.
§ 479
In this representation of a universal satisfaction brought forth by reflecting thinking, the drives are posited as negative according to their particularity and are supposed to be sacrificed partly one to another for the sake of that purpose, partly directly to it, wholly or in part. Their limitation by one another is on the one hand a mixture of qualitative and quantitative determination; on the other hand, since happiness has its affirmative content solely in the drives, the decision lies in them, and it is subjective feeling and liking that must tip the balance as to where it places happiness.
§ 480
Happiness is the merely represented, abstract universality of the content, which merely ought to be. But the truth of particular determinacy, which equally is as it is sublated, and of abstract singularity, of arbitrariness, which in happiness equally gives itself a purpose as it does not, is the universal determinacy of the will in itself, i.e. its self-determining itself, freedom. Arbitrariness is in this way the will only as pure subjectivity, which is pure and concrete at the same time by having as its content and purpose only that infinite determinacy, freedom itself. In this truth of its self-determination, in which concept and object are identical, the will is actually free will.
§ 481
Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical spirit; free will which is for itself as free will, in that the formalism, contingency and restrictedness of the previous practical content has sublated itself. Through the sublating of the mediation contained therein, it is immediate singularity posited through itself, which, however, is equally purified to the universal determination, freedom itself. The will has this universal determination as its object and purpose by thinking itself, knowing this its concept, being will as free intelligence.
§ 482
Spirit that knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object, i.e. has its essence as its determination and purpose, is at first in general rational will or in itself, the idea, and therefore only the concept of absolute spirit. As abstract idea it again exists only in immediate will, [it] is the side of the existence of reason, the singular will as knowledge of that determination of its own which makes up its content and purpose and of which it is only the formal activity. The idea thus appears only in the will, which is a finite will, but is the activity of developing it and of positing its unfolding content as existence, which as existence of the idea is actuality, – objective spirit.
Of no idea is it so generally known that it is indeterminate, ambiguous and capable of the greatest misunderstandings, and therefore actually subject to them, as [of] the idea of freedom, and none is current with so little consciousness. Since free spirit is actual spirit, misunderstandings about it have such enormous practical consequences, as nothing else, once individuals and peoples have taken the abstract concept of freedom being for itself into their representation, has this invincible strength, precisely because it is the very essence of spirit, and indeed as its actuality itself. Whole parts of the world, Africa and the Orient, have never had this idea and do not yet have it; the Greeks and Romans, Plato and Aristotle, also the Stoics did not have it; on the contrary, they knew only that man is actually free through birth (as an Athenian, Spartan etc. citizen) or strength of character, education, through philosophy (the wise man is free even as a slave and in chains). This idea came into the world through Christianity, according to which the individual as such has an infinite value, in that it is object and purpose of the love of God, destined to have its absolute relation to God as spirit, to have this spirit dwell within it, i.e. that man is destined in himself to the highest freedom. If in religion as such man knows the relation to absolute spirit as his essence, he further has the divine spirit present also as entering the sphere of worldly existence, as the substance of the state, the family etc. These relations are formed by that spirit and constituted in conformity with it just as, through such existence, the disposition of ethical life comes to dwell in the individual, and he is then actually free in this sphere of particular existence, of present sensing and willing. If the knowledge of the idea, i.e. of men’s knowing that their essence, purpose and object is freedom, is speculative, then this idea itself as such is the actuality of men, not one which they therefore have, but [one] which they are. Christianity has made it the actuality of its adherents, e.g. not to be a slave; if they were made slaves, if the decision about their property were laid in arbitrary liking, not in laws and courts, they would find the substance of their existence violated. This willing of freedom is no longer a drive that demands its satisfaction, but character – spiritual consciousness that has become drive-less being. – But this freedom, which has the content and purpose of freedom, is itself at first only concept, principle of spirit and heart, and destined to develop into objectivity, into legal, ethical and religious as well as scientific actuality.
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1827), §§ 440–481
- Spirit: concept and division: § 440 · § 441 · § 442 · § 443 · § 444
- Intuition: § 445 · § 446 · § 447 · § 448 · § 449 · § 450
- Representation: § 451 · § 452 · § 453 · § 454 · § 455 · § 456 · § 457 · § 458 · § 459 · § 460 · § 461 · § 462 · § 463 · § 464
- Thinking: § 465 · § 466 · § 467 · § 468
- Practical spirit: § 469 · § 470 · § 471 · § 472 · § 473 · § 474 · § 475 · § 476 · § 477 · § 478 · § 479 · § 480 · § 481
§ 440
Spirit has shown itself to be the truth of soul and of consciousness – of the former simple immediate totality, and of the latter knowing, which now, as infinite form restricted by no content, does not stand in relation to the object as such, but is knowledge of the substantial totality, neither subjective nor objective. Spirit therefore begins only from its own being and relates itself only to its own determinations. Psychology therefore considers the faculties or universal modes of activity of spirit as such, intuiting, representing, recollecting etc., desires etc., without the content which, according to appearance, is found in empirical representing, also in thinking, as in desire and will, a content which partly, in the soul, is determined by nature, partly, in consciousness, has a relation to an object present for itself. But spirit is precisely this: to be raised above nature and natural determinacy, as above entanglement with an external object, i.e. above the material in general; as this is the concept that has resulted. It now has only this to do: to realize this concept of its freedom, i.e. only to sublate the form of finding itself determined. The content that is raised to intuitions is its sensations, as its intuitions are changed into representations, and representations in turn into thoughts etc.
§ 441
The soul is finite insofar as it is determined immediately or by nature; consciousness insofar as it has an object; spirit insofar as it no longer has an object, to be sure, but has a determinacy immediately in its knowing, or insofar as this determinacy is one merely posited by it. In and for itself it is the absolutely infinite, objective reason which is its concept, and whose reality is knowing or intelligence. The finitude of spirit therefore consists more precisely in knowing not having grasped the being-in-and-for-itself of its reason. But reason is infinite only insofar as it is absolute freedom, and therefore presupposes itself to its knowing and thereby makes itself finite, and is the eternal movement of sublating this immediacy and comprehending itself, of being knowledge of reason.
§ 442
The progress of spirit is development, because its existence, knowing, has within itself being-determined-in-and-for-itself, i.e. the rational, and its import and purpose, and the activity of translating is purely only the formal transition into manifestation and therein return into itself. Insofar as knowing is as the absolute form, this translating is, in the concept, creation in general. Insofar as knowing is only at first abstract or formal, spirit in it is not in conformity with its concept, and its goal is to bring forth at the same time the absolute objective fulfilment and the absolute freedom of its knowing. Here one must not think of the development of the individual connected with the anthropological, according to which faculties and powers are considered as emerging one after another and expressing themselves in existence – a progression to the cognition of which great value was attached for a time (by Condillac’s philosophy), as if such supposed natural emergence were to set out the origin of these faculties and explain them. One cannot fail to recognize in this the tendency to make the manifold modes of activity of spirit comprehensible in its unity and to show a connection of necessity. But the categories employed there are on the whole of a meagre kind. Above all the ruling determination is that the sensible is, to be sure, rightly taken as the first, as beginning and foundation, but further determinations appear to emerge from this starting point only in an affirmative way, and the negative of the activity of spirit, by which that material is spiritualized and sublated as something sensible, is misrecognized and overlooked. The sensible in this way remains not merely the empirical first, but [counts] as the true substantial foundation. Likewise, if the activities of spirit are considered only as expressions, powers in general, perhaps with the determination of usefulness, i.e. as purposive for some other interest of intelligence or of the mind, there is no final end present. This can only be the concept itself, the in-itself of spirit, and the expression through the activity of the concept is to sublate the form of mere being-in-itself, to reach and grasp itself, to free itself to itself. In this way the so-called faculties of spirit in their distinctness are to be considered as stages of this liberation. And this alone is to be held to be the rational way of considering spirit and its various activities.
§ 443
The path of spirit is a) to be theoretical, to have to do with the rational as its immediate determinacy and to posit it as its own; – or to free knowing from the presupposition and thereby from its abstraction, and to make the determinacy subjective. In that knowing is thus determined within itself in and for itself, the determinacy posited as its own, and hence is as free intelligence, it is b) will, practical spirit, which at first is likewise formal, wills immediately and frees its determination of will from its subjectivity as the one-sided form of its content, so that it is as free will and objective spirit.
§ 444
Theoretical as well as practical spirit are still in the sphere of subjective spirit in general. They are not to be distinguished as passive and active. Subjective spirit is productive. But its productions are formal. Inwardly the production of theoretical spirit is only the ideal ground of its world, the gaining of abstract self-determination within itself. Practical spirit has to do, to be sure, only with self-determinations, with its own material, but likewise still formal, with restricted content. Outwardly, since subjective spirit is unity of soul and consciousness, hence also existing reality, at once anthropological and in conformity with consciousness, its products are the word and (not yet deed and action) enjoyment. Psychology, like logic, belongs to those sciences which in recent times have drawn the least benefit from the more general cultivation of spirit and the deeper concept of reason, and it is still in an extremely bad condition. Through the turn of the Kantian philosophy, to be sure, a greater importance has been attributed to it, even that it, and indeed in its empirical condition, is supposed to make up the foundation of metaphysics, as a science consisting in nothing other than grasping the facts of human consciousness empirically, and indeed as facts as they are given, and analysing them. With this position of psychology, which is at the same time mixed up with the standpoint of consciousness and with anthropology, nothing has changed for its condition itself; only this has been added, that for metaphysics and philosophy in general, as for spirit as such, cognition of the necessity of what is in and for itself, reflection, the concept and truth have been renounced.
a. Theoretical spirit.
§ 445
Intelligence finds itself determined; this is its seeming; the content is rational in itself. But as knowing it is this: to have what is found as its own, to be reason for itself; as intelligence it knows itself to be reason in itself. Its activity has to do in this with the empty form of finding reason; it is in so far purely formal knowing, which it has only to raise to determinate knowledge of itself. The manner of this raising is itself rational, and a necessary transition, determined by the concept, of one determination of its activity into the other. The refutation of that seeming is thus grounded on its faith in its capacity to know rationally, in the possibility of being able to appropriate reason. The distinction of intelligence from will often has the incorrect sense that both are taken as a fixed existence separated from one another, so that willing could be without intelligence, or the activity of intelligence will-less. The most trivial form of such false separation is the imagined possibility that, as it is called, the understanding can be cultivated without the heart and the heart without the understanding. Such an opinion is the abstraction of the contemplating understanding, just as one-sidedly heartless understandings and understanding-less hearts may well exist; but it is not philosophy that should take such untruths of existence and representation for the truth. – A multitude of other forms used of intelligence, that it receives impressions from outside, takes them up, that representations arise through the effects of external things as the causes etc., belong to the standpoint of perceiving, a standpoint which does not befit spirit as such, still less philosophizing. A popular form of reflection is that of the powers and faculties of the soul, of intelligence or of spirit. – The faculty, like power, is the fixed determinacy of content, represented as reflection-into-itself. Power (§ 136) is, to be sure, the infinity of form, of inner and outer, but its essential finitude contains the indifference of content to form (ibid. Remark). Herein lies the irrational element which is brought into spirit, as also into nature, by this form of reflection and the consideration of spirit as a multitude of powers. What can be distinguished in its activity is held fast as a self-standing determinacy, and spirit is in this way made into an ossified, mechanical collection. It makes no difference at all whether instead of faculties and powers the expression activities is used. Isolating the activities equally makes spirit only an aggregate being, and considers their relation as an external, contingent relation.
α) Intuition.
§ 446
Spirit, which as soul is naturally determined, as consciousness is in relation to this determinacy as to an external object, but as intelligence 1) finds itself so determined, is feeling – the dull weaving of spirit within itself, in which it is material to itself and has the whole material of its knowing. Because of the immediacy in which it still is as feeling, it is in it simply only as a singular and commonly subjective spirit.
§ 447
The form of feeling is that it is, to be sure, a determinate affection, but this determinacy is simple and therefore as contingent particularity. In feeling, the distinction both of the content against other content and of its externality against subjectivity, and therefore this subjectivity as free, is not yet posited. That spirit has the material of its representations in its feeling is a very general presupposition, but more usually in the opposite sense to the one this proposition has here. Against the simplicity of feeling, judgement in general and the distinction of consciousness into a subject and object are usually presupposed as the original; so then the determinacy of sensation is derived from a self-standing external or internal object. Here, in the truth of spirit, this standpoint of consciousness opposed to its idealism has perished. As regards content, it is a common prejudice that there is more in feeling than in thinking; this is laid down in particular with regard to moral and religious feelings. – It has resulted that the material which spirit is to itself as feeling is the being-determined-in-and-for-itself of reason. Therefore all rational and, more precisely, all spiritual content enters into feeling, as into the most proper, selfish singularity of spirit. But this form of its singularity is the lowest and worst, in which it cannot be as spirit, as something free, as infinite universality, which is its essence. It must rather go simply beyond this most untrue mode of its being, because in this immediacy it in general, and its import and content, is something contingent, subjective, particular, and it is not yet actual as rational. Cultivated sensation is the sensation of a cultivated spirit which has acquired consciousness of determinate distinctions, essential determinations etc., and in which it is this corrected material that enters into its feeling, i.e. receives this form. – But when a person appeals about something not to the nature and concept of the matter, or at least to reasons, the universality of the understanding, but to his feeling, there is nothing to be done but to leave him standing, because he thereby refuses the community of rationality and shuts himself up in his isolated subjectivity, particularity.
§ 448
2) The abstract identical direction of spirit in sensation, as in all its other further determinations, is attention, without which nothing is for it; – active recollection, but as the still formal self-determination of intelligence.
§ 449
This self-determination, however, is essentially not this abstract one; as infinite, 3) it sunders the simplicity of its being-determined and thereby sublates its immediacy. Thus it posits it as something negative, as the abstract otherness of itself. Intelligence hence at first determines the content of sensation as something existing outside itself, throws it out into space and time, which are the forms in which it is intuiting. The material is that totality of the determinacy of feeling in general, but at the same time in this first, abstract externalization of it, still in its found, external singularity. Intelligence as intuiting is still sunk in this material.
§ 450
But the other side of the sundering is to posit form as infinite reflection into itself, the awakening of intelligence to itself in this material, its recollection into itself in it; thus the material is its own, and it no longer needs its immediacy and finding – representing.
β) Representation.
§ 451
Representation, as recollected intuition, is the middle between intelligence’s immediately finding itself determined and intelligence in its freedom, thinking. Representation is intelligence’s own, but still with one-sided subjectivity, in that this own is still conditioned, formal, and thus in difference from intuition, and is not in itself being. – The path of intelligence in representation is to make immediacy inward as much as to sublate the subjectivity of inwardness, and to externalize itself within itself.
αα) Recollection.
§ 452
Recollecting intuition, intelligence places the content of feeling into its inwardness, into its own space and its own time. Thus it is 1) image, freed from its first immediacy and abstract singularity against other things, as taken up into the universality of the I in general. The image no longer has the complete determinacy which intuition has, and is arbitrary or contingent, in general isolated from the external place, time and the immediate context in which intuition stood.
§ 453
2) The image for itself is transitory, and intelligence itself, as attention, is its time. But intelligence is for itself the subject, the in-itself of its particularities; so recollected in it, the image is preserved no longer existing (unconsciously). To grasp intelligence as this nocturnal pit in which a world of infinitely many images and representations is preserved without their being in consciousness is the same universal demand in general: to grasp the concept as concrete, as for example the germ, such that it contains affirmatively, in virtual possibility, all the determinacies that first come to existence in the development of the tree. But the germ comes out of the existing determinacies only in another, the germ of the fruit, to return into its simplicity, again to the existence of being-in-itself. But intelligence as such is the existence of being-in-itself recollecting itself into itself in its development.
§ 454
3) Recollection proper is the relation of the image to an intuition, and indeed as subsumption of the immediate singular intuition under what is universal in form – the representation, which is the same content; so that intelligence is inward to itself in the determinate sensation and its intuition, and recognizes it as already its own, just as it at the same time knows this its at first inner representation also as immediate content of intuition, and as confirmed by it. – The inner representation, which is now in the possession of intelligence together with the determination of externality, is thereby at the same time posited as distinguishable from intuition and separable from the simple night in which it is at first sunk. Intelligence is thus the power to be able to express it, and no longer to need external intuition for the existence of such representation in it.
ββ) Imagination.
§ 455
1) Intelligence active in this possession is reproductive imagination, the calling forth of images from the I’s own inwardness, which is now their power. The nearest relation of the images is that of the external immediate space and time preserved along with them. — But since the image has, in the subject in which it is preserved, alone the individuality in which the determinations of its content are knotted together, its immediate concretion, which it has as one in intuiting, is by contrast dissolved. The reproduced content, as belonging to the self-identical unity of intelligence and stepping forth from its interior into representation, therefore has a universal representation for the associating relation of images, of representations more abstract or more concrete according to other circumstances. The so-called laws of the association of ideas have had great interest, especially in the flowering of empirical psychology contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. In the first place, it is not ideas that are associated. In the second place, these modes of relation are not laws, precisely because there are so many laws about the same thing, whereby arbitrariness and contingency, the opposite of a law, rather prevail; it is contingent whether what connects is something pictorial or a category of the understanding, equality and inequality, ground and consequence etc. Proceeding among images and representations according to associating imagination is in general the play of a thoughtless representing, in which the determination of intelligence is still formal universality in general, but the content is the one given in the images. – Image and representation are distinguished only by the former being the sensibly more concrete representation; representation, whether the content is something pictorial or concept and idea, has in general the character of being, though something belonging to intelligence, yet something given to it and immediate as to its content. Being, the finding-itself-determined of intelligence, still clings to representation, and the universality which that material receives through representing is itself this abstract form of relation-to-self which being is. Representation is therefore the middle in the syllogism of the elevation of intelligence; the connection of the two meanings of relation-to-self, namely of being and of universality, which in consciousness are determined as object and subject. – On the distinction of representations and thoughts cf. Introd. § 20 Remark. This abstraction which is in representing activity, by which universal representations are produced, is usually expressed as a coinciding of many similar images and is supposed to become comprehensible in this way. In order that this coinciding not be wholly chance, the conceptless, a power of attraction of similar images or the like would have to be assumed, which would at the same time be the negative power to rub off against one another what is still unequal in them. This power is in fact intelligence itself, the self-identical I, which through its recollection immediately gives them universality and subsumes the singular intuition under the image already made inward (§ 453).
§ 456
The association of representations is subsumption of the singular ones under a universal one which makes up their connection. This universality is at first form of intelligence, and the content of the subsuming representation belongs to what is found. But intelligence (taken by anticipation) as concrete subjectivity determinate within itself has its own content, which can be a thought, concept or idea. It is now the power over the store of representations belonging to it, and thus 2) free connecting and subsuming of the images under its peculiar content. Thus it is recollected, determinate within itself, in those images, and imagines them into this its content – fantasy, symbolizing, allegorizing or poetic imagination.
§ 457
Intelligence is complete in the determinate recollection of fantasy insofar as its content, taken from itself, has a pictorial existence. It is concrete totality of representing within itself, and has returned into itself, to free, identical relation to itself, at first to immediacy. Intelligence active in this determination is, expressing itself, producing intuition – 3) sign-making fantasy.
§ 458
In this unity, belonging to intelligence, of self-standing representation and of the intuition into which the former expresses itself as free fantasy, the content of this intuition as such is at first something taken up, something immediate or given (e.g. the colour of the cockade and the like). But in this identity the intuition does not count as positive and as representing itself, but something else. It is an image that has received into itself a self-standing representation of intelligence as its soul, its meaning. This intuition is the sign. The sign is some immediate intuition, but one that represents a quite different content from the one it has for itself; – the pyramid, into which an alien soul is placed and preserved. The sign is different from the symbol, an intuition whose own determinacy is, according to its essence and concept, more or less the content which it expresses as symbol; with the sign as such, by contrast, the intuition’s own content and the content of which it is the sign have nothing to do with each other. As designating, therefore, intelligence proves a freer arbitrariness and mastery in the use of intuition than as symbolizing. Usually sign and language are inserted somewhere as an appendix in psychology or even in logic, without thought being given to their necessity and connection in the system of the activity of intelligence. The true place of the sign is the one shown: that intelligence, which as intuiting generates time and space, now gives its self-standing representations a determinate existence, filled space and time, uses intuition as its own, effaces its immediate and peculiar representation and gives it another as its meaning and soul. – This sign-creating activity could be called productive memory (Muse, Mnemosyne), since memory, which in ordinary life is often confused with recollection, also with representation and imagination, and used synonymously with them, has to do in general only with signs. This expression, however, in its more precise determination is usually used for that activity which, in distinction from sign-making, would have to be called reproductive memory.
§ 459
The intuition that is used for a sign, and as immediate is at first something given and spatial, has the essential determination of being only as sublated. Since intelligence is this its negativity, the truer form of the existence of the sign is time – a vanishing of existence in that it is – and equally its appropriate externality and determinacy is a being-posited proceeding from intelligence out of its own (anthropological) naturalness – tone, the fulfilled expression of inwardness making itself known. Tone articulating itself further for determinate representations, speech and its system, language, gives sensations and intuitions a second existence higher than their immediate one, and gives representations in general an existence that counts in the realm of representing. Language comes into consideration here only according to its peculiar determinacy as the product of intelligence, manifesting its representations in an external element. If language were to be treated in a concrete way, then for its material (the lexical) the anthropological, more precisely the psycho-physiological (§ 401) standpoint would have to be recalled, and for its form (grammar) the viewpoint of the understanding anticipated. For the elementary material of language, on the one hand the representation of mere contingency has been lost, and on the other the principle of imitation has been restricted to its small range, sounding objects. Yet one can still hear the German language praised for its richness because of the many particular expressions it possesses for particular sounds (rustling, whistling, creaking etc.; perhaps more than a hundred of them have been collected; momentary whim makes new ones when it pleases); such a superfluity in the sensible and insignificant is not to be counted as what is supposed to make up the richness of a cultivated language. The peculiarly elementary itself, which must rest not so much on a symbolism relating to external objects as on an inner symbolism, the anthropological articulation as it were as a gesture of bodily expression in speech, is modified to inconspicuousness and insignificance by further natural moments and needs of cultivation. But the formal side of language is the work of the understanding, which forms its categories into it – this logical instinct brings forth its grammatical side. The study of languages that have remained original, which one has only begun to get to know thoroughly in recent times, has shown in this regard that they contain a grammar developed into great detail and express distinctions that are lacking or have been blurred in the languages of more cultivated peoples; it can even seem that, comparatively, the languages of the most cultivated peoples have the more imperfect grammar. It is not necessary in itself that written language be mentioned here along with tone language, as the original one, for the former is a further development in the particular domain of language that takes an external practical activity to its aid. It may be remarked in general that written language goes on to the field of immediate intuiting and takes and brings forth the signs (§ 454) in it. More precisely, hieroglyphic script designates representations by spatial figures, alphabetic script by contrast designates tones, which are themselves already signs; the latter therefore consists of signs of signs, and in such a way that it dissolves the concrete signs of tone language, words, into their simple elements and designates these. – Leibniz let himself be misled by his understanding into holding a complete written language formed in a hieroglyphic way, which certainly also occurs partially with alphabetic script (as in our signs for numbers, planets, chemical substances and the like), to be very desirable as a universal written language for the intercourse of peoples and in particular of scholars. Rather one could hold that the intercourse of peoples (as was perhaps the case in Phoenicia and happens at present in Canton – see Staunton’s account of Macartney’s embassy) brought about the need for alphabetic script and thus its origin. In any case one should not think of a comprehensive finished hieroglyphic language; sensible objects seem, to be sure, capable of signs that remain fixed, but for signs of the spiritual, the progress of the formation of thought, progressive logical development brings about altered views of their inner relations and thus of their nature, so that with this another hieroglyphic determination would also enter. The same happens already with the names of sensible objects in tone language, as e.g. with chemical and also mineralogical ones; since one has forgotten what names as such are, namely externalities meaningless for themselves that have a meaning only as signs, since instead of proper names one demands the expression of a kind of definition and forms it – by chance, moreover, for some objects and not for others – the naming, i.e. only the composition of signs of their generic determination or of other properties supposed to be characteristic, changes according to the difference of the view one forms of the genus or of some other property supposed to be specific. – The hieroglyphic written language of the Chinese people is appropriate only to the stationary character of Chinese spiritual cultivation; this kind of written language can in any case only be the share of the smaller part of a people. The development of tone language is at the same time most closely connected with the habit of alphabetic script, through which alone tone language gains the determinacy and purity of its articulation. The imperfection of the Chinese tone language is well known; a multitude of its words have several quite different meanings, even up to ten, indeed twenty, so that in speaking the difference is made noticeable merely by stress, intensity, speaking more softly or shouting. Europeans who begin to speak Chinese before they have made these absurd subtleties of accentuation their own fall into the most ridiculous misunderstandings. Perfection here consists in the opposite of the parler sans accent [speaking without an accent] which is rightly demanded in Europe for cultivated speech. Because of the hieroglyphic written language, the Chinese tone language lacks the objective determinacy that is gained in articulation through alphabetic script. – Learning to read and write an alphabetic script is to be regarded as an infinite means of cultivation not sufficiently esteemed, since it brings spirit from the sensibly concrete to attention to the formal, to tone and its abstract elements, and does something essential to ground and purify the soil of inwardness in the subject. – Acquired habit later also effaces the peculiarity and the detour of alphabetic script and makes it hieroglyphic script for us, so that in using it we do not need to have before us in consciousness the mediation of tones by which the written characters are connected with representations; people, by contrast, who have little habit of reading speak what they read aloud to themselves in order to understand it in its sounding. Apart from the fact that the capacity for abstraction gained through that first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is for itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing, and the mediation of representations through the less sensible element of tones is in and for itself of essential importance for the following transition from representing to thinking – memory.
§ 460
The name, as connection of the intuition produced by intelligence and its meaning, is at first a singular transitory production, the connection of the two an external one, as is that intuition itself. The recollection of this externality is memory.
γγ) Memory.
§ 461
Intelligence, 1) making its own that connection which the sign is, makes through this recollection (cf. § 453) the singular connection into a universal, i.e. lasting connection, in which name and meaning are objectively bound for it, and makes the intuition which the name at first is into a representation, so that the content, the meaning, as well as the sign is one representation, and representing is concrete in its inwardness, its content as its existence; – name-retaining memory.
§ 462
The name is thus the thing as it is present and has validity in the realm of representation. 2) Reproducing memory has in the name the thing, and with the thing the name, without intuition and image. With the name lion we need neither the intuition of such an animal nor even the image; rather the name, in that we understand it, is the imageless simple representation. It is in names that we think. The mnemonics of the ancients, warmed up again some time ago and rightly forgotten again, consists in transforming names into images and thereby lowering memory again to imagination. The place of the power of memory is taken by a lasting tableau of a series of images fixed in the imagination, to which the essay to be learned by heart, the sequence of its representations, is then attached. Given the heterogeneity of the content of these representations and of those permanent images, and also because of the speed at which it is supposed to happen, this must happen in no other way than through stale, silly, wholly contingent connections. Not only is spirit put on the rack to torment itself with crazy stuff, but what is learned by heart in this way is for that very reason quickly forgotten again, since the same tableau is in any case used for learning by heart every other series of representations, and those previously attached to it are therefore wiped away again. What is mnemonically impressed is not, like what is retained in memory, brought forth by heart [auswendig], i.e. properly from within outward, from the deep pit of the I, and so recited, but is, so to speak, read off from the tableau of imagination. – Mnemonics is connected in general with the usual prejudices one has about memory in relation to imagination, as if the latter were a higher, more spiritual activity than memory. Rather memory no longer has to do with the image, which is taken from the immediate, unspiritual being-determined of intelligence, from intuition, but with an existence which is the product of intelligence itself – such an outward [Auswendiges] which remains enclosed in the inward [Inwendige] of intelligence and is only within intelligence itself its outward, existing side.
§ 463
The name, as existence of the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligence itself within it; the recollection of the name as the intuition brought forth by intelligence is at the same time the externalization in which theoretical spirit posits itself within itself. It is thus being, a space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. Names are in general many, and as such they are contingent with respect to one another, and in so far there is nothing here but I and many words. But the I is not only universal being or their space in general, but as subjectivity their power, the empty bond which fixes series of them within itself and keeps them in fixed order. Insofar as they are merely existent, and intelligence within itself is here itself only as being, it is the power of wholly abstract subjectivity – 3) memory, which is called mechanical because of the complete externality in which the members of such series are with respect to one another and which is itself this externality. As is well known, one knows an essay properly by heart only when one attaches no sense to the words; the recitation of what is known by heart in this way therefore becomes accentless of itself. The correct accent that is brought in goes to the sense; the meaning, representation, that is called up, by contrast, disturbs the mechanical connection and therefore easily confuses the reciting. The capacity to be able to retain by heart series of words in whose connection there is no understanding, or which are already meaningless for themselves, is so highly wondrous because spirit is essentially this, to be with itself, while here it is as externalized within itself, its activity as a mechanism. But spirit is with itself only as unity of subjectivity and objectivity; and here in memory, after it is at first in intuition as something external, finds the determinations, and in representation recollects itself in what is found and makes it its own, it makes itself in it into something external, so that its own appears as something being found. The one moment of thinking, objectivity, is here posited in intelligence as a quality of intelligence itself.
§ 464
Mechanical memory is the sublating of the one-sided external objectivity which at first still belongs to what is existent, as name, in that it needs another, the meaning of representing intelligence, in order to be the thing, true objectivity. Intelligence, which as mechanical memory is itself that external objectivity, is thereby at the same time itself what alone signifies. Memory is in this way the transition into thought, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. in whose objectivity the subjective is no longer something different from it, just as this inwardness is in itself existent. Already our language gives memory, of which it has become a prejudice to speak contemptuously, the high position of immediate kinship with thought [Gedächtnis – Gedanke]. Youth does not by chance have a better memory than the old, and their memory is not exercised merely for the sake of usefulness; rather they have the good memory because they do not yet behave reflectively, and their memory is exercised intentionally or unintentionally in order to level the soil of their inwardness into pure being, into pure space, in which the thing, the content being in itself, may hold sway and explicate itself without the opposition to a subjective inwardness. A thorough talent is usually combined with a good memory in youth. – It is one of the most difficult points in the doctrine of spirit, in the systematization of intelligence, to grasp the position of memory and to comprehend its organic transition into thinking.
γ) Thinking.
§ 465
Through the recollection of the immediate being-determined of intelligence and the externalization of its subjective determining, the difference with which representing is burdened (§ 451) is sublated, and their unity and truth has come to be: thought. Thought is the thing; simple identity of the subjective and the objective. What is thought, is; and what is, is only insofar as it is thought.
§ 466
The thinking of intelligence is for itself, it is – having thoughts. At first it is formal; universality as universality, and its being equally the simple subjectivity of intelligence. Thoughts are thus not as determined in and for themselves; the representations recollected into thinking are in so far still the content – a content which in itself is only the being-determined-in-and-for-itself of reason.
§ 467
But thinking, as this free universality which is identical with being, and as this unity is concrete within itself and pure negativity, develops itself in the content, and is thus not only α) formally identical understanding, but β) essentially sundering and determination – judgement, and γ) the identity finding itself out of this particularization – comprehending thinking, formal reason. Intelligence, as comprehending, has being-determined, which in its sensation is at first immediate material, within itself as absolutely its own. In insight into the necessity of the content at first given to thinking itself, the course of its own activity is for it identical with the being-determined of the content as it is in itself; it is for itself as determining. In logic thinking is as it is only in itself, and reason develops itself in this element without opposition. In consciousness it likewise occurs as a stage (see § 437 Remark). Here reason is as the truth of the opposition as it had determined itself within spirit itself. – It steps forth again and again in these various parts of the science because they are distinguished only by the element and the form of the opposition, while thinking is this one and the same centre into which, as into their truth, the oppositions return.
§ 468
Thinking, as the free concept, is hence free also as regards content; the determinacy of reason is in itself the own determinacy of subjective intelligence, and the content means nothing other than precisely the determinacy which comprehending thinking develops out of itself. Intelligence knowing itself as what determines a content which is as much its own as it is determined as existing is will.
b. Practical spirit.
§ 469
Spirit as will knows itself as determining itself, thus as fulfilling itself out of itself. This fulfilled being-for-itself or singularity makes up the side of existence or reality of the idea of spirit, whose concept is reason. – The finitude of will consists in its formalism, according to which it is as self-determining with itself and hence free, but this being-fulfilled through itself is at first only abstract determinacy, its own in general, and has not yet identified itself with developed reason. The determination of the will being in itself is to bring freedom in the formal will to existence, and thus the determination of the latter is to fulfil itself with this its concept, i.e. to make freedom its determinacy, its content and purpose as well as its existence. This concept, freedom, is essentially only as thinking; the path of the will to make itself objective spirit is to raise itself to thinking will – to give itself the content which it can have only as thinking itself. True freedom, ethical life, is this: that the will has as its purposes not subjective, i.e. selfish, but universal content; but such content is only in thinking and through thinking; it is nothing less than absurd to want to exclude thinking from ethical life, religiosity, rightfulness etc.
§ 470
Practical spirit at first contains, as formal will, a twofold ought: 1) in the opposition of the determinacy posited out of it against its immediate being-determined, against its existence and condition, which in consciousness develops at the same time in the relation to external objects. 2) That first self-determination is at first not raised into the universality of thinking, which therefore in itself makes up the ought against it as regards form, and can make it up as regards content; – an opposition that is at first only for us.
α) Practical feeling.
§ 471
The self-determination of spirit, as at first in an immediate way, is thereby only formal, so that spirit finds itself as singularity determining itself according to its inner nature. It is thus practical feeling.
§ 472
The will is this nature of spirit as subjectivity simply identical in itself with reason and thereby itself universal; it therefore has in the immediate singularity of practical feeling the content of reason, to be sure, but as immediately singular, hence as natural, and at the same time contingent and subjective, and equally a content determining itself out of the particularity of need, of opinion etc., and out of subjectivity setting itself up for itself against the universal. When appeal is made to the feeling of right and morality, as of religion, which man is supposed to have within himself, to his benevolent inclinations etc., to his heart in general, i.e. the subject insofar as all the various practical feelings are united in it, this has 1) the correct sense that these determinations are his own immanent ones, 2) and then, insofar as feeling is opposed to the understanding, that it can be the totality against the understanding’s one-sided abstraction. But equally feeling can be one-sided, inessential, bad. The rational in the shape of rationality, which by contrast is as something thought, is the same content that good practical feeling has, but in its universality and necessity, in its objectivity and truth. Therefore it is, on the one hand, foolish to think that in the transition from feeling to right and duty something is lost in content and excellence; this transition first brings feeling to its truth. It is equally foolish to hold intelligence to be superfluous, indeed harmful, to feeling, heart and will; the truth and, what is the same, the rationality of heart and will can take place solely in the universality of intelligence, not in the singularity of feeling as such. If feelings are of a true kind, they are so through their determinacy, i.e. their content, and this is true only insofar as it is universal within itself, i.e. has thinking spirit as its source. The difficulty for the understanding consists in freeing itself from the separation it has once arbitrarily made between the faculties of the soul, feeling, thinking spirit, and in coming to the representation that in man there is only one reason, in feeling, willing and thinking. The difficulty connected with this is that the ideas belonging solely to thinking spirit, God, right, ethical life, can also be felt. But feeling is nothing other than the form of the immediate peculiar singularity of the subject. On the other hand it is suspicious, and very well more than that, to hold fast to feeling and heart against thinking rationality, because what is more in the former than in the latter is only particular subjectivity, vanity and arbitrariness. – For the same reason it is clumsy, in the scientific consideration of feelings, to engage with more than their form and to consider their content, since this, as thought, rather makes up the self-determinations of spirit in their universality and necessity, rights and duties.
§ 473
Practical feeling contains the ought, its self-determination as being in itself, related to an existing singularity that is determined as null in itself and as valid only in identity with that self-determination. Since in this immediacy the two do not yet have a necessary identity, this relation of need to existence is the feeling of the agreeable or disagreeable. Pleasure, joy, pain etc., shame, remorse, contentment etc. are partly only modifications of formal practical feeling in general, but partly distinguished by their content, which makes up the determinacy of the ought. The famous question about the origin of ill in the world arises on this standpoint of the formal practical, at least insofar as by ill is first understood only the disagreeable and pain. Ill is nothing other than the inadequacy of being to the ought. This ought has many meanings and, since contingent purposes likewise have the form of the ought, infinitely many. With regard to them ill is only the right that is exercised against the vanity and nullity of their conceit. They themselves are already ill. That there are such singularities, and all others inadequate to the idea, lies in the judgement of the concept within itself (living soul, spirit, reason etc.) and into being, and in its indifference toward immediate being in general, which, released by the concept itself into free actuality, equally remains related to it and, as being for itself not adequate to it, is against it and hence in itself the null; – a contradiction that is called ill. In the dead there is neither ill nor pain, because in inorganic nature the concept does not step over against its existence. Already in life, and still more in spirit, this distinguishing is present, and with it an ought enters; and this negativity, activity, I, freedom, are the principles of ill and of pain. – Jacob Böhm grasped I-hood as pain and torment and as the source of nature and of spirit.
β) The drives.
§ 474
The practical ought is a real judgement. The immediate, itself merely found adequacy of the existing determinacy to need is, for the self-determination of the will, a negation and inadequate to it. In order that the will, i.e. the unity of universality and determinacy, satisfy itself and be for itself, the adequacy of its inner determination and existence ought to be posited by it. The will is, as regards the form of its content, still natural will, as in need in general, which, however, as to be satisfied by it, is now drive and inclination, and, with the more precise determinacy that the totality of practical spirit places itself into a single one of the restricted determinations, passion.
§ 475
Inclinations and passions have the same self-determinations as their content as practical feelings. Because the one as well as the other are immediate self-determinations which do not yet have the form of rationality, they are manifold particular ones. They have, on the one hand, the rational nature of spirit as their foundation, but on the other hand, as belonging to the still subjective, singular will, they are just as essentially burdened with contingency, and relate to the individual, as to one another, according to an external, unfree necessity. Of inclinations exactly the same holds as of feelings; they are self-determinations of the will free in itself, which, however, is not yet free for itself as intelligence in the content of its self-determination, not yet universal and objective. Passion already contains in its determination that it is restricted to a particularity of the determination of will and to subjective singularity, whatever its content may otherwise be. Because of this formal character, however, passion is neither good nor evil; this form therefore expresses only that a subject has laid the whole living interest of his spirit, talent, character, enjoyment into one content. Nothing great has been accomplished without passion, nor can it be accomplished without it. It is only a dead, indeed too often hypocritical morality that inveighs against the form of passion as such. But of the inclinations the question is immediately raised which are good and which evil, likewise up to what degree the good ones remain good and, since they are particular against one another and there are many of them, how they must at least restrict one another, since they are after all found in one subject and, according to experience, cannot well all be satisfied. With these many drives and inclinations it is at first the same as with the powers of the soul, whose collection theoretical spirit is supposed to be; – a collection that is now increased by the multitude of drives. The formal rationality of drive and inclination consists only in their universal drive, in not being as something subjective, but sublating their subjectivity through the activity of the subject itself, being realized. Their true rationality cannot result in a consideration of external reflection, which presupposes and retains self-standing natural determinations and immediate drives. But it is rather the immanent reflection of spirit itself to go beyond their particularity as well as their natural immediacy and to give their content rationality and objectivity, in which they are as necessary relations and rights and duties. It is this objectification, then, that shows their import as well as their relation to one another, in short their truth. Just as Plato showed, with true sense, also insofar as he comprised under the right of spirit its whole nature, that he could present what justice is in and for itself only in the objective shape of justice, namely the construction of the state as ethical life. The question which are the good, rational inclinations and what their subordination is thus turns into the presentation of what relations spirit brings forth in developing itself as objective spirit; – a development in which its self-determinations in general have lost the form of inclinations, as the content has lost subjectivity, contingency or arbitrariness. The treatment of drives, inclinations and passions according to their true, ethical import is therefore essentially the doctrine of duties. Nothing peculiar remains to them but the particularity deviating from the ethical, evil drives and passions.
§ 476
The subject is the activity of satisfying the drives, of formal rationality, namely of translation from subjectivity into objectivity, in which the subject closes together with itself. That the matter which has come about contains the moment of subjective singularity and its activity is interest. Therefore nothing comes about without interest. An action is a purpose of the subject, and equally it is his activity that carries out this purpose; only by the subject being in this way in the most disinterested action, i.e. through his interest, is there acting at all. – Against drives and passions one sets, on the one hand, the stale daydream of a natural happiness through which needs are supposed to find their satisfaction without the activity of the subject in bringing forth the adequacy of immediate existence and its inner determinations. On the other hand, morality is opposed to them. But drive and passion is nothing other than the liveliness of the subject, according to which it is itself in its purpose and its execution. The ethical concerns the content, which as such is the universal, something inactive. It has its activating factor in the subject, and as immanent to the subject it is interest of drive and, when it claims the whole effective subjectivity, of passion.
§ 477
Interest and drive or inclination have a particular content determined by the will. The simple subjectivity of the will stands at the same time above this its manifold content and the contradiction of the drives. It is thus determined as thinking will and, since thinking has only that manifold content before it, as reflecting will, and therewith as arbitrariness. Since arbitrariness, against the restricted particularity of the drives, makes their universality its purpose, it is the drive for happiness.
γ) Arbitrariness and happiness.
§ 478
Happiness is the representation, brought forth by reflecting thinking, of the satisfaction of all drives, which are posited as negative in their particularity and are supposed to be sacrificed and preferred one to another, wholly or in part. Their limitation by one another is on the one hand a mixture of qualitative and quantitative determination; on the other hand, since happiness has its affirmative content solely in the drives, the decision lies in them, and it is subjective feeling and liking that must tip the balance.
§ 479
In the universal purpose of happiness the will is freed from the singularization in which it is caught as a particular drive or passion. Such a particularity is in so far no longer immediate, but is its own only through the will closing together with it and thereby giving itself determinate singularity and actuality. It is thus on the standpoint of having to choose between inclinations, and is arbitrariness.
§ 480
The will is in this way free for itself, in that it is reflected into itself as the negativity of its immediate determining; however, insofar as the content in which this its formal universality resolves itself into actuality is still no other than an immediate particularity, it is actual only as subjective and contingent will. As the contradiction of actualizing itself in a particularity which is at the same time a nullity for it, and of having a satisfaction in it out of which it has at the same time stepped, it is at first the process of dispersion and of sublating one inclination or enjoyment by another, and of satisfaction that equally is not satisfaction, by another, to infinity.
§ 481
Happiness is the universality of the content, which merely ought to be. But the truth of the particular content, which is just as much determinacy as it is sublated, and of abstract singularity, of arbitrariness, which in it equally gives itself a purpose as it does not, is the universal determinacy of the will, i.e. its self-determining itself, freedom. Arbitrariness is in this way the will as pure subjectivity, which is pure and concrete at the same time by having as its content and purpose only that determinacy, freedom itself. Spirit in this truth of its self-determination, in which concept and object are identical, is objective will, objective spirit in general.
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (1817), §§ 363–399
- Spirit: concept and division: § 363 · § 364 · § 365 · § 366 · § 367
- Intuition: § 368 · § 369 · § 370 · § 371 · § 372
- Representation: § 373 · § 374 · § 375 · § 376 · § 377 · § 378 · § 379 · § 380 · § 381 · § 382 · § 383
- Thinking: § 384 · § 385 · § 386 · § 387
- Practical spirit: § 388 · § 389 · § 390 · § 391 · § 392 · § 393 · § 394 · § 395 · § 396 · § 397 · § 398 · § 399
§ 363
Spirit has shown itself to be the unity of soul and consciousness – of the former simple immediate totality, and of the latter knowing, which, restricted by no object, no longer stands in relation, but is knowledge of the simple totality, neither subjective nor objective. Spirit therefore begins only from its own being and relates itself only to its own determinations.
§ 364
The soul is finite insofar as it is determined immediately or by nature; consciousness insofar as it has an object; spirit insofar as it immediately has a determinacy within itself, or insofar as this is one posited by it. In and for itself it is the absolutely infinite, objective reason which is its concept and whose reality is knowing or intelligence. The finitude of spirit therefore consists more precisely in knowing not having grasped the being-in-and-for-itself of reason. But reason is infinite only insofar as it is absolute freedom, and therefore presupposes itself to its knowing as immediate being-determined and thereby makes itself finite, and is the eternal movement of sublating this immediacy and comprehending itself.
§ 365
The progress of spirit is development, because its existence, knowing, [is] being-determined-in-and-for-itself, the purpose or the rational, and translating is purely only this formal transition into manifestation. Insofar as knowing is infinite negativity, this translating is, in the concept, creation in general. Insofar as knowing is only at first abstract or formal, spirit in it is not in conformity with its concept, and its goal is to bring forth the absolute fulfilment and the absolute freedom of its knowing.
§ 366
The path of spirit is a) to be theoretical, to have to do with its immediate determinacy and to posit it as its own; – or to free knowing from the presupposition and thereby from its abstraction, and to make the determinacy subjective. In that knowing is determined within itself in and for itself, or is as free intelligence, it is immediately b) will, practical spirit, which at first wills immediately and frees its determination of will from its subjectivity, so that it is as free will and objective spirit.
§ 367
Theoretical as well as practical spirit are still in the sphere of subjective spirit in general; this knowing and willing is still formal. But as spirit it is in general the unity of subjectivity and objectivity; as subjective spirit it is therefore just as much productive; but its productions are formal; the production of theoretical spirit is the ideal ground of its world, that of practical spirit a formal material and content of it. The doctrine of spirit is usually treated as empirical psychology, and spirit considered as a collection of powers and faculties which happen to be found together, so that one or another could just as well not be there without detriment to the rest; just as in physics one does not see that nature would lack much if, for example, such an appendage as magnetism is represented to be were not to be found in it. – The relation of the faculties to one another is, moreover, regarded as an external necessity or purposiveness, and this usefulness of the faculties thus often appears a very remote, indeed sometimes even absurd one. Psychology, like logic, belongs to those sciences which in recent times have drawn the least benefit from the more general cultivation of spirit and the deeper concept of reason, and it is in an extremely bad condition. From the other side, to be sure, a greater importance has been attributed to it through the turn of the Kantian philosophy, even that it, and indeed in its empirical condition, is supposed to make up the foundation of metaphysics, as a science consisting in nothing other than grasping the facts of human consciousness empirically, and indeed as facts as they are given, and analysing them. With this position of psychology, which is at the same time mixed up with the standpoint of consciousness and with anthropology, nothing has changed for its condition itself; only this has been added, that for metaphysics and philosophy in general, as for spirit as such, cognition of the necessity of what is in and for itself, the concept and truth have been renounced.
a) Theoretical spirit.
§ 368
Intelligence finds itself determined; but as knowing it is this: to have what is found as its own, because it is reason in itself, to be it for itself, and to make its objectivity being in and for itself subjective. Intelligence is therefore not receptive, but essentially active, to sublate the empty form of finding its reason, or to raise purely formal knowing, which it is as reason’s finding itself, to determinate knowledge of itself. The manner of this raising is, because intelligence is reason, itself rational, and a necessary transition, determined by the concept, of one determination of its activity into the other. 1) The distinction of intelligence from will often has the incorrect sense that both are taken as a fixed existence separated from one another, so that willing could be without intelligence, or the activity of intelligence will-less. But intelligence is will just as essentially, for only free self-determination is will, as will is intelligence, for freedom is only as the certainty of myself, in the immediate determination being in itself. Thus will will show itself as the truth of intelligence, or rather intelligence will show it itself as its truth. The will of spirit to be as intelligence is its self-determination to abstract from its purposes and interests posited by it and not to behave as will. – The most trivial form of that false separation is the imagined possibility that, as it is called, the understanding can be cultivated without the heart and the heart without the understanding. Such an opinion is the abstraction of the contemplating understanding, which holds fast to such distinctions; just as it is the actual understanding in the individual which separates it in this way, brings it into the untruth of spiritual existence and fixes it there – an understanding that is just as much will. But it is not philosophy that should take such untruths of existence and representation for the truth. – A multitude of other forms used of intelligence, that it receives impressions from outside, takes them up, that representations arise through the effects of external things as the causes etc., belong to the standpoint of perceiving, of the mixture of sensible and understanding determinations (§ 336), a standpoint which does not befit spirit, still less philosophizing. – That intelligence appears determined in infinitely manifold, contingent ways is likewise the standpoint of wholly finite singularity and of the extreme untruth of the empirical natural life of the singular soul. 2) An especially popular form of reflection is that of the powers and faculties of the soul, of intelligence or of spirit. – As regards faculty [Vermögen], dynamis has a quite different meaning in Aristotle – it designates being-in-itself and is distinguished from entelechy, as activity, being-for-itself, actuality. But the faculty, like power, is the fixed determinacy of content, represented as reflection-into-itself. Power (§ 85) is, to be sure, the infinity of form, of inner and outer; but its essential finitude makes up the indifference of content to form (ibid. Remark). Herein lies the irrational element which is brought into spirit, as also into nature, by this form of reflection and the consideration of spirit as a multitude of powers. What can be distinguished in its activity is held fast as a self-standing determinacy, and spirit is in this way made into an ossified, mechanical collection. If a power of spirit is considered in and for itself, i.e. its content, the particular determinacy it contains, it proves itself to be determinacy, i.e. dialectical and passing over, not self-standing; thus precisely the form of a power that was used sublates itself, which is supposed rather to be the reflection-into-itself of the determinacy and to fix it into self-standingness. With this the concept enters, in which the powers vanish. – This concept and dialectic is intelligence itself, the pure subjectivity of the I, in which the determinacies are as fluid moments, and which is the absolutely concrete, the night of the self, in which the infinite world of representations which every intelligence is, as well as the own determinations of its activity which have been taken as powers, are sublated. As the simple identical of this manifoldness it determines itself to this simplicity of a determinacy, to the understanding, to the form of a power, of an isolated activity, and grasps itself as intuition, power of representation, faculty of understanding etc. But this isolating and the abstractions of activities and these opinions about them are not the concept and the rational truth of itself.
§ 369
Intelligence is as soul immediately determined, as consciousness it is in relation to this determinacy as to an external object; as intelligence it finds itself so determined; thus it is 1) feeling, the dull weaving of spirit within itself, in which it is material to itself and has the whole material of its knowing. Because of the immediacy in which spirit is as feeling or sensing, it is in it simply only as singular and subjective.
§ 370
The form of sensation is that it is, to be sure, a determinate affection, but this determinacy is simple, and in it the distinction both of its content against other content and of its externality against subjectivity is not yet posited. That spirit has the material of its representations in its sensation is a very general presupposition, but more usually in the sense opposite to the one this proposition has here. For although judgement in general and the distinction of consciousness into a subject and object is later than simple sensation, it is nevertheless taken as the earlier, and the determinacy of sensation is derived from a self-standing external or internal object. Here, in the sphere of spirit, this standpoint of consciousness opposed to idealism has perished. Feeling or sensation is by its form the material-like, since it is this immediate, still internally undifferentiated, dull knowing of spirit. – Aristotle too recognized the determination of sensation, in that he recognized the sensing subject and the sensed object, into which consciousness separates it, only as sensing according to possibility, but said of sensation that the entelechy of the sensing and of the sensed is one and the same. – No prejudice is likely to be more false than that the proposition that nothing is in thinking which was not in the senses – and indeed in the usual sense mentioned above – is ascribed to Aristotle. His whole philosophy is rather the direct opposite of it. – An equally common prejudice as this historical one is that there is even more in feeling than in thinking; this is laid down in particular with regard to moral and religious feelings. – It has resulted that the material which spirit is to itself as feeling is the being-determined-in-and-for-itself of reason. But this form of its simplicity is the lowest and worst, in which it cannot be as spirit, as something free, as infinite universality, which is its essence. It must rather go simply beyond this most untrue mode of its being, because in this immediacy, in which it is determined because it merely is, it is something contingent, subjective, particular, not actual as rational. – Therefore also, when a person appeals about something not to the nature and concept of the matter, or at least to reasons, the universality of the understanding, but to his feeling, there is nothing to be done but to leave him standing, because he thereby refuses the community of rationality and shuts himself up in his isolated subjectivity, particularity.
§ 371
The abstract identical direction of spirit in sensation, as in all its other further determinations, is attention; the moment of the formal self-determination of intelligence.
§ 372
This self-determination, however, is essentially not this abstract one; as infinite it sunders the simplicity of its being-determined and thereby sublates its immediacy. Thus it posits it as something negative, the felt, distinguished from intelligence as reflected into itself, the subject, in which feeling is something sublated. This stage of reflection is representation.
§ 373
2) The representing activity of intelligence is αα) recollection. Sundering its simple sensation and determining it as the extreme negative against its reflection-into-itself, it posits the content of sensation as something existing outside itself; thus it throws it out into space and time, and is intuiting. Intuition is immediate insofar as it is abstract externalization and intelligence is not posited as reflection-into-itself and subject against this externality.
§ 374
But this positing is the other extreme of the sundering; in it intelligence equally places the content of feeling into its inwardness, into its own space and its own time. Thus it is image and representation in general, freed from its first immediacy and abstract singularity against other things – and thereby taken up into the form of the universality of the I, at first this abstract, ideal universality.
§ 375
Recollection is the relation of the two, the subsumption of the immediate singular intuition under this, which is universal in form – representation, which is the same content; so that intelligence is inward to itself in the determinate sensation and its intuition, and recognizes itself in it, no longer needs intuition and now possesses it as its own.
§ 376
β) Intelligence now active in this its possession is reproductive imagination, the calling forth of images from the I’s own inwardness. The relation of concrete images is at first that of the external immediate space and time preserved along with them. – But since the image has, in the subject in which it is preserved, alone the negative unity in which it is borne and its concretion is preserved, its immediate concretion, in which it is determined as one in sensing and intuiting or rather in consciousness, is by contrast dissolved. The reproduced content, as belonging to the self-identical unity of intelligence and stepping forth from its interior into representation, is a universal representation, which is the associating relation of concrete representations. The so-called laws of the association of ideas have had great interest, especially in the flowering of empirical psychology contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. In the first place, it is not ideas that are associated. In the second place, these modes of relation are not laws, precisely because there are so many laws about the same thing, whereby arbitrariness and contingency, the opposite of a law, rather prevail. Proceeding among images and representations according to associating imagination is in general the play of a thoughtless representing, in which the determination of intelligence is still wholly formal universality, but the content is the one given in the images. – Moreover, image and representation are distinguished only by the former being the more concrete; representation, whether the content is something pictorial or concept and idea, has in general the character of being, though something belonging to intelligence, yet something given to it and immediate as to its content. – It is otherwise evident that, since intuition is immediate relation, the I as ideal universality, hence external to its reflection-into-itself, which [is] not yet as determination of the content, while representation and its reproduction is a determinate universality – that intuiting, representing and imagination are therefore essentially thinking, although they are not yet liberated thinking, and the content is not a thought. – The abstraction which is in representing activity, by which universal representations are produced, is usually expressed as a coinciding of many similar images and is supposed to become comprehensible in this way. In order that this coinciding not be wholly chance, the conceptless, a power of attraction of similar images or the like would have to be assumed, which would at the same time be the negative power to rub off against one another what is still unequal in them. This power is in fact intelligence itself, the I as universal, which through its recollection immediately gives them universality.
§ 377
The association of representations is therefore a subsumption of the singular ones under a universal one. This universality is at first form of intelligence. But intelligence is equally concrete subjectivity determinate within itself, and its own content can be a thought, concept or idea. As subsuming the images under its peculiar content, intelligence is recollected in them, determinate within itself, and imagines them into this its content. Thus it is fantasy, symbolizing, allegorizing or poetic imagination.
§ 378
Intelligence is complete in the determinate recollection of fantasy insofar as its content, taken from itself, has a pictorial existence. But the material of the pictorial is given, and the product does not have the immediacy of existence. It must give it this, because in it, as totality of representing, it has returned out of its particularization into subjective representation and external intuition, to free, identical relation to itself. This recollection of intuition is memory.
§ 379
γ) Memory (Mnemosyne, Muse) is the unity of self-standing representation and of the intuition into which the former expresses itself as free fantasy. – This immediacy is, because intelligence is not yet practical, an immediate or given one; but in this identity the intuition does not count as positive and representing itself, but as representing something else; it is an image that has received into itself a self-standing representation of intelligence as its soul, its meaning. This intuition is the sign. The sign is some immediate intuition, but one that represents a representation of quite different content from the one it has for itself; – the pyramid, into which an alien soul is placed and preserved. The sign is different from the symbol, an intuition whose own determinacy is, according to its essence and concept, more or less the thought which it expresses as symbol. As designating, therefore, intelligence proves a freer arbitrariness and mastery in the use of intuition than as symbolizing. – Usually sign and language are inserted somewhere as an appendix in psychology or even in logic, without thought being given to their necessity and connection in the system of the activity of intelligence. Its true place is the one shown: that intelligence, which as intuiting generates time and space, now gives its self-standing representations a determinate existence, filled space and time, uses intuition, in the determinacy it has from the material of sensation, as its own, effaces its immediate and peculiar representation and gives it another as its meaning and soul. – This sign-creating activity is rightly called memory, and indeed productive memory; since memory, which admittedly in ordinary life is often confused with recollection, also with representation and imagination, and used synonymously with them, has to do in general only with signs. But even when it is meant in this its more precise determination, usually only reproductive memory is thought of; intelligence, however, essentially produces what it reproduces.
§ 380
The intuition that is used for a sign is, as immediate, at first a given and spatial one. But since it is only as sublated, and intelligence is this its negativity, the truer form of the existence of the sign is time – a vanishing in that it is – and tone is the fulfilled expression of inwardness making itself known (§ 279). Tone articulating itself further for determinate representations, speech and its system, language, gives sensations and intuitions a second existence higher than their immediate one, and gives representations in general an existence that counts in the realm of representing.
§ 381
The identity of the intuition in the sign and its meaning is at first the singular production; but as unity of intelligence it is just as essentially universal. The activity of recollecting it and thereby making it universal, as also of reproducing it, is retentive memory by heart and reproductive memory.
§ 382
Signs are in general many, and as such absolutely contingent with respect to one another. The empty bond which fixes such series and keeps them in this fixed order is the wholly abstract, pure power of subjectivity – memory, which is called mechanical because of the complete externality in which the members of such series are with respect to one another.
§ 383
The name is the thing as it is present and has validity in the realm of representation. But it has an externality brought forth by intelligence, and is intuition as inessential for itself, standing in the use of intelligence and made subjective, so that it has value solely through the meaning given to it by intelligence, which is the representation determined in and for itself, and the thing or the objective. Mechanical memory is the formal sublating of that subjectivity, whereby the contradiction of the sign falls away and intelligence, in habit, makes itself for itself into the thing, as immediate objectivity. In this way it makes, through memory, the transition to thinking.
§ 384
3) Through the recollection of its immediate being-determined and the externalization of its subjective determining, their unity and truth has come to be: thought. Thought is the thing; simple identity of the subjective and the objective. What is thought, is; and what is, is only insofar as it is thought.
§ 385
Thinking is at first formal; universality as universality, and being equally the simple subjectivity of intelligence. It is thus not as determined in and for itself; the representations recollected into thinking are in so far still the content – a content which in itself is only being-determined-in-and-for-itself of reason.
§ 386
But thinking, as this free universality which is this only as pure negativity, is thus not α) only formally identical understanding, but β) essentially sundering and determination – judgement, and γ) the identity finding itself out of this particularization; the concept and reason. Intelligence, as comprehending, has being-determined, which in its sensation was at first as immediate material, within itself as absolutely its own, and thereby not as being-determined but as determining. In logic thinking has been considered as it is first in itself, then as it is for itself and as it is in and for itself – as being, reflection and concept, and then as idea. In the soul it is wakeful presence of mind; in consciousness it likewise occurs as a stage. It steps forth in these various parts of the science again and again because they are distinguished only by the element and the form of the opposition, while thinking is this one and the same centre into which, as into their truth, the oppositions return.
§ 387
Thinking, because it is the free concept, is free also as regards content; the determinacy of reason is the own determinacy of subjective intelligence, and as determinate it is its content and existence. Thinking subjectivity is thus actual; its determinations are purposes; it is free will.
b) Practical spirit.
§ 388
Spirit as intelligence, however, is at first abstract for itself; as free will it is fulfilled, because it is as concept, as determining itself. This fulfilled being-for-itself or singularity makes up the side of existence or reality of the idea of spirit, whose concept is reason.
§ 389
This existence of the self-determination of spirit is at first the immediate one: that spirit finds itself as singularity determining itself inwardly within itself or through nature. It is thus 1) practical feeling.
§ 390
Free will is the singularity or pure negativity of self-determining being-for-itself, as subjectivity simply identical with reason and thereby itself universal, will as intelligence. The immediate singularity of will in practical feeling therefore has that content, to be sure, but as immediately singular, hence contingent and subjective. When appeal is made to the feeling of right and morality which man is supposed to have within himself, to his benevolent inclinations etc., to his heart in general, i.e. the subject insofar as all the various practical feelings are united in it, this has 1) the correct sense that these determinations are his own immanent ones, 2) and then, insofar as feeling is opposed to the understanding, that it can be the totality against the understanding’s one-sided abstraction. But equally feeling can be one-sided, inessential, bad; through the form of immediacy it is essentially the contingent and subjective. The rational in the shape of rationality, which by contrast is as something thought, is the same content that practical feeling has, but in its universality and necessity, in its objectivity and truth. Therefore it is, on the one hand, foolish to think that in the transition from feeling, e.g. to right and duty, something is lost in content and excellence – this transition first brings feeling to its truth – and likewise to hold intelligence to be superfluous, indeed harmful, to feeling, heart and will; the truth and, what is the same, the rationality of heart and will can take place solely in the universality of intelligence, not in the singularity of feeling. – On the other hand, however, it is suspicious, and very well more than that, to hold fast to feeling and heart against thought rationality, because what is more in the former than in the latter is only particular subjectivity, vanity and arbitrariness. – For the same reason it is clumsy, in the consideration of feelings, to engage with more than their form and to consider their content, since this, as thought, rather is the self-determinations of spirit in their universality and necessity, rights and duties.
§ 391
Practical feeling, as self-determination of the thinking subject in general, contains the ought, concrete free universality as being in itself but as related to an existing singularity that is determined as null in itself and as something true being for itself only in identity with universality. Practical feeling in its immediate singularity, related with its ought to the determinacy which merely is, gives, since in this immediacy they do not yet have a necessary identity, the feeling of the agreeable or disagreeable. 1) Pleasure, joy, pain etc., shame, remorse, contentment etc. are partly only modifications of formal practical feeling in general, but partly distinguished by their content, which makes up the determinacy of the ought. 2) The famous question about the origin of ill in the world receives its answer here in its universality, but more precisely insofar as by ill is at first understood only the disagreeable and pain. Ill is nothing other than the inadequacy of being to the ought. But this ought has many meanings and, since contingent purposes likewise have the form of the ought, infinitely many. With regard to them ill is only the right that is exercised against the vanity and nullity of their conceit. They themselves are already ill; and that there are such singularities, and all others inadequate to the idea, lies in the necessary indifference of the concept toward immediate being in general, which stands over against it insofar as it is a free actuality, and is likewise released by it into free actuality, but is equally related to it and determined as what is null in itself; – a contradiction that is called ill. In the dead there is neither ill nor pain, because the concept does not exist in it, or because in inorganic nature it does not step over against its existence. Already in life, and still more in spirit, this distinguishing is present; and this negativity, activity, I, freedom, are the principles of ill and of pain. – Jacob Böhm grasped I-hood as pain and torment and as the source of nature and of spirit.
§ 392
The practical ought is 2) a real judgement. The immediacy of feeling is a negation for the self-determination of the will; it therefore makes up the will’s subjectivity, which is to be sublated so that the will be identical for itself. Since this activity is not yet freed from form and is therefore formal, the will is still natural will, drive and inclination, and, with the more precise determinacy that the totality of practical spirit places itself into a single one of the restricted determinations, passion.
§ 393
Inclinations and passions have the same self-determinations as their content as practical feelings. Because the one as well as the other are immediate self-determinations which do not yet have the form of rationality, they are manifold particular ones. They have, on the one hand, the rational nature of spirit as their foundation, but on the other hand, as belonging to the still subjective, singular will, they are just as essentially burdened with contingency, and relate to the individual, as to one another, according to an external, unfree necessity. Of inclinations exactly the same holds as of feelings; they are self-determinations of the will free in itself, which, however, is not yet free for itself as intelligence in the content of its self-determination, not yet universal and objective. Passion already contains in its determination that it is restricted to a particularity of the determination of will and to subjective singularity, whatever its content may otherwise be. But of the inclinations the question is rather raised which are good and which evil, likewise up to what degree the good ones remain good and, since they are particular against one another and there are many of them, how they must at least restrict one another, since they are after all found in one subject and, according to experience, cannot well all be satisfied. With these many drives and inclinations it is at first the same as with the powers of the soul, whose collection theoretical spirit is; – a collection that is now increased by the multitude of drives. The formal rationality of drive and inclination consists only in their universal drive, in not being as something subjective, but being realized. But their true rationality cannot result in a consideration of external reflection, partly not on the presupposition that they are assumed and fixed as self-standing natural determinations and immediate drives; partly it is rather the immanent reflection of spirit itself to go beyond their particularity and immediacy and to give them the form of rationality and objectivity, in which they are as necessary relations and rights and duties. It is this objectification itself, then, that shows their import as well as their relation to one another, in short their truth. Just as Plato showed, with true sense, also insofar as he comprised under the right of spirit its whole nature, that he could present what justice is in and for itself only in the objective shape of justice, namely the construction of the state as ethical life. – The question which are the good, rational inclinations and what their subordination is thus turns into the presentation of what relations spirit brings forth in sublating its subjectivity and realizing itself; – an objectivity in which precisely its self-determinations in general lose the form of inclinations, as the content loses subjectivity, contingency or arbitrariness.
§ 394
The universal in these drives is the singular subject, the activity of their satisfaction or formal rationality, namely of translation from subjectivity into objectivity. In the latter the former has returned into itself; that the matter which has come about contains the moment of subjective singularity is interest. – Because the activity is singular subjectivity in that dialectical movement, nothing comes about without interest.
§ 395
Interest, however, is here not yet as merely formal activity or pure subjectivity, but has, as drive or inclination, a content determined by immediate will. But the dialectic of this manifold particular content is the simple subjectivity of the will itself, which at first, as reflecting will, raises the contradiction of the drives into formal universality and 3) makes happiness its purpose.
§ 396
Happiness is the confused representation of the satisfaction of all drives, one of which, however, is supposed to be sacrificed to another, wholly or in part, preferred and placed before it. Their limitation by one another, as existent ones, is on the one hand a mixture of qualitative and quantitative determination; on the other hand, since inclination is a subjective and immediate determining ground, it is subjective feeling and liking that must tip the balance.
§ 397
The will which as passion is abstract understanding and shuts itself up in one of its determinacies is freed from this singularization in the universal purpose of happiness; but the many particular inclinations, still counting as immediate, self-standing determinations, are at the same time sublated in the unity of the purpose, happiness, and [posited] as non-self-standing. The will stands, as this indeterminate universality reflected into itself, above the singular inclination; this is its own only through the will closing together with it and thereby giving itself determinate singularity and actuality; – it is thus on the standpoint of having to choose between inclinations, and is arbitrariness.
§ 398
The will is in this way free for itself, in that it is reflected into itself as the negativity of its immediate being-determined; however, insofar as the content in which it resolves itself into this singularity and actuality is still a particularity, it is actual only as subjective and contingent will. As the contradiction of actualizing itself in a particularity which is at the same time a nullity for it, and of having a satisfaction in it out of which it has at the same time stepped, it is at first the process of dispersion and of sublating one inclination by another, of satisfaction that equally is not satisfaction, by another, to infinity.
§ 399
But the truth of the particular purpose of the will, of particularity, which is just as much determinacy as it is sublated, and of abstract singularity, of arbitrariness, which in such a purpose equally gives itself a content as it does not, is the unity in which both are only moments; the absolute singularity of the will, its pure freedom, which determines itself in and for itself for itself. Spirit in this truth of its self-determination, which as pure reflection-into-itself is the purpose, is thus as universal, objective will, objective spirit in general.
