[p. 21]
|21|
But this content itself, these ends, a finite content, are contingent, taken up only for the moment, and inconsistently lose themselves at once. If, for example, the wisdom of God in nature is admired because the animals are armed partly to get their food, partly to protect themselves against enemies, experience at once shows that these weapons are of no help and that the creatures regarded as ends are consumed by others as means.
It is then in fact cognition advancing further that has degraded and displaced this external consideration of ends: the higher cognition, which at first at least demands consistency and recognizes such ends as are assumed to be divine ends as subordinate, finite ones, as something that in the same experience and observation proves itself in its nullity and not as an object of the eternal divine will.
That consideration, if it is accepted and its inconsistency thereby disregarded, is then indeterminate and superficial for the very reason that each and every content – no matter what it is like – can be taken up into it; for there is nothing, no arrangement of nature, no event, of which a use in some direction could not be pointed out. And piety is now no longer present at all as the unselfconscious, feeling piety; rather it starts from the universal thought of an end, of a good, and argues by subsuming the things present under these universal thoughts. With this argumentation, however, piety comes into the embarrassment that, in this immediate appearance of natural things, however much purposiveness and however much use it points out in them, just as much unpurposiveness and just as much harm can be held up against it. What serves the use of one is to the disadvantage of the other and is therefore unpurposive:
