[p. 55]
|55| to show that this omission does not happen contingently and that we have the right to it, because the essential element of that investigation falls within our science itself and all those questions can be settled only in it.
Here, therefore, we have only to face the obstacles that the culture and view of the age considered so far set against the justification of knowing religion comprehendingly.
1. First, we do not have religion in general before us as object, but positive religion, of which it is acknowledged that it is given by God, which rests on more than human authority and therefore appears outside the range of human reason and elevated above it. The first obstacle in this respect is that we would first have to establish the competence and the capacity of reason to occupy itself with such truth and doctrine of a religion as is supposed to be withdrawn from the range of human reason. Comprehending cognition, however, does come and must come into relation with positive religion. It has indeed been said and is still said: positive religion is for itself; its doctrines we leave as they are, respect and esteem them; on the other side stand reason and comprehending thought, and the two are not supposed to come into relation, and reason is not supposed to relate to that doctrine. Formerly people wanted to reserve the freedom of philosophical investigation for themselves in this way. It was said that it was a matter for itself which was not supposed to do any harm to positive religion, and its result was then also, no doubt, subjected to the doctrine of positive religion. This position, however, we do not want to give our investigation. It is something false that both, faith and free philosophical investigation, could subsist calmly side by side. It is unfounded that faith in the content of positive religion can subsist when reason has convinced itself of the opposite; consistently and rightly, therefore, the church did not allow it to come about that reason
