[p. 39]
|39| main determination, to which the presupposed biblical truth must submit. That argumentation therefore keeps its presuppositions and moves in the relationships of the understanding proper to reflection, without these being subjected to a critique. The philosophy of religion, however, as rational cognition, is opposed to the arbitrariness of this argumentation and is the reason of the universal, which presses for unity.
Philosophy is therefore so far from being found on the common highway of that theology of reason and of this exegetical argumentation that these tendencies rather contest it most and try to cast suspicion on it. They protest against philosophy, but only in order to reserve for themselves the arbitrariness of their argumentation. They call philosophy something particular, whereas it is nothing but rational, truly universal thinking. They regard philosophy as something ghostlike, of which one does not know what it is, about which there is something altogether uncanny; but with this representation they only show that they find it more comfortable to stop at their irregular, arbitrary reflections, which philosophy does not let count. Those theologians who move with their argumentations in exegesis, and appeal to the Bible for all their notions when they deny the possibility of cognition against philosophy, have indeed gone so far and so degraded the authority of the Bible that, if it were so and according to correct explanation of the Bible no cognition of the nature of God were possible, spirit would have to look round for another source in order to gain a truth rich in content.
γ) In the manner of that metaphysics of the understanding and of argumentative exegesis, therefore, the philosophy of religion cannot stand opposed to positive religion and to the doctrine of the church that has still preserved its content. It will rather turn out that it stands infinitely closer to positive doctrine than appears at first sight, indeed that the
