Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Introduction

[p. 57]

|57| This result with regard to reason, the negation of reason, is even supposed to be a result of rational cognition itself. Accordingly one would first have to investigate reason itself as to whether the capacity to know God, and hence the possibility of a philosophy of religion, lies in it.

3. Connected with this is that the knowing of God is not supposed to be placed in comprehending reason, but that the consciousness of God springs only from feeling and the relationship of man to God lies only in the sphere of feeling and is not to be drawn over into thinking. If God is excluded from the domain of rational insight, of necessary, substantial subjectivity, then admittedly nothing remains but to assign him the domain of contingent subjectivity, that of feeling, and one must only be surprised that objectivity is still ascribed to God at all. In this the materialist views, or whatever else they may be called, the empirical, historical, naturalistic ones, have at least been more consistent: that, in thinking they have taken spirit and thinking for something material and traced them back to sensations, they have also taken God for a product of feeling and denied him objectivity; the result has then been atheism. God is thus a historical product of weakness, of fear, of joy or of selfish hope or greed and lust for power. What is rooted only in my feeling is only for me, mine, but not its own self, not independent in and for itself. Accordingly it seems necessary first to show that God does not merely have feeling as his root, is not merely my God. Earlier metaphysics therefore always proved first that a God is and not merely a feeling of God. So there is also the demand for the philosophy of religion to prove God.

It may seem as if the other sciences had an advantage over philosophy in that their content is already

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