[p. 15]
|15|
In the usual shallow manner it has been used as an argument against cognition to say that this or that person possesses cognition of God and yet remains far from religion, has not become pious. But cognition neither wants nor is supposed to lead to that; it is supposed to know the religion that is there, not first to move this or that, this single empirical subject, to religion, if it has or wanted to have nothing of religion in itself.
But in fact no human being is so corrupt, so lost and so bad, and we can regard no one as so wretched, that he would have nothing at all of religion in himself, even if it were only that he had fear of it or longing for it or hatred against it; for even in the last case he is inwardly occupied and entangled with it. As a human being religion is essential to him and a sensation not alien to him. Yet what essentially matters is the relationship of religion to his other view of the world, and to this philosophical cognition essentially relates and on this it works. In this relationship lies the source of the division against the original, absolute urge of spirit towards religion, and here in general the most manifold forms of consciousness and the most diverse relations of them to the interest of religion have formed. Before the philosophy of religion can gather itself to its own concept, it must work its way through all those entanglements of the interests of the age that have at present concentrated themselves in the great circle of the religious domain. At first the movement of the principles of the age still stands outside philosophical insight; but it drives itself on to entering into contact, struggle and opposition with philosophy, and this opposition and its resolution we have to consider once we have investigated the opposition as it still keeps itself outside philosophy and have seen it develop to its completion, where it draws philosophical cognition into itself.
