[p. 33]
|33| call the absolute is synonymous with the expression God.
b) But we also ask in a second sense, which demands the opposite. When we begin from pure determinations of thought and not from representation, it can be that spirit does not find itself satisfied in them, is not at home in them, and asks what this pure determination of thought is supposed to mean. Thus, e.g., there occurs the determination of unity of the subjective and objective, of unity of the real and ideal; one can understand each by itself, know what unity, objective, subjective etc. is, and yet one can very well say that one does not understand this determination. When we ask in such a case, the meaning is the opposite of before. Namely, here a representation of the determination of thought is demanded, an example of the content that was previously given only in thought. When we find a content of thought difficult, the difficulty lies in our having no representation of it; through the example it becomes clear to us; only thus is spirit present to itself in this content.
If we now begin from the representation of God, the philosophy of religion has to consider its meaning, that God is the Idea, the absolute, the essence grasped in thought and concept, and it has this in common with logical philosophy; the logical Idea is God as he is in himself. But God is this: not only to be in himself; he is just as essentially for himself, absolute spirit, which is not only the essence keeping itself in thought, but also the essence that appears, that gives itself objectivity.
c) Thus, considering the Idea of God in the philosophy of religion, we at the same time also have before us the mode of his representation: he represents only himself to himself. This is the side of the existence of the absolute. In the philosophy of religion we thus have the absolute as object, but not merely in the form of thought, but also in the form of its
