[p. 23]
|23| existences, which fall precisely into the sphere of the contingent. Cognition and science in this way set the most manifold material in mutual relation, take from it the contingency it has through its immediacy, and in considering the relationships that the wealth of finite appearance has, they close off the world of finitude within itself into a system of the universe, so that cognition needs nothing outside this system for it. For what a thing is, what it is according to its essential determinacy, emerges from its perception and observation. From the constitution of things one goes on to their relationships, where they stand in relation to an other, but not in a contingent but in a determinate relation, and where they point to the original thing of which they are something derived. So one asks for the grounds and causes of things, and this question has here the meaning that it wants to know the particular causes. So it is no longer enough to give God as the cause of lightning or of the fall of the republican constitution in Rome or of the French Revolution; one soon finds that this cause is only quite universal and does not provide the explanation demanded. Of a natural appearance or of this or that law as effect or consequence one also wants to know the ground as the ground of this appearance, i.e. not the ground that fits everything, but the one that fits exclusively only this determinate thing. And so the ground of such particular appearances, and such a ground being the nearest, must be sought and taken up in the finite and must itself be a finite one. This cognition therefore does not get beyond the sphere of the finite and does not demand to get beyond it, since in its finite sphere it knows how to know everything and has advice and answers for everything. The
